THE ROLE OF ARCHERS, SLINGERS AND OTHER LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN GREEK WARFARE FROM THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD TO 362 B.C.

A thesis presented for the degree of M.Litt. at the University of Glasgow

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TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

P R E F A C E

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SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE THESIS ENTITLED "THE ROLE OF ARCHERS, SLINGERS AND OTHER LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN GREEK WARFARE FROM THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD TO 362 B.C." PRESENTED BY C. S. THOMSON, M.A., FOR THE DEGREE OF M. LITT. AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

The above is a study of various types of light-armed infantry from the Shaft-grave Period to the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. The work is comprised of the following chapters:

1. "Archers, Slingers and Other Light-armed Infantry from the Mycenaean Period to the End of the Dark Age With Particular Reference to the Homeric Poems".
2. "Light-armed Infantry in the Works of the Early Greek Elegiac and Lyric Poets".
3. "Light-armed Infantry in the Forces of the Tyrants Peisistratus and Hippias at Athens and Polycrates on Samos".
4. "Greek Light-armed Infantry in the Period of the Persian Wars (499 - 479 B.C.)".
5. "Light-armed Infantry in the Period of the Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 B.C.)".
6. "Light-armed Infantry in the Forces of Opposition to the Thirty Tyrants at Athens (404 - 403 B.C.)".

7./

7. "Light-armed Infantry in the Army of the Ten Thousand (401 - 400 B.C.)".
8. "Light-armed Infantry in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.".
9. "Sicilian Light-armed Infantry from the Seventh Century B.C. to c. 367 B.C.".
10. "The Greeks' Views of Light-armed Infantry".

The thesis also contains introductory and concluding sections.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Archäologischer Anzeiger (supplement to Jd I)
AAA	Archaiologica Analecta ex Athenon
AAG	A.M.Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (1967)
ABFV	J. Boardman, Athenian Black Figure Vases (1975)
ABV	J. Beazley, Attic Black-figure Vase - painters (1956)
AD	Archaiologicon Deltion
AE	Archaiologice Ephemeris
Ahlberg	G. Ahlberg, Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae, Series in 4^{o}, XVI (1971)
AJA	American Journal of Archaeology
AM	Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologishen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung
ANEP	J. B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament (1954)
AO	R. M. Dawkins et al., The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta (JHS supp. 5 - 1929)
ARFV	J. Boardman, Athenian Red Figure Vases (1975)
ARV	J. Beazley, Attic Red-figure Vase - painters (1963)
AWBL	Y. Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (1963)
BCH	Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique
Best	J. G. P. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare(1969)
BM	British Museum
BSA	Annual of the British School at Athens
Burn	A. R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks (1962)

CAAP	P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (1981)
CJ	Classical Journal
CQ	Classical Quarterly
CVA	Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum
CW	Classical Weekly
Delbrück	H. Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte Vol I (1920)
EGAW	A.M. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour and Weapons (1964)
EGW	P. A. L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare(1973)
Foss	C. Foss, A Bullet of Tissaphernes, JHS 95 (1975) p. 25f.
GHI	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C. (1969)
GMS	H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers - From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (1933)
GR	Greece and Rome
Grundy	G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War (1901)
GSW	W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War (I - IV)
HCT	A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (I - V - 1945 - 1981; Vols IV and V by Gomme, Andrewes and Dover)
Hignett	C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (1963)
HM	H. L. Lorimer, Homer and the Monuments (1950)
HW	W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus (I - II : 1912)

JAI	Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
JdI	Jahrbuch desdeutschen archäologischen Instituts
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies
Korfmann	M. Korfmann, The Sling as a Weapon, Scientific American, 229, 4 (October 1973), pp. 35 - 42.
Lazenby	J. F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (1985)
MTPAX	J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (1970)
NMA	National Archaeological Museum of Athens
PM	A. J. Evans, Palace of Minos (I - IV - 1921 - 35)
REG	Revue Des Études Greques
S and A	D. A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry, Vol I - Sappho and Alcaeus (Loeb Classical Library, 1981)
SGH	N. G. L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (1973)
Vos	M. F. Vos, Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase-painting (1963)
WACG	V. D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (1983)
West	M. L. West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci (I - II - 1971 - 72)

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Introduction: Light-armed Troops and Their Weapons

Let us begin with a survey of the various types of light-armed troops and their weapons:

i. Archers ('toxotai')

Archers ('toxotai'), who are almost always portrayed in Greek representations as light-armed (since the archer needed two hands to draw and hold the bow he could not carry a large shield or wear armour which would restrict his movement)[1], appear to have been used in warfare in Greece throughout our period of study. They appear to have used two main types of bow: the self bow made out of one material, usually wood, and the composite bow made out of several materials bonded together.

A very problematic question is the range of ancient bows.[2] Firstly let us consider the range of the ancient Greek self bow: the English long-bow, which was made of yew, had a target range of 220 metres but the smaller Cretan type of self-bow depicted on Greek vases, which was probably made of cedar or yew, cannot have matched this range.[3] In the 1920s self bows from Californian anthropological collections were tested and it was found that the best ranges attained by wooden self bows fell within the limits of 155-190 metres.[4] W. McLeod estimates the extreme range of the Cretan bow of self-type as about 175 metres, although he comments that its effective range will not have been so great.[5]

The detailed studies of McLeod show that the effective range of the composite bow was greater than that of the self bow. He suggests that archers armed with composite bows were most accurate against specific targets at a range of up to 55-60 metres and he defines their effective range as being "at least 160-175 metres, but not as far as 350-450 metres".[6] Flight shots in competitions with composite bows and light arrows could attain a greater range: an inscription from Olbia, dating to shortly before 300 B.C., records

a shot by a certain Anaxagoras of 500 metres.[7] This was an extreme rather than an effective range and the archer used a special arrow and did not aim at any specific target. The effectiveness of ancient bows is reflected by the instances of casualties caused by this weapon in ancient texts, by the deep arrow-wounds recorded by medical writers ("Nothing penetrates so easily into the body as an arrow, and it also becomes very deeply fixed". Celsus, De Medicina VII.5.2 [W.G. Spencer-Loeb]), by depictions of men wounded by arrows in Greek art and by skeletons which have been found with arrowheads deeply imbedded in their bones.

ii. Javelin-throwers ('akontistai' and true 'peltastai')

The throwing-spear was most probably used throughout our period of study in Greece. Peltasts, 'akontistai' and also some more crudely trained (if they were trained at all!) light-infantry were armed primarily with the javelin; the javelin in general was not a suitable weapon for a heavily-armed foot soldier because the thrower had to have the ability to run fast, twist his body and extend his arm fully and heavy armour would have inhibited him in these roles. The javelin was a fairly cheap weapon in the Classical Period - an Athenian inscription of 415 B.C. gives two drachmas as the price of a war javelin (at this date Athenian hoplites received about a drachma a day plus an allowance for provisions); it was therefore used as a weapon by men who could not afford a very expensive panoply.[8] Another point in favour of using the javelin was that it could be thrown with a relatively small amount of practice - an ideal weapon for smallholders and landless labourers who spent much time cultivating crops and had little time for weapon practice. The fact that it is often shown on Greek pots being used against wild animals would suggest that it could not only be used by hunters but also by pastoralists protecting their flocks from predators.[9]

From Archaic and Classical evidence it would appear that the javelin used in warfare had a wooden shaft and varied in length from somewhat shorter than the height of the javelin-thrower to considerably longer.[10] Archaeological and ceramic evidence furthermore shows that the javelin was almost always tipped with a leaf - or barbed-shaped metallic head. Pindar twice calls a javelin 'bronze-cheeked' (χαλκοπάρᾳος)[11] - this epithet suits best the head of a war or hunting javelin since the metal tips of athletic javelins depicted on Greek vases were extremely small and narrow and seem only to have continued the taper of the wooden shaft. We also hear occasionally in literature of a spiked butt which was fitted to the javelin.[12] The javelin was a fairly light weapon and in Lucian's Anacharsis it is noted that the flight of the javelin could be affected by wind in contrast to heavier spears which flew straight.[13] The javelin was almost always hurled with the help of a thong (ἀγκύλη , Lat.amentum), which was generally fastened near the centre of gravity of the javelin.[14] The ἀγκύλη was a leather thong and would appear from depictions on Greek vases of javelin-throwers holding an ἀγκύλη loose in one hand and a javelin in the other to have measured approximately one foot in length. In the case of the war javelin, it was always bound and fixed securely to the shaft in such a way as to leave a loop of 3 or 4 inches long in which the 'akontistes' inserted his first, or first and middle fingers. In war quick action was often needed and the ἀγκύλη was permanently fastened to the shaft so that precious seconds would not be wasted trying to fasten it.[15] We often find in depictions that the javelin used in war had its thong positioned nearer the head than its counterpart used in athletic competitions (which generally had its ἀγκύλη bound behind the centre of gravity to give increased distance to the throw).[16] It is generally agreed that the purpose of the ἀγκύλη was to increase the range and penetrative power of the javelin by both the additional leverage which the thong gave and the rotatory motion which it imparted. It is, however, disputed whether the thong increased or reduced the accuracy of the javelin.[17]

The war javelins were almost always thrown with a run and in the great majority of cases, hurled overarm, although an underarm method is apparently occasionally depicted on Greek vases. With the overarm throw the javelin is mostly held horizontally in warfare, whilst in athletics the javelin is depicted as being pointed slightly upwards at the moment of hurling.[18] The range of the ancient javelin without an ἀγκύλη may have been slightly more than 20 metres; the range of the javelin fitted with the ἀγκύλη is still not known for certain. Harris, an unskilled javelin-thrower, only managed a maximum 25% improvement in range when his javelin was fitted with a thong, whilst General Reffye in experiments for the Emperor Napoleon recorded throws of up to 80 metres for a javelin hurled by means of a thong. Jüthner, another inexperienced 'akontistes', increased his throw from 25 to 65 metres when he used a thong. It seems probable that the heavier war javelin with fixed thong could attain a range of approximately 25-45 metres.[19]

iii. Slingers ('sphendonetai')

There is some evidence for the use of the sling throughout our period. Slingers ('sphendonetai'), whom we may presume in the vast majority of cases to have been lightly-armed (due to the fact that heavy armour would have impeded the movement necessary to operate the sling), were armed with the sling ('sphendone').[20] The normal hand sling consisted of two strips of leather, plaited sinews, linen, horse hair or wool, each about three feet long and one inch in width, with a leather pocket to hold the bullet.[21] M. Korfmann hypothesises that one end of the sling was actually tied to the thrower's hand. The sling was fired by whirling it around the head three or four times and then releasing one end so that the missile flew off by centrifugal force. Pebbles made smooth by water were perhaps always the most common type of sling-bullet, although man-made bullets of clay and lead were manufactured. The reason for making bullets of approximately uniform weight and shape was

so that the slinger did not have to compensate for differences in weight at every cast. Bullets were produced in a stream-lined almond shape to increase accuracy, velocity and range; this shape of bullet also fitted into the sling-pocket snugly and was less inclined than a normal stone to fall out of the pocket and fly off at random. The speed of the bullet when being shot from the sling could easily have exceeded 100km per hour and Korfmann comments that "If one assumes that a 25- gram missile had that velocity when it reached the target, the force of its impact would be equivalent to that of a golf ball falling from the top of a seven-story building. The energy of heavier missiles, of course, would be proportionately greater".[22] The potential of the sling was frightening: sling-bullets could kill horses and, as Onasander notes, penetrate deep into unprotected human bodies:[23] ἡ δὲ τῆς σφενδόνης ἄμυνα χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἐστιν· ὅ τε γὰρ μόλιβδος ὁμόχρους ὢν τῷ ἀέρι λανθάνει φερόμενος, ὥστ' ἀπροοράτως ἀφυλάκτας τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων ἐμπίπτειν σώμασιν, αὐτῆς τε τῆς ἐμπτώσεως σφοδρᾶς οὔσης καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥοίζου τρεβόμενον τῷ ἀέρι τὸ βέλος ἐκπυρωθὲν ὡς βαθυτάτω δύεται τῆς σαρκός, ὥστε μηδ' ὁρᾶσθαι, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον ἐπιμύειν (The General, 19.3).

What was the range of the sling?[24] The general consensus of opinion is that the sling had a greater effective range than a composite bow and that this effective range may have been more than 400 metres, although it may only have been used accurately against specific targets up to a range of about 200 metres. The only ancient evidence we have as to the range of the sling comes in Vegetius' Epitoma Rei Militaris which was written between 383 and 450 A.D.; in this work Vegetius recommends that slingers should practice at a target placed 600 feet (178 metres) away.[25] It seems likely that long slings could propel bullets with such velocity that they could strike objects

great distances away, although perhaps not as far as 400 metres - the modern world record for firing a sling-shot is 350 metres.[26] The sling, unlike the javelin, needed much practice to master, and a proficient slinger probably learnt the art from childhood.[27]

The sling seems to have been associated with pastoral farming from an early date;[28] it is an ideal weapon for warding off wild animals from a distance and Korfmann notes that it is used to this day by herdsmen in backward parts of the world. It is highly probable that this weapon was used by herdsmen and hunters in ancient Greece also: on one Greek vase we find depicted two men who use the sling against a wild boar.[29] We also find on a Black-figured amphora, a depiction of Heracles shooting at the Stymphalian birds with a sling - it is possible that the sling was used also in Ancient Greece to drive birds away from the fields at sowing time, just as in Medieval England.[30] As we shall see, slingers came mainly from the less-developed parts of the Greek World such as Acarnania, Aetolia and Thessaly; the general consensus of opinion is that it was the hunters and shepherds of these areas who were slingers.[31]

iv. Stone-throwers ('lithoboloi')

The stone was almost certainly used as a make-shift missile at all periods of ancient Greek history. In Classical Greek literature, as we shall see, we find crude forms of light-armed troops using the stone as a weapon, and also that it was used by hoplites on various occasions. On Attic Black-figured and Red-figured vases and also on Attic White-ground lekythoi we find most often that it is light-armed troops (who wear various types of soft caps [piloi and broad-brimmed sun-hats], tunics, cloaks, animal skins or are even naked) who are depicted as stone-throwers.[32] Stone-throwers naturally did not have to be trained and could pick up stones on the battlefield or carry them in a bag - camp-attendants and men used for building military structures,

untrained in the use of and unprovided with heavy arms, could ideally have been used in the role of 'lithoboloi'. These troops had to be used in fairly large numbers to lay down a concentrated barrage of rocks and stones. The effectiveness of large numbers of stone-throwers should not be underestimated: even today stone-throwers can cause many casualties among police equipped with protective riot gear and it is probable that a rock thrown from close range at the head of a hoplite could have caused him concussion even if he was wearing a metallic helmet; the unprotected parts of his legs and arms would also have been vulnerable points. Stone-throwers must always have been used for skirmishing attacks since they could not have put up any effective resistance to heavily-armed infantry in a close-fought battle. A stone large enough to do some damage could probably have been thrown from a maximum range of about 200 feet.[33]

v. Terms used Collectively to Describe Various Types of Light-armed Troops

The first Greek writer to use a collective term for various types of light-infantry was Tyrtaeus: in frag.11.35 (West) he refers to γυμνῆτες who were stone-throwers and javelin-throwers and in P. Oxy. no.3316.14 he refers to γυμνομάχοι who were armed with javelins. The next writer to use a blanket term to describe all types of light-armed troops was Herodotus: in his account of the battle of Plataea he calls the Greek light-infantry ψιλοί (Herod.IX.28.1, 29.2, 30, 61.2 and cfVII.158.4).

Let us consider the derivation of the terms 'gymnetes', 'gymnomachoi' and 'psiloi'. The root 'gymn-' is found as early as Homer and is used mainly in the specialized sense of 'without armour and arms' or 'stripped of armour' or 'laid bare' (γυμνόν : Iliad P122, P693, Φ50, X124; γυμνός P711; γυμνοῦ Σ 21; γυμνωθείη M428; γυμνωθέντα M389, ΤΤ 312, ΤΤ 400). Less often in the Homeric poems the root 'gymn-' has a more general meaning of 'naked' (γυμνόν : Iliad X510; γυμνός : Odyssey ζ136; γυμνοῦσθαι : Od. ζ222; γυμνωθέντα: Od. K341;

γυμνώθη :Od.$_{\chi}$1). In the works of Hesiod we also find the root 'gymn-': on three occasions we find γυμνωθέντα meaning 'without armour', 'unprotected' or 'exposed' (Shield of Heracles, 334, 418, 460).[34] We also find the term γυμνωθέντα in Tyrtaeus meaning 'without armour' or 'stripped of armour' (West 10.25). The root 'gymn-' is used by other Greek poets in the general sense of 'naked' (Archilochus 265 (West) [probably], Hipponax 62, Sophocles 4.2). The historian Herodotus never uses the term 'gymnetes' to describe light-armed troops but words containing the root 'gymn-' are found in the general sense of 'naked' (Herod.I.8, 10, 11, II.130, VI.67). Only once in Herodotus do we find the adjective γυμνός meaning 'without arms' (Herod.II.141). Thus we find that as early as Homer the root 'gymn-' had a specialized meaning of 'without arms and armour', as well as the general meaning of 'naked'.

Let us now consider the derivation of the term 'psiloi'. The term is never used in a specialized sense in the Homeric poems to refer to soldiers. We do, however, find the adjective ψιλός with the meaning of 'bare', 'smooth', and 'naked' (see e.g. Il.I580; Od.μ421, ν437). Hesiod may also have used the word 'ψιλοῦτο' (or ψίλωτο) in a general sense (frag.54.3). The word is not used by the Early Greek poets. Herodotus is the first Greek writer to use the term 'psiloi' to mean light-armed troops.

Thus the term 'gymnos' in the early works of Homer and Hesiod had a specialized meaning of 'without armour' or 'stripped of armour', as well as the general meaning of 'naked'. In contrast, the term 'psiloi' did not have a specialized military usage before Herodotus.

The later historian Thucydides, as we shall see, frequently uses the term 'psiloi' to refer to all types of light-armed troops (e.g. in IV.32.3-4, Thuc. uses the term 'psiloi' to cover archers, javelin-throwers, stone-throwers and slingers and in VI.69.2, to describe stone-throwers, archers and

slingers). He also uses the term γυμνητεία to describe Syracusan light-armed troops (Thuc.VII.37.2) - Athenian light-infantry are never termed 'gymneteia' or 'gymnetes' in the narrative of Thucydides and consequently it seems probable that the historian only used the term γυμνητεία to describe Dorian light-armed troops (Syracuse was a Dorian community founded by Corinth). The historian Diodorus also uses the term 'psiloi' to describe light-armed troops in general (see e.g. Diodorus XIII.109.3,.111.1-2).

Although the historian Xenophon does use the terms 'psiloi' (Hell.II. 4.33; Oeconomicus VIII.4 and .6) and 'gymnetes' (Hell.II.4.25-26; Anab. IV. 1.16) to describe various types of light-armed troops, we find that most often he uses the term 'peltastai' collectively to describe these troops (see e.g. Hell.II.4.33; Anab.I.2.9, 7.10, 8.5, 10.7, VI.2.16; Cyrop.VI.3.26).[35] Thucydides in contrast always uses the term 'peltastai' accurately to describe troops armed with true peltast equipment and never uses it in the collective sense (see e.g. Thuc.IV.32.2 and IV.93.3).

Thus in the works of the main sources which we will study there are several terms which are used collectively to describe a wide range of missile-troops: 'gymnetes', 'gymnomachoi', 'psiloi' and 'peltastai'.

CHAPTER ONE

ARCHERS, SLINGERS AND OTHER LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY FROM THE MYCENAEAN PERIOD TO THE END OF THE DARK AGE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE HOMERIC POEMS

i. The Homeric Poems as History:

I will begin my study of light-armed troops by considering their role in the Homeric Poems (our earliest coherent Greek texts), and in particular the Iliad, and by examining the relative Early Greek archaeological material which may be used to clarify the information which we may glean from the Homeric Epics. Firstly, we must address ourselves briefly to two vital questions: [1]

1 Does the Iliad record a historical expedition against Troy or is it purely fantasy and not to be believed in the slightest?

2 Does the Iliad contain allusions which can be dated to one particular period, or to several?

The first question, despite the results of the excavations on the mound of Hissarlik, cannot be answered with certainty. Using later allegories, such as the Anglo-Saxon 'Beowulf', the Teutonic 'Nibelungenlied', the 'Chanson de Roland' from the time of Charlemagne, and sagas from the Viking age and Russian and South Slavic poetry, most commentators suppose that there is always a certain amount of historical fact in oral poetry and hold the view that Iliad did record a Greek expedition, which did in fact take place, against a city called Troy. Before examining the second question, we must consider when the Iliad was composed: although some historians, such as Snodgrass, think that it is not possible for us to date Homer at all accurately, the general consensus of opinion among commentators is that the Iliad was composed in the second half of the eighth century B.C.[2] If archaeologists are correct in associating Homeric Troy with Troy VIIa on the mount of Hissarlik and in dating its destruction to around 1250 B.C., this will mean that Homer was attempting to describe warfare which took place roughly 500 years before his own time. [3] Archaeological evidence can be used to show that some objects and practices mentioned in the Homeric poems

probably date to the Mycenaean Period and others to the Dark Age; the majority of objects and practices cannot, however, be dated with any certainty. The following objects are ascribed to the Mycenaean Period: the tower-like body-shield of Ajax (H 219), which dates to before c.1200 B.C.; the silver-studded sword, which became rare towards the end of the Mycenaean Period and was apparently not used again till the early Archaic Period; the boars' tusk helmet (K 261-5), for which we have archaeological evidence, and the cup of Nestor (Λ 632-5). The assumption that bronze, and not iron, is the metal which is in general use would also seem to be a Mycenaean element. It is also supposed that there is an element of late-Mycenaean political geography in the catalogue of Greek forces in the second book of the Iliad.[4]

There are a number of features which would seem to date to the Dark Age - the pair of throwing-spears may possibly be an allusion to the warfare of this period, although this is not certain.[5] The references to Phoenician ships around the Aegean in the Iliad and Odyssey are thought to date to the ninth century B.C. Archaeological evidence would also suggest that cremation of the dead began in the early Iron Age and went out of fashion by the end of the eighth century B.C.

Between the end of the Mycenaean Period and the eighth century B.C., lay an age of obscurity in which the old Mycenaean script was forgotten and the stories of the past kept alive in popular memory. It was only in the eighth century itself, when the Greeks borrowed the alphabet of the Phoenicians, that literacy reoccurred. We can therefore imagine the poet of the Iliad in the later eighth century B.C. keeping alive in his work the popular memories of the past and also using some allusions to the more recent past or to the present. Some different portrayals of fighting in the Iliad probably also should be attributed to different periods: there are frequent allusions to the superiority of individual heroes in battle, yet the Locrian slingers

and archers are described as breaking the Trojan ranks with their fire.[6] It is often impossible to ascribe with any certainty various fighting practices to definite periods but in some cases, as we shall see, there is some external evidence which may possibly justify us doing so. Bearing in mind the uncertainties inherent in the use of the Homeric Epics as historical sources, let us now move on to consider the role of missile troops in these poems.

1 Archers and Archery in the Iliad of Homer

In her introductory paragraph on the use of the bow in the Homeric poems Lorimer states that "archery plays an insignificant part in the Iliad" and that the Homeric bow was used "with so little effect that we must conclude the poet to have had only the European (i.e. 'self'-) type in mind". She further would lead us to believe that the heroes carried bows primarily for hunting and aristocratic contests: "The heroes, however, seem to have possessed bows, presumably for hunting and aristocratic contests".[7]

Although the bow is used in the Iliad for hunting and contests of shooting, it is portrayed foremost as a weapon of war of both the 'laoi' and the heroes and furthermore as a weapon which could inflict severe and often fatal wounds.[8] The fact that arrow wounds are frequently mentioned would suggest that Lorimer is wrong in minimizing the effect of the bow in the Iliad.[9] In Δ 132 - 140, Pandarus wounds Menelaus by firing an arrow through his belt, outer thorax and inner apron:

αὐτὴ δ' αὖτ' ἴθυνεν, ὅθι ζωστῆρος ὀχῆες
χρύσειοι σύνεχον καὶ διπλόος ἦντετο θώρηξ·
ἐν δ' ἔπεσε ζωστῆρι ἀρηρότι πικρὸς ὀιστός·
διὰ μὲν ἄρ ζωστῆρος ἐλήλατο δαιδαλέοιο,
καὶ διὰ θώρηκος πολυδαιδάλου ἠρήρειστο
μίτρης θ', ἣν ἐφόρειν ἔρυμα χροός, ἔρκος ἀκόντων,

ἦ οἱ πλεῖστον ἔρυτο· διαπρὸ δὲ εἴσατο καὶ τῆς,
ἀκρότατον δ' ἄρ' ὀιστὸς ἐπέγραψε χρόα φωτός·
αὐτίκα δ' ἔρρεεν αἷμα κελαινεφὲς ἐξ ὠτειλῆς.

In Ε 95 - 100 Pandarus shoots an arrow at Diomedes with such force that it pierces the plate (γύαλον) of Diomedes' thorax and passes on into his body:

τὸν δ' ὡς οὖν ἐνόησε Λυκάονος ἀγλαὸς υἱὸς
θύνοντ' ἂμ πεδίον πρὸ ἕθεν κλονέοντα φάλαγγας,
αἶψ' ἐπὶ Τυδεΐδῃ ἐτιταίνετο καμπύλα τόξα,
καὶ βάλ' ἐπαΐσσοντα, τυχὼν κατὰ δεξιὸν ὦμον,
θώρηκος γύαλον· διὰ δ' ἔπτατο πικρὸς ὀιστός,
ἀντικρὺς δὲ διέσχε, παλάσσετο δ' αἵματι θώρηξ.

In Ε111 - 3 we learn that Sthenelus had to push an arrow right through a wound both because it had penetrated so deeply and because of the barbs;[10] the Homeric physicians frequently had to cut arrowheads out of shallower wounds and push them through deeper ones if they were not liable to pierce a vital part of the body.[11] An arrow which hit an unprotected part of the body could pass right through it and the result was in many cases immediate death.[12]

It would appear,then,that Lorimer was mistaken in her hypothesis that the Homeric bow was of little effect and in her conclusion that the poet must have had only the self-type in mind.[13] Archaeological evidence proves that early composite bows could propel arrows with such velocity that they could penetrate armour and inflict deep wounds such as those Homer described: among the reliefs on a chariot found in the tomb of King Thutmose IV (XVIIIth Dynasty - 1411 - 1397 B.C.) is a charioteer with coat of metal scale-armour penetrated by an arrow which has been fired from a composite bow.[14] In a Mycenaean grave on the site of Ugarit was found a skeleton which had an

arrow transfixing two of its dorsal vertebrae.[15] During the excavations of the 1930s by the Welkome-Marston Archaeological Research Foundation on the site of Lachish, there were found a number of Assyrian arrowheads which had penetrated deeply into thick potsherds and lodged themselves in bricks - we know from reliefs that the Assyrians of this period used the composite bow.[16] Depictions of men wounded by arrows occur frequently in the battle scenes on Attic Late Geometric pottery - both the self- and composite-bows are depicted on this type of pottery.[17]

Indeed, the view that the Homeric bow was a powerful weapon is confirmed by line 718 of the thirteenth book (N) of the Iliad, where the Locrian archers and slingers are described as actually breaking up ranks of the Trojans with their missile fire;[18] this passage would incline one to believe that the Locrians were equipped with the powerful composite bow. The fact that there were organized bands of archers at all contradicts Lorimer's view that archery had little part to play in the Homeric battle.

Let us now examine the question of who used the bow as a weapon in the Iliad. The bow appears on several occasions to be a weapon of the 'laoi' of both sides:

B 771 - 775 (Achaeans, practising shooting with the bow)

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν νήεσσι κορωνίσι ποντοπόροισιν
κεῖτ' ἀπομηνίσας Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν
Ἀτρεΐδῃ, λαοὶ δὲ παρὰ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης
δίσκοισιν τέρποντο καὶ αἰγανέῃσιν ἱέντες
τόξοισίν θ'.

Γ 79 - 80 (Achaeans)

τῷ δ' ἐπετοξάζοντο κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,
ἰοῖσίν τε τιτυσκόμενοι λάεσσί τ' ἐβαλλον.

O 312 - 14 (Both sides)

Ἀργεῖοι δ' ὑπέμειναν ἀολλέες, ὦρτο δ' ἀυτὴ
ὀξέ' ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ἀπὸ νευρῆφι δ' οἰστοὶ
θρῴσκον·

Π 359 - 361 (Achaeans)

ὁ δὲ ἰδρείῃ πολέμοιο,
ἀσπίδι ταυρείῃ κεκαλυμμένος εὐρέας ὤμους,
σκέπτετ' ὀϊστῶν τε ῥοῖζον καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων.

Π 772 - 775 (Both sides)

πολλὰ δὲ Κεβριόνην ἀμφ' ὀξέα δοῦρα πεπήγειν
ἰοί τε πτερόεντες ἀπὸ νευρῆφι θορόντες,
πολλὰ δὲ χερμάδια μεγάλ' ἀσπίδας ἐστυφέλιξαν
μαρναμένων ἀμφ' αὐτόν·

X 194 - 198 (Trojans; attempt to cover Hector with their fire from the walls and towers).

ὁσσάκι δ' ὁρμήσειε πυλάων Δαρδανιάων
ἀντίον αἴξεσθαι, εὐδμήτους ὑπὸ πύργους,
εἴ πώς οἱ καθύπερθεν ἀλάλκοιεν βελέεσσιν,
τοσσάκι μιν προπάροιθεν ἀποτρέψασκε παραφθὰς
πρὸς πεδίον, αὐτὸς δὲ ποτὶ πτόλιος πέτετ' αἰεί.

X 205 - 207 (Achaeans; Achilles forbids his own soldiers from sniping at Hector with their 'bitter darts').[19]

λαοῖσιν δ' ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς,
οὐδ' ἔα ἰέμεναι ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα,
μή τις κῦδος ἄροιτο βαλών, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι.

Homer further gives the impression that there were organized bodies of archers:

1 Philoctetes and his followers: B716 - 720.

οἱ δ' ἄρα Μηθώνην καὶ Θαυμακίην ἐνέμοντο
καὶ Μελίβοιαν ἔχον καὶ Ὀλιζῶνα τρηχεῖαν,
τῶν δὲ Φιλοκτήτης ἦρχεν, τόξων εὖ εἰδώς,
ἑπτὰ νεῶν· ἐρέται δ' ἐν ἑκάστῃ πεντήκοντα
ἐμβέβασαν, τόξων εὖ εἰδότες ἶφι μάχεσθαι.

2 Pyraichmes and the Paionians: B848 - 850. [20]

αὐτὰρ Πυραίχμης ἄγε Παίονας ἀγκυλοτόξους
τηλόθεν ἐξ Ἀμυδῶνος, ἀπ' Ἀξιοῦ εὐρὺ ῥέοντος,
Ἀξιοῦ, οὗ κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπικίδναται αἶαν.

3 The Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, were armed with bows and slings: N712 - 722.

οὐδ' ἄρ' Ὀιλιάδῃ μεγαλήτορι Λοκροὶ ἕποντο·
οὐ γάρ σφι σταδίῃ ὁμίνῃ μίμνε φίλον κῆρ·
οὐ γὰρ ἔχον κόρυθας χαλκήρεας ἱπποδασείας,
οὐδ' ἔχον ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους καὶ μείλινα δοῦρα,
ἀλλ' ἄρα τόξοισιν καὶ εὐστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ
Ἴλιον εἰς ἅμ' ἕποντο πεποιθότες, οἷσιν ἔπειτα
ταρφέα βάλλοντες Τρώων ῥήγνυντο φάλαγγας.
δή ῥα τόθ' οἱ μὲν πρόσθε σὺν ἔντεσι δαιδαλέοισιν
μάρναντο Τρωσίν τε καὶ Ἕκτορι χαλκοκορυστῇ,
οἱ δ' ὄπιθεν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον· οὐδέ τι χάρμης
Τρῶες μιμνήσκοντο· συνεκλόνεον γὰρ οἰστοί.

The bow is also used by several of the warrior chieftains on both the Achaean and Trojan sides. On the Achaean side we are specifically told that Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones and Philoctetes were on certain occasions armed with the bow and on the Trojan side Paris, Pandarus, Dolon and Helenus.[21] Out of all the occasions in which we are told that heroes were armed or used certain weapons, we find that the bow occurs in 12.9% of all instances (on 34 occasions), the spear 68.5% (181 occasions), the sword 13.6% (36 occasions) and the stone 4.9% (13 occasions).[22] Thus in the Iliad of Homer we find that the heroes most commonly used the spear, less often the sword and bow, and only occasionally threw stones.

Thus, we have found that the bow was used both by the 'laoi' and several of the heroes. Let us now examine in what roles the archers among the laoi and chieftains were used. We have only one passage in the Iliad which might suggest how archers among the 'laoi' were used in open battle: in N712 - 722 we are told that the Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, could not enter into the close combat because they had none of the conventional heroic arms and armour but rather trusted in the bow and sling. In N721 we learn that they shot their missiles unseen from behind the normal infantry and in N718 that their fire was so effective that they actually broke up the ranks of the Trojans.

Thus, the Locrian archers and slingers operated as an effective body by shooting their missiles over the heads of the infantry positioned in front of them. Commentators have been confused as to why Homer has let these missile-troops influence the course of fighting; Leaf comments: "It is quite unlike the Homeric view to make the sudden change of the course of battle, even to 'a sorry repulse from ships and huts' (N723), depend not upon the doughty deeds of individual heroes, but solely on the effect of a body of archers concealed in the rear. Of such soldiers Homer always speaks in a slighting tone, and nowhere else do they exercise the least influence on the course of a fight".[23]

We find in Ancient Greek art individual archers operating from behind more conventionally armed infantrymen: the archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger from Shaft-grave IV is represented shooting his bow from behind two infantrymen with large shields and spears and a crude terra-cotta group from Cyprus, which dates no earlier than the seventh century B.C., depicts an archer drawing his bow from behind an infantryman who protects him with his shield;[24] but we never find massed units of archers operating from behind infantrymen in Early Greek art. It is only in Assyrian reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh that we find a massed force of archers, used in conjunction with slingers, shooting high over the heads of the infantrymen positioned in front of them. We must, however, reckon with the difficulty of representing massed archers and massed infantrymen in Early Greek Art; the Assyrian reliefs were on a huge scale which allowed these to be depicted - we only have archers depicted on knife blades, pots and small seals etc. in Early Greek art, which did not have a very large surface area.[25] In Classical Greek literature we find that it was only in exceptional circumstances that archers were positioned behind infantry or fired high trajectory shots over their heads[26] the danger of hitting one's own men in the back is obvious and is perhaps best exemplified by the plight of the English at Bannockburn when their own archers fired their arrows too short and killed many of their own infantry.[27] The military author Onasander, who wrote in the first half of the first-century A.D., realized this danger and comments:

Ψιλοὺς δέ, ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας, πρώτους πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τάξει· κατόπιν μὲν γὰρ ὄντες πλείονα κακὰ διαθήσουσι τοὺς ἰδίους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους,

(The General, XVII). He also realized that high trajectory shooting from behind one's own ranks could be very ineffective and advocates that archers should be used to shoot horizontally at specific targets: ... οἵ τε τοξόται

προϊόντες μὲν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἐκτοξεύουσι τὰ βέλη, μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόχους ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς μέσοις ὄντες εἰς ὕψος τοξεύουσιν, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἄνω φορὰν τόνον ἔχειν τὸ βέλος, αὖθις δέ, κἂν κατὰ κεφαλῆς πίπτῃ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐκλελύσθαι καὶ μὴ πάνυ τι λυπεῖν τοὺς ἐχθρούς (The General, XVII).

Is it possible that the positioning of a massed force of archers and slingers behind a force of ordinary infantry is a non-Greek feature of the Iliad which has been influenced by Assyrian practice? The Assyrian reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib at Nineveh would perhaps suggest this. Cyprus was subjugated in 712 B.C. by Sargon II and in the following rebellion by the cities of the Philistine coast, the lead was taken by Ashdod and her adopted Greek king. During these years many Cypriots and some Greeks of other communities on the Mediterranean coasts must have witnessed Assyrian troops and tactics. It seems possible, then, that the Locrian passage is influenced by Assyrian tactics and dates possibly to around the last decade of the 8th century B.C. [28]

A force of archers could ideally be used to defend a fortified position; in Iliad X194 - 198, we find Trojan archers positioned on the towers and battlements of Troy, giving covering fire to Hector as he flees from Achilles.[29] It has been suggested by K. Müller that certain parts of Mycenaean fortifications were specially built with the fire of defending archers in mind and, in particular, it is his opinion that certain features of the west staircase at Tiryns were designed to enable archers to protect the line of communication with the most probable source of water supply.[30] Although the use of missile troops to defend fortified positions is a timeless feature of Greek history, it is worth noting that archers on Egyptian and Assyrian wall-paintings, reliefs and metal-work are frequently depicted in this role.[31]

We might have expected that the Achaean archers fired arrows at the defending Trojans in their attacks on the walls of Troy, yet Homer does not mention them in this role - the fact that Blegen found in the Troy VIIa stratum a small bronze arrowhead of a type which is very similar to a LHIIIB example from mainland Greece might suggest that they did.[32] We have a depiction of an archer on a LMII fragment of a vase from Knossos shooting high, almost certainly at the walls of a city; Egyptian and Assyrian archers are also depicted in this role.[33]

Let us consider how the heroes who were armed with bows operated in the Iliad of Homer. We find that unlike the Locrians, the heroes always snipe at specific targets, often close at hand, which they can see - this means that they must have shot horizontally at their targets and did not employ high trajectory shots which could only have been effective against a body of men spread over a wide area. In many respects Homer's depiction of these chieftain bowmen is too stylistic to reflect reality - they always wound or kill other heroes and never turn their bows against the 'laoi', just as no hero is ever killed by an insignificant man.[34] They also often operate at an extremely short range from their targets; I find it very hard to believe that this reflects reality since the main strength of the bow lay in the fact that an archer could wound an enemy with it from a distance and so with impunity - it would rather defeat his purpose to advance so close to an enemy that he could be wounded or killed by a spear-thrust or stone-throw.[35] Thus in N594 - 5 we find Helenus equipped as an archer advancing so close to Menelaus that he was wounded by his spear in the hand and in Ⓗ 327 Teucer is so near to Hector when he draws his bow that Hector can hurl a rock at him and crush his shoulder. If the archer did, as Homer would suggest, on occasion enter into the mêlée of the infantry, there would have been no good grounds for him to have received the rebuke of cowardice in the Iliad.[36]

In other respects Homer's account of the archery of these heroes is less stylized: the wounds they inflict are graphic and Teucer's method of operation in conjunction with the spearman Telamonian Aias is quite striking:

Τεῦκρος δ' εἶνατος ἦλθε παλίντονα τόξα τιταίνων,
στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπ' Αἴαντος σάκεϊ Τελαμωνιάδαο.
ἔνθ' Αἴας μὲν ὑπεξέφερεν σάκος· αὐτὰρ ὅ γ' ἥρως
παπτήνας, ἐπεὶ ἄρ τιν' οἰστεύσας ἐν ὁμίλῳ
βεβλήκειν, ὁ μὲν αὖθι πεσὼν ἀπὸ θυμὸν ὄλεσσεν,
αὐτὰρ ὁ αὖτις ἰών, πάις ὡς ὑπὸ μητέρα, δύσκεν
εἰς Αἴανθ'· ὁ δέ μιν σάκεϊ κρύπτασκε φαεινῷ.
(Iliad Θ266-272).

In Δ 113 we are also informed that Pandarus was positioned behind his companions' protecting shields when he was taking a shot at Menelaus. As Leaf rightly notes, this mode of fighting with an archer acting in conjunction with one or several infantrymen is characteristically Oriental, and more particularly Assyrian.[38] Single Assyrian archers operating from behind the protective shields of infantrymen are depicted on the carved orthostats from the palace of Ashurnasirpal II (883 - 859 B.C.) at Nimrud, on reliefs from the palace of Tiglath - pileser III (745 - 727 B.C.) at Nimrud, Sargon II (721 - 705 B.C.) at Khorsabad, Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh and Ashurbanipal (c.668 - 630 B.C.) at Nineveh.[39] As mentioned previously, we also possess a terra-cotta group from Cyprus of an archer who is shielded by an infantryman while he holds out his bow to fire. The find dates to no earlier than the seventh century B.C. and Lorimer notes that the figures' high peaked helmets and facial features indicate an Eastern influence, possibly Assyrian.[40] Cyprus was subjugated by Sargon II in 712 B.C. and in his advance to the Mediterranean coast the Eastern Greeks would have learned about Assyrian modes of combat.[41] Along with the Locrian passage (N712 - 722),

the piece in which the archer Teucer and the spearman Telamonian Aias act in conjunction is possibly influenced by Assyrian practices and may date to the late 8th century B.C.; although this hypothesis is attractive, we should bear in mind that the archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger aims his bow from behind the protection of the shields of the two more conventionally equipped men. The situation is timeless: an archer, since he needs both hands to draw his bow, cannot carry a shield and therefore ideally needs a shield-bearer to cover him while firing; thus Homer may simply be describing an Early Greek rather than an Assyrian practice.

As well as being used by the 'laoi', the bow was, as we have seen, used by the warrior aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, Pandarus, Helenus and Dolon on certain occasions and in the majority of the passages in which they use the bow there is no hint that it was regarded as a disreputable weapon. Note that Dolon is regarded by Homer as a very wealthy man because he owns much gold and bronze (πολυχρύσοιο πολύχαλκος, K315), yet he chooses the bow as a weapon(K333;K459). However, there are echoes in the Iliad of the timeless belief that archery was cowardly and that a man could only show true valour by fighting hand-to-hand with spear or sword. Inherent in the tactics of the archer was combat at a distance from the enemy and it was this feature which throughout the ages was felt most to smack of cowardice.[42] We find Diomedes pouring scorn on Paris' archery and using the word τοξότα as a rebuke:

τοξότα, λωβητήρ, κέραι ἀγλαέ, παρθενοπῖπα,
εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης,
οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμῃσι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί·
νῦν δέ μ' ἐπιγράψας ταρσὸν ποδὸς εὔχεαι αὔτως.
οὐκ ἀλέγω, ὡς εἴ με γυνὴ βάλοι ἢ πάις ἄφρων·
κωφὸν γὰρ βέλος ἀνδρὸς ἀνάλκιδος οὐτιδανοῖο.
ἦ τ' ἄλλως ὑπ' ἐμεῖο, καὶ εἴ κ' ὀλίγον περ ἐπαύρῃ,
ὀξὺ βέλος πέλεται, καὶ ἀκήριον αἶψα τίθησιν·

τοῦ δὲ γυναικὸς μέν τ' ἀμφίδρυφοί εἰσι παρειαί,
παῖδες δ' ὀρφανικοί· ὁ δὲ θ' αἵματι γαῖαν ἐρεύθων
πύθεται, οἰωνοὶ δὲ περὶ πλέες ἠὲ γυναῖκες.

(Λ385 - 395).

Note the idea that Diomedes' arrow-wound does not pain him over-much but that sure death awaits anyone who is struck by his spear.

In Δ 242 Agamenmon rebukes and in Ξ 479 the Trojan Acamas taunts the Greeks as shirkers by calling them ἰόμωροι. Although the derivation and sense of the word are not certain, it seems highly likely that it is a word of rebuke relating to the use of arrows in place of 'heroic' weapons. In both the Iliad and Odyssey we find ἐγχεσίμωρος[43] Leaf notes that the analogy of ἐγχεσίμωρος makes it probable that the first element of the word is ἰός (an arrow) though this always has ῑ in the Homeric poems (but cf. ἰοχέαιρα in Pindar, Pythian II.9.). Leaf further notes that ἰός is probably equal to ἰσFος, the Sanskrit 'ishus', 'so that we may compare the Attic ἶσος by ἶος from FίσFος'.[44] The second element is quite uncertain, but some possible derivations are:

1 μερ, to think of, 'thinking of arrows' i.e. devoted to fighting with the bow.
2 μαρ of μάρναμαι, 'fighting with arrows'.
3 the sanskrit muras, stormy, eager, earnest-so 'eager with arrows'.

There are hints, then, that although the bow was widely used by the 'laoi' and a number of warrior chieftains in the Iliad its use was not accepted by certain heroes who thought that it was an unmanly weapon. Influenced probably by a later Cretan tradition, the bow receives a more kindly treatment in the Odyssey.[45]

In conclusion, we may say that the bow was fairly frequently used in the Iliad both by certain nobles and by the 'laoi', a section of whom represented organized groups of archers (e.g. the Locrians, Paionians and followers

of Philoctetes). The bows of Pandarus in the Iliad and Odysseus were almost certainly of the composite type and throughout the Iliad the potential of the bow is stressed by the penetrative power of the arrow and by the fairly large number of casualties caused by the bow.[46] It is clear that a section of the 'laoi', such as the Locrians, were organized into forces of archers and slingers who operated by firing their missiles over the heads of the infantrymen positioned in front of them; this mode of combat is portrayed as being very effective because the Locrians are described as breaking up the ranks of the Trojans with their fire. The description of the Locrians is possibly based on some knowledge of Assyrian tactics. Forces of archers were also positioned on the walls and towers of Troy, presumably to ward off attacks in normal circumstances (cf. Iliad X194 - 8). The picture is confused by the aristocratic archers who do not operate from behind their infantrymen but act on their own or with single infantrymen, who cover them with their shields, and snipe, often at very close range, at specific targets. The picture is also highly stylized: heroes always wound or kill other heroes but never turn their bows against the 'laoi', just as no hero is ever killed by an insignificant man. The acceptability of the bow as a weapon by the heroes is also confused - the warrior aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, Pandarus, Helenus and Dolon quite merrily twang away with their bows, whilst Diomedes, Agamemnon and Acamas used the words 'τοξόται' and 'ἰόμωροι' as taunts and rebukes.

2 The Sling in the Iliad of Homer:

In the Iliad there are two possible references to the sling.[47] In N598 - 600, the wounded Helenus requires a sling for his arm and an attendant produces οἰὸς ἀΐτος which is then explained to be a σφενδόνη[48].

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ χειρὸς ἔρυσεν μεγάθυμος Ἀγήνωρ,
αὐτὴν δὲ ξυνέδησεν εὐστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀΐτῳ,
σφενδόνη, ἣν ἄρα οἱ θεράπων ἔχε ποιμένι λαῶν.

We also learn that the Locrians, the followers of the Lesser Aias, were not equipped with the conventional heroic arms and armour but followed their master with bows and 'εὐστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ' (N712 - 717).[49] We furthermore learn that they were positioned behind the normal foot soldiers (οἱ δ' ὄπιθεν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον , N721) and that their missile fire was so effective that it actually broke up the Trojan ranks (N718).

The meaning of the οἰὸς ἄώτος has confused modern commentators but it seems to have been taken for granted by Pausanias that it referred to slings: Ἔλλησιν ὅτι μὴ Κρησὶν οὐκ ἐπιχώριον ὂν τοξεύειν, Λοκροὺς γὰρ τοὺς Ὀπουντίους ὁπλιτεύοντας ἤδη κατὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ ἴσμεν, οὓς Ὅμηρος ἐπαίησεν ὡς φερόμενοι τόξα καὶ σφενδόνας ἐς Ἴλιον ἐλθοιεν (I.23.4). It seems best to take the phrase 'εὐστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ' to refer to slings made of well-twisted wool. It is impossible for it to refer to bowstrings made of wool because wool - however tightly wound - lacks the elasticity needed for a bowstring and almost certainly cannot stand the strain of a self-bow, let alone one of composite type. The elasticity of the sling-cord is, however, not important since the sling-shot shoots off at the same speed as the rotary motion of the sling - it does not matter whether the sling-cord is made of tough, thick leather or more supple sinews, the bullet will fly at the same speed.[50] Despite some commentators' misgivings, it would appear that a sling-cord made out of well-twisted wool is a distinct possibility.[51]

Our archaeological evidence would suggest that slings were used at a very early date in Greece: stone sling-shots have been found at Neolithic sites in Thessaly, Macedonia and Central Greece and these finds have led V.G. Childe to suggest that the sling may have been a major weapon in Prehistoric Greece, while the bow may have played a minor role, if any, in

warfare.[52] Sling-shots have also been found at Troy dating from the Middle Helladic II Period (from c.2500 - 2200 B.C.): Schliemann excavated a large number of objects which he regarded as sling-bullets from Troy II and Troy III at the mound of Hissarlik.[53] These objects, which are made of hematite or diorite, are roughly the shape of a cylinder with convex sides and flattened ends and many of them are about 6.5 cm long - just under the normal breadth of a human palm; some of these objects were quite heavy - the largest example found weighed 1130 grams, whilst the second largest weighed 520 grams. Although Schliemann was convinced that these finds were sling-bullets, G. Fougères thinks that they were more probably amulets.[54] On Crete there have been excavated at Pseira stones which are supposed to have been intended for the use of very early Cretan slingers: one of the buildings excavated at Pseira (which first expanded in the Early Minoan II Period [c.2500 - 2200 B.C.] and developed fully in Late Minoan I times [c.1550 - 1450 B.C.]) was found to have three of its rooms filled with beach pebbles and these have been identified by the excavators as sling-stones and the building as a primitive arsenal.[55]

Sling-shots dating to the Mycenaean Period have been found at Mycenae and Knossos. At Mycenae, outside a tomb of the Acropolis, was excavated a large sling-stone, apparently made of limestone.[56] At Knossos, Evans made a startling discovery when he found two crude lead sling-bullets (lead bullets are common in the Classical Period, but are not found before this date) 6 metres down a pit near the Shrine of the Double Axes "in a medium which excludes any possibility of later intrusion".[57] Beside the two bullets in the LMIII stratum were found cups and pottery identical to those found in situ in the Shrine of the Double Axes. These two bullets are quite unlike the later examples, often inscribed, which have been found on the site of the Graeco - Roman city - Evans notes that they are heavier, more round in section, and that the slight ridge on the sides shows a less perfect

method of casting; the surface of the bullets is rough and they bear no inscriptions. A point has also been carved out at each end of the bullets with a knife, presumably to increase their penetrative power - this practice seems quite unique. Evans hypothesises that the last Minoan occupants of the Palace site were driven out under a hail of such bullets fired by invading Achaeans. It would seem that these LMIII lead sling-bullets remained an isolated phenomenon and one which seems to have had no connection with the Classical development of lead bullets since no such Classical bullet which can be dated with any certainty to the period before c.401 - 395 B.C. has ever been published.[58]

Sling-bullets have been found at two Dark Age sites: stone sling-bullets, which were almond-shaped and had a length of 6.5 cm (exactly the same length as many of the objects classed as sling-bullets by Schliemann), were found in Tholos Tomb V at Marmariane in Thessaly; clay bullets of the same shape were also found in Tomb V.[59] Clay sling-shots were also found in Dark Age contexts on Thera.[60]

From our limited archaeological evidence from finds of sling-shots, it would appear then that slingers, using bullets of stone and in some areas of lead, were in existence in the Mycenaean World and probably had their origins in the Neolithic Age. We also have evidence that there were slingers using stone and clay bullets in the Dark Age Period.

Let us now examine the equipment and mode of combat of the Locrian slingers to see if they may be compared to the few early Greek depictions of slingers which we possess. We are told that the Locrians were equipped with neither bronze helmets, nor round shields, nor spears, but only with bows and slings (N714 - 716) and as for their mode of fighting, we are informed that they did not enter the mêlée (στασίη ξυμίγη ,N713) but were positioned and fired their missile weapons from behind the conventional infantry forces

(οἱ δ' ὄπιθεν βάλλοντες ἐλάνθανον, N721); furthermore, their fire was so intensive and accurate that they broke up the Trojan ranks (N718). Now let us consider our limited number of early Greek depictions of slingers: our only Mycenaean depiction of slingers comes from two of the four surviving fragments of the famous silver Siege Rhyton excavated from Shaft-grave IV at Mycenae.[61] On the main fragment an army is portrayed in the act of fending off an attack on a fortified town. There are three slingers in the defending force who stand upright with their slings poised above their heads in the starting position for the whirling motion, whilst behind them and to their sides are positioned five archers.[62] Behind the main group of three slingers and four archers are depicted two more conventionally armed warriors with large shields and spears advancing shoulder to shoulder. On another fragment (Lorimer, H.M., Fig.4,b) we have the incomplete body of a slinger who holds a stone in his left hand while he whirls the sling above his head with his right; on the same fragment two men are shown, probably also slingers, stooping down to pick up stones. Note that in the main fragment the slingers appear to be acting in conjunction with the archers in front of the infantrymen armed with shields and spears and that there are no missile troops positioned on the walls of the city, only alarmed women. The archers and slingers, like their Locrian counterparts in the Iliad, have no helmets, shields or spears but are depicted naked - they carry no secondary weapons, only their slings and bows; their nakedness has led Snodgrass to suppose that the archers and slingers were barbarian auxiliaries but his reasons for this supposition are unclear.[63] It has been suggested, since the archers are kneeling or crouching and there are stones strewn around the ground beside the warriors, that their enemies possessed a force of slingers.[64]

There are no surviving depictions of slingers from the Dark Age but we possess two later depictions dating to the sixth century B.C. which may be used for comparison to the slingers on the Siege Rhyton. A slinger wearing

no armour is depicted on an Early Corinthian alabastron, while on a Spartan moulded pithos fragment a slinger, wearing helmet, leopard's skin and sword over his shoulder, is shown operating behind an infantryman;[65] on both these Archaic vases the slingers are depicted operating singly and we have no Archaic portayals of slingers acting as a coherent group such as we found on the Mycenaean Siege Rhyton.

We must also examine Assyrian reliefs in which slingers are portrayed, to see if their use bears any similarity to that of the Locrians in the Iliad. In the reliefs from the palace of Sennacherib (704 - 681 B.C.) at Nineveh of the attack of the Judaean city of Lachish, a force of Assyrian slingers, in well ordered ranks, are depicted operating from behind a body of archers who in turn are positioned behind a force of more conventionally armed infantrymen.[66] The archers and slingers act together as a combined force of missile-troops and direct their concentrated fire over the heads of their own infantrymen at the enemy. They are presumably positioned behind the archers because their sling-shots could carry a greater distance than the arrows shot from composite bows.[67] The mode of employment of the Assyrian archers and slingers is strikingly similar to that of the Locrians and it seems very possible that Homer had some knowledge of Assyrian tactics (Assyrian slingers are also depicted attacking and defending city walls).[68] Only the equipment of the Assyrian slingers is different from that of the Locrians - as well as having the sling, they also possess helmets, cuirasses and swords.

Thus the pictorial evidence of the Siege Rhyton would suggest that forces of lightly-equipped slingers were present in battles of the Mycenaean Period and that they were used, along with archers, as skirmishers. It is, however, only in Assyrian reliefs that we find massed forces of slingers and archers operating over the heads of infantrymen and it therefore seems very possible that Homer was influenced by some knowledge of Assyrian tactics in his description of the fighting mode of the Locrian contingent (although

admittedly, as noted previously,the Assyrian reliefs had a far larger surface area on which massed bodies of troops could be portayed than most Early Greek works of art).

3 The Laoi in the Iliad

In the Iliad we find that heroes of both sides were normally armed with sword and either one or two spears, which could be used for both thrusting and throwing, and, for protection, were equipped with plated cuirass, bronze helmet, greaves and shield.[69] The heroes fought in highly stylized and unrealistic battles in which one single hero could turn the great mass of his opponents to flight;[70] Jasper Griffin comments: "All attention is focused on the clash of heroes, and everything which could blur or detract from their encounter is as far as possible stylized away. All this is, in a sense, unrealistic, and that effect is intensified by the way in which the heroes are presented as superhuman". [71] With the exception of the organized forces of Locrian archers and slingers, we learn next to nothing about the masses (laoi), whom we might suppose at this early period to have been armed as light-skirmishers,on both the Achaean and Trojan sides.

We are given next to no information as to how the 'laoi' were armed and equipped. In relation to this question,it would be worthwhile for us here to examine the passages in which heroes are armed and equipped unconventionally: in Γ 15f, Paris is described as advancing in front of the other Trojans armed with bow, sword and two spears and clad in a panther's skin:

οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες,
Τρωσὶν μὲν προμάχιζεν Ἀλέξανδρος θεοειδής,
παρδαλέην ὤμοισιν ἔχων καὶ καμπύλα τόξα
καὶ ξίφος, αὐτὰρ ὁ δοῦρε δύω κεκορυθμένα χαλκῷ
πάλλων... (Γ 15 - 19).

Odysseus in K260 - 265 is armed for a night scouting expedition with a bow and sword and wears a leather skull-cap reinforced with boars' tusks:

Μηριόνης δ' Ὀδυσῆι δίδου βιὸν ἠδὲ φαρέτρην
καὶ ξίφος, ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ κυνέην κεφαλῆφιν ἔθηκεν
ῥινοῦ ποιητήν· πολέσιν δ' ἔντοσθεν ἱμᾶσιν
ἐντέτατο στερεῶς, ἔκτοσθε δὲ λευκοὶ ὀδόντες
ἀργιόδοντος ὑὸς θαμέες ἔχον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως, μέσση δ' ἐνὶ πῖλος ἀρήρει.

In K333 - 336 the Trojan Dolon, on a similar task, is armed with bow and throwing-spear and wears a wolf pelt about him and a cap of marten's hide:

αὐτίκα δ' ἀμφ' ὤμοισιν ἐβάλλετο καμπύλα τόξα,
ἔσσατο δ' ἔκτοσθεν ῥινὸν πολιοῖο λύκοιο,
κρατὶ δ' ἐπὶ κταδέην κυνέην, ἕλε δ' ὀξὺν ἄκοντα,
βῆ δ' ἰέναι προτὶ νῆας ἀπὸ στρατοῦ·

Although Homer does not attempt to describe the equipment of the masses with whom he is largely uninterested, could the wild animal skins of Paris and Dolon (Γ17; K334) and the hide caps of Odysseus and Dolon (K261f; K335) and the bow (Γ 17; K260 (quiver here); K333), sword (Γ 18; K261) and javelin (Γ 18 (note a pair); K335) reflect the dress and arms of light-armed skirmishers? They most certainly are very different from the normal heroic weapons and equipment - as we have noted, the hero usually wears a bronze helmet, plated cuirass and bronze greaves and most often uses his spear as his primary weapon. We must bear in mind the roles of Paris, Odysseus and Dolon when they are equipped thus: Paris is skirmishing, or advancing, in front of the other Trojan troops (προμάχιζεν, Γ 16) and Odysseus and Dolon are both engaging in a night scouting expedition in which speed of foot and silence were vital. As we see on the Siege Rhyton and find later in Tyrtaeus and Thucydides, it was an accustomed role of light-armed troops to operate in front of their more conventionally armed soldiers and, as we find in the

Classical historians, to take part in night expeditions and to scout out positions - could the three heroes have equipped themselves with the dress and arms of the skirmishers from among the 'laoi' for their special roles?[72] Paris in front of his own troops was in a vulnerable position and Odysseus and Dolon, who were both going to approach enemy positions in the dark, were in danger also and it must have been vital for them to be able to run away quickly if attacked by superior numbers; heavy bronze arms and armour would have severely hampered them in this and it would have been most expedient for them to adopt the dress and arms of light-armed skirmishers. On the François vase and on the interior of a Black-figure kylix in the British Museum we find javelin-throwers, and on an Archaic pithos fragment a slinger, clad in animal skins and,in the case of the javelin-throwers on the François vase,also wearing leather skull-caps.[73] Interestingly, Pausanias describes the dress of some 'psiloi' on the side of the Messenians in their wars against Sparta: "Not all of the light-armed troops had a breastplate or shield but those who lacked them were protected with the skins of goats and sheep; some of them, particularly the Arcadian mountain-dwellers, had the skins of wild beasts, wolves and bears" (IV.11.2f).[74] It would seem,then,very possible that the dress and equipment of Paris, Odysseus and Dolon in these three passages reflects that of the light-armed skirmishers from among the masses.

Best's study of Thracian dress and equipment in the Iliad is very interesting and it may well be that Euripides, who projected in the Rhesus fifth century types of Thracian troops,including peltasts and 'akontistai', into the distant past, was closer to the truth than he imagined.[75] Best tries to show that the Thracian peltast of Classical times was a relict from the Prehistoric Period which Homer described,by his comparison between the arms and dress of Thracian peltasts on sixth and fifth century vase-paintings and the Thracian troops in the Iliad. Although the fighting methods of the

Thracian troops in the Iliad do not differ much from those of other peoples - we are told that chariots were popular among the Thracians;[76] the Paionians used long thrusting-spears as well as bows[77] the similarity between Homer's description of the dress worn by certain heroes and the clothing of the Thracian peltasts on Attic vases is striking. The Thracian alopekis, as Best points out, is very like the skull-cap of oxhide or marten mentioned by Homer;[78] just like the Thracian peltasts, the Homeric heroes wore a cloak over the chiton and it was made of a woollen material and folded in two and fastened with a brooch[79] Best notes that on vase-paintings the Thracian zeira is often clearly folded in two and fastened together with a brooch at the neck.[80] He further supposes that 'λαισήια' in Homer represents a type of shield and that the epic formula 'ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους λαισήιά τε πτερόεντα' in Homer refers to a wing-shaped shield like the pelte.[81] There is in fact archaeological proof that such a shield was used in the Late Mycenaean Period: the marching infantrymen on the Warrior Vase from Mycenae are shown carrying this type of shield which is believed by several historians to be related to the Thracian pelte of the Classical Period.[82] Furthermore, the φάσγανον Θρήικιον used by the Paionian Asteropaeus reminds one of the machaira used by the Thracian peltasts in Classical times;[83] he also uses two throwing-spears when he fights with Achilles - this too reflects Classical practice as Thracian peltasts are shown on several vases holding two javelins.[84] However, Best's suggestions about the presence of troops dressed and possibly armed exactly like the Thracian peltasts of the Classical Period in the Iliad, although attractive, must remain hypothetical.

Archaeological evidence may throw new light on the existence of javelin-throwers in the Geometric Period: from about 900 B.C. onwards we find that the practice of including two or three spearheads with a burial became common in Greece and on the island of Crete;[85] in many cases no secondary weapons,

such as swords or knives, were found. The critical question is whether these multiple spearheads represent throwing- or thrusting-spears.[86] The smaller heads, such as those found in certain Mycenaean tombs and in two later tombs at Athens (Agora, grave XXVII - Late Proto-geometric; Dipylon grave - Late Geometric), are very likely to have come from javelins.[87] Snodgrass hypothesises that larger spearheads which have a socket which is long in proportion to the size of the head may also have been used as javelins.[88] In the majority of cases listed in my note 86 we find one small head occurring along with a larger head - it seems most likely that the small head belonged to a javelin which the warrior threw when at a distance from the enemy and the large head to a thrusting-spear which he used for close combat.[89]

In the Iliad we frequently hear of spears being thrown and warriors carrying a pair of spears - it is very likely that these (or at least one of them, if a pair is indicated) are to be identified as javelins. In Late Geometric vase-painting also, the warrior holding two spears is a common recurrent motif;[90] in these Geometric scenes we also find figures wounded by spears, although no enemy is standing near them, and men holding spears at such an angle that they must be about to throw them.[91] Thus it would seem extremely likely from weapon finds and depictions on Late Geometric pottery that the javelin was used in battle during the Geometric Period and possibly in Mycenaean times also.[92] We may furthermore hypothesise that some of the spears thrown by heroes in the Iliad were javelins which were fitted with either small heads or fairly large heads with proportionally long sockets.

Is any opinion expressed about the masses in the Iliad? There are two passages in which heroes express their feelings about the 'laoi'. In B198 - 204, when Agamemnon comes upon a man of the rank and file running to the ships, he strikes him with his sceptre and scorns him as unwarlike and weak and

counting for nothing in war or in the council:

ὃν δ' αὖ δήμου ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι,
τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ·
δαιμόνι', ἀτρέμας ἧσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε,
οἳ σέο φέρτεροί εἰσι, σὺ δ' ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ.
οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί.
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη·

In A225 - 228, Achilles taunts Agamemnon that he does not possess the nerve to arm himself for normal battle along with the masses or to take part in an ambush with the captains of the Greeks - this piece would seem to imply that only the officers were regarded as having enough courage to dare to take part in an ambush, although the 'laoi' could be used in regular combat:

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο,
οὔτε ποτ' ἐς πόλεμον ἅμα λαῷ θωρηχθῆναι
οὔτε λόχονδ' ἰέναι σὺν ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν
τέτληκας θυμῷ· τὸ δέ τοι κὴρ εἴδεται εἶναι.

Thus it would appear that, with the exception of some specialist light-armed troops such as the Locrians, Homer tends to depreciate the military value of the troops of the masses. [93]

In conclusion to the Homeric Poems, we may say that Homer refers frequently to archers but only once to a corps of slingers. The potential of the bow in the Iliad, and to a lesser extent in the Odyssey, is stressed by the penetrative power of the arrow and by the number of casualties caused by the bow. The bow was used on many occasions in the Iliad both by certain nobles and by the masses (laoi), a section of whom represented organized groups of archers (e.g. the Locrians, Paionians and followers of Philoctetes). Only once does Homer make clear how he thought that the archers and slingers

from among the masses were used in a normal battle: he describes the organized corps of Locrian archers and slingers as being positioned behind the conventional infantry and firing their missiles over the heads of these troops; this mode of combat is portrayed as being very effective because the Locrians are described as breaking up the ranks of the Trojans with their fire. From Iliad Χ194 - 8, we can infer the presence of archers positioned on the walls of Troy. The portrayal of the aristocratic archers is very different from that of the Locrians - they do not operate from behind their own infantrymen but act on their own or with single infantrymen, who protect them with their shields, and snipe, often at very close range, at specific targets.

We learn next to nothing about the arms, equipment and organization of the masses, whom at this early period we might suppose to have been armed as skirmishers. We can, however, detect a feeling in the Iliad that the 'laoi', as with the archers, were regarded by some of the heroes as cowardly and of little military value. Although it is impossible to date with certainty the various features of combat in the Iliad, the Locrian passage (N712 - 722) and the passage in which Telamonian Aias is described as operating with the archer Teucer (Θ 266 - 272), may show some knowledge of late eighth century Assyrian modes of combat and the references to the heroes using a pair of throwing-spears may be a Dark Age element, although this is far from certain.

Appendix 1: The Archaeological Evidence for the Use of the Bow from the Shaft-grave Period to the Late Geometric Period

1 Archery in the Mycenaean World

i. The Shaft-grave Period (16th century B.C.): Before the 16th century B.C., the Egyptians, Anatolians and Assyrians had begun to develop a composite type of bow;[94] this bow consisted of three materials: ① a wooden stave. ② strips of horn which were fitted to the inner face (or 'belly') of the wooden stave ③ sinews which were moulded to the outer face (or 'back') of the wooden stave.[95] Such a bow had the potential to fire an arrow with much greater velocity than a bow consisting of a single stave of wood (a 'self'-bow) or of two or more staves of similar materials (a 'compound' bow). No Ancient Greek bow fragments have survived but from the few representations of bows in Mycenaean art dating to the Shaft-grave Period we can be fairly sure that the Mycenaeans of this period used the self-bow made from a single stave of wood.[96] An archer on the Lion Hunt Dagger from Shaft-grave IV is represented shooting horizontally with a self-bow;[97] the archer depicted on a gold ring from Shaft-grave IV shoots what appears to be a self-bow.[98] The archers on the silver Siege Rhyton, yet again from Shaft-grave IV, also appear to have been equipped with the simple self-bow.[99]

On Crete, representations of the self-bow with an inward curve at the handle have been found dating to the Middle Minoan Period,[100] but by MMIII (c.1700 - 1500 B.C.) the self-bow is apparently superseded by a single-curved composite type with reflexed tips, which is first portrayed on the disk of Phaistus;[101] but note that what appears to be a composite bow (only part of the bow is visible) is depicted on a Late Minoan clay sealing.[102] The Cretans may have learned about the composite bow from immigrants or traders from North Africa and Anatolia. Note Snodgrass' hypothesis that the Middle Minoan bows which have double curves but no reflexed tips are not composite but self-bows.[103]

Finds of arrowheads in interments also testify to the use of the bow in the Shaft-grave Period. Many arrowheads of flint, obsidian and bronze were found in the Shaft-graves, especially graves IV and V, and in one of them was found an 'arrow-shaft-polisher'.[104] Snodgrass supposes that the large number of arrowheads found and the possible importation of the flint arrowheads from Egypt indicates "an interest in archery perhaps too intensive to be explained in terms of sport or food-gathering" - on the Siege Rhyton the bow is certainly used for war.[105]

ii. The Palace Period (c.1450 - 1350 B.C.): Finds of flint, obsidian and bronze arrowheads dating to the Palace Period are fairly numerous and it would appear that archery in this period was flourishing.[106] A startling discovery relating to the use of the bow in Crete at this period was made in a palace out-building at Knossos: a group of clay sealings with arrow-ideograms, which had been used to secure chests full of bronze arrowheads, was found with a broken tablet which, if correctly deciphered, alone recorded over eight and a half thousand arrowheads. A large number of these arrowheads were found nearby in two large deposits and Evans hypothesised that this was the armoury of the palace.[107] The fact that such a large number of arrowheads were carefully sealed in chests and recorded on clay tablets would suggest that they were for public use, presumably for warfare rather than hunting.[108] Other tablets were excavated from 'The Armoury' which had inscribed on them a pair of horns of the Cretan wild goat; the outer flexible sheath of keratin, which encloses the central core of the horn, was used to make the inner face ('belly') of a composite bow - Pandarus' bow in the Iliad is made from a wild goat's horns(Δ 105), Odysseus' bow in the Odyssey, is made of horn (ϕ 395) and in a Ugarit text Aqhat promises to supply Anat with the necessary materials for making a composite bow and specifically mentions horns from wild goats.[109] Do these tablets then record composite bows or the raw materials used in their manufacture? Note that we found probable representations of the composite bow in Crete in the Late Middle Minoan Period (MMIII).[110]

We have very few representations of bows which date to the Late Minoan Period and only one of these is large enough for us to examine the bow: this bow is portrayed in the hands of an archer on a LMII (1450 - 1400 B.C.) fragment of a steatite vase from Knossos.[111] The bow appears to have been of the self-type, although it is hard to be certain since only the lower half is preserved. It seems, as Lorimer notes, that the archer is taking part in some combat as he disembarks from his boat; he shoots high, possibly aiming at a defender on a city wall.[112] Lorimer argues from the archer's dress and beard that he is not a Minoan but a Mycenaean and thus this depiction does not invalidate the hypothesis that the composite bow was used in Crete from the Late Middle Minoan Period.[113] An archer is also shown on a signet ring from Cydonia which dates to the Palace Period, but his bow is so small that one cannot be sure if the artist was trying to depict a real bow.[114]

The Late Mycenaean Period (13th century B.C. to around the middle of the 12th century B.C.): Archaeological evidence for archery in the Late Mycenaean Period is extremely limited. Only one crude depiction of an archer has, as far as I know, survived from this period: the archer is shown in a line of marching soldiers on a fragment of a vase of the late thirteenth century B.C. from Iolkos in Thessaly.[115] The bow which the archer holds is crudely painted, but appears to have been of the self-type. There is evidence that the Mycenaeans in this period adopted a new type of arrowhead with a large blade and thick tang (a few examples of arrowheads of similar shape, but with a hollow socket instead of a tang, have been found) — Snodgrass thinks that the Mycenaeans copied this head from a type from Asia Minor.[116] However, the simpler form of flat arrowhead made of bronze is still the most commonly found variety.

It was in the Late Mycenaean Period, in around 1250 B.C., that the city identified as Troy VIIa, on the mound of Hissarlik, which has been associated by archaeologists with Homeric Troy, fell.[117] Among some fallen stones just west of the main street Carl Blegen found a small broad arrowhead of barbed

type, with its sides curving in a convex line from point to tips of barbs. The arrowhead stem is solid and circular in section and, as Blegan suggests, probably fitted into a socket hollowed out in the arrow-shaft.[118] A comparable arrowhead, attributed to Late Helladic IIIB, has been found at Nestor's Palace in Western Messenia and this leads Blegen to hypothesise: "One may wonder if the arrowhead found in street 710 - a point of a type known in the contemporary Mycenaean world on the Greek mainland - was not perhaps a missile discharged by an invading Achaean". [119]

2 Archery in the Dark Age (From the Middle of the 12th Century B.C. to circa 700 B.C.):[120]

There is little evidence for archery in the Greek world from the beginning of the Dark Age to the end of the Middle Geometric period. I have found only one depiction of archers dating to this period - this is on an early tenth century hydria from Lefkandi.[121] The two archers on the hydria are shown shooting at each other from close range; the depictions of the bows are quite crude and it is impossible to tell of what type they are. Only a fairly small number of arrowheads have been excavated which probably date to this period. The findspots of these arrowheads are widely geographically diffused: the Peloponnese, mainland Greece, Northern Greece and certain islands in the Aegean. Only on Crete, however, do we have archaeological evidence which would suggest that archery continued throughout the Dark Age.

On mainland Greece arrowheads dating to this early period have been found at Athens:

i. A Protogeometric barbed and tanged arrowhead, which has no boss, was excavated in the Kerameikos.[122]

ii. A single Early Geometric arrowhead, which was similar to one found at Corinth, was excavated in the Agora.[123]

They have also been found on two sides in the North-East Peloponnese, namely Corinth and Tiryns:

i. An iron arrowhead was found under the western shops of the later agora at Corinth in an early 9th century burial. An iron spearhead and knife were found along with it. The arrowhead is very similar to the one found in the Agora at Athens.[124]

ii. Two obsidian arrowheads have been excavated from a grave of about 900 B.C. at Tiryns.[125]

In Northern Greece at Verghina a group of four arrowheads of the barbed and tanged type, without a boss, were found in the tumulus cemetry. These heads may date back as far as the early 10th century.[126] In an outlying part of Ialysos on Rhodes an iron arrowhead was found with a warrior's cremation urn which dates to the 9th century B.C.; along with the arrowhead were also found a spearhead and sword.[127] On Crete two Protogeometric arrowheads have been found at Karphi and Kofina (Panagia). Three bronze heads found at Karphi are of 'boss-and-barb' type and were found in levels dating to no later than 900 B.C.[128] Iron arrowheads of a cruder form than those from Karphi have been found at Kofina in an eary context.[129]

Arrowheads which can be dated with some degree of certainty to the Middle and Late Geometric Periods have been found at Argos, Asine, Pherai in Thessaly and also on Crete at the sites of Fortetsa, Kavousi, Dreros and Arkades. An iron head from Argos comes from a grave which dates to about 720 B.C. and it is leaf-shaped and without a tang.[130] A spurred and socketed bronze head, which is very like the 'Scythian' type of head, was found at Asine and it is almost certainly of Middle or Late Geometric date.[131] It is impossible to say if this head was used by a forerunner of the Scythian mercenary archers.[132] Six iron arrowheads were found in a grave at Pherai which dates to the Late Geometric Period.[133]

The heads from Fortetsa and Arkades, which are mostly of iron, are barbed and have a long tang and no boss;[134] Snodgrass hypothesises that

this is the type of barbed head depicted in Attic Geometric Art.[135] Late Geometric heads of the 'boss-and-barb' type have also been found at Kavousi, Dreros and Arkades.[136]

Arrowheads which have not been securely dated but which almost certainly belong to the Geometric Period have been found on Crete at the Idaean Cave, the Dictaean Cave and Prinias and some are housed in the Giomalakis Collection.[137] A mould for making arrowheads of the 'boss-and-barb' type has been found in a Geometric level at Samos.[138]

From about 750 B.C. illustrations of archers begin to occur on Attic Late Geometric vases.[139] The archers on these vases appear to hold three different types of bow:[140]

1 The 'self'-type.

2 The single-curved 'composite' type with reflexed tips.

3 The double-curved bow.

The bow appears most often in the double-curved form and Snodgrass hypothesises that although this type bears a marked resemblance to the Scythian composite bow, it is more likely to have been a simple self-bow with an inward curve half-way down the bow stave.[141] Note that in many cases the portrayal of the bow is too crude for us to come to any definite conclusion as to its construction and type.

Archers are found in Geometric portrayals of both land battles and sea-borne landings.[142] From the recurrent motif of the beached ship, it would seem that sea-borne raids, in which archers took part, were fairly common in the Geometric Period.[143] The archers are frequently depicted carrying a sword at waist level - this would only have been used if the archer was forced into close combat.

Uncatalogued fragments of Geometric Ware (from the second half of the 8th century B.C.) in the National Museum in Athens, from Argive workshops, show archers carrying bows of both the self- and double-curved types. An archer is also depicted on the Archer Seal from Argos; this stone seal dates to before 700 B.C.[144] One of the decorated sides of the seal portrays a mythical scene in which an archer holding what appears to be a simple self-bow aims at a centaur who raises a branch in either hand. Thus archers were depicted by Attic and Argive artists in the Late Geometric Period, but unfortunately we have no depictions of archers from other parts of Greece dating to this period.

In conclusion, I would say that few arrowheads dating to the Dark Age have been found when compared to the large number of Mycenaean heads which have been excavated; Snodgrass hypothesises that this may be because arrowheads were not usually included in graves, which form our primary source of information.[145] The fact that arrowheads have been found at Crete dating from throughout the Dark Age would suggest that archery continued in Crete throughout this period.[146] With the exception of the tenth century hydria from Lefkandi, we have no depictions of archers in the Dark Age until Attic and Argive artists begin to depict them from the middle of the 8th century B.C. In Attic Late Geometric vase-painting, archers are shown taking part in both ordinary land battles and in combat around beached ships.

Appendix 2: The Type of Bow in the Homeric Poems.

In the Homeric poems only the bow of Pandarus in the Iliad (Iliad Δ 105 - 126) and the bow of Odysseus in the Odyssey (Odyssey φ , passim) are described in any detail.[147] The two bows came from different regions - Pandarus was a Lycian of Asia Minor and his bow almost certainly was produced in this region; the bow of Odysseus was given to him by Iphitus, king of Oechalia, which was probably located in Thessaly (Od. φ 31 - 33) - we are not told how Iphitus came to be in possession of the bow. Thus we know that the bow of Pandarus was almost certainly of Western Asiatic origin and that the bow of Odysseus had been derived from a mainland Greek source, although we cannot be sure where the bow was actually manufactured.

Let us firstly consider what Homer says about the bow of Pandarus; it was of great size (μέγα τόξον ,Δ124) and was manufactured from the horns of a wild goat (ἰξάλου αἰγὸς / ἀγρίου, Δ 105 - 106) which were sixteen palm-breadths in length (ἑκκαιδεκάδωρα , Δ 109 i.e. about four feet); we furthermore learn that these horns had been put together, polished and fitted with gilded tips by a skilled craftsman in horn (Δ110 - 111) and that the bow was kept in a bow-case (Δ105).[148] The bow string was made of ox-sinews (νεῦρα βόεια , Δ 122) and when drawn the bow almost assumed the shape of a circle (κυκλοτερὲς μέγα τόξον ἔτεινεν , Δ 124).

Now let us examine the information Homer gives us about the bow of Odysseus in the twenty-first book of the Odyssey: it is also of large size (μέγα τόξον, φ 74) and was kept in a bow-case (γωρυτῷ, φ 53-54). Like the bow of Pandarus the only material mentioned in connection with its construction is horn (κέρα , φ 395). The bow itself is described as παλίντονος , ἀγκύλα and καμπύλα (back-bent and curved) and well-polished (εὔξοον).[149] As the suitors found out, the bow was very

difficult to string - even when Antinous and Eurymachus had the bow anointed with fat and heated it to make it supple they were unable to string it.[150]

The bows of both Pandarus and Odysseus are said to have been constructed out of horn. The construction of Pandarus' bow is described in much greater detail than that of Odysseus by Homer in Iliad Δ 105 - 113 - it was made from the horns of a single wild goat which were each about four feet in length: these horns were polished, joined together base-to-base, almost certainly by means of a centre piece, and fitted with golden tips. Such a bow manufactured soley out of horn would have been of little use since the horns of the Pasang, the Persian wild goat which is kept in Western Asia Minor, are almost unbendable - after all, if they were flexible, they would be of no use to the goat, who needed them to attack an adversary or to defend himself.[151]

It is also unlikely that staves of sufficient thickness and width could have been cut from the marginal ridges of the horns from a single goat to make a bow - the weapon would have been extremely weak. In India and Java bows have been made completely of staves of horn - but these have been cut from the huge horns of buffaloes, from which staves of far greater stoutness can be cut than can be obtained from any type of goat horn; these bows are relatively powerless and quite easy to string.[152]

Bows made of staves of bone reinforced with sinews on the inner surface have been manufactured in several areas;[153] these bows are more effective than bows made solely out of horn because, when they are drawn, the elasticity of the sinew-backing gives a strong rebound which increases the potential velocity with which they can propel an arrow.

By introducing a central wooden stave with strips of horn fitted to its inner face and sinews moulded to its outer face, the Egyptians, Anatolians and Assyrians developed a true composite bow which was much more effective than the bow made of horn 'backed' with sinews. Balfour notes that with

Manchu, Chinese, Korean, Central Asiatic and Turkish bows, although the sinew-'backing' is covered with a protective material, the horn 'belly' remains exposed and is quite conspicuous;[154] we must remember that Homer was a poet and probably had little or no knowledge of the complex nature of a composite bow - had Homer seen a composite bow on which only the shining horn was visible since the sinews and wooden stave were covered by some protective material such as leather and did he then presume that the whole bow was made of bone? Vividness of expression must have concerned Homer more than accuracy in detail.[155]

There are other details in the Homeric Poems which lead one to believe that the bows of Pandarus and Odysseus were of the composite type. Although the adjectives παλίντονος, ἀγκύλα and καμπύλα could be applied to a simple self-bow as well as to a bow of the composite type, a bow of simple structure would break under the strain if drawn almost into a circular shape (κυκλοτερὲς μέγα τόξον ἔτεινε, Iliad Δ124); although 'κυκλοτερὲς' is no doubt a poetic exaggeration, only a composite bow could be bent with the high degree of curvature described in the passage which has been quoted above.[156]

The bows of Pandarus and Odysseus were both kept in bow cases (Iliad Δ105; Odyssey φ 53 - 54). Composite bows need to have their sinew-backing and central wooden stave protected from damp and insects as much as possible so that a protective case is very necessary. We know from depictions that the Ancient Egyptians kept their composite bows in cases.[157] Balfour notes that bow-cases are always employed by the Eskimo, American Indian and Asiatic peoples who used composite bows but that the bow-case is only rarely associated with single-stave bows.[158] Note that Odysseus examined his bow carefully to find out if insects had eaten into the horn (Odyssey φ 395); Balfour comments: "If one may judge from the remains of ancient composite bows found in Egypt, the horny portions of their structure were specially

liable to insect attacks. In some instances the horn has been entirely eaten away. The sinews also, though to a lesser extent, were attractive to insects, the wood alone seeming to have resisted their attentions".[159]

The bow of Odysseus was very hard to string without prior knowledge of the special mode necessary - Telemachus, Leiodes and Eurymachus all strained hard in their attempts to string it but were unable to accomplish the task.[160] Odysseus obviously had the knack and "just as when a man skilled in playing the lyre and in singing, easily stretches a new lyre-string round a peg, fastening at either end the twisted sheep-gut, just so, without any effort, did Odysseus strung the mighty bow". (Odyssey ϕ 406 - 409). Note especially that Odysseus probably strang the bow, and certainly shot the arrow, sitting on a chair (Odyssey ϕ 420) - there was a special technique used in stringing a composite bow and it involved the archer either sitting or kneeling down.[161] The simple self-bow could be strung without the same exertion and in the standing up position, as we seen Egyptian archers doing on a wall painting from Beni-hasan (c.1900 B.C.).[162]

It appears then from the details given about their construction and other features, that the bows of Pandarus and Odysseus in the Homeric poems were most probably meant to be interpreted as bows of the composite type; certainly, as Lorimer points out, there is exaggeration and inaccuracy in Homer's description of the bows - but we must bear in mind that Homer was a poet and not a technical writer who had to be exact in every detail.[163] If we accept that the two bows were of the composite type, let us now examine our limited archaeological evidence to try to define the earliest period with which our two presumed composite bows can be associated. Note that only Odysseus' bow was derived from a mainland Greek source, whilst that of Pandarus was almost certainly produced in Asia Minor. From the small number of surviving depictions of Mycenaean archers from mainland Greece, we find that there is not one single portrayal of the composite bow in the

Shaft-grave Period, the Palace Period or the Late Mycenaean Period - all bows are of the simple self-type.[164] Only in Crete by the end of the Middle Minoan Period do we find the first Greek depictions of what appear to be composite bows.[165] On mainland Greece it is not until the Late Geometric Period that we find what may be depictions of single-curved composite bows with reflexed tips.[166] Was Homer influenced by the type of bow used at the end of the eighth century B.C., or by some knowledge that the Cretans at an early date used a bow constructed in part out of horn, in his description of the bows of Odysseus and Pandarus?[167] Or was he influenced by a non-Greek model - the composite bow was used at a very early date by the Egyptians, Anatolians and Assyrians?[168] All these hypotheses are possible but we simply do not have enough evidence to be able to judge which one (or combination of several) is correct.

Appendix 3: The Type of Arrowhead in the Homeric Poems.

In the Iliad and Odyssey, the arrowheads are regularly described as being made of bronze (χαλκήρης and χαλκοβαρής);[169] only the arrowhead of the Lycian Pandarus was made of iron (σίδηρος).[170] Some heads are described as τριγλώχις - this must mean 'with triple cutting edges' or 'with triple barbs'.[171]

Firstly, let us examine the material of manufacture: in five out of the six cases in the Homeric poems, where the material of manufacture is stated, we are informed that the arrowheads were made of bronze. The vast majority of Mycenaean arrowheads were made of bronze and these bronze heads have been found in numbers at the sites of Mycenae, Thebes, Kakovatos, Prosymna (The Argive Heraeum), Knossos, Asine, Dendra and Malthi.[172] We are informed that the arrowhead of the Lycian Pandarus was made of iron - although iron Mycenaean arrowheads from the Greek mainland are extremely rare (I have only come across one example, which has been excavated from the Kerameikos),[173] this need not be regarded as a late feature as it may represent Anatolian practice: iron arrowheads which date to the beginning of the Iron Age have been excavated from Anatolian sites.[174] Note, however, that a small number of iron heads have been found in Dark Age contexts in mainland Greece and on the islands of Crete and Rhodes.[175]

On several occasions in the Iliad, arrowheads are described as 'triglochis'; three-edged barbed arrowheads, and in fact barbed arrowheads of any type, are extremely rare from Near Eastern sites and probably originated in Greece, although it has been suggested that they may have been introduced to Greece by Scythians or Thracians.[176] The true triangular barbed head is not found until the Archaic Period, when it appears on sites such as Perachora, Delos, Olympia and Cyrene, but it did have a precedent in the Bronze Age three-cornered 'arrow-plates'.[177] The bronze arrowhead found by Blegen in the

Troy VIIa stratum, and which he suggested was Achaean, is certainly not of a three-edged type.[178] In all probability the Trojans and Achaeans used various different forms of arrowheads and among these it is possible that there was a three-edged type such as that described by Homer.[179]

C H A P T E R T W O

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE WORKS OF THE EARLY GREEK ELEGIAC AND LYRIC POETS

1 Archilochus:

Archilochus of Paros is generally regarded as the earliest lyric poet and it seems likely that he lived and wrote roughly in the period c.680 - 640 B.C.[1] Telesicles, the father of Archilochus, led a colony to Thasos and Archilochus probably also went there as Thasos is frequently mentioned in his surviving fragments (West 89, 91, 92, 93a, 102 - 4).[2] Archilochus took part in warfare with the neighbouring inhabitants of Thrace (West 5, 42, 92, 93a), probably over the gold-mines of that region, and he also refers to warfare in Euboea (West 3) and fighting in which Naxos apparently took part (West 89). Plutarch asserts that he was killed in a battle (De Sera Num. Vind. 17).

Lorimer (The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus, BSA 42(1947), pp.114-5), Forrest (Colonization and the Rise of Delphi Historia 6 (1957), pp.163-4), Snodgrass (EGAW, p.179) and Greenhalgh (EGW, p.90) think that we should probably infer from the spear of fragment 2 (West) and the shield of fragment 5 that Archilochus fought as a hoplite.[3] John Boardman (Early Euboean Pottery and History BSA 52 (1957), p.29) and O. Murray (Early Greece, p.103) are doubtful, rightly I think, about this, and suggest that he may have lived in a transitional period when soldiers were equipped with only some pieces of the hoplite panoply.

Let us now examine the fragments of Archilochus in which light-armed troops or their weapons are referred to. The most important fragment is West no.3:[4]

οὗτοι πόλλ' ἐπὶ τόξα τανύσσεται, οὐδὲ θαμειαὶ
σφενδόναι, εὖτ' ἂν δὴ μῶλον Ἄρης συνάγῃ
ἐν πεδίῳ· ξιφέων δὲ πολύστονον ἔσσεται ἔργον·
ταύτης γὰρ κεῖνοι δάμονές εἰσι μάχης
δεσπόται Εὐβοίης δουρικλυτοί.

This fragment appears to be saying that few, if any, bows and slings will be used in a coming conflict by the Euboeans and that the battle will be fought in close-combat with the sword. The true context of this poem is not known: it may simply refer to a conflict which took place in Euboea in Archilochus' time. In spite of the future tenses, several historians think that the poet is looking back and is describing some conflict in the Lelantine War, which possibly took place in the last thirty years of the 8th century B.C.[5] Strabo records an agreement between Chalcis and Eretria not to use missile weapons (τηλεβόλα) in a war over the Lelantine Plain: "Now in general,the cities of Chalcis and Eretria were at peace with one another, and when differences arose concerning the Lelantine Plain they did not completely break off relations with one another so that they waged the war in the manner they each wished, but they made an agreement as to the conditions under which they were to fight the war. This agreement forbidding the use of missiles, is recorded on a certain pillar in the Amarynthium" (Strabo 10.1.12). It would seem possible,then,that Archilochus and the inscription on the pillar in the Amarynthium are both referring to the same agreement made in the Lelantine War forbidding the use of missile weapons.[6]

Why should certain states in Euboea have come to an agreement not to use missile-troops? Note that in line 3 of the fragment we are told that the Euboeans will battle it out with the sword (on the apparent inconsistency of the ξιφέων of line 3 and the δουρικλυτοὶ of line 5, see Renehan, The Early Greek Poets: Some Interpretations, HSCP 87 (1983) pp.1 - 2 - he concludes: " δουρικλυτοὶ in Archilochus is not a general epic epithet but a specific allusion to the Homeric account of the Abantes".); as Boardman points out (EEPH, p.29), the use of the sword, for which the Euboeans were famed, may indicate heroic and aristocratic combat: were archers and slingers not used by the Euboean 'despotai' because they were regarded as men of low social and military standing?[7]

P.A.L. Greenhalgh (EGW, pp.90 - 93) offers another interpretation of this agreement: he suggests that the 'spear-famed Lords of Euboea' were in fact the aristocratic Eretrian Hippeis and Chalcidian Hippobatae - these 'cavalrymen' dominated their states militarily (Aristotle, Politics, 1289 b 39; Plutarch, Moralia, 760 - 1). He argues that if the Hippeis and Hippobatae used their horses for warfare, either for the charge or as a means of conveyance, they would have been the chief sufferers from a missile barrage and it was to save these prized animals of war from being maimed that the 'telebola' were banned. As we shall see in Thucydides' history, cavalry could be very vulnerable to large forces of archers and slingers.[8] Unfortunately, Archilochus never mentions cavalry once in any of his surviving fragments and this makes Greenhalgh's suggestion, as he himself admits, "little more than hypothetical".[9] Also, is it really plausible that if one side thought they could gain the upper hand in a battle by using missile-troops, they would not do so because of an agreement? - we must bear in mind the fact that warfare was not a game and that the lands of a city and the lives of its inhabitants were at stake.

We have no archaeological evidence, in the form of arrowheads, sling-shots or depictions of archers or slingers, from Euboea which might be used to prove that the Euboeans used 'toxotai' or 'sphendonetai'. A small number of sling-shots and arrowheads dating to the Dark Age have, however, been found in other areas of Greece and archers are depicted in Attic Late Geometric vase-paintings.[10] Archers are also depicted on vases of the seventh century, such as on a Middle Protocorinthian aryballos from Lechaion and on a Protocorinthian aryballos from Perachora.[11] We also possess a seventh century depiction of a slinger on an Early Corinthian alabastron.[12] Thus we have archaeological evidence for the use of the bow and possibly also of the sling in the eighth century (when the Lelantine War was probably fought) and in the seventh century (when we assume that Archilochus was writing).

There are several other fragments of Archilochus which refer to the weapons used by light-armed troops. Fragment 98 (West), found inscribed on two stones of Parian marble dating to the first century B.C., describes an attack on a city tower (l.9 πύργος ; l.15 πύργον ; l.16 κλίμακας [restoration]).[13] In line 5 there is a reference to brandishing or throwing spears and in line 10 there is a reference to 'lithoi', which were probably thrown from the hands of soldiers positioned on the towers. In line 19 quivers ('pharetrai') are mentioned. In fragment 98 (W), then, it would seem that we have references to stone-throwers positioned in the towers of a city and also to archers. In two very fragmentary pieces of Archilochus we have references to a javelin (frag.113 (West), line 7 - 'akontis̀) and the sound made by javelins (frag.139 (West), line 6 - 'akonton doupon').[14] Note that John Boardman suggests that the two spears which are carried by the warriors on a Late Geometric Eretrian vase (he thinks that the vase was made in Eretria) were javelins rather than thrusting-spears.[15]

Thus, we have evidence in the fragments of Archilochus that the poet had knowledge of a wide range of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin-throwers and stone-throwers.

2 Tyrtaeus:

Tyrtaeus was an elegiac poet of the seventh century B.C. who composed poetry about the Spartans' wars with the Messenians. He was most probably a Spartan citizen and may have been a Spartan general.[16] He probably produced his martial poetry to inspire the Spartan warriors to fight in the Second Messenian War, which may have started in the 650s, although Pausanias dates it to the period 685 - 668 B.C., and may have dragged on until nearly the end of the seventh century.[17] The general consensus of opinion among historians is that we should place Tyrtaeus in the middle of the seventh century B.C., although some have suggested that he may have been writing his poetry towards the end of that century.[18]

Most historians agree that the conventional troops which Tyrtaeus described were equipped as hoplites.[19] These Spartan soldiers were equipped with spear, sword, helmets with crests, breastplates and large round convex shields; no mention is made of greaves.[20] The fact that there were hoplites in Sparta from about the middle of the seventh century is substantiated by archaeological evidence. A large early deposit of lead hoplite figurines has been excavated from the Artemis Orthia sanctuary and John Boardman in his study of the stratum (Lead I) and the pottery in it (Laconian I) comes to the conclusion that the pottery, and hence the stratum, should not be dated much before 650 B.C.[21] (an ivory seal, again from the Artemis Orthia sanctuary, which depicts three hoplites marching in line and which dates to c.650 B.C., has also been found).[22] Thus we know for certain that by about 650 B.C. votive hoplite figurines were being produced in large numbers at Sparta. The main question, however, which has divided historians is not whether Tyrtaeus was describing troops equipped with 'hopla', but whether he is portraying them fighting in a primitive unorganized fashion or in phalanx formation. Along with Lazenby (The Spartan Army, p.76), Greenhalgh (EGW, p.94), Salmon (Political Hoplites? JHS 97 (1977), p.91) and others, I am of the opinion that Tyrtaeus was describing hoplites operating in phalanx formation rather than in a confused mêlée (however, the Spartans who fought in the First Messenian War, c.735 - 715 B.C., were probably not equipped with full hoplite armour and probably did not fight in phalanx formation).[23] Although Tyrtaeus' elegiac poetry is coloured by Homeric vocabulary and idiom, his attitude to fighting in battle is very different from that of Homer: Homer's heroes fight duels for themselves and their own glory and dominate the battle, in which the masses are portrayed as taking no effective part. Tyrtaeus, in contrast, addresses his warriors as a group (cf. West, 11. 7-14) and exhorts them as a body to show 'arete' by standing close together in their battle line and not fleeing. As Oswyn Murray notes, Tyrtaeus' view of valour is very different from that of Homer (Early Greece, pp.128 - 131):[24] in a Homeric

battle heroes frequently advance in front of their own line of soldiers and each hero challenges an opposing hero to a duel (e.g. Iliad Γ 19 - 20, E 627f, Z 119f, N 445f, N 809), but Tyrtaeus repeatedly exhorts the Spartan troops to stand firm beside one another (West 10.15: 11.11) and to give encouragement to the men standing beside them (West 12. 15 - 20). It seems very likely,then,that Tyrtaeus was describing hoplites fighting in phalanx formation.

Although Tyrtaeus in his poetry concentrates on the heavily-armed infantry,he also refers in three of his fragments to light-armed troops and to missiles which were presumably used by these troops (West frag.11, lines 27 - 28 and 35 - 38; frag.19 and lines 19 - 20 and P.Oxy. Vol.47 (1980) no.3316, pp.1-6). Firstly, let us consider West frag.11: in this fragment Tyrtaeus exhorts the 'neoi', who are equipped with large shields (ls.23-24), heavy spears (l.25) and helmets with crests (l.26), to come to grips with the enemy and not to fear the barrage of missiles as they approach them:

ἐρδων δ' ὄβριμα ἔργα διδασκέσθω πολεμίζειν,
μηδ' ἐκτὸς βελέων ἑστάτω ἀσπίδ' ἔχων, (27 - 28).

Missiles (belea l.28) must have been used against the Spartans by their enemies; Tyrtaeus' exhortation would suggest that a barrage of missiles struck fear into the hearts of even heavily-armed troops.

After an exhortation of 25 lines (ls.10-34) addressed to the 'neoi', whom I assume were probably hoplites arranged in phalanx block, Tyrtaeus exhorts the 'gymnetes', the lightly-armed troops, in four lines:

ὑμεῖς δ', ὦ γυμνῆτες, ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
πτώσσοντες μεγάλοις βάλλετε χερμαδίοις
δούρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτούς,
Τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάμενοι. (35 - 38)

This is our first literary reference to light-armed infantry being termed 'gymnetes'.[25] They are also termed 'gymnomachoi' in another fragment which we shall examine shortly.[26] There has been some confusion among historians about the meaning of the above passage and its importance in the context of understanding what type of formation was used by the 'neoi' - Snodgrass comments: "Yet in general spirit the poems, particularly 8 (E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca (Teubner text, Leipzig, 1925) no. 8 = West 11), leave much to be desired as exhortations to hoplites fighting in the phalanx. The presence of light-armed men with javelins and stones is not incompatible with hoplite tactics; but when it is clear that the heavy-armed warrior has the choice of fighting bravely among the promachoi or else of skulking behind out of range of missiles, and that the gymnetes are apparently to take cover behind the hoplites' shields, one may well ask what kind of phalanx this is". However, the point of the exhortation seems fairly clear: the hoplites must not fear to charge on through the shower of missiles fired at them.

Let us now consider how the 'gymnetes' were armed in this fragment: the Spartan 'gymnetes' are in turn exhorted to let fly with their smooth javelins and big stones. The ' μεγάλοις χερμαδίοις ' may well simply have been stones thrown by hand, such as most commentators take them, but we should bear in mind the possibility, as Greenhalgh suggests, that Tyrtaeus was referring to stones used as sling-bullets.[27] Some stone sling-shots could be fairly large, but possibly not large enough to be described as 'μεγάλους '.[28] A moulded pithos fragment, dating to the sixth century B.C., has been found at Sparta which depicts a slinger.[29] Only the stone is shown in relief but the position of the warrior's hands makes it certain that the sling was painted in. The slinger, who is also equipped with a sword and helmet and is clad in a leopard's skin, operates from behind a hoplite - this makes Wace suppose that the slinger is the squire of the hoplite.[30] The stone which the slinger uses seems to be larger, if the scale is correct, than later Classical

lead bullets and seems to have been about the size of a tennis ball - is this big enough to be termed 'megà? Javelins, being cheap to manufacture and easy to use, were a favourite weapon of light-armed troops - it is probable that the Spartan light-armed helots in the Persian War of 480 - 79 B.C. were also equipped with javelins.[31] Note that Tyrtaeus in this fragment only mentions javelin-throwers and stone-throwers/slingers; contrary to the view of Pritchett, Tyrtaeus never mentions archers in any of his fragments.[32] There is, however, archaeological evidence which would strongly suggest that the bow was used from the middle of the seventh century into the sixth century B.C. at Sparta. Many early lead figurines of kneeling archers (Lead I) have been excavated from the Artemis Orthia Sanctuary.[33] The figurines are small, of poor quality, and their execution is sketchy. The archers are depicted naked, apart from the crested helmets which they wear, and they appear to hold two different types of self-bow, one of which is small, the other quite large like the English long-bow.[34] They always take horizontal aim with their bows. Archer figurines were commonly found in the early Lead I and Lead II deposits, but only rarely in the later Lead III - IV deposits. In the sixth century the composite bow appears as the weapon of a goddess in lead figurines; there are also lead figurines of Heracles carrying his quiver, in the Greek fashion, at shoulder height.[35] There is further archaeological evidence which would suggest that the bow was used at this early period at Sparta in the form of arrowheads which have been excavated there and which most probably date to the Archaic Period.[36] The pithos fragment, although of a later sixth century date, also shows an archer equipped with what appears to be a self-bow, operating from the rear of a hoplite.[37] It seems strange, given our strong body of archaeological information for the use of the bow at Sparta, that Tyrtaeus never mentions archers in any of his surviving fragments. Pausanias does, indeed, assert that the Spartans used a force of Cretan mercenary archers in the early Messenian Wars,

but much of his narrative of these wars is of extremely dubious historicity.[38]

Let us now consider how the 'gymnetes' were used in relation to the more heavily-armed troops in fragment 11 (West). Tyrtaeus urges the light-infantry to hurl their missiles "crouching here and there under the shield" (ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος / πτώσσοντες (ls.35-36) and "standing in close proximity to the soldiers equipped with a full panoply" (τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἑστάμενοι (l.38). The first problem is to whom does the shield (aspis) referred to in line 35 belong. Snodgrass (EGAW, p.182, but cf. AAG, p.67) and Cawkwell (Philip of Macedon (1978), p.152) suggest that the 'aspis' belonged to a heavily-armed soldier and that the 'gymnetes' crouched for protection behind the shields of their own hoplites. If their own hoplites did fight in a phalanx formation, as I have suggested, it seems unlikely that the light-armed troops would have operated from behind the shields of the hoplites in the front ranks during a close-range phalanx battle - they would have created much confusion in their own ranks by getting in the way of the hoplites and would have loosened the cohesion of the phalanx block and thus presented a fragmented front to the enemy. It is possible, however, that light-armed troops did crouch behind the shields of the hoplites of the front ranks and throw their missiles but then withdrew, either to the wings or the rear, when it appeared that the phalanx blocks were about to engage.[39] The alternative possibility, suggested by Lorimer (The Hoplite Phalanx, p.127) and followed by Pritchett (GSW IV, p.40 with n.131), is that the 'aspis' may refer to some type of shield which the 'gymnetes' carried. Pritchett thus thinks that the light-troops crouched behind their own shields and translates the phrase τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἑστάμενοι as "keeping your position near the hoplites" and takes it to mean that "the light-armed were to be on the flanks or behind the hoplites, but not intermingled with them". I would follow Pritchett's suggestion that the 'gymnetes' were not intermingled with the hoplites -

in order to throw a stone or a javelin for any distance, the light-armed troops would have needed a run-up and it seems very unlikely that there was any room at all for this in a phalanx block - but I think we should bear in mind the possibility that the 'gymnetes', as the Scythian archers on Attic vase-paintings of the later sixth century are sometimes portrayed as doing, may have operated under the protection of hoplites in front or possibly on the wings of their own phalanx block. Lazenby's interpretation of lines 35 - 38 seems strained:[40] he argues that these lines indicate that the light-armed troops could have performed no independent role, but, as Pitchett argues, the phrase τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάμενοι may simply mean that the light-armed troops (equipped with their own shields) were positioned near the hoplites, possibly on the wings, and could well have played their own active role of protecting the flanks of the hoplites.[41]

In another very fragmentary passage of a poem by Tyrtaeus missiles, used presumably by light-armed troops, are referred to (West, frag.19):

- τ]ῆρός τε λίθων καὶ
]ν ἐθνεσιν εἰδομ[ένους (lines 2 - 3)

αἱ δ' ὑπὸ] χερμαδίων βαλλόμεναι μ[εγάλων
χάλκεια]ι κ[όρυ]θες κανα χὴν ἔξου[σι (lines 19 - 20)

Note that there is nothing to support Pitchett's view (GSW IV, p.38) that archers are referred to in this fragment. In line two we have a reference to stones which must have been thrown by 'lithoboloi' and the advance of these troops seems to be compared to a group of creatures - Pitchett suggests an 'ethnos' of wasps.[42] Lines 1 - 2 possibly describe the large numbers of stone-throwers (and other light-armed troops?) used in a battle. In lines 19 - 20 of the same fragment we are told about the clanging noise made by bronze helmets when struck by large stones. The stones were probably hurled by missile-troops at the heads of the hoplites because a large stone had the

potential to cause even a helmeted warrior to suffer from concussion.

The last piece of Tyrtaeus which we shall examine comes from a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus which has been recently published [43]

γλαυκῶπις θυ[γ]άτηρ αἰγιόχ[οιο Διός.
πολλοὶ δὲ ξυστοῖσιν ἀκοντιόϲ[
α]ἰχμῆις ὀξείηις ἄνδρες ἐπι[
γ]υμνομάχοι προθέ[ο]ντες ὐ[
]καδες Ἀργειωνυ ε[ ] [
]ιμεν παρὰ τειχ[
]θιηισιν· ὕδωρ [
] αρ' Ἀθηναίης γ[
] ψαντ[ ] τάφρο[
πάντ]ας μὲν κτενέουϲ[
Σπα]ρτιητέων ὁπόσουϲ
ἐξ]οπίσω φεύγοντας α[

In these elegiacs, which are ascribed to Tyrtaeus, 'gymnomachoi' are described as taking part in what appears to be an imminent campaign - the only surviving main verb, κτενέουϲ[ι , is in the future tense. This piece is almost certainly set in the Second Messenian War - in line 21 we have Spartans mentioned and in line 15 Argives and also possibly Arcadians (according to Strabo (Tyrt.fr.8 West) and Pausanias (IV.15.7) the Arcadians as well as the Argives helped the revolting Messenians in the Second Messenian War). In line 16 there is mention of a wall (τειχ[ ) and in line 19 a ditch (τάφρο[ ) - these clues would lead us to suspect that a battle is about to take place around a position which is protected by a ditch and a fortification wall. Pausanias in IV.17.2 and .17.7 describes a battle in the Second Messenian War in which the Spartans fought with a trench at their backs and gained a victory over the Messenians.[44] Tyrtaeus also in other

fragments described a battle in which the Spartans had a trench at their backs so that they could not run away (frag.9 West, and cf. τα̣φ̣[in 23.5; in frag.23 there are also references to a τεῖχος in lines 3 and 7).[45] It is probable that Tyrtaeus and Pausanias are referring to the same battle - Rhianus in his Messeniaca may have preserved a true tradition about this battle, based probably on the verses of Tyrtaeus.

Let us now consider the light-armed troops who are referred to in this papyrus fragment: in line 14 we are informed of light-infantry (γ]υμνο-μάχοι) who are described as running forward (προθέ[ο]ντες), presumably in front of their more heavily-armed troops. 'Gymnomachoi' is almost certainly the correct reading and this is the first occurrence of the word;[46] in the other fragment of Tyrtaeus (frag.11.35 West) where light-armed troops are mentioned, they are termed 'gymnetes'. We are given no clue as to whether the 'gymnomachoi' belong to the Spartan side or to their opponents. The 'gymnomachoi' in this fragment were probably armed with the smooth javelins (ξυστοῖσιν ἀκοντίσ̣ε̣) of line 12 - note also that in Tyrtaeus fragment 11.36 - 37 (West) the 'gymnetes' are urged to throw their smooth javelins and large rocks. The evidence of the recently discovered papyrus fragment would suggest that light-armed infantry engaged either other enemy light-armed troops or the front ranks of enemy hoplites at a distance by running in front of their own hoplites and showering them with javelins; being lightly-armed, they probably took no part in the hand-to-hand fighting in which the heavily-armed infantry excelled; when it looked as if the hoplites were about to come to grips in close combat, the light-armed troops must either have withdrawn to the flanks or rear of their own hoplite formation. They may possibly have continued to operate from the flanks, but if they were positioned in the rear it seems unlikely that they would have thrown missiles over the heads of their own hoplites because of the danger of hitting their own men in the back.[47]

In conclusion, we may say that the fact that Tyrtaeus mentioned light-armed troops twice (termed 'gymnetes', 11.35 West; 'gymnomachoi', P.Oxy. no. 3316, line 14) and their missile weapons in six lines ('belea': 11.28 (West); 'lithoi': 19.2; 'chermadioi': 11.36, 19.19; 'akontia': 11.37 and P.Oxy. no.3316, line 12) in the few fragments of his poems which we possess, would suggest that he did not dismiss their effect on warfare as negligible. Unfortunately we have no evidence about the size of Sparta's light-armed infantry force or as to whether the Spartans, as Snodgrass asserts, were the first Greeks to organize such a corps;[48] Lazenby may well be wrong in suggesting that it was very small and unimportant since there may be in West 19.2-3 a reference to the large number of these troops.[49]

Although we are not specifically informed in any of Tyrtaeus' fragments whether the Spartan light-armed troops were true Spartiates or of an inferior social group, I think that A.J. Toynbee (Some Problems of Greek History (1969), p.256 n.17) is mistaken in accepting F. Kiechle's view (Lakonien und Sparta (1963), pp.192 - 3) that the 'gymnetes' were Spartiates: would full Spartan citizens, who claimed to be equals (homoioi) and who could afford heavy arms (hopla were valuable and must have reflected a warrior's status), consent to fight as light-armed troops with missile weapons, which the Spartans appear to have despised throughout the Classical Period?[50] In primitive societies are we really to expect the élite to arm themselves lightly, when they have the wealth and position to acquire heavy arms and armour? I think not, and would suggest that the light-armed troops in the Spartan forces were not true Spartans but men of inferior social groups.

We have limited information about the military role of the light-troops used by the Spartans. In fragment 11.38 they are described as standing near to the hoplites, crouching down behind either their own shields or those of the hoplites. In the Oxyrhynchus papyrus fragment (3316, line 14) they are described as running forwards in front of their own ranks. Although

their role in warfare was almost certainly subordinate to that of the hoplites (this may be reflected in the fact that the 'neoi' of fragment 11 are exhorted for 25 lines, whereas the 'gymnetes' are exhorted for only 4), there is no evidence to support the theory of Lazenby that they were of negligible military value. [51]

3 Callinus:

Callinus, an elegiac poet of Ephesus, probably composed his poetry around the middle of the seventh century B.C., when the Cimmerians and Trerians (frags. 4 and 5a West) were attacking Phrygia, Lydia and Ionia (Strabo 627,647).[52] Fragment 5(a) (West) must have been composed soon after the fall of Sardis, which can be dated by the records of Ashurbanipal to 652 B.C. Callinus also referred to the destruction of Magnesia on the Maeander by the citizens of Ephesus (Athenaeus 525 c).

In one of his surviving fragments (West 1) Callinus mentions javelin-warfare:

μέχρις τέο κατάκεισθε; κότ' ἄλκιμον ἔξετε θυμόν,
ὦ νέοι; οὐδ' αἰδεῖσθ' ἀμφιπερικτίονας
ὧδε λίην μεθιέντες; ἐν εἰρήνηι δὲ δοκεῖτε
ἧσθαι, ἀτὰρ πόλεμος γαῖαν ἅπασαν ἔχει
. . . . . .
καί τις ἀποθνήσκων ὕστατ' ἀκοντισάτω. (1 - 5)

πολλάκι δηΐοτῆτα φυγὼν καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων
ἔρχεται, ἐν δ' οἴκωι μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου,
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔμπης δήμωι φίλος οὐδὲ ποθεινός· (14-16)

The exact context of this poem is not known: Snodgrass (AAG,p.64) and Pritchett (GSWIV,p.35) think that Callinus is exhorting the Ephesians to fight against the Cimmerians, but we should bear in mind the suggestion of

D.A. Campbell (Greek Lyric Poetry) (1967), pp.161-2), based on Strabo 14.1.40 (Callinus 3 West), that he may be exhorting them to combat with the Magnesians.

Callinus refers twice in this poem to javelin-warfare ("And let each man hurl a javelin for the last time as he dies" (line 5) / "Often will he escape the battle-strife and the whizz of javelins" (line 14)). Javelin-heads have been found at Old Smyrna and Paphos and it seems likely that these were used by Ionian 'akontistai'.[53] Some commentators take lines 9 - 11 to refer to hoplites advancing in phalanx formation, but this inference is hardly justifiable: Callinus merely mentions soldiers equipped with spears and shields advancing.[54] J. Latacz in his discussion of the poem (Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios. Zetemata 66 (1977), pp.229 - 232) thinks that Callinus refers to hoplites in phalanx formation armed primarily with the javelin . However, it seems to me very unlikely that hoplites arrayed in phalanx formation would have used the javelin as their main weapon: a javelin , to be thrown with any effect, needed a run up and it is certain that there would have been no room for this in a close-packed phalanx formation; the phalanx would have been a very awkward and unsuitable formation for 'akontistai' since it would not have allowed any space for this run or for the throwing action of the arm. A javelin also would not have been a very suitable weapon for a true hoplite to use since his full panoply of helmet, cuirass, greaves and any other weapons with which he may have been equipped, would have severely inhibited movement.[55] It seems most likely to me that Callinus was not describing hoplites in phalanx formation armed with javelins, but rather men armed with javelins or spears, some of whom were equipped with shields, operating in a loose formation. It is possible also that Callinus was describing a transitional phase, apparently depicted on a number of early vases, in which the Ephesians had adopted some pieces of the hoplite

panoply, such as the shield and thrusting-spear, but still fought mainly with the javelin in loose formation.[56]

Mimnermus and the Siege of Smyrna

Mimnermus, an elegiac poet of Colophon and Smyrna, probably composed his poetry towards the end of the seventh century B.C.[57] Two surviving fragments of his works portray warfare (West 13a and 14). Pausanias (9.29.4) informs us that his war-poetry described fighting between Smyrna and Gyges, king of Lydia - this fighting probably took place at some time in the period c.675 - 660 B.C.[58] Fragment 13a describes Lydian troops charging and covering themselves with their shields, whilst fragment 14 deals with a story told to Mimnermus by his elders about a hero who routed bodies of Lydian troops on the plain of Hermus; we are further informed that this man was armed with a spear (φῶτα φερεμμελίην) and that he rushed at the Lydians without fearing the bitter missiles (πικρὰ βέλεα) which they fired.[59] There is a strong epic tinge throughout fragment 14 and we cannot tell if the Smyrnian spearman was a hoplite and have no information as to whether the Smyrnians fought in phalanx formation.[60]

O. Murray and J.M. Cook suggest that fragment 14 was sung as an encouragement to the Smyrnians in their war with the Lydian king Alyattes at the end of the seventh century B.C.[61] Herodotus in I.16 narrates Alyattes' march against the Greek cities of Smyrna, Colophon and Clazomenae and against Miletus in I.17.1.[62] The excavations on the site of Old Smyrna by the British School at Athens in the 1950s provide us with useful archaeological information about the archers and other missile-troops who were present on both the Lydian and Greek sides at the siege of Smyrna in c.600 B.C.[63] To the north-west of the impressive fortification system of Smyrna the archaeologists found the remains of the massive siege mound constructed by the attacking Lydian troops out of earth, branches of trees, stones, bricks and

timbers from houses which had been demolished. The excavators dug probes in and around the siege mound and discovered a quantity of stone sling-shots and arrowheads of various types, manufactured mainly out of bronze.[64] The sling-shots were confined to rounded stones and no metal bullets were found; it is uncertain whether they were used by the Lydians or the Greek defenders and since even the identification of these was a rather subjective matter it was not possible to obtain statistics for them.[65] The bronze arrow-heads which occurred both in the mound and the city were of four main types:[66]

(a) A small hollow-socketed type with three flanges on its blade, referred to by Nicholls as a 'triangular' head. This type is not of Greek or local Anatolian origin and was used primarily by the Scythians and Persians. It has been found on the battlefields of Marathon and Plataea and on the north slope of the Acropolis.[67]

(b) A small socketed variety with a leaf-shaped blade and a single barb projecting from the socket. Nicholls refers to this type as a 'leaf' head. It is extremely common in Greece and Anatolia.[68]

(c) A small socketed type with four flanges on its narrow blade. It is referred to as a 'diamond' head by Nicholls. Only a very few examples of this type were found and its origins and associations are obscure.[69]

(d) A large and heavy, barbed and tanged, type which Nicholls refers to as a 'barbed and tanged' head. Many Classical examples of a similar type have been found on Crete and this type of head is depicted on Cretan coins.[70] Seven heads of this type were found in the destruction stratum in the temple area.[71]

From a fairly small number of probes into the main body of the siege mound to the north of the city walls, 26 arrowheads of the 'leaf' type were found and only a small number of arrowheads of other types. This must represent fire directed against the mound by the Greek defenders and would suggest that the Ionians were using arrowheads almost entirely of the 'leaf'

type. Probes into the mound-spill material to the west also produced a predominance of arrowheads of the 'leaf' type.

In the probes made inside the city directly opposite the Lydian siege mound arrowheads of the Eastern 'triangular' type were found to be predominant, although a smaller number of leaf-shaped heads were also found. The latter may have been washed in with the mound spill or could have been Greek ricochets which had rebounded off the Lydian mound. It would appear that the Lydians were using arrowheads of primarily the 'triangular' type.[72]

Further inside the city far more heads from thrusting-spears and javelins were found than arrowheads. However, in an undisturbed area of about $10m^2$ in the temple pylon were found 7 arrowheads of the 'barbed and tanged' variety, 12 of the 'leaf' type and 10 of the 'triangular'.[73]

All these findings would suggest that there was much use of archers (and probably also slingers, although it is uncertain whether by one or both sides) by both sides during the building of the siege mound. It has been suggested that the mound was first started at some distance from the wall to give the Lydian construction parties some protection against the deadly fire from the Greek archers.[74] Nicholls suggests that in the early stages of the building of the mound the Lydian archers played little part but that when it had been raised to a height which placed them on an equal level with the Ionian defenders their role increased.[75] When the siege mound overtopped the defensive wall of Smyrna and the Lydians managed to bridge the gap between the wall and mound, their assault parties rushed across the path into the city. From the finds inside the city it would appear that both sides then engaged each other in a desperate struggle in which the thrusting-spear and javelin were used far more than the bow.

The great volume of weapons found in the temple area led Nicholls to conclude that they could not all have been votive offerings but probably

indicate that heavy fighting took place in this position.[76] His suggestion that the temenos area with its massive enclosure walls to the south could have been used as an inner fortress with the help of an additional barricade on the west is very attractive. It was probably here that the Ionians made their last stand, with their archers, javelin-throwers and troops armed with the thrusting-spear, all fighting desperately to drive the Lydians from the walls.[77] The Lydians, under the protective fire of their own archers, must have taken the inner sanctuary in hard combat.[78]

Although the hypothesis that the finds of barbed and tanged arrowheads at Smyrna may indicate the presence of Cretan archers (mercenaries?) may seem far fetched, I think we should bear it in mind as a possibility.[79] The archaeological information gained from the excavations at Smyrna and Paphos sheds new light on the bare narrative of Herodotus and gives conclusive proof that some of the Ionian Greeks used the bow in the defence of their city walls in the Archaic and Early Classical Periods.[80] From the finds of relatively small javelinheads at both sites and from a fragment of Callinus (West 1.5), it would seem probable that the Greeks of Ionia also used the javelin.[81]

4 Alcaeus

The poet Alcaeus was probably born in c.620 B.C. and in the period c.600 - 570 B.C. wrote about the aristocratic faction-fighting which took place on the island of Lesbos.[82] In the surviving fragments of Alcaeus there are only two references which are of immediate interest to us: one to the bow (fr.124,Campbell, S. and A.) and the other to greaves which are described as a protection against powerful missiles (fr.140,Campbell, S. and A.).

In fragment 124 (=Pap.Oxy.1788 fr.7) there is a solitary reference to the bow - ἀ]πὸ τόξω . In fragment 140 Alcaeus describes the weapons and armour which are in a great house: horse-crested helmets, shining bronze greaves, linen cuirasses, convex shields, Chalcidian swords, belts and tunics (it is curious that there is no mention of the spear).[83] The bronze greaves are described as ἔρκος ἰσχύρω βέλεος - "a defence against the powerful missile".[84] This is one of the first references to metal greaves and it is clear that their special function was to protect the wearer against missiles such as arrows, javelins and stones (whether hurled from hand or fired from a sling).[85] Usually the thursting-spear was aimed at the neck and abdomen; the archer, who must have been comparatively ineffective against the shielded bodies of hoplites, generally aimed at their legs so as to provide crippled victims for the heavily-armed troops on his own side.[86] There is no evidence as to which parts of the body javelin-throwers, slingers and stone-throwers aimed at,but it seems likely that they also would have fired at the legs, and possibly also the face and spear-arm, when set against hoplites. The Lesbian hoplites, then, must have been subjected to missile fire and it was as a protection against these weapons that they wore metal greaves.[87] The fact that Alcaeus refers to the bow in fragment 124 may indicate that the Lesbians had forces of archers.

In conclusion to this chapter, we may say that the early Greek lyric and elegiac poets Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Callinus, and Alcaeus all refer to Greek light-armed infantry, or to the weapons or missiles used by these troops. Archilochus of Paros (fl.c.680 - 640 B.C.) shows a knowledge of a wide variety of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin-throwers and probably also stone-throwers. Tyrtaeus of Sparta (fl.middle of seventh century B.C.) refers to 'gymnetes' and 'gymnomachoi' who were apparently armed with javelins and stones and are described as running forwards in front of their

own ranks in one fragment and as standing near to their hoplites, crouching down either behind their own shields or those of the hoplites, in another. Callinus of Ephesus (fl.middle of seventh century B.C.) refers to javelin-throwers, who were most probably Ephesians. Although Mimnermus of Colophon and Smyrna (fl.end of seventh century B.C.) does not specifically mention any Greek light-armed troops, there is strong archaeological evidence which would suggest that the inhabitants of Smyrna used archers, and possibly also javelin-throwers and slingers, in the defence of their city against the Lydian Alyattes in c.600 B.C. Alcaeus of Lesbos (fl.c.600 - 570 B.C.) probably also witnessed Greek missile-troops in action - in one fragment he refers to the bow and in another he describes the greaves as a "protection against the powerful missile". Anacreon of Teos (born c.575 B.C. and died c.490 B.C.) does not mention Greek light-armed troops in any of his surviving fragments, but only a crook-bowed (ἀγκυλοτόξων) race of people, who were probably Sintians or Scythians (West 3). These references to Greek light-armed infantry, their weapons and missiles, in the surviving fragments of the early Greek elegiac and lyric poets would lead us to believe that the effect of these troops on the warfare of the seventh century and early sixth century B.C. was not negligible. Archaeological evidence confirms the fact that missile-troops must have played a part in the battles of the seventh century B.C.: we have seventh century depictions of archers, stone-throwers, javelin-throwers and of a slinger.[88]

CHAPTER THREE

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE FORCES OF THE TYRANTS PEISISTRATUS AND HIPPIAS AT ATHENS AND POLYCRATES ON SAMOS

Light-armed troops under the Peisistratids at Athens (c.560 - 510B.C.)

i. Warfare under the Peisistratids:

The literary sources for the period of the Peisistratids give us little information about the composition of the tyrants' military forces but do shed some light on the campaigns they waged. We learn that Peisistratus had been a successful general and had won renown in a war against Megara.[1] He was head of the hill faction and in the stasis which was then current between the faction of the coast and that of the plain he tried to set himself up as a tyrant with the aid of a force of club-bearers (c.561 - 560 B.C.).[2] After a short time Peisistratus was driven out by the other two faction leaders, Megacles and Lycurgus.[3] Peisistratus returned for a second time but was again driven out and it was probably not until 546/45 B.C. that he established himself as tyrant at Athens by defeating his enemies at the battle of Pallene.[4] In this final coup Peisistratus' Athenian supporters were supplemented by 1,000 Argive mercenaries (Herod.I.61; Ath.Pol.XV.2), troops supplied by Lygdamis of Naxos (Herod.I.61; Ath.Pol.XV.2), Thracian mercenaries (Ath.Pol.XV.2) and possibly by Theban and Eretrian soldiers, although these are not specified by our sources. Although Peisistratus' rule was on the whole peaceful (Ath.Pol.XVI.7), we do know that he took part in some fighting over Sigeion and that he captured Naxos.[5]

Peisistratus died in c.528/7 B.C. (Ath.Pol.XVII.1) and was succeeded by his son Hippias. It was almost certainly under Hippias that the Alcmeonid exiles, with the help of other exiles, fortified Leipsydrium and more than once attempted in vain to return by force to Athens. The Alcmeonids were besieged by the tyrant's troops and many noble Alcmeonids lost their lives in the fighting.[6] It appears that in 519 B.C. the Athenians, under Hippias, fought a war with Thebes over Plataea. Our

sources refer only casually to this battle: Herodotus (VI.108) mentions this war as the origin of the alliance between Athens and Plataea, in order to explain the presence of Plataean troops at the battle of Marathon. Thucydides in III.55.1 explains why the Plataeans became allies of Athens, and in III.68.5, in connection with the destruction of Plataea, says that this event took place in the 93rd year after the beginning of its alliance with Athens, which is thus dated to 519 B.C. The last major fighting which we hear about is during the two Spartan expeditions against Hippias which led to his expulsion in c.510 B.C. The first invasion was defeated by a force of 1,000 Thessalian cavalry at Phalerum; the force was led by the Thessalian king Cineas, who was an ally of the Peisistratids (Herod.V.63); Ath.Pol.XIX.5). In the second Spartan invasion Cleomenes defeated the Thessalian cavalry and while he was laying siege to the Peisistratids on the Acropolis he managed to capture their sons and force them to withdraw from Attica.[7] The warfare of the period c.520 - 510 B.C. is reflected by the number of surviving Attic stelai depicting hoplites which can be dated to these years.[8]

ii. Thracian Peltasts used by the Peisistratids:

Our sources do not mention any light-armed troops in the forces of the Peisistratids. However, we are informed in the Athenaion Politeia that Peisistratus before his final coup received financial resources and mercenary soldiers from the regions around Mount Pangaeum in Thrace (Ath.Pol. XV.2).[9] The native soldiers of Thrace had probably been armed as peltasts at an early date and these troops were often sought as mercenaries by Greek city states in the 5th century B.C.[10]

We possess archaeological information which can be used to supplement and clarify the testimony of Ath.Pol.XV.2. There are in existence several Attic vases dating to the period after 550 B.C. on which peltasts are

portrayed, and in at least ten cases we can judge from their dress (zeira and alopekis) that they are most probably Thracians.[11] Our earliest portrayal of these peltasts on Attic vases comes from the exterior of a Little-Master cup signed by Epitimus which can be dated to just after 550 B.C.[12] On it are depicted two peltasts, equipped with javelins and peltai, who operate at a considerable distance from one another; each of the peltasts has already thrown one of his javelins, which has hit, but not penetrated through, his opponent's pelte and each is about to throw his second javelin - the peltast with the high cap throws with an overarm action, the bare-headed peltast possibly with an underarm action. [13] The painter of the pot has portrayed clearly the throwing-loops attached to the javelins which have been thrown and the peltasts with their fingers in the loops of the javelins which they are about to hurl.[14] When peltasts could fight at long range , it may be expected that they would never have closed in hand-to-hand fighting with more heavily armed infantry; this is confirmed by the fact that these early peltasts are never portrayed with a secondary weapon such as a dagger or axe. Both the peltasts on the cup are wearing boots and a chiton under a chlamys and both carry wicker-work shields. One of the peltasts has a small pointed beard and a strange high cap which probably indicates that he is a barbarian.[15] The other peltast shows no foreign features and is probably Greek.

Our first certain depiction of Thracian peltasts comes from an Attic amphora which dates to about 540 B.C.[16] On the amphora is depicted a battle scene in which two peltasts use their javelins at close range as stabbing weapons; also present in the scene are an archer, a cavalryman and a fallen warrior. The peltasts both wear caps and the typical Thracian geometrically patterned cloak or zeira; they both carry peltai and hold their javelins in a thrusting position.[17] The peltasts on the amphora are drawn in much greater detail and with much greater accuracy than those on

the Little-Master cup and it seems likely that the artist of the amphora had a closer aquaintance with Thracian peltasts. The amphora was painted around the time of the battle of Pallene and Peisistratus' final coup and it is very likely that the peltasts depicted on it were the Thracian mercenaries from the region of Mt. Pangaeum which are mentioned in the Athenaion Politeia as having been recruited by the tyrant before the battle.[18] Best regards both the archer and cavalryman as Thracians, but this I feel is far from certain.[19] The only distinctive barbarian feature which the cavalryman and archer have is the pointed cap which they wear, neither of them wear the typically Thracian zeira in which the two peltasts are clad.

In the period c.550 - 490 B.C. true peltasts equipped with crescent-shaped peltai and javelins or spears are generally depicted ; whereas after that date, until the last decades of the fifth century, the warriors are almost always simple spearmen who are not equipped with peltai. It seems probable, then, that there were no true peltasts in Athens after c.490 B.C. - certainly Herodotus mentions no Thracian troops fighting on the side of the Athenians at Marathon in 490 B.C. It has been suggested by Best that with the Persian occupation of the Thracian coastline in 492 B.C., the flow of Thracian mercenary peltasts to Athens ceased, but since the land was not held down by garrisons it would have been difficult for the Persians to stop the flow of mercenaries.[20] The reason why Athens had no Thracian peltasts by the time of Marathon is unknown. Note well the chronology: Thracian peltasts still appear on Attic vases after Hippias' fall in 510 B.C. until about 490 B.C. It seems as if the Thracian peltasts continued to be used by the Athenians after Hippias' fall. One might argue that this does not agree with reality and that after 510 B.C. the Thracian peltasts had in fact left Athens, but that the Attic vase-painters did not forget these striking barbarians with their strange caps, curved shields and distinctive geometric cloaks and continued to draw them on their vases.

But if the Thracian peltasts had formed part of the Peisistratid body-guard or their personal mercenary force and in 510 B.C. had disappeared from the scene as the tyrants' henchmen, it is very unlikely that the Athenian vase-painters would have continued to portray these unpopular troops - they would have found few customers to buy the pots on which peltasts were depicted! The logical solution, I think, is to consider the Thracian peltasts as a regular part of the Athenian army. They must have fought well and been accepted as useful by the Athenians, otherwise they would not have been kept on in Athens after the fall of the tyrants in 510 B.C. It may be that the peltast force received no new recruits after 510 B.C. (for an unknown reason) and its numbers declined until by 490 B.C. there was no recognized force of Thracian peltasts in the Athenian army.

We know little about the tactics and deployment of these Thracian peltasts. Our literary sources give us no information and we must rely heavily on archaeological evidence in the form of vase-paintings which may contain stylistic features which do not reflect reality. On the Little-Master cup of c.550 B.C. the peltasts are portrayed as throwing their javelins at each other from a considerable distance, whereas on the amphora of c.540 B.C. the Thracian peltasts close in hand-to-hand fighting with their javelins in a mêlée in which an archer and a cavalryman are also present. Although the depiction of the peltasts on the amphora is more detailed than that of their counterparts on the cup, the portrayal of their mode of combat seems artificial and inaccurate - the peltasts fight too close to one another (note that they are not equipped with a sword or dagger for close combat) and although they apparently use their javelins for stabbing, they do not grip them with their full fists but hold their fingers as if they are placed through the throwing-loops ready for a cast rather than a thrust. The artist of the amphora wished to portray a coherent group of

warriors which was artistically pleasing and thus portrayed peltasts fighting at a closer range than they were accustomed to do in reality. The portrayal of the two peltasts fighting at a distance on the cup is more likely to reflect accurately the normal peltast mode of combat and accords well with the descriptions of peltasts in action in Thucydides and Xenophon.[21]

Note that the peltasts are never depicted fighting along with hoplites, as the Scythian infantry archers frequently are.[22] They may possibly have run in front of their own phalanx block and either engaged with enemy hoplites from a distance or other light-armed troops[23]- this would explain why the archer is in the mêlée and also the cavalryman who, as we shall see in the narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon, was well suited to combat light-infantry in scattered formation, especially on flat exposed positions.

On which of the campaigns mentioned on pages 72-3 might the peltasts have been used? It is probable that they were recruited initially to aid Peisistratus in his third attempt at tyranny and that they fought at Pallene, although Herodotus makes no mention of them in this battle. Peltasts were well suited to operating on hilly or uneven ground and it is possible that they took part in the attack against the Alcmeonids and their supporters in their high fortified position of Leipsydrion. We frequently hear in the histories of Thucydides and Xenophon of peltasts being used in storming parties to take walled positions.[24] Peltasts could have been utilized in normal hoplite battles where they could have harried the less organized enemy light-infantry and the front ranks of the opposing phalanx before the two main armies of hoplites engaged. They may also have been positioned on the wings to prevent a flank attack. For maximum effect the peltasts of the Peisistratids would have been used in large numbers, either in conjunction with archers or cavalry. Indeed, on the Attic amphora of c.540 B.C. the Thracian peltast on the left is supported by a cavalryman and an archer. Did Hippias use the Thessalian cavalry in conjunction with Thracian peltasts

to defeat Anchimolius and his Spartan army at Phalerum? In the Peloponnesian War peltasts were used on ravaging attacks and overseas expeditions: the Thracian peltasts in the army of the Peisistratids could possibly also have been used in ravaging attacks and on the overseas expeditions to Sigeion and Naxos.[25]

iii. Scythian Archers used by the Peisistratids:

We have no reference in our sources to the use of foreign mercenary archers by the Peisistratids at Athens and it therefore comes as a surprise to find that there are in existence well over three hundred depictions of what appear to be Scythian archers on Attic vases of the period c.530 - 490 B.C. The first accurate depictions of these Scythian archers occur in the period c.540 - 530 B.C. and from c.530 B.C. onwards they appear in great numbers, the greatest number lying in the period c.520 - 500 B.C. After c.500 B.C. there are comparatively few representations of Scythian archers and these representations are generally inaccurate. M.F. Vos has studied in detail the depictions of Scythian archers on Attic vases in her work entitled Scythian Archers in Archaic Attic Vase-Painting (1963) and I must confine myself to considering the role of these foreign archers on the battlefield.[26] Firstly, however, I would state that I follow Vos in assuming that these archers were Scythians and not, as A. Plassart supposes, Athenian citizens dressed in Scythian attire.[27] I also assume that Peisistratus recruited these archers for his regular army in c.530 B.C. and that they were not the personal servants of individual hoplites.[28]

It is possible for us to hypothesise from Attic vase depictions of the period c.530 - 500 B.C., which on the whole appear to be very accurate, how the Scythian archers were used and where they were positioned in relation to their hoplites. They appear, from the vase-paintings, to have been positioned in the first or possibly the first two ranks of their own phalanx,

often covered by the shields of their own hoplites, and shot horizontally at their targets. They are always depicted singly or in small groups, acting in conjunction with hoplites, and are never shown operating as a coherent unit on their own. [29]

The Scythian archers are never portrayed as operating from behind a phalanx or shooting their arrows high so as to rain down upon their opponents, as Assyrian and Egyptian archers are sometimes depicted doing and as the Persians are described doing in Herodotus. [30] The light Scythian arrowheads would have simply fallen as a rain on the bronze helmets and bronze or linen cuirasses of the enemy hoplites and since they would have no greater force than that provided by their own weight, they would not have had much penetrative power. It is apparent that the Scythian archers took horizontal aim both from the pictures where they are shown shooting thus and, as Vos notes, from others in which they are depicted checking their arrows for straightness. [31] There would have been no point in checking their arrows if they did not intend to shoot them at a particular target since if they were about to shoot high at a body of troops so that their arrows rained down upon them, the slight deflection caused by an arrow not being totally straight would not have mattered.

If, as they are so portrayed on several vases, the Scythian archers were positioned in the front ranks of a phalanx, this would obviously have loosened the cohesion of the close-packed infantry block; [32] the Scythians would have got in the way of the hoplites, who were trying to lunge overarm with their spears, by attempting to gain protection behind their shields. They were totally unsuited to fighting in the front ranks of a phalanx beside hoplites: their secondary weapons, the battle-axe and dagger, would not have been efficient against troops who could lunge at them from a distance with thrusting-spears, and the unwieldy long-handled Scythian battle-axe would have posed a grave danger to the hoplites standing at either side and behind the

Scythians in the phalanx block.[33] The fact that Scythians could not stand up well to hoplites in close battle is reflected by the recurrent motif of a dead or wounded Scythian lying at the feet of battling hoplites.[34]

It is obvious that the Scythian archers were used with single hoplites to operate either in front of their own phalanx or to pick off enemy troops from their positions in the front ranks of their own phalanx when they approached within firing range.[35] When the two phalanxes were about to join, the Scythians must have retired either to the wings or the rear of their own phalanx and left their hoplites unhindered to fight with their spears in close formation. At the end of a battle it is probable that the Scythian archers, being very mobile, were used either to pursue a routed enemy or to protect the rear of their own fleeing hoplites.[36]

It is possible that in the period of the Peisistratids no other Greek state had a force of Scythian archers and consequently an organized and fully trained corps of these troops would have given the tyrants at Athens a military ascendancy over their enemies who very probably lacked forces of efficient missile troops.

Appendix: Scythian Archers at Athens after the Fall of Hippias in 510 B.C.

Scythian archers continue to be depicted on Attic vases in large numbers in the period c.510 - 500 B.C. after Hippias had been overthrown from his tyranny. It is only after c.500 B.C. that depictions of Scythian archers decrease dramatically and after c.490 B.C. we find that there are hardly any accurate depictions at all.[37] As with the depictions of the Thracian peltasts on Attic vases, we find that Scythian archers continue to be portrayed until the period c.500 - 490 B.C. and since Herodotus specifically states that the Athenians advanced without the support of archers at the battle of Marathon we must assume that there were no Scythians left in Athens in 490 B.C.[38] The fact that the Scythian archers are portrayed in large

numbers in the period c.510 - 500 B.C. probably indicates that the Scythians had fought well in the army of the Peisistratids and the Athenians felt that they should be kept as a contingent in their forces.[39]

The reason why there were no Scythians at Athens in 490 B.C. is a mystery. As in the case of the peltasts, the disappearance of these archers was probably not connected with the fall of the Peisistratids and it is very unlikely that the Athenians would have abandoned them in the period of worsening relations with Persia. It may be that during and after Darius' expedition against Scythia in c.514 B.C. the Scythians needed all the troops they could muster and could not have afforded to send any more new archers to Athens.[40] The Scythians may also have become hostile to the Greeks because some Greeks of Ionia, including Miltiades, had taken part in this attack against their country.[41] After the burning of Sardis in c.498 B.C. the Persians would have tried to stop the Athenians recruiting mercenaries who might be used against themselves in any future retaliatory action which the Persian king might take.[42] Thus because of either one or a combination of these factors it may have been difficult for the Athenians to replace Scythian archers who had been killed in action or died of illness or natural causes. The force of Scythian archers may have become so small that it was of no military value or had ceased to exist by 490 B.C.

We are next informed about Athens recruiting Scythian archers by Andocides who asserts that the Athenians acquired a body of 300 mercenary Scythian archers during the period of the Thirty Years Peace of 446 B.C. with Sparta (On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians, 5).[43] This passage of Andocides is, however, riddled with historical inaccuracies and we cannot be certain if the Athenians really did recruit Scythian archers at that period.[44]

Archers in the Forces of Polycrates of Samos (c.538 - 522 B.C.):

Not long after the Persian conquest of Ionia, Polycrates set himself up as tyrant of Samos, with military aid from Lygdamis of Naxos.[45] Polycrates was militarily ambitious and wished to make himself master of Ionia and the Aegean islands.[46] Herodotus informs us that he organized a fleet of 100 pentekonêrs and a force of 1,000 archers (ἔκτητο δὲ πεντηκοντέρους τε ἑκατὸν καὶ χιλίους τοξότας [III.39.3]). In Herodotus III.45.3 we further learn that the archers were both 'misthotoi' and 'oikeioi'.

The force of one thousand mercenary archers would have been useful for Polycrates in his ravaging expeditions against the other Aegean islands and the cities on the Ionian mainland[47] during the Peloponnesian War the Athenians frequently sent archers on sea-borne expeditions.[48] They probably would have been useful in sea-battles also. In c.525 B.C. the Samian exiles, Spartans and Corinthians made a joint attack against Polycrates.[49] Herodotus does not specifically inform us that the mercenary archers took part in the fighting, but it is most probable that they did, as Polycrates needed every man to help to repel the large enemy force. However, in III.54.2 Herodotus does mention Polycrates' 'epikouroi' as a separate group from his many native Samians - were the 'epikouroi' in fact his mercenary archers?[50] In the fighting around the walls of Samos when the 'epikouroi' and many Samians sallied out of part of the city's defensive system which stood on a ridge of some high ground, they held their own against the large Spartan force before they gave ground.[51] Was this because the high ground was rough and ill-suited to the Spartan phalanx formation but well suited to the mobile light-armed archers of Polycrates? In the rout which followed, the Spartan troops inflicted heavy losses on the Samians - was this because some Samian light-armed troops stood their ground and tried

unsuccessfully to fight on with their missile weapons against the Spartan hoplites? It is very frustrating that Herodotus does not say more about the Spartan and Samian troops and their modes of combat.

Were Polycrates' mercenary archers native Samians or foreigners? Herodotus calls them 'oikeioi' (III.45.3) and this term is explained by some as 'native', but by others as 'household' troops.[52] W. Helbig infers that Polycrates hired Scythian archers from a fragment of Anacreon (D.A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry (1967) p.68, no. 356(b)) in which the poet describes Scythians shouting drunkenly - we know that Anacreon spent some time at the court of Polycrates and Helbig suggests that it was here that he gained knowledge of Scythians who acted as household troops.[53] This hypothesis is possible, but by no means certain: bear in mind that after Polycrates' death Anacreon went to Athens and he might have got to know the Scythians there.[54] The fact remains that Polycrates' archers may well have been native Samians and indeed there is archaeological evidence that the Samians produced the Greek 'boss-and-barb' type of arrowhead in the Geometric Period and another bronze tanged type in the Archaic Period.[55]

There has furthermore been some speculation that pairs of hoplites, whose shield blazons show marine-associated symbols, and Scythian archers represented on Attic vases of the last quarter of the sixth century B.C., may represent the troops of Polycrates, but there is no good reason to accept this theory. On CVA USA 10; 3He,pl 5,1 there is portrayed an old man in front of whom stand a hoplite and a Scythian archer; another hoplite stands behind the old man. The blazons on the hoplites' shields represent a ship's prow and a fishing fork. Smith in the CVA suggests that these are troops belonging to Polycrates: but shield blazons which represent marine-related objects are quite numerous and they cannot all have been associated with Polycrates.[56]

In conclusion we may say that the tyrants Peisistratus and Hippias at Athens included forces of specialist barbarian missile-troops, who were almost certainly mercenaries, in their army. It seems probable that Thracian peltasts and Scythian archers helped to give the Peisistratids a military ascendancy over their enemies (note that we never hear of the Peisistratids being beaten in battle once their tyranny had become established). Polycrates, a tyrant of Samos, also had a large force of 1,000 archers who were probably native Samians, although there is a possibility that they may have been Scythian mercenaries.

CHAPTER FOUR

GREEK LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF THE PERSIAN WARS (499 - 479 B.C.)

1 The Ionian Revolt (499 - 494 B.C.)

Herodotus in his narrative of the Ionian Revolt never mentions the use of archers or light-armed infantry by the Greeks of Asia Minor or of the islands off its coast in their fight against the Persians.[1] The excavations of Palaepaphos in 1950 - 53 have however shed some new light on the presence of Greek light-armed troops, at least in the case of Cyprus, in the Ionian Revolt. In Cyprus the anti-Persian parties headed by Onesilus gained control and in 498 or 497 B.C. a Persian fleet landed an army at the Karpass peninsula.[2] In the following battle in the plain of Salamis the Cypriots fought well until Stasanor, the King of Courion, betrayed the Greek cause; the Persians gained a great victory.[3] Although Herodotus does not specifically mention unconventional Cypriot infantrymen in his account of the battle, their presence may possibly be inferred from the fact that Onesilus' Carian shield-bearer (hypaspistes) was armed with a curved sword or scythe (drepane), a weapon which was not used by hoplites.[4]

Although the Ionians won a sea battle over the Phoenicians off Cyprus they sailed away home when they saw that the city of Salamis was about to surrender and thereafter the resistance of the Cypriots ended with a series of sieges (Herod. V.115). One of the cities which was put under siege and has in part been excavated is Paphos (the modern Kouklia).[5] The excavators found from the position of the siege and counter-siege works that the Persians had chosen to attack the northeast gate of the fortification walls on the Marcello Hill. The gate itself had very shortly before been remodelled, probably with the purpose of intensifying the possible missile fire of the defenders in mind. Any attacker had to fight his way through the narrow gate passage (2.9m wide) with its sharp double bend and the gate could effectively be defended by the crossfire of missile-troops posted on the gate bastions.

Directly outside the northeast gate and the neighbouring walls were found the remains of the massive siege-ramp which was constructed by the Persians out of stones, soil, rubble, wood and architectural and sculptural fragments.[6] In addition there were found in the mound vast quantities of weapons: as well as helmets and large spearheads, there were found hundreds of smaller spearheads, presumably from javelins, and arrowheads of various types made out of both iron and bronze. The hollow-socketed bronze arrowhead with triangular section, used especially by the Scythians and Persians, was found in large numbers;[7] this arrowhead is of a traditional Near Eastern type and, as well as having been excavated at many sites in Asia, has been found on the battlefields of Marathon and Thermopylae and on the north slope of the Acropolis.[8] The longer tanged arrowheads with triangular section are almost certainly Greek; other similar tanged heads have been found on other Greek sites on Cyprus.[9] No opinion is expressed by the archaeologists as to whether the javelinheads were Greek or Persian - the javelin was of course known to both nations.[10] There were also found many enigmatic large stones which had one of their sides flattened - these were probably too heavy to be used as sling-shots and may have been shot from catapults.[11]

To judge from the large quantities of fire-damaged arrowheads and javelinheads and fire-blackened stone missiles and fragments of burnt bones, severe fighting took place, in which missile-troops played a large part, during the building of the ramp. The Persian attackers, despite the intense crossfire of the defending Greek archers from the parapets, must have fought their way through the passage of the northeast gate and either burned or broken through the wooden doors and taken the city.

Archaeology, then, can show that Paphos fell after a desperate struggle in which the defending Greek archers and possibly also javelin-throwers rained their missiles down on the attacking Persian troops. Herodotus says nothing about this stout defence by the Greek missile-troops. It is thus very

possible that other Greek states on the side of the Ionians had forces of archers and other missile-troops in their revolt against Persia and that Herodotus has omitted to mention them. [12]

2 The Campaign of Mardonius (492 B.C.) and the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.)

We are informed by Herodotus that a Persian expeditionary force under the command of Mardonius met reverses in 492 B.C. when the fleet was caught in a north-easterly gale rounding Mt. Athos and the army was routed by native Thracians called Brygians.[13] Herodotus describes in VI.45 how the Thracian tribe attacked Mardonius' army at night and caused many casualties. It seems very possible that the Brygians were equipped as peltasts, although we are not specifically told this; the javelin and small wicker shield were probably used in mountainous areas of northern Greece at a very early date. [14] In later Classical times, as we shall see, Thrace is specially noted for its peltast troops and it appears from our sources that these troops often attacked at night.[15] The victory of the Thracian Brygians was short lived as they were soon subjugated.

In 490 B.C. the Persian commanders Datis and Artaphernes were sent by Darius with a large sea-borne force to punish Eretria and Athens for their part in the Ionian revolt. [16] After successfully sacking Eretria the Persians sailed from Euboea and landed at Marathon. [17] The Athenians marched out to Marathon to meet the Persian threat. In preparation for battle the Athenian and Plataean front had to be extended to the same length as that of the Persians to ward against a turning movement on their flanks; the Athenian centre was, of necessity, only a few ranks deep, whilst both wings were kept strong. [18] The Greeks advanced at a run towards the Persians, using the same tactic as the Greeks were to use at Cunaxa to reduce their losses from the Persian archers.[19] The Persians prepared to meet their attack, thinking the Athenians mad to advance without the support of either cavalry or archers

(καὶ τούτους δρόμῳ ἐπειγομένους οὔτε ἵππου ὑπαρχούσης ὀφι οὔτε τοξευμάτων. Herod. VI.112.2). On both wings the Athenians and Plataeans were victorious, but their centre was broken by the Persians; in what was probably a pre-arranged plan, the two wings then converged and routed the Persians who suffered very heavy casualties.

Note that Herodotus in his account of the battle mentions no Athenian or Plataean light-armed infantry and specifically tells us that the Persians were amazed when the Athenians advanced without the support of archers. Assuming then that the Athenians had no archers in their force, we must now examine any literary and archaeological evidence which may throw new light on the presence of other types of light-troops at Marathon. The main literary source which suggests that slaves, almost certainly armed with non-hoplite weapons, were present and fell in the fighting is Pausanias: τάφος δὲ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ Ἀθηναίων ἐστίν, ἐπὶ δὲ αὐτῷ στῆλαι τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἀποθανόντων κατὰ φυλὰς ἑκάστων ἔχουσαι, καὶ ἕτερος Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν καὶ δούλοις· ἐμαχέσαντο γὰρ καὶ δοῦλοι τότε πρῶτον (I.32.3).

At the end of the nineteenth century Schliemann and Staës excavated parts of the Soros, which is situated near the beach and is now generally agreed to have been the burial mound of the Athenians.[20] More interestingly for our purpose, Marinatos in 1970 discovered and excavated part of a tumulus which is most probably to be identified as the tomb of the Plataeans and slaves.[21] The tumulus, roughly 30 - 35m in diameter and 3m in height, is situated at the end of the Vrana valley, 1¼ miles south-west of the main Soros. The pottery found in the excavations is identical to the pottery finds from the Soros, both in size and shape, and is approximately datable to the period 500 - 490 B.C.[22] In the eastern third of the tumulus which has been excavated there were found 9 burials and 2 cremations and this has

led Marinatos to hypothesise that the mound may cover 20 - 30 burials or cremations. All of the 9 skeletons were males and 7 of them were aged between 20 and 25. Professor Breitinger, Director of the Anthropological Institute of the University of Vienna, has tried to reconstruct part of the face of one of the cremations from bone fragments and suggests that these are the remains of a 25-year-old man.[23] Hammond thinks that the two cremations are of Plataean hoplites and the inhumations are of slaves:

"The two forms of burial are what we should expect: cremation for the Greeks and inhumation for slaves. The skeleton of a small boy was evidently that of a slave, taken by his master to the field of the battle. The small number of cremations - only two - may be understandable, if the remains of some Plataean dead were taken to Plataea".[24] This hypothesis of Hammond is far from certain.[25]

There have also been stray finds of Greek lead sling-bullets which purport to be from the plain of Marathon.[26] Information about these bullets seems to have been derived solely from Athenian antique dealers of the 19th century who might well have claimed that the missiles came from Marathon to raise their value. It might be quite attractive to believe that one sling bullet in the Ashmolean Museum, supposedly from the field of Marathon and with what is probably an abbreviation of ΒΟΙΩΤΩΝ inscribed on it, was used by a Plataean slave armed with a sling, but since it is so difficult to date sling-bullets and even to prove their authenticity it is important for us to be cautious about the inferences we draw from such dubious objects. [27]

Let us now try to evaluate the supplementary literary information of Pausanias and the archaeological finds. Most modern commentators accept the testimony of Pausanias (I.32.3) that slaves fought in some capacity in the battle of Marathon,[28] although Hammond notes cautiously (presumably from Herodotus' silence) that some light-armed troops may have been held back to

defend Athens.[29] It seems likely that both the Athenians and Plataeans used slaves in the battle,[30] and since a hoplite's equipment was very expensive and only men who owned a sizeable plot of land could have afforded to buy a panoply, it seems certain that the slaves and other landless Athenians and Plataeans, if they did fight, fought as light-armed troops, possibly equipped with the sling, javelin or dagger (or whatever crude weapon they could lay their hands on!) but probably not the bow (Herod.VI.112.2). It is very unlikely that the hoplite class would have given slaves and retainers training with heavy arms, not only because of the expense of such weapons as noted above but also because of the obvious danger to the state if these men decided to better their position with their new found military skill and because most of the time they were needed to farm the land and look after flocks, and thus I would conclude that they formed a crude light-armed force which had little or no training in the use of their weapons.[31]

How then were these light-armed troops utilized in the fighting? Burn thinks that the light-armed troops could play no useful part in the battle and comments "Like Bruce at Bannockburn, Miltiades ordered his 'small folk' to the rear".[32] The only useful task he can see the Greek light-armed performing is defending wooden stockades which according to Cornelius Nepos (Life of Miltiades.5) were put up when Miltiades and his troops gradually advanced their position. He suggests that the slaves were killed while guarding their camp and presumably also the stockades - but Nepos is a poor source and Herodotus nowhere in his account mentions a fight near a camp or any stockades.[33] I follow Hammond in suggesting that the light-armed troops probably took part in the actual battle (c.f. ἐμαχέσαντο of Pausanias I.32.2), although I am dubious about the manner in which he asserts they were utilized; he comments: "It is likely that the slaves fought not as a separate unit in the line but each in support of his master, since a religious tie existed between free and slave within the family".[34] If slaves

or free retainers armed as light-infantry fought alongside their hoplite masters this would have significantly weakened the cohesion of the phalanx formation and we should note that we never in Classical Greek history find light-armed infantry interspersed in a phalanx block; the slaves and retainers could only have fought beside their masters if they themselves were armed with and trained in the use of hoplite weapons and equipment, and, as I have argued above, this is extremely unlikely. Burn, Hammond and other commentators fail to perceive a vital role which the light-armed troops could have performed, bearing in mind the fact that the Persians had a large numerical superiority and consequently could have extended their line to a greater length than that of the Greeks:[35] it seems probable to me that the Athenian and Plataean light-armed troops, like the Boeotian 'psiloi' at Delium in 424 B.C., were positioned on both wings to prevent a dangerous outflanking movement by the Persian force.[36] As D.M. Lewis points out, if the Athenians did set up their camp with their backs to Mt. Pentelikos they may have swung their left wing, on which the Plataeans were posted, forward across the Vrana valley.[37] It seems very possible that a mobile battle was fought to a certain degree up and down the valley and that the Plataean slaves who fell defending the flank of the left wing were buried with the Plataeans in the tumulus which is situated at the end of the Vrana valley.[38] If the Athenians did have a force of crude light-armed troops, it was probably positioned 1¼ miles away on the extremity of the right wing near the Soros and the beach.

There are two pieces of evidence which would suggest that the Athenians suffered badly at the hands of the Persian archers at Marathon and consequently afterwards realized the potential of archers and also modified in one respect the hoplite panoply to combat the effect of enemy archers. Firstly, if we are to believe the report of Ctesias, the Athenians soon after Marathon recruited a force of Cretan archers:[39] βουλῇ δὲ Θεμιστοκλέους Ἀθηναίου καὶ

Ἀριστεύδου, τοξόται μὲν ἀπὸ Κρήτης παρακαλοῦνται καὶ παραγίνονται·

Certainly by 479 B.C. the Athenians had a corps of archers.[40]

Secondly, we find the first representations on Attic Red-figure vases of the shield-apron after about 490 B.C. This was a rectangular piece of leather or cloth which was fastened to the lower edge of the 'hoplon' by means of studs or rivets and hung down almost to the ankles; the object of these shield-aprons was to spend the force of arrows before they hit the parts of the legs not protected by the greaves. Shield-curtains are a fairly common phenomenon on Attic Red-figure vases in the period of the Persian invasions and of the Athenian counter-offensive in Asia but very rare thereafter. [41]

3 The Great Persian War (480 - 479 B.C.)

In the list of the contingents in the army of Xerxes (Book VII.61-96) the forces armed in what How and Wells term the Anatolian fashion are of particular interest to us.[42] Let us first consider some of these Anatolian troops: the Paphlagonians carried small shields and were armed with javelins and daggers and wore boots.[43] The Phrygians were armed and equipped in like fashion.[44] The Mysians carried small shields and javelins.[45] The Mares and Colchians carried small shields made out of hides and javelins or small spears, and the Colchians were also equipped with the 'machaira'.[46] The Cilicians had small shields made out of raw hides and two javelins and a sword like the Egyptian 'machaira'.[47] The Lycians had bows and javelins.[48] The equipment of these peoples is very like that of the Thracian peltasts on Attic pottery.[49] We further learn of a Thracian tribe, who were then called the Bithynians, who were clad and armed in exactly the same way as the European Thracians: Θρήικες δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῇσι κεφαλῇσι ἀλωπεκέας ἔχοντες ἐστρατεύοντο, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα κιθῶνας, ἐπὶ δὲ ξειρὰς

περιβεβλημένοι ποικίλας, περὶ δὲ τοῖς πόδας τε καὶ τὰς κνήμας πέδιλα νεβρῶν, πρὸς δὲ ἀκόντιά τε καὶ πέλτας καὶ ἐγχειρίδια σμικρά. οὗτοι δὲ διαβάντες μὲν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην ἐκλήθησαν Βιθυνοί, τὸ δὲ πρότερον ἐκαλέοντο, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, Στρυμόνιοι, οἰκέοντες ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι· (Herod.VII.75.1-2)

Thracian migrations to Asia Minor are assumed to have taken place in the early twelfth century B.C.[50] Homer places two Thracian tribes, the Mysians and Phrygians, in Asia Minor.[51] Later writers seem to regard the Bithynians simply as Thracians[52] and there is a great deal of evidence for the use of peltast arms and equipment by various tribes living in Asia Minor.[53] Best hypothesises that the Greek colonists in Asia Minor who dwelt near Thracian tribes, had adopted the method of fighting used by the Thracian peltasts.[54] We possess an Attic oinochoe of about 510 B.C. on which are depicted peltasts who are most probably from Asia Minor;[55] two light-armed men are shown equipped with 'peltae' and kneeling between an altar and a palm tree. Best is fairly certain that the palm tree indicates that the scene "did not take place in Greece but somewhere in the East".[56]

In 481 B.C. the patriotic Greek states, realizing that the Persian invasion was imminent, sent an unsuccessful embassy to Gelon the tyrant of Syracuse to gain military assistance;[57] Gelon had large forces of 'toxotai', 'sphendonetai' and 'hippodromoi psiloi' and these would have been of great use to the Greeks who appear, with the exception of the Athenians, to have lacked organized and fully trained forces of light-armed troops.[58] An embassy was also sent to Crete but the Cretans gave no military aid due most probably to their fear of the Persian navy.[59] Were the Greeks especially anxious either to gain a force of archers or to supplement any which the Athenians or other states may have had?

In 480 B.C. it was first decided to stop the Persian advance on land around the Tempe Pass.[60] A force of 10,000 hoplites and, as far as we know,

no light-armed troops, was sent to guard the Tempe Gorge and possibly also the steep path to Gonnos. The attempt was of course abandoned, possibly because the Greeks had hoped for help from the neighbouring highland peoples which was not forthcoming and because the defence line was too broad: not only would the Greeks have had to guard the Tempe Pass and the mountainous pass over Gonnos but also another western route which led from Oloösson to Larissa.[61] The Greeks must have realized that at least part of the defence of the Tempe line would depend on their ability to repulse the invader on uneven and hilly terrain; it seems almost incomprehensible then that they did not take a large number of light-armed skirmishers with them, such as were present at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C.[62] This leads one to the conclusion that either the Greeks showed a distinct lack of good sense or Herodotus omits to mention the presence of these troops.

The Patriotic Greeks, after abandoning the Tempe position, attempted to save Central Greece by defending the pass of Thermopylae which was bordered on one side by the foothills of Mount Callidromos and the waters of the Malian Gulf on the other; the Greek fleet was to be positioned on the north-eastern shore of Euboea (at the temple of Artemis) to guard against a Persian landing on northern Euboea and to stop the Persian navy sailing into the Malian Gulf or round the east coast of Euboea.[63] In Herodotus' list of the Greek troops sent to guard Thermopylae no mention is made of any light-armed troops or helots.[64] However, in his narrative of the battle of Thermopylae Herodotus mentions the presence of helots on two occasions: in VII.229.1 we learn that the blinded Spartiate named Eurytus had a helot who led him to the battlefield and then ran away: ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ διενεχθέντας Εὔρυτον μὲν πυθόμενον τῶν Περσέων τὴν περίοδον αἰτήσαντά τε τὰ ὅπλα καὶ ἐνδύντα ἄγειν αὐτὸν κελεῦσαι τὸν εἵλωτα ἐς τοὺς μαχομένους, ὅκως δὲ αὐτὸν ἤγαγε, τὸν μὲν ἀγαγόντα οἴχεσθαι φεύγοντα, τὸν δὲ ἐσπεσόντα ἐς τὸν ὅμιλον διαφθαρῆναι...

In VIII.25.1 we learn that the bodies of the helots lay on the battlefield intermingled with those of the Lacedaemonians and Thespians:

διαπεραιωθέντες δὲ ἐθηεῦντο διεξιόντες τοὺς νεκρούς· πάντες δὲ ἠπιστέατο τοὺς κειμένους εἶναι πάντας Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Θεσπιέας, ὁρῶντες καὶ τοὺς εἵλωτας.

Why does Herodotus not mention these helots in his list of the forces which were present at the battle? Burn thinks this was because just before Herodotus visited Sparta there had occurred the earthquake of 464 B.C. and the helot rebellion and consequently internal relations between the Spartiates and helots were not good.[65] Perhaps the reason was more simple - Herodotus probably regarded the unorganized mass of helots as being of little worth in battle.

In spite of How and Wells who seem to regard the helot as simply a camp servant who carried the baggage and shield of the Spartan, we learn from Herodotus (VIII.25.1) that helots actually fell on the battlefield.[66] In Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. helots are mentioned four times in active roles supporting the Spartans on the Greek right wing and in IX.29.1 we are informed that every one of the 35,000 helots was armed for war.[67] It seems almost certain that they fought not as hoplites, as Burn asserts, but as non-specialist light-armed skirmishers[68] the helots on the Spartan right wing at the battle of Plataea are described as 'psiloi' on three occasions.[69] There is no evidence whatsoever that Sparta armed helots as hoplites at this early date. The dangers inherent in arming and training the subservient helots with heavy arms are obvious, especially in view of the fact that helots may have revolted just before the Persian expedition of 490 B.C.;[70] it would also have been very expensive to produce panoplies for a large number of helots.

There is no truth in How and Wells' statement that light-armed helots "would be useless at Thermopylae owing to the nature of the ground".[71] Light-armed troops could be used effectively on both flat and high ground. It could be argued that in the narrow pass of Thermopylae, which in places was only about 50 feet wide, the flanks of the Greek phalanx would have been protected on one side by the waters of the Malian Gulf and on the other by the foothills of Mt. Callidromos and therefore there would have been no need of light-armed troops to protect them, but the fact is that even in the Middle Pass, the lowest parts of the foothills are not over steep or rough, and light-armed troops could well have been utilized here to protect the southern flank of the phalanx from a turning movement by the Persians. One would also have thought that light-armed troops would have been useful to reinforce the Phocian hoplite contingent guarding the Anopaea Path, but Herodotus does not mention their presence;[72] light-skirmishers would surely have been more suited to a battle on a rough mountain track than heavily-armed and less mobile hoplites who formed a sitting target for the Persian archers. Light-armed troops could also ideally have been used to guard the steep pass which led under the citadel of Trachis to Phocis, the route of the modern road from Lamia to Brallos, Gravia and Amphissa, but again we are not told by Herodotus of their presence.[73] Perhaps Leonidas hoped for help from the native Malians, who are mentioned by Thucydides as having 'akontistai' and 'sphendonetai' in 424 B.C., in the guarding of these two positions, but we are given no indication of this in Herodotus.[74]

Attempts have been made to judge the size of the helot force at Thermopylae. How and Wells and Lazenby, inferring it probably from the single helot of Eurytus (Herod.VII.229.1), suggest that each Spartan was accompanied by one helot;[75] I think that we should take 300 as the minimum figure for the number of helots present at Thermopylae. In Herodotus'

account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. we are repeatedly told that there were 7 helots to each Spartan hoplite. Grundy supposes that there were 7 helots to each Spartan at Thermopylae also and this gives us a total force of 2,100 helots.[76] This, I think, should be our maximum.

We are told that the bodies of helots were seen lying intermingled with those of the Spartans and Thespians (Herod.VIII.25.1). Let us try to reconstruct a hypothetical casualty list: the total number of Greek dead is given by Herodotus in VIII.25.2 as 4,000 men and we know that the 300 Spartans, 700 Thespians and possibly also 80 hoplites from Mycenae were wiped out to a man;[77] the Greeks obviously suffered casualties in the first two days of fighting, although probably fairly light, and some of the Phocians must have been killed by the Persian archers near the Anopaea Path and some of the Thebans in the final battle before the majority of their number surrendered[78] these casualties I would estimate (with some reserve) at about 400 men. If we add on the hypothetical 2,100 helots of Grundy we arrive at the following list:

	300	Spartans
	700	Thespians
(uncertain)	80	Mycenaeans
(uncertain)	400	Early casualties; Phocians and Thebans
(uncertain)	2,100	helots
Total	3,580	casualties (estimate)

This grand total of circa 3,600 men is not far off the 4,000 of Herodotus; more men may have been killed in the first two days of fighting and more Thebans may have fallen than I have allowed for.[79] However, I do not have much confidence in such juggling with the numbers given by Herodotus and the total casualty number of 4,000 men (Herod.VIII.25.2) is probably derived from the χιλιάδες τέτορες (which I feel must be inaccurate) of the inscription to the Peloponnesians (Herod.VII.228.1).[80] Herodotus enumerates only 3,100 Peloponnesian troops as being present at Thermopylae

and Burn suggests that the deficit is to be made up by 900 helots,[81] but I feel that How and Wells must be right in commenting: "But it is unlikely that the 4,000 Peloponnesians of the epigram are to be made up by adding Helots, whom neither the inscription nor the historian would be likely to include".[82] It is impossible for us to tell how many helots were present at the battle of Thermopylae.

In 1939 Marinatos excavated part of the small hillock where he thought that the remaining Greeks had made their last stand.[83] In the sandy subsoil among Roman and Byzantine foundations he found hundreds of bronze arrow-heads of various Oriental types, one spearhead (probably Persian) and one spike, described as 'probably Greek', which could have come from either a spear - or javelin - butt; if indeed it can, after more study, be identified as from a javelin butt, it might be that we possess part of the weapon used by a helot as he fought beside his master on the last-stand hillock.[84]

We gain some insight of the Spartans' view of the Persian archers at the time of the battle of Thermopylae by the sneering remark of the Spartiate Dieneces to a fellow from Trachis who informed him that the multitude of the Persian arrows would obscure the sun itself: "All the better!" quoth Dieneces, "We'll be able to come to grips with those Persians in the shade".[85]

The Persians advanced on Athens and when they found the Acropolis held by a body of what Herodotus terms 'poor men' (πένητας ἀνθρώπους), began to besiege it.[86] The poor men, who were probably crudely armed with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on, put up a stout resistance and sent boulders down at the invading Persians, but their defence was in vain and the citadel was taken. We next learn about the presence of light-armed troops at the battle of Salamis: although Herodotus does not mention the presence of Athenian toxotai on the ships, we learn from Plutarch and the Troizen Inscription that there were 4 archers on each ship.[87] Aeschylus in his Persae would suggest that a force of archers and stone-throwers landed

with Aristeides' force of hoplites on Psyttaleia, although neither Herodotus nor Pausanias mentions their presence.[88] We do not know if these archers were Athenian citizens or possibly Cretan mercenaries.[89] The fact that we have the first occurrence of the Greek title 'toxarchos' in the Persae (472 B.C.) would suggest that Aeschylus even at this early period knew of one or more 'commander of the archers' and transferred this Greek title which was already in existence, to the Persian Xerxes.[90] If there was one 'toxarchos' or perhaps several 'toxarchoi' in command of the Athenian archers during the invasion by Xerxes this would suggest that the force of archers was well organized.

In December 480 B.C. Chalcidice revolted against the Persians and consequently Artabazus acted against the insurgents, among whom were the Olynthians (Herod.VIII.127).[91] Tanged arrowheads, some of which are very similar to Cretan heads, have been excavated at Olynthus from the ash-layer of the south hill and the fill from the granaries and it may be supposed that they were used by Greek defenders of the city, most probably in the Persian siege of late 480 or early 479 B.C.[92] Persian arrowheads of the small hollow - socketed triangular type, again associated with the siege, have also been found at Olynthus.[93] It is surprising that Herodotus does not mention these Greek archers who fought in defence of Olynthus. Does this Cretan type of head indicate tht the Olynthians employed Cretan mercenary archers (cf. Ctesias, Persica, 26) or simply that their own archers manufactured or had manufactured for themselves arrowheads based on a Cretan model?[94]

We are furthermore informed by Herodotus (VIII.128) that Timoxenus, the general of the Scionaeans, was equipped with a bow with which he shot arrows containing messages to Artabazus; this story makes it seem very probable that some of the Greek defenders of Potidaea were armed with the bow (Timoxenus would have aroused suspicion if he was the only one of the

defenders who possessed a bow), but yet again Herodotus omits to mention their presence. Archers were well suited to defending fortified positions and we should have expected to hear of archers defending the Acropolis of Athens and the besieged cities of Chalcidice. From the archaeological evidence from Olynthus, and the reference to Timoxenus equipped with the bow, I would suggest that archers did in fact take part in the defences of some, at least, of the cities of Chalcidice and that Herodotus fails to mention them.

The Battle of Plataea (479 B.C.):

There were present at the Battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. very large forces of light-armed infantry (psiloi); let us examine the passages in Herodotus' account of the campaign of Plataea in which these troops occur:

1 IX.10.1 οἱ δὲ φρενὶ λαβόντες τὸν λόγον αὐτίκα, φράσαντες οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἀγγέλοισι τοῖσι ἀπιγμένοισι

IX.10.1 οἱ δὲ φρενὶ λαβόντες τὸν λόγον αὐτίκα, φράσαντες οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἀγγέλοισι τοῖσι ἀπιγμένοισι

ἀπὸ τῶν πολίων, νυκτὸς ἔτι ἐκπέμπουσι πεντακισχιλίους Σπαρτιητέων καὶ ἑπτὰ περὶ ἕκαστον τάξαντες τῶν εἱλώτων,...
7 helots to each.

2 IX.28.2 τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας εἶχον Λακεδαιμονίων μύριοι· τούτων δὲ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἐόντας Σπαρτιήτας ἐφύλασσον ψιλοὶ τῶν εἱλωτέων πεντακισχίλιοι καὶ τρισμύριοι, περὶ ἄνδρα ἕκαστον ἑπτὰ τεταγμένοι.

We are informed in this piece that there were 10,000 Lacedaemonians and that 5,000 of these were Spartiates (i.e. there were 5,000 perioikoi, presumably armed as hoplites); there were 35,000 light-armed troops (psiloi) from among the helots and seven of these were assigned to each Spartan man.

3 IX.29 - 30 οὗτοι, πλὴν τῶν ἑπτὰ περὶ ἕκαστον τεταγμένων Σπαρτιήτησι, ἦσαν ὁπλῖται, συνάπαντες ἐόντες ἀριθμὸν τρεῖς τε μυριάδες καὶ ὀκτὼ χιλιάδες καὶ ἑκατοντάδες ἑπτά. ὁπλῖται μὲν οἱ πάντες συλλεγέντες ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἦσαν τοσοῦτοι, ψιλῶν δὲ πλῆθος ἦν τόδε, τῆς μὲν Σπαρτιητικῆς τάξιος πεντακισχίλιοι καὶ τρισμύριοι ἄνδρες ὡς ἑόντων ἑπτὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἄνδρα, καὶ τούτων πᾶς τις παρήρτητο ὡς ἐς πόλεμον· οἱ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἑλλήνων ψιλοί, ὡς εἷς περὶ ἕκαστον ἐὼν ἄνδρα, πεντακόσιοι καὶ τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ τρισμύριοι ἦσαν. ψιλῶν μὲν δὴ τῶν ἁπάντων μαχίμων ἦν τὸ πλῆθος ἓξ τε μυριάδες καὶ ἐννέα χιλιάδες καὶ ἑκατοντάδες πέντε, τοῦ δὲ σύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ τοῦ συνελθόντος ἐς Πλαταιὰς σύν τε ὁπλίτῃσι καὶ ψιλοῖσι τοῖσι μαχίμοισι ἕνδεκα μυριάδες ἦσαν, μιῆς χιλιάδος, πρὸς δὲ ὀκτακοσίων ἀνδρῶν καταδέουσαι. σὺν δὲ Θεσπιέων τοῖσι παρεοῦσι ἐξεπληροῦντο αἱ ἕνδεκα μυριάδες· παρῆσαν γὰρ καὶ Θεσπιέων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀπεριεόντες, ἀριθμὸν ἐς ὀκτακοσίους καὶ χιλίους· ὅπλα δὲ οὐδ' οὗτοι εἶχον.

In chapter 29 we are told yet again that the Spartan force included 35,000 'psiloi', with 7 of these being assigned to each Spartan; all of these Spartan light-armed troops were equipped for war. For the hoplites of the 'perioikoi' and of other states there was about one light-infantryman (psilos) to each of them. The total number of 'psiloi' in the Greek force amounted to 69,500 men.[95] In chapter 30 we are again told that the light-armed troops were equipped for combat (ψιλοῖσι τοῖσι μαχίμοισι) and that 1,800 Thespians, without heavy arms (i.e. light-armed), joined the force.[96]

4 IX.61.2 οὕτω δὴ μουνωθέντες Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Τεγεῆται, ἐόντες σὺν ψιλοῖσι ἀριθμὸν οἱ μὲν πεντακισμύριοι, Τεγεῆται δὲ τρισχίλιοι (οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδαμὰ ἀπεσχίζοντο ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων), . . .

We learn in this passage that the whole Lacedaemonian force amounted to 50 000 men - 5,000 Spartiates with 35,000 light-armed helots and 5,000 'perioikoi' with 5,000 light-armed retainers.[97] The Tegean force amounted to 3,000 men - 1,500 Tegean hoplites with 1,500 'psiloi'.

Some modern historians find it hard to believe that a force of 'psiloi' amounting to as many as 69,500 men (adding the 1,800 Thespians gives a grand total of 71,300) could have been present at Plataea; most controversy has surrounded Herodotus' statements that there were 35,000 helots on the battlefield. Lazenby comments: "It is very unlikely that there were really 35,000 helots at Plataea, despite what Herodotus says - apart from anything else, there hardly seems room for them on the battlefield or in the complicated manoeuvres that took place, and at most we should probably assume one batman to each hoplite".[98] Did Herodotus merely make a rough guess of the number of helots present? But the fact that Herodotus repeatedly states in four passages (IX.10.1; IX.28.2; IX.29.1; IX.61.2 - inferred from total) that there were seven helots to each Spartan would suggest that he was stressing a fact which he believed to be true and that this information is more than mere conjecture on his part. Why should Sparta have sent so many helots with the Spartan army to Plataea?[99] Hignett, I think rightly, concludes that this must have been through fear of a helot revolt and comments: "The position of Sparta in the Peloponnese was more precarious than the outside world was allowed to realize, but its insecurity was mainly due to the ever-present threat from the helots, and in the summer of 479 B.C. Sparta countered this particular menace by sending an unusually large force of helots out of the Peloponnese in the army of Pausanias".[100] I think then that we should accept Herodotus' testimony that there were 35,000 helots and

and a very large number of 'psiloi' from other states present at Plataea.[101]

How then were the helots and other light-infantry armed and what, if any, role did they play in the battle? Herodotus classes the helots and the other light-troops as 'psiloi' (IX.28.2; IX.29-30; IX.61.2) and informs us that they were all equipped for fighting (ψιλῶν μὲν δὴ τῶν ἁπάντων μαχίμων (IX.29.2); ψιλοῖσι τοῖσι μαχίμοισι (IX.30)) but never mentions specifically how they were armed. Historians have suggested that they were armed with a variety of different weapons: Delbrück suggests that all the 'psiloi' carried at least a dagger or a hatchet and possibly also a long spear, Burn thinks that they were armed with javelins, and Hignett hypothesises that some of them may simply have thrown stones.[102] The ineffectiveness of the helots as light-armed skirmishers may be inferred from Herodotus IX.60.3 in which Pausanias, when his hoplites were suffering badly from the attacks of Persian archers, called for the aid of the Athenians and in particular of their archers. Pausanias' own massive force of light-armed helots must have been inefficient at warding off the Persian archers, presumably because they were armed either with close-combat weapons or because their missile weapons (javelins, stones etc.) did not have a sufficient range to be useful against the Persian bowmen.[103] It would seem extremely unlikely from Herodotus IX.60.3 that the Spartan helots were armed with the bow. According to Plutarch the Persian cavalry commander Masistius was killed by a Greek, probably an Athenian or Megarian light-armed infantryman, who struck him with the spike of a javelin (ἀκοντίου στύρακι) through the eyehole of his helmet.[104] The javelin was an ideal weapon for crude light-infantry - it was probably cheap to make, required only a little practice to throw and could be used at a distance (thus not committing the light-infantryman to close combat with hoplites).[105] It would seem likely, as Burn suggests, that many of the Greek 'psiloi' were armed with javelins.

How then was the vast force of Greek light-armed troops utilized? Herodotus says next to nothing about how these troops were used in battle, and this has led some historians to minimize their military value, and made Lazenby and Hignett believe that such a huge force cannot have taken part in the battle;[106] it has seemed probable to some that a section of the light-armed were not on the battlefield but were used to protect the supply lines and to guard the passes.[107] But note that just before the final battle the Lacedaemonians are described as having their 'psiloi' with them (Herod.IX.61.2) and that the helots, who were presumably killed in the final battle, were buried in a separate grave or mound (Herod.IX.85.2); it is obvious from these two passages that light-armed troops, particularly the helots, did take part in the fighting.

Where were the helots then positioned?[108] It is impossible that the seven helots allotted to each Spartan would have fought around him in the phalanx block since they were neither trained to fight as hoplites nor equipped with hoplite arms.[109] Hignett's suggestion that they were positioned at the rear and threw stones over the heads of the hoplites also seems unconvincing.[110] It seems most probable that the light-armed troops were used to protect the flanks of the various phalanxes and I would suggest that the light-armed troops of the Spartans and Tegeans were used thus in the final battle;[111] the light-infantry could also have rushed on in front of the victorious Spartan phalanx, using their speed of foot to cut down the fleeing Persians.[112] After the battle the helots were used to collect the spoils of victory: Παυσανίης δὲ κήρυγμα ποιησάμενος μηδένα ἅπτεσθαι τῆς λείης, συγκομίζειν ἐκέλευε τοὺς εἵλωτας τὰ χρήματα (Herod.IX.80.1).

It is incomprehensible that Herodotus does not mention the actions of such a huge force of 'psiloi' during the campaign and final battle of Plataea - was he, or were his sources, biased in regarding the final battle as solely a

fight between hoplites and light-armed barbarians? It is very probable that Herodotus and his sources, not having foreseen the potential of specialized light-armed troops, regarded the 'psiloi', both socially and militarily, as of little account.

It is in his account of the battle of Plataea that Herodotus mentions for the first time an Athenian force of archers, possibly the only specialized corps of light-armed troops in the Greek army;[113] the Megarians, who were in an exposed position and in trouble due to the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry, sent a messenger to request aid urgently and accordingly the Athenians sent 300 picked troops and a body of archers: ὁ μὲν δή σφι ταῦτα ἀπήγγελλε, Παυσανίης δὲ ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἴ τινες ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοι ἐθελονταὶ ἰέναι τε ἐς τὸν χῶρον τοῦτον καὶ τάσσεσθαι διάδοχοι Μεγαρεῦσι, οὐ βουλομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπεδέξαντο καὶ Ἀθηναίων οἱ τριηκόσιοι λογάδες, τῶν ἐλοχήγεε Ὀλυμπιόδωρος ὁ Λάμπωνος. οὗτοι ἦσαν οἵ τε ὑποδεξάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρεόντων Ἑλλήνων ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς ταχθέντες, τοὺς τοξότας προσελόμενοι.

(Herod.IX.21.3 - 22.1).

In Herodotus IX.22.1 we learn that Masistius' horse was shot by an arrow which was probably fired by an Athenian archer (although, of course, it may have been a stray Persian arrow). The Persian horsemen then retreated as far as two stades and it has been argued that the extent of the withdrawal was dictated by the range of the Athenian archers - thus D.J.F. Hill suggests that the archers of the Athenian force had an effective range of somewhat less than 335 metres. [114]

When the Spartans and Tegeans were suffering badly from the attacks of the Persian archers in the final phase of the battle, Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians asking for their assistance and saying that if

they were unable to come en masse, they were at least to send their corps of archers: εἰ δ' ἄρα αὐτοὺς ὑμέας καταλελάβηκε ἀδύνατόν τι βοηθέειν, ὑμεῖς δ' ἡμῖν τοὺς τοξότας ἀποπέμψαντες χάριν θέσθε (Herod.IX.60.3).

We are not told by Herodotus whether the archers in the Athenian force were native Athenians or Cretan mercenaries. How and Wells suggest that they were Athenian citizens of the Thetic class but Ctesias (Persica, 26) informs us that the Athenians had obtained some Cretan mercenaries.[115] The Cretans almost certainly were unable to promise military assistance to the Greek embassadors in 481 B.C., not because of an oracle as Herodotus asserts, but because Xerxes had a massive navy with which he could threaten Crete.[116] After the decisive Persian naval defeat at Salamis in September 480 B.C. the Cretans would no longer have been in such great fear of the relatively small remnant of the Persian navy and may have felt confident enough to send out archers to help the Greeks of the mainland.[117] It is also possible that the Athenians had hired Cretan mercenary archers before Xerxes' invasion.

How large was the Athenian force of archers? Herodotus does not inform us of its numerical strength but Rawlinson hypothesises from Herodotus IX.21.3-22.1 that for the Athenian select force to have been of any practical use, a large force of archers, possibly as many as 3,000, must have supplemented the 300 Athenian hoplites.[118] The fact also that the Spartans specifically requested the assistance of the corps of archers would lead one to believe that it was not a unit of negligible numerical size. Herodotus, after describing the advance of the Greek army from Cithairon to the south bank of the Asopus, gives an account (Herod.IX.28.2 - 6) of all the twenty-five contingents in the army from right to left and the number of hoplites in each contingent. The total number of hoplites, including Spartiates, comes to 38,7000; we are further informed that each of the hoplites from all the states, with the exception of Sparta (7 helots to 1 Spartan), were accompanied by one light-armed infantryman. The number of hoplites, minus the 5,000

Spartiates, comes to 33,700, but we are told by Herodotus that the total number of 'psiloi', excluding the 35,000 helots, amounted to 34,500. Where do the extra 800 'psiloi' come from? Hauvette, Meyer, Munro, Macan and Hignett suggest that the extra 800 light-armed are to be found in the regiment of Athenian archers. [119]

Munro hypothesises further: he believes that the Athenian archer force at Plataea numbered 800 and points out that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War these archers numbered 1,600 (Thuc.II.13.8; Arist. Ath. Pol.24); he then suggests that during the Persian War of 480 - 479 B.C. also,there was a body of 1,600 archers at Athens - 800 with the army (see above) and the other 800 with the fleet (there were around 200 ships in the Athenian navy before the battle of Salamis and it is probable that there were 4 archers on board every ship).[120] However,the suggestions that the Athenians had 800 archers at Plataea and the same number on board their fleet cannot be proven and must remain speculation.

Let us now try to consider what military value we should attach to the Athenian corps of archers and how they were possibly used in battle. Wardman takes the view that Herodotus tries to portray the Athenian archer corps as an effective unit and also that he stresses the foresight of the Athenians in forming such a force to counter the Persian archers.[121] His interpretation of Herodotus' narrative is strained and although the Athenians do appear to have been the only Greek state to organize a force of archers to meet the Persian threat, the historian does not positively emphasize the effectiveness of the Athenian corps of archers and certainly not the foresight of the Athenians.[122] He also asserts that Herodotus gave the "corps of archers a large part to play".[123] What does Herodotus in fact tell us about the value of the archers in the two passages where they are mentioned? The 300 Athenian hoplites and force of archers, who were positioned in front of the Megarians, failed to beat off the subsequent

Persian cavalry attack and were suffering badly until the rest of the Greek army came to their aid (Herod.IX.23). The address of Pausanias to the Athenians (Herod.IX.60), in which he requests the aid of the Athenian archers, although probably tainted with pro-Athenian bias, may feasibly be true due to the Spartan lack of troops armed with the bow.[124] However, even if this message can be interpreted as showing that the Athenian archers were highly valued by Pausanias because he had no troops of this arm in his army, we have no evidence that the archers played any part in the final battle: the Athenians, as they moved towards the Spartans in their attempt to fill the gap which the centre had left, were checked by the Medizing Greeks (Herod.IX.61.1). There is no evidence that the Athenian archers played a large role in the actual fighting at Plataea, although IX.21.3 and IX.60.3 would suggest that both the Athenians and Spartans were aware of the potential value of these troops in combating their Persian counterparts.

How were these archers deployed? Yet again Herodotus tells us almost nothing about this question: we may infer from XI.21.3 that the archers were to be used in conjunction with the 300 Athenian hoplites and this has led Burn to suppose that the combined unit of archers and hoplites formed a "taskforce specially adapted for advanced - guard action".[125] Did they operate interspersed among the hoplites of the front rank, crouching behind their shields for cover, or did they act as a coherent unit on their own protecting the weak points of the phalanx such as the wings? [126]

We thus learn even less about the Athenian force of archers at Plataea from Herodotus than we do about the 'psiloi' - he gives us no direct information about their numbers or position on the battlefield in relation to the Athenian hoplites or role in relieving the Megarians. We must, I think, by these omissions, conclude, as we did with relation to the 'psiloi', that Herodotus and his sources regarded the 'toxotai' militarily, and possibly

also socially, of little standing - I can see no truth in Wardman's hypothesis that Herodotus emphasised the worth of these archers. The saying of the Spartan Callicrates as he lay dying with a Persian arrow in his side again gives us an insight into the Spartans' view of archers: [127]

Ἕτερος τοξευθεὶς καὶ τὸν βίον ἐκλείπων,
ἔλεγεν, οὐ μελέι μοι τοῦτο ὅτι ἀποθανοῦμαι,
ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπὸ γύννιδος τοξότου καὶ μηδὲν πράξας.

In the only other major battle of the Persian War of 480 - 479 B.C., Mycale, Herodotus is silent about the presence of any light-armed troops in the Greek forces. [128]

In conclusion to the period of the Persian Wars we may say that although there were certainly Greek archers and probably 'akontistai' present in the defence of Paphos during the Ionian revolt, it is not until the battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. that Herodotus gives us any indication that there were active light-armed troops (here helots) in the Greek armies, although Pausanias informs us that slaves fought at Marathon in 490 B.C. (almost certainly, if they did fight, as light-infantrymen who were not equipped with the bow). We are not told by Herodotus that archers defended the besieged Acropolis or the cities of Olynthus or Potidaea but, as we have seen, it is probable that archers took part in the defence of the two last named cities. At Plataea in 479 B.C. we learn that the Greeks had a massive force of 71,300 'psiloi' in their army, each one of whom was equipped for fighting. Although we learn that some of their number were killed (helots), Herodotus does not mention them in his narrative of the fighting and he gives us no indication of how they were armed or utilized. We also learn from Herodotus that the Athenians, probably the only Greeks who had a specialized corps of light-armed troops in the battle, had a force of archers at Plataea, although he gives us no information about its composition, numerical strength, or mode of combat. Perhaps the most striking omissions by Herodotus are in

his accounts of the forces sent to defend the Tempe position and the Anopaea Path - one might have expected that light-armed troops would have been ideally suited to help to defend such rugged places but we do not learn of their presence in either of these instances, although we are informed that some Phocians (light-armed?) attacked the Persians from Parnassus (Herod.IX. 31.5). Why then did Herodotus omit to mention or give very few details about Greek archers and other light-armed troops in the period of the Persian Wars? It seems probable that Herodotus and his sources regarded them as militarily, and also probably socially, of little worth. The sayings of Callicrates at Plataea, and Dieneces at Thermopylae, must indicate that Spartans at this period despised troops who fought at a distance with missile weapons.

One final note about the defeat of the Persians which is important with respect to our understanding of successful light-armed tactics: the Persian archers, who were light-armed compared to the Greek hoplites, succeeded in harassing the Greeks and causing them many casualties and, so long as they kept their distance from their enemies, held the upper hand since the Greeks had few light-armed missile-troops who could equal them in range; the reason why they were defeated at Marathon, Plataea and Mycale and suffered badly at Thermopylae was that they committed themselves to hand-to-hand combat in which the Greeks by reason of their arms, armour and close-packed battle formation were bound to excel them; the greatest strength of light-armed troops, whether they were Persian or Greek, was their ability to operate from a distance and not to commit themselves to a close fight with their more heavily armed adversaries - if for some reason they did enter into close combat with hoplites in phalanx formation, their fate was sealed.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (431 - 404 B.C.)

Book One of Thucydides: Preliminaries to the Outbreak of Hostilities in 431 B.C.

Our first reference to light-armed troops in Thucydides lies outside the earlier limit of this chapter but will be examined here. In 460 or 459 B.C., while Athens was engaged in military operations against the Persians in Egypt, the Corinthians advanced into the Megarid but were eventually defeated by an extraordinary force of Athenians, many of whom were above and below the regular military age, led by the general Myronides. On the Corinthian retreat Thucydides comments: οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καί τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθὲν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἐς τοῦ χωρίου ἰδιώτου, ᾧ ἔτυχεν ὄρυγμα μέγα περιείργον καὶ οὐκ ἦν ἔξοδος. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι γνόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε εἶργον τοῖς ὁπλίταις καὶ περιστήσαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψιλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ' οἴκου (Thuc.I. 106.1-2).

We learn here that the Athenians' 'psiloi' acted as crude stone-throwers (lithoboloi); they were able to pelt the Corinthian hoplites with impunity since the Corinthians were surrounded by a large ditch which hampered them from attacking their light-armed adversaries.[1] These tactics were extremely effective: the Athenian 'psiloi' managed to wipe out all the Corinthian hoplites who were in the enclosure without, as far as we know, any casualties to themselves. Rocks, when thrown at close range, had the potential to kill or badly wound even hoplites if they hit a particularly vulnerable part of the body. We also learn from an inscription on a fragmentary marble stele found in Athens that four citizen archers from the Erechtheid tribe fell in the fighting ἐν Κύπρο[ι] ⋮ ἐν Αἰγ[ύ]πτο[ι] ⋮ ἐν Φοινίκε[ι] [⋮] ἐν

Ἁλιεῦσιν [⋮] ἐν Αἰγίνει ⋮ Μεγαροῖ of this period.[2]

A fragmentary inscription on a marble slab, copied by Fauvel, may possibly have recorded a force of archers; the slab, which was found on the Acropolis near the Erectheium, is now lost.[3] Although we know that the inscription set out regulations for the Ionian city of Erythrae, its exact context is shrouded in obscurity. Meiggs and Lewis suggest that it may date to the year 453 - 2 B.C. and that we should infer from the text that the Athenians had expelled a medizing faction from Erythrae, set up a democracy and installed a garrison in the city to protect the Erythraeans and their new constitution. On the military affairs, we have two references to a garrison commander (φρούραρχος - lines 14 and 15), who was presumably an Athenian, and Fauvel, in the fortieth line of his text, gives us a reference to τοχσ[ότ]ας , who must have been in the garrison. However, I have little faith in Fauvel's restoration and Meiggs and Lewis are certainly right in pointing out that the closing section of the text (lines 37 - 46) is too uncertain to be restored.

We learn in Thucydides' narrative of the naval engagement off the bay of Cheimerion in 433 or 432 B.C. that the ships of the Corinthians, Megarians and Ambraciots on one side, and of the Corcyraeans and Athenians on the other, had many 'toxotai' and 'akontistai', in addition to their hoplite forces, posted on their decks.[4] Thus we know that both sides in this battle had large forces of archers and javelin-throwers, although we cannot tell if all the states mentioned contributed these troops or whether it was only one state on each side which did. Thucydides further informs us that this type of naval battle in which hoplites, archers and javelin-throwers fought it out from deck to deck, rather than the ships being used for manoeuvring and ramming, was of a sort which had an ancient history in early Greek naval warfare. On Attic Late Geometric pottery we frequently find scenes in which archers are portrayed on the decks of ships or taking part in seaborne landings.[5]

Also in 432 B.C. we learn from Thucydides' narrative that during the revolt of Potidaea both the Corinthians and Athenians had light-armed troops among their forces. The Corinthians sent off a force which contained 400 'psiloi' to aid the Potidaeans.[6] The Corinthians, Peloponnesians and Potidaeans fought a battle near Potidaea against an Athenian army, but were defeated; no mention is made of the Corinthian 'psiloi' in the engagement. The Corinthians then retreated towards Potidaea, harassed by the missiles of their enemies.[7] It comes as a surprise to learn that some of the Athenian troops were using missile weapons (βαλλόμενος) against the retreating Corinthians since Thucydides has not previously mentioned any missile-troops in the force of Athenians.

Book Two of Thucydides: The Outbreak of the War; The Battle of Spartolus (429 B.C.); The Battle near Stratus (429 B.C.)

In 431 B.C., before the first invasion of Attica by Archidamus, Pericles addressed the Athenian assembly and informed them, among other things, of their military strength: ἱππέας δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ξὺν ἱπποτοξόταις, ἑξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χιλίους τοξότας, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας (Thuc.II.13.8).

Note that there was a number of 'hippotoxotai', probably two hundred, and a corps of 1,600 ordinary 'toxotai' in the Athenian army.[8] No force of Athenian 'psiloi' is mentioned, almost certainly because such troops were untrained, crudely armed and not organized into formal units. The 'toxotai' were a properly organized and trained unit of specialist light-armed troops: they had regular unit commanders and in funerary inscriptions are recognized as a separate entity from other troops.[9] According to Thucydides' figures, the 'toxotai' formed 5% of all the Athenian troops in 431 B.C.; in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, which probably reflects the period before mobilization, they represent 30% of all the Athenian troops.[10]

In most of the occasions when we are told by Thucydides that there were archers present in Athenian forces, we are not informed whether they were Athenian citizens, allies or mercenaries.[11] They are specified as being Athenians on only 2 occasions (Thuc.III.107.1; V.52.2) and the 'tochsotai' on the stelai of the Erechtheid tribe were certainly citizens.[12] On three occasions they are specified as being non-Athenians (IV.28.4 [ἀλλοθεν]; VI.43 [Cretan]; VIII.98.1 [barbarian]). There is a certain amount of information which supports the view of Vos that barbarian, and in particular Scythian, archers may have formed part of Athens' archer force and may have fought for her in the Peloponnesian War.[13] Andocides, a fairly untrustworthy source, asserts that Athens provided herself with a force of 300 Scythian mercenary archers during the Thirty Years Peace of 446 B.C.[14] Several fragments of stelae which mention barbarian archers and date to the period of the Peloponnesian War have been found in Athens.

One fragmentary inscription on pieces of Pentelic marble, which were found in the Kerameikos, records barbarian archers who fell in Thrace; the date of the inscription is very uncertain, but it may belong to the first years of the Archidmaian war:[15]

vacat

25 [ἐπὶ] Θράικες
[β]άρβαροι
[τ]οχσόται
[Ν]ομένιος
[κα]λλιστρατ[-]

A fragment of Pentelic marble which seems to record barbarian archers has been found at a modern level east of the southern part of the Odeion. The fragment has been badly damaged but the surviving letters have been very well cut and suggest a date in the 430s.[16] Another fragmentary inscription, probably dating to the Decelean War, has been found in Athens which records barbarian infantry archers as well as mounted archers:[17]

Frag.e.(Stele C), Col.II

Ν[- - - - -]
τοχ[σόται]
βάρβαροι]
Ἀριστ[- - -]
Κεφισ[- - -]
Σιμον[- - -]
Νικος[- - -]
vacat
ἱππο[τοχσόται]
Ἀλεχσ[- - -]

Light-armed troops are mentioned on several other occasions in Thucydides' narrative of the year 431 B.C.: the Athenians sent a force of 1,000 hoplites and 400 archers in an expedition round the Peloponnese.[18] Nymphodorus was appointed by the Athenians as their representative in Thrace with the task of securing an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Thracians. He managed to persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian army of peltasts and cavalry and in 429/8 B.C. Sitalces led an abortive invasion of Macedonia.[19] In 431 B.C. the Athenians under the command of Pericles also marched into the Megarid and ravaged the countryside - included in the expedition were a considerable number of 'psiloi' whose main purpose must have been to ravage the land; as Victor Hanson notes, light-armed troops were well suited to such a role.[20]

In 429 B.C. took place the battle of Spartolus.[21] An Athenian army of 2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry was sent against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans and began by concentrating its attack on the land of the Bottiaean town of Spartolus. The Chalcidian hoplites with their auxiliary troops sallied from Spartolus, but were defeated and retreated into the city.

Thucydides specifically notes that in the battle, the Chalcidian cavalry and 'psiloi' had defeated their Athenian counterparts: οἱ δὲ ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων καὶ ψιλοὶ νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέας καὶ ψιλούς (Thuc.II.79.3). It comes as a surprise to us to learn that there were light-armed troops (psiloi) in the Athenian force since these are not included in Thucydides' enumeration of the Athenian army in II.79.1. Gomme supposes that the Athenians must have recruited some peltasts from cities situated near Spartolus, but if they had recruited only true peltasts Thucydides would have termed them 'peltastai' rather than 'psiloi'.[22] The Chalcidians, in addition to their ordinary 'psiloi', had a small body of specialist peltasts from Crusis and shortly after the engagement an auxiliary band of peltasts came from Olynthus.[23] Encouraged by their reinforcements and previous victory over the 'psiloi' of the Athenians, the Chalcidian light-armed troops,with the support of their cavalry, again attacked the Athenians while they were retiring. Thucydides describes their mode of combat: καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐνεδίδοσαν, ἀναχωροῦσι δ' ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον. οἵ τε ἱππῆς τῶν Χαλκιδέων προσιππεύοντες ἢ δοκοίη προσέβαλλον, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβήσαντες ἔτρεψαν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ἐπεδίωξαν ἐπὶ πολύ (Thuc.II.79.6).

Note that the Chalcidian light-armed troops used classic skirmishing tactics - retreating when the Athenians attacked them and pursuing when they retired and raining javelins all the time at them from a distance. When the Athenians finally broke and fled, the Chalcidian light-armed pursued them for a considerable distance: pursuit was another role for which light-infantry were well suited. The Athenian losses were heavy: 430 men and all their generals.[24] It is clear from Thucydides' account that the battle took a favourable turn for the Chalcidians when they used their specialist peltasts and ordinary 'psiloi' in conjunction with their cavalry. The Chalcidian cavalry played an important part in the engagement: they prevented the

Athenian cavalry from attacking their own light-armed troops and pressed home the attacks of their light troops in the places where they succeeded in fragmenting the phalanx block of the Athenians with their javelins. Best probably rightly emphasises the importance of the peltasts from Olynthus and Crusis, who were almost certainly better trained, organized and equipped than the cruder 'psiloi' who were present in both armies.[25] The Athenian 'psiloi', whom we hear of being defeated in the first battle, apparently took no part in defending their own hoplites in the second engagement; probably they were totally outclassed by the peltasts on the Chalcidian side. Two points which should be particularly noted with respect to this battle are, that it was fought on comparatively level ground, and that, as mentioned above, the victory was probably due to the use of light-armed troops in conjunction with cavalry.[26]

Also in 429 B.C., the inhabitants of the Acarnanian city of Stratus defeated a force of Chaonians by using the sling against them.[27] The Chaonians formed part of a Peloponnesian force which was sent to invade Acarnania and capture the largest Acarnanian city, Stratus. The Chaonians, being over confident in themselves, rushed towards the city of Stratus, but fell into ambushes which the Stratians had laid; the Chaonians and other allied barbarians rushed back into the Peloponnesian lines and when their forces had joined together, they were attacked by the Stratians who used their slings against them from a distance: ἐπεὶ δ' ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες οἱ βάρβαροι, ἀνελάμβανόν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυναγαγόντες τὰ στρατόπεδα ἡσύχαζον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐς χεῖρας μὲν οὐκ ἰόντων σφίσι τῶν Στρατίων διὰ τὸ μήπω τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀκαρνᾶνας ξυμβεβοηθηκέναι, ἄπωθεν δὲ σφενδονώντων καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν καθιστάντων· οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ ὅπλων κινηθῆναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ Ἀκαρνᾶνες κράτιστοι εἶναι τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

(Thuc.II.81.8).

Note that the Acarnanian slingers were used in ambush and that their efficiency with the sling was so great that only men equipped with hoplite defensive armour could move out of their camp.[28] Stratus was situated on a hill two miles west of a ford over the Achelous; it will become apparent that the sling was used by several peoples inhabiting hilly areas.[29]

Book Three of Thucydides: The Siege of Plataea (429 - 8 B.C.); Demosthenes' Campaign against the Aetolians (426 B.C.); Military Operations in Amphilochia (426 B.C.)

Before considering the three main actions in which light-armed infantry took part, we must examine briefly some miscellaneous references to these troops in the first part of book 3. In 428 B.C., 'psiloi' were taken along with a Peloponnesian army under the command of Archidamus for the purpose of ravaging the Attic countryside.[30] The Athenian cavalry were used to combat these troops: καὶ προσβολαί, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγνοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων ὅπῃ παρείκοι, καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὅμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν εἶργον τὸ μὴ προεξιόντας τῶν ὅπλων τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν (Thuc.III.1.2). As we shall see, cavalry were very useful for combating light-armed infantry.

Also in 428 B.C. Lesbos revolted from Athens with the encouragement of Sparta and Boeotia. Thucydides informs that the people of Lesbos were waiting for archers from the Pontus region.[31] These 'toxotai' were Scythian mercenary soldiers from the northern shore of the Black Sea. It is possible that the Athenians had a force of Scythian archers in their army during the period of the Peloponnesian War, although these are not specifically mentioned by Thucydides.[32] A short time before the surrender of Mytilene in 427 B.C. we are told that the Spartan Salaethus issued heavy armour and weapons to the demos of Mytilene which is described as 'psilos'; 'psilos' here seems simply to mean 'without heavy arms' rather than light-armed.[33]

In 428 B.C. during the blockade of Potidaea we are informed that every one of the hoplites engaged in the siege received two drachmae a day, one for himself and one for his 'huperetes.'[34] The motif of a light-armed man, usually carrying two spears (javelins?), and wearing a tunic and cloak and often a soft cap or broad brimmed sun-hat, either standing or fighting beside a hoplite, is a very common motif of Attic Red-figure vases;[35] it is almost certain that a hoplite would have been unwilling to buy an expensive panoply for his servant and the ceramic evidence would also suggest that the servant of a hoplite was light-armed.

The Siege of Plataea:

In 431 B.C., when war was about to break out, a Theban force marched against Plataea, but after gaining possession of the city for a short time the Theban advance party was shut in and captured. We are informed that one of the Plataeans managed to shut and fasten the city gates which were open by using the spiked butt of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead of the pin.[36] We may infer from this that the Plataeans had some troops armed as javelin-throwers.

In 429 B.C. a Peloponnesian force put the city under siege. The Peloponnesians constructed a circumvallation and the Plataeans were forced to build a makeshift wall and put a defensive covering of skins and hides on it to protect the woodwork and their own workmen from the fire-arrows shot by the attackers: ξύνδεσμος δ' ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ ξύλα, τοῦ μὴ ὑψηλὸν γιγνόμενον ἀσθενὲς εἶναι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα, καὶ προκαλύμματα εἶχε δέρσεις καὶ διφθέρας, ὥστε τούς ἐργαζομένους καὶ τὰ ξύλα μήτε πυρφόροις οἰστοῖς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τε εἶναι. (Thuc.II.75.5). This is the first reference which we have in ancient Greek literature to fire-arrows being used by Greek archers. It was not till after the disaster of Sphacteria in 425 B.C. that the Spartans raised a force of archers of their own, so the

archers firing these arrows must have belonged to Sparta's Peloponnesian allies.[37] We can infer from the repeated use of the verb ἐτόξευον (III.23.2 and.23.4) and the τοξότης of III.24.2 that the defending Plataeans also had a force of archers. Rüstow and Köchly argue that since the Plataean defending force included archers, the Peloponnesians took care to locate their circumvallation out of range of the Plataean arrows.[38] As the individual bricks of the wall were visible, they think that the wall was no further away than 100 metres;[39] it has been argued from this that the range of the Plataean archers could not have been as great as 100 metres. McLeod depreciates, I think wrongly, the value of the defending archers and asserts without any firm evidence, that they used single-stave (i.e. non-composite) bows.[40]

In 428 B.C., when it was evident that no help was coming from Athens, a group of Plataeans decided to attempt to break out of their besieged city. The men who set out to cross the Peloponnesian circumvallation were all light-armed: troops of this type were almost always used to take fortifications by surprise because they were silent (no clanking heavy arms) and swift. When it was dark and stormy, twelve 'psiloi', armed with daggers and wearing breastplates, climbed the ladders which they placed against the circumvallation and after them went more 'psiloi' with spears; shields for the shock troops were carried by other men who mounted the ladders. The Plataeans succeeded in climbing the walls and sent missile-troops up to the top of the towers to shoot missiles down at the besieging garrison, while another group of Plataean missile-troops were positioned at the foot of the wall to fire missiles up at them. As each man got across, he formed up with the others at the edge of the ditch, and from there the archers and javelin-throwers shot their missiles at all who came up along the wall to prevent them crossing over. As the Plataeans who had occupied the tower came down, the Peloponnesian garrison fell upon them but since they were carrying torches in the darkness

they presented perfect targets for the Plataean archers and javelin-throwers, who shot at them where their bodies were exposed. All the Plataeans in the group, with the exception of one archer who had been taken on the outer ditch, managed to get away safely owing to their agility.[41]

We shall find many other occasions in the writings of Thucydides and later Xenophon in which light-armed troops were used to take by surprise fortified positions. Note especially the diversity of arms with which the light-infantry who took part in the operation were armed: there were men armed with bows and javelins and other 'psiloi' amongst the assault party who were armed with daggers and equipped with breastplates or simply carried normal spears; some of these troops were also equipped with shields. Note that although some of the 'psiloi' had spears and shields, none were equipped with the full hoplite panoply.

In Thucydides' narrative of the period between the end of the siege of Plataea and the Aetolian campaign, there are two references to light-armed troops: at Notium in 427 B.C., the Athenian commander Paches had his archers shoot down Hippias, the general of some Arcadian mercenaries.[42] During the civil strife in Corcyra in 427 B.C., there was some fighting at long range with missile weapons.[43]

The Aetolian Expedition (426 B.C.):

In 426 B.C. the Messenians in Naupactus persuaded the Athenian general Demosthenes to attack the territory of the neighbouring Aetolians who were their enemies;[44] they furthermore told Demosthenes that the Aetolians would be easy to subdue since their troops were only lightly-equipped (σκευῇ ψιλῇ χρώμενον).[45] Demosthenes agreed to attack the Aetolians probably because he wanted to safeguard the city of Naupactus which was situated in a vital position on the Corinthian Gulf, and ultimately to attack Boeotia from the rear.

The Acarnanians, who were Athenian allies and might have contributed valuable light-armed troops, were angered by Demosthenes' refusal to blockade Leucas and sent no troops. Demosthenes set off with his army of Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians and 300 Athenian 'epibatai'.[46] Although it had been arranged that the Ozolian Locrians, who were 'akontistai' and familiar with the Aetolians' countryside and methods of fighting, were to join the Athenian force, Demosthenes decided not to wait for these reinforcements, in spite of his lack of light-armed troops, and marched into Aetolia towards the hilltop city of Aegitium.[47] The Aetolians had learned beforehand about the coming Athenian attack and had collected together to meet the threat. Demosthenes attacked and captured Aegitium, while the Aetolians fled and took up position on the tops of hills overhanging it. The Aetolians then ran down the hills and pelted Demosthenes' force with javelins on ground which must have been very unsuitable for hoplites: οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοί (βεβοηθηκότες γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον) προσέβαλλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καταθέοντες ἀπὸ τῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐπίοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπέκειντο· καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί, ἐν οἷς ἀμφοτέροις ἥσσους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. (Thuc. III.97.3).

The position of Demosthenes' force was perilous: his hoplites were becoming worn out in their attempts to pursue the swift 'akontistai' on ground which was unsuitable for them and their formation must have become increasingly fragmented. Only a corps of hitherto unmentioned 'toxotai' in the Athenian force managed to fend off disaster for a time but when their arrows were spent and their 'toxarchos' had been killed, they scattered and left the hoplite army open to full force of the Aetolian attack: μέχρι μὲν οὖν

οἱ τοξόται εἶχόν τε τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷοί τε ἦσαν χρῆσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντεῖχον (τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ψιλοὶ ἀνεστέλλοντο)· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ τε τοξάρχου ἀποθανόντος οὗτοι διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκεκμήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ ξυνεχόμενοι, οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἐσπίπτοντες ἐς τε χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο· (Thuc.III.98.1).

The swift-footed Aetolians chased after the hoplites and killed many with their javelins; many of them got lost and wandered around in the woods which the Aetolians set alight. Forty percent of the Athenian force was slaughtered and the casualties of their allies must have been about the same percentage.[48]

Note that the Aetolian javelin-throwers used the classic light-armed tactic of retreating and then attacking to wear out the Athenian hoplites and were extremely efficient in the final pursuit. The hilly and forested terrain of Aetolia was probably one of the worst places Demosthenes could have taken hoplites - they could not have hoped to form a regular phalanx on such ground.[49] The Athenian force of archers played a vital role in fending off the Aetolians during the main engagement; the fact that they were commanded by a'toxarchos' would suggest that they were a well organized unit and possibly Athenian citizens, although we are not specifically told this.[50] This is the first occurrence of the word 'toxarchos' in prose; there is, however, an earlier reference to the noun 'toxarchos' in the Persae of Aeschylus.[51] The defeat of the Athenian hoplite force was severe, but Demosthenes learnt from his expensive lesson and put the Aetolian tactics to good use at the battlesof Olpae and Sphacteria.

Military Operations in Amphilochia (426 B.C.):

In 426 B.C., the Ambraciots descended into Amphilochian Argive territory and seized the fort of Olpae, which was situated on a hill near Amphilochian Argos.[52] The Acarnanians sent for Demosthenes and the 20 ships which were coasting off the Peloponnese. Eurylochus and his Peloponnesian army marched through Acarnania and advanced towards Argos, joining with the Ambraciots at Olpae.[53] Demosthenes arrived in the Ambracian Gulf and brought with him 200 Messenian hoplites and 60 'toxotai' who were Athenian citizens (ἑξήκοντα δὲ τοξότας Ἀθηναίων);[54] Gomme suggests that these archers may have been part of the permanent garrison of Naupactus.[55] After five days of inactivity, both armies drew up for battle and Demosthenes, seeing that the Peloponnesian army outnumbered his own and fearing that his own flanks might be surrounded, laid an ambush with 400 hoplites and 'psiloi', by placing them in a deep lane overgrown with brushwood which was situated at the rear of the enemy.[56] Both armies prepared to engage; Demosthenes, with the Messenians and a few Athenians, held the right wing, while the other was held by the Acarnanians and Amphilochian 'akontistai'.[57] In the fighting which followed, Demosthenes' wing was outflanked by the superior numbers of the Peloponnesian troops and was in great danger. The Acarnanians realized his predicament and came rushing out of their ambush behind the Peloponnesian force; the Peloponnesians who were facing the Athenians fled in terror without striking a blow and the rest of their left wing followed their example. The Ambraciots and other troops on the Peloponnesians' right wing managed to rout their opponents but were later defeated by Demosthenes' Acarnanian troops who drove them back to Olpae.

The Athenian victory over the numerically stronger Peloponnesian force was due to the surprise attack of the 400 Acarnanian hoplites and 'psiloi'. Gomme supposes that the Athenian 'toxotai' were with the 400 in the sunken road,

but Thucydides makes no mention of their part in the fighting.[58] Hammond believes that Demosthenes' force consisted mainly of light-armed troops:[59] the Amphilochians, who were used to protect the flank of the left wing, are said to be 'akontistai' in Thuc.III.107.4; some of the Acarnanian troops who were set in ambush were 'psiloi' and we can probably infer from Thuc.III.111.3 that some of their number were equipped with javelins.[60]

After this victory, Demosthenes learnt that the Ambraciots with all their forces were advancing towards him and, bearing in mind the disastrous experience which he had suffered at the hands of the Aetolians, in whose territory he had failed to take the necessary precautions, he now sent part of his army to lie in ambush along the roads and to occupy strategic positions. The main Ambraciot force reached Idomene (there is some disagreement about which mountain we should identify as Idomene) and encamped on the smaller peak, while Demosthenes' men had already secretly occupied the larger one at night.[61] Demosthenes himself took half of his army to the pass between the hills at dusk, while the other half travelled through the Amphilochian mountains. At dawn he attacked the Ambraciots in their sleep and slaughtered a great number of them, whilst the survivors fled into the mountains. The swift Amphilochian javelin-throwers were used to pursue and lie in wait for the Ambraciot hoplites and managed to kill a great number of them:

προκατειλημμένων δὲ τῶν ὁδῶν, καὶ ἅμα τῶν μὲν Ἀμφιλόχων ἐμπείρων ὄντων τῆς ἑαυτῶν γῆς καὶ ψιλῶν πρὸς ὁπλίτας, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων καὶ ἀνεπιστημόνων ὅπῃ τράπωνται, ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε χαράδρας καὶ τὰς προλελοχισμένας ἐνέδρας διεφθείροντο. (Thuc.III.112.6).

There are striking similarities between the defeat of Demosthenes in Aetolia and that of the Ambraciots in Amphilochia: in both cases the heavily-armed hoplite in unfamiliar hilly countryside appears to have been entirely defenceless against the light-armed soldier.[62] In the Amphilochian

campaign we find light-armed troops fulfilling many important roles: lying in ambush behind enemy lines and in other suitable positions, occupying dominant positions, taking part in dawn attacks and pursuing a routed enemy. Demosthenes' defeat in Aetolia had taught him a lesson which he could not forget and he used light-armed troops in battle to good effect both in the campaign in Amphilochia and on Sphacteria.

Book Four of Thucydides: Pylos (425 B.C.); Nisaea (424 B.C.); Delium (424 B.C.); Campaigns in Chalcidice (424 - 423 B.C.)

Pylos and Sphacteria (425 B.C.):[63]

In 425 B.C., Demosthenes was sent to accompany a fleet of 40 ships, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, which was ready to set off for the West. Demosthenes wished to establish a military post in the western Peloponnese and pressed the commanders to put in at Pylos, on the coast of Messenia, and to fortify the headland of Coryphasium. The main fleet went on its way, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to hold Pylos. The Spartan army under Agis had invaded Attica, but returned early, probably because of news of Pylos. Demosthenes, confronted by a body of Spartan troops, sent two of his ships to overtake the fleet and beg Eurymedon to return to help him. The Spartans wanted to blockade Pylos and were moreover afraid that the Athenians might use the island of Sphacteria as a base for military operations, and accordingly Epitadas occupied Sphacteria with 420 Lacedaemonian hoplites and their helots.[64]

The Spartans then prepared to take Pylos by storm before help could come to the Athenians. Demosthenes dragged his ships into a stockade and, to meet the emergency, armed his oarsmen as crude 'psiloi' with wicker shields of poor quality;[65] he then posted the greater part of his light-armed troops (ἀκόντων) and hoplites (ὡπλισμένων) to guard the northern line

of defence and the south-eastern corner of the promontory of Coryphasium, while he himself, with 60 hoplites and some 'toxotai', protected the edge of the south-western shore, where the Spartans were about to try to land.[66] The Spartans attacked on two days but failed to make a landing. The force of Athenian triremes then arrived and attacked the Peloponnesian fleet on the shores of Navarino Bay, possibly near the Gialova river; the Athenians succeeded in gaining a substantial victory which consequently enabled them to blockade the Spartans on Sphacteria. The Spartans lost their whole fleet of 60 ships in the truce which followed.

The siege became protracted and the Spartans on Sphacteria managed to get supplies by means of helots who swam across from the mainland with provisions. The Athenians at home grew impatient; in the assembly Cleon came forward and said that he was not frightened of the Spartans and would sail against them without taking a single man from Athens, only the Lemnians and Imbrians (who may have been peltasts) who were already in the city and the peltasts who had come from Aenus to offer their help and four hundred 'toxotai' who were available from other quarters.[67] Thucydides' observation that Demosthenes intended to give the most important tasks in his plan of campaign to light-armed troops from the beginning probably indicates that Cleon brought these troops to Pylos at Demosthenes' request.[68] The fact that some men in the Athenian assembly ridiculed Cleon's promise that he would defeat the Spartans with these specialist troops shows that they had no notion as yet of how effective light-armed men could be in certain conditions. Note well that Cleon proposed to use specialist light-troops obtained from sources outside Athens: peltasts from Aenus in Thrace, troops from Lemnos and Imbros, two northern Athenian colonies, and allied or mercenary 'toxotai' who came from outside the city.

Before Cleon arrived at Pylos, the forest on Sphacteria had been destroyed by fire; many commentators suppose the fire was started deliberately by the Athenians to burn the thick undergrowth and so make landing easier. Best suggests that the Spartans could have used the thick undergrowth "to launch surprise attacks from all sides" and thus they would have been "able to defeat an enemy unfamiliar with the thickly wooded terrain, even if they were outnumbered".[69] I am dubious of this suggestion: the heavily armed, less mobile, Spartan hoplites would have found great difficulty in using such tactics on rough terrain against Athenian light-armed troops. They were trained to fight in a phalanx block and the tactics which Best supposes they might have employed would have been strange to them. Did Demosthenes fear such tactics, not from the Spartan hoplites, but from their lightly-armed helots and consequently order an advance party to set light to the undergrowth? [70]

Cleon and Demosthenes, after an appeal to the Spartans to surrender had failed, landed all their 800 hoplites at two different points on the island with orders to destroy the first Spartan observation post and to provide a bridgehead for the rest of the Athenian army.[71] The hoplites accomplished their task and at dawn the rest of the Athenian force went ashore on Sphacteria:

ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινον, ἐκ μὲν νεῶν ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλεόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμιῶν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλον κατεῖχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων (Thuc.IV.32.2).

The light-armed forces, then, consisted of 800 archers[72] and 800 peltasts, who were fully trained specialist troops, and the majority of the sailors from over 70 ships who were armed with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on and acted as crude 'psiloi.'[73] How many light-armed sailors did the

ships produce? The lowest rank of sailors (Thalamioi), sixty in number to each ship, were excluded from the military operation, only the sixty 'Zugitai' and fifty 'Thranitai' in each ship were utilized. Thus 70 ships would have produced 7,700 Zugitai and Thranitai, but we must bear in mind that Thucydides informs us that the crews (excluding the Thalamioi) of more than 70 ships landed; Wilson assumes that there were over 80 triremes with the Athenian force at this time - this gives us a maximum total of 8,800 for the number of Zugitai and Thranitai who could have landed.[74] If we add 8,800 crude 'psiloi' to the 1,600 archers and peltasts, we come up with the incredible total of 10,400 men for the light-armed force which landed on Sphacteria. Little wonder that the 420 Spartans were overwhelmed.

Demosthenes formed his light-armed troops into units of roughly 200 men and ordered them to attack the Spartans on all sides, using the typical attack then retreat tactics which were common to skirmishers: Δημοσθένους δὲ τάξαντος διέστησαν κατὰ διακοσίους τε καὶ πλείους, ἔστι δ' ἣ ἐλάσσους, τῶν χωρίων τὰ μετεωρότατα λαβόντες, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστη ἀπορία ἦ τοῖς πολεμίοις πανταχόθεν κεκυκλωμένοις καὶ μὴ ἔχωσι πρὸς ὅτι ἀντιτάξωνται, ἀλλ' ἀμφίβολοι γίγνωνται τῷ πλήθει, εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπίοιεν, ὑπὸ τῶν κατόπιν βαλλόμενοι, εἰ δὲ τοῖς πλαγίοις, ὑπὸ τῶν ἑκατέρωθεν παρατεταγμένων. κατὰ νώτου τε αἰεὶ ἔμελλον αὐτοῖς, ἢ χωρήσειαν, οἱ πολέμιοι ἔσεσθαι ψιλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι, τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντες ἀλκήν, οἷς μηδὲ ἐπελθεῖν οἷόν τε ἦν· φεύγοντές τε γὰρ ἐκράτουν καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ἐπέκειντο (Thuc.IV.32.3-4). Note that Thucydides uses the term 'psiloi' here to cover archers, javelin-throwers, stone-throwers and slingers. We know that there were two forces, each numbering 800 men, of archers and peltasts, but who were the men who threw the stones and operated

with slings? One would expect that the oarsmen, who were armed with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on, may have picked up stones and hurled them at the Spartans. Pausanias asserts that there was a corps of Messenian 'sphendonetai' present in the Athenian force.[75]

The main body of the Spartan troops, who were posted in the northern part of Sphacteria, when they saw that their first guard-post had been overwhelmed and that a force was advancing upon them, formed up and advanced towards the Athenian hoplites, wishing to get to grips with them in close combat. They probably assumed that, as in most battles, the light-armed troops were insignificant and that the battle would be fought between their own phalanx and that of the Athenians. However, the Athenian hoplites stayed where they were, probably on one of the hills at the southern end of the island, near where the Spartan guard-post had been stationed, and meanwhile their light-troops advanced against the Spartans, showering missiles at them from on their flanks and in their rear.[76] The Spartan hoplites tried unsuccessfully to attack their light-armed foes, who took to their heels when they saw an attack developing; the Spartans were hampered in pursuit both by their heavy equipment and by the terrain which was extremely rough and difficult.[77]

Thucydides then states in IV.34.1: χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινὰ ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἠκροβολίσαντο. In the preceding chapter, Thucydides describes the Athenian 'psiloi' raining missiles on the Spartans, then the Spartans charging and the light-troops running away. This type of fighting could well be defined as a 'skirmish' in English, but the Greek verb ἀκροβολίζομαι does not seem to have a general meaning of 'skirmish' but rather it specifically implies using missile weapons such as the arrow, javelin, sling-bullet or stone at a distance from the enemy.[78] The aorist third person plural of the verb ἀκροβολίζομαι would mean that some troops on the Spartan side were also fighting with long-

range weapons - if not, how are we to explain πρὸς ἀλλήλους ? Hoplites were not equipped to operate with missiles since their heavy armour and large shields would have inhibited the movement necessary to fire them, so that we can safely assume that it was, as we should suppose, their helot attendants who fought with missile weapons. As we have seen in the Persian wars, helots fought and died on the battlefield of Thermopylae and a huge force of helots, whom Herodotus specifically terms 'psiloi', were present at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C.[79]

We know that there were helots present on Sphacteria (Thuc.IV.8.9) and it seems likely that it was these who acted as light-armed missile-troops. We do not know how large the force of helots was which was present on the island. Lazenby thinks that "each Spartan hoplite was accompanied by his own batman" and Wilson comments "I do not believe that there were more than one or two helots per Spartan";[80] there may feasibly have been more than two helots to each Spartan, but not many more because water and food supplies were very limited on the island.

In the fighting in which the Athenians rained missiles at the Spartans and then ran away, one would have thought that the support of the light-armed missile-troops, however crudely equipped, would have been vital to help to ward off such attacks; indeed,I fail to see how the Spartans could have been able to withstand the ferocious attacks from all sides of the numerically superior Athenian 'psiloi' unless their helots were in some way trying to ward off their attackers. Wilson comments: "the prolonged Spartan resistance against such overwhelming numbers is hardly intelligible if we picture 420 Spartans on their own, with no helot assistance".[81] The helots must have protected the rear of the Spartans which was attacked by the Athenian 'psiloi' and given some support in the retreat to Mount Elias and in the final defence of the hilltop.

Although I believe that the helots helped to prolong the Spartan resistance, I am forced to conclude by Thucydides' silence that they could not have severely hampered the Athenian light-armed, probably because they were vastly outnumbered, ill-equipped and untrained - certainly no match for the large specialist bodies of archers and peltasts in the Athenian force.[82] However, we must also bear in mind the possibility that Thucydides does not mention the part played by the helots in the fighting because he regarded them as socially and militarily insignificant. Thucydides' main interest in the battle was the surrender of the Spartan hoplites.

The fighting with missile weapons lasted for a relatively short time and the Athenian light-armed troops' incessant attacks began to wear out the Spartan hoplites who became unable to counter them with much force. The 'psiloi', being confident owing to their own large number and success, attacked all the more fiercely; they rushed upon them showering them with stones, arrows and javelins.[83] The predicament of the bewildered Spartans is described graphically by Thucydides: γενομένης δὲ τῆς βοῆς ἅμα τῇ ἐπιδρομῇ ἔκπληξίς τε ἐνέπεσεν ἀνθρώποις ἀήθεσι τοιαύτης μάχης καὶ ὁ κονιορτὸς τῆς ὕλης νεωστὶ κεκαυμένης ἐχώρει πολὺς ἄνω, ἄπορόν τε ἦν ἰδεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν τοξευμάτων καὶ λίθων ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετὰ τοῦ κονιορτοῦ ἅμα φερομένων (Thuc.IV.34.2). The Spartans began to suffer many casualties and Thucydides informs us that the felt caps (πῖλοι) of the Spartans were no protection against arrows and that javelins broke off in the bodies of Spartans who had been hit.[84] The Spartans closed their ranks and made for the fort on Mount Elias at the northern end of the island, pursued closely by the Athenian light-armed troops who killed any Lacedaemonian who could not keep up with the main body.[85]

Once the Spartans gained the stronghold, the Athenians were unable to surround them and this meant that the battle was conducted face to face;

the Spartan hoplites then showed their prowess by driving off the incessant Athenian attacks for the rest of the day. It was only when a number of archers and light-armed troops led by the commander of the Messenian contingent reached a higher position behind the Spartans that the battle was decided;[86] according to Pausanias the contingent of 'psiloi' were Messenian slingers.[87] Now, when the Spartans were being harassed on two sides, they were compelled to give up their positions and retreat from the advancing Athenians; their situation soon became hopeless and Cleon and Demosthenes stopped the engagement and accepted the Spartan surrender. The Spartan casualties were heavy: 128 of the 420 Spartan hoplites were killed. The Athenian losses were slight: although, if I.G.1²949 is a stele recording the Athenian dead at Pylos, we know that out of the light-armed troops at least some 'toxotai' had fallen. [88]

Demosthenes had used the very same tactics which were used against him by the Aetolians to win a brilliant and relatively bloodless victory over the Spartans. The skirmishing tactics of his large forces of archers, peltasts, slingers and other cruder 'psiloi' in the rough terrain had totally baffled the Spartan hoplites, who could find no way to join battle with them. The victory was probably due more to the well organized and equipped forces of archers and peltasts than to the makeshift oarsmen-'psiloi' who were armed with whatever weapons they could pick up (possibly with knives, hatchets and spare spears and some at least carried wicker-shields) or possibly even just threw rocks and stones. Demosthenes' relatively large body of hoplites appear to have played no part in the main battle, though they did serve the purpose of focussing the attention of the Spartans, and presumably were in a position to carry out a crushing attack if the Spartans had attempted to break into smaller parties to deal with the Athenian light-armed troops.

The Spartan hoplites evidently despised the tactics of the Athenian missile-troops and the sneering answer of one of them, when asked if all the

brave Spartans had fallen, typifies this: "The spindle (meaning the arrow)", quoth the Spartan "would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it picked out the brave".[89] After the battle both Athens and Sparta must have realized that light-armed troops had great military potential, whether they approved of their skirmishing tactics or not.[90]

After their defeat on Sphacteria, the Spartans raised a force of 400 cavalry and a corps of archers to meet the swift ravaging attacks of the Athenian 'psiloi' and hoplites: ... καὶ πανταχόθεν σφᾶς περιεστῶτος πολέμου ταχέος καὶ ἀπροφυλάκτου, ὥστε παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς ἱππέας τετρακοσίους κατεστήσαντο καὶ τοξότας (Thuc.IV.55.2). This passage of Thucydides is very important as it implies that before this measure the Spartans had no archers in their own army. It also implies that the helots were not armed with bows and arrows; this accords well with Herodotus' account of the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C., when Pausanias, who already had a large force of light-armed helots, specifically requested the assistance of the Athenian corps of archers.[91] If the helots on Sphacteria did in fact 'skirmish' with missile weapons, it seems probable that they used javelins and stones, but not bows; this explains why the helots did not carry out an effective role against the Athenian light-armed force which contained 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai', who could operate from a much greater range. We are not told if the members of the Spartan archer corps were Spartan citizens, 'perioikoi', or helots.

To meet attacks on the Peloponnese by the Athenian fleet the Spartans also placed garrisons round the coast, but there were in most cases insufficient numbers in a particular area for action. The attacks of the Athenians on the Peloponnese were particularly effective because they used swift-footed 'psiloi', who were difficult to bring to battle, to ravage land and these were backed up by hoplites. If the Spartans had raised a much larger body of cavalry, which could have been split up into sector-forces for the coast,

they might have had a strong weapon to counter the ravaging attacks of Athenian 'psiloi'. In Thucydides IV.56.1. we hear of a Spartan garrison which supporting hoplites:[92] μία δὲ φρουρά, ἥπερ καὶ ἠμύναντο περὶ Κοτύρταν καὶ Ἀφροδισιάν, τὸν μὲν ὄχλον τῶν ψιλῶν ἐσκεδασμένον ἐφόβησεν ἐπιδρομῇ, τῶν δὲ ὁπλιτῶν δεξαμένων ὑπεχώρησε πάλιν, καὶ ἄνδρες τέ τινες ἀπέθανον αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἐλήφθη, τροπαῖόν τε στήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κύθηρα.

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In 425 B.C., we also hear of archers taking part in the stasis at Corcyra; members of the Corcyraean popular party murdered a number of the oligarchs by shutting them in a building, dismantling the roof, and shooting arrows down at them.[93] It is worth nothing that it was the lower classes in Corcyra who were armed with the bow.

Megara and Nisaea (424 B.C.)

After the Spartan defeat on the island of Sphacteria, the Athenians undertook a bold attack against Megara. In 424 B.C., stasis had erupted at Megara which led to the expulsion of a faction who seized the port of Pagae; the opponents of the exiled faction wished to gain the support of Athens and offered to betray Megara and the harbour of Nisaea. They agreed to help the Athenians to take the Long Walls which extended from Megara to Nisaea, where a Peloponnesian garrison was positioned.[94]

The surprise attack was well planned: the Athenian general Hippocrates, with 600 hoplites, took up his position not far from the Long Walls in a trench. A second division of the Athenian army, consisting of 'psiloi' of the Plataeans and other 'peripoloi', under the command of Demosthenes, lay in ambush at the temple of Enyalius, which was situated very near to the Long Walls.[95] Although we have very little evidence about the 'peripoloi' at this

period, it seems probable, as Parke suggests, that they were light-armed troops and that they were used in frontier duties and for garrisons.[96] By a trick on the part of the pro-Athenian party in the city, the Plataean 'psiloi' and the 'peripoloi' succeeded in leaving their hiding place just before daybreak and running towards the gates which had been opened. At that, their Megarian supporters cut down some of the guards, while the Athenian light troops overpowered the Peloponnesians who stood in their way and secured the gates for the entrance of the Athenian hoplites: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημοσθένη Πλαταιῆς τε καὶ περίπολοι ἐσέδραμον οὗ νῦν τὸ τροπαῖόν ἐστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν (ἥσθοντο γὰρ οἱ ἐγγύτατα Πελοποννήσιοι) μαχόμενοι τοὺς προσβοηθοῦντας οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἐκράτησαν καὶ τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλίταις ἐπιφερομένοις βεβαίους τὰς πύλας παρέσχον (Thuc.IV.67.5).

Demosthenes had planned this attack well, using a contingent of light-armed as shock troops to capture the gate, and the hoplites to consolidate the occupied positions. The operation took place at night to ensure the maximum amount of panic among the opponents. The 'psiloi' were ideally suited to spearheading this surprise attack since they were swift and unencumbered with heavy, clanking armour. After the Long Walls and Nisaea had been taken, a Spartan and Boeotian force came to relieve Megara, which the Athenians had not captured, and the Boeotian cavalry carried out a surprise attack on the 'psiloi' of the Athenians, who were scattered over the plain, ravaging the Megarian land, and routed them, driving them to the sea. Light-armed troops on flat land were always very vulnerable to cavalry attack.[97] The Athenians failed to take Megara.

The Battle of Delium (424 B.C.):

Athens was very confident after the recovery of Nisaea in 424 B.C. and this success led Athens to try to crush the power of Boeotia. The Boeotian

government was to be threatened on three sides by a synchronized attack: Demosthenes and his force of Acarnanians were to secure Siphae, the port of Thespiae, Hippocrates and an Athenian force were to fortify the temple of Apollo at Delium as a base, whilst Chaeronea was to be seized by a democratic faction. The Boeotians, however, organized resistance to Demosthenes and he did not try to take Siphae and the democratic faction in Chaeronea failed to gain control of the city.[98] Hippocrates' attack went ahead: he called out the whole army of Athens, metics as well as citizens and all the 'xenoi' who were then in the city (the majority of the metics and 'xenoi' were probably armed as light-infantry).[99] A massive force of 'psiloi' accompanied the hoplite force: Gomme's assertion that they were primarily taken on the expedition for the rapid construction of the fortifications around the temple of Delium is probably correct.[100]

When the work of fortifying the temple precinct was almost finished, the Athenian army retired a short distance from it, while the majority of the light-armed troops proceeded on their march home.[101] Under the influence of the Boeotarch Pagondas, the Boeotians marched with a large force, which consisted of 7,000 hoplites, more than 10,000 'psiloi', 1,000 cavalry and 500 peltasts, against the Athenians.[102] In the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (11.4) it is stated that each of the eleven divisions into which the Boeotian confederacy was divided (at the beginning of the 4th century B.C.) had to produce 1,000 hoplites and 100 cavalry. With this in mind, P.A. Seymour suggests that the 7,000 hoplites and 500 peltasts in the Boeotian force at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. represented two thirds of the total force from ten divisions and the full force from the Tanagra division. I have little faith in Seymour's hypothesis: he seems to regard the peltasts as equivalent to hoplites, but the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia makes no mention of peltasts or any other light-armed troops.[103] We are not told if the peltasts in the Boeotian force were native Boeotians or mercenaries from elsewhere.

Thus the Boeotian army had a large force of over 10,500 light-armed troops (amounting to over 56.8% of the whole force), five hundred of whom were specialist peltasts. We are further told that the Boeotian cavalry and light-armed troops were placed on the wings of their army, almost certainly to hamper attacks on their own flanks or to initiate attacks on those of the Athenians.[104]

Thucydides recounts again the Athenian force under Hippocrates: they had 7,000 hoplites and a force of cavalry which were stationed on the wings of the Athenian phalanx. He then gives us some very important information about the Athenian 'psiloi': ψιλοὶ δὲ ἐκ παρασκευῆς μὲν ὡπλισμένοι οὔτε τότε παρῆσαν οὔτε ἐγένοντο τῇ πόλει· οἵπερ δὲ ξυνεσέβαλον ὄντες πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἄοπλοί τε πολλοὶ ἠκολούθησαν, ἅτε πανστρατιᾶς ξένων τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἀστῶν γενομένης, καὶ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμησαν ἐπ' οἴκου, οὐ παρεγένοντο ὅτι μὴ ὀλίγοι (Thuc.IV.94.1). Thucydides informs us in this passage that the Athenians had far more 'psiloi' in their force than the Boeotians (i.e. the Athenians had well over 10,000 'psiloi'). More importantly for our understanding of Athenian light-armed troops, he also tells us that the 'psiloi' at the time of the Delium campaign were not uniformly armed and equipped, nor did Athens possess any native 'psiloi' who were. We also learn that the majority of the 'psiloi', who did not remain with the main army but started on their march home, were ἄοπλοι ; Gomme takes ἄοπλοι to mean 'unarmed' rather than 'light-armed' but, although it is difficult to separate ἄοπλοι from ὡπλισμένοι , I think we should not exclude the possibility that at least a proportion of the 'psiloi' carried crude weapons.[105] Even if the Athenian 'psiloi' were used mainly for the building operation, they were all marching in enemy territory and were sent back to Athens without the protection of hoplites and cavalry and, in view of these facts, it seems probable that many of them were armed

with weapons for their own defence; doubtless some of the Athenian 'psiloi' could simply have picked up rocks and stones and thrown them at the enemy. Indeed, some Theban and Tanagraian black stone stelai with pictures of warriors incised on them, which A. Keramopoullos believes should be associated with the battle of Delium, show rocks which have been thrown by an enemy.[106] On the funerary stele of Sauganes from Tanagra, which dates approximately to the period of the battle but may be slightly later, a warrior is depicted carrying a short sword in his right hand and with his broken thrusting-spear lying at his feet; we also see the head of an opponent's spear directed against him and a stone flying near his face and other stones lying by his feet - were the stones thrown by Athenian 'psiloi'?[107] The stele of Rynchon from Thebes, which also dates approximately to the period of the battle, shows a charging warrior and two rocks which may have been thrown at him at his feet.[108]

In the battle itself, both armies charged at one another but Thucydides informs us that the extreme right and left wings of both forces, where the Boeotian light-infantry were placed and probably also the 'psiloi' of the Athenians who had been kept behind, were prevented form engaging by water-courses (ῥύακες).[109] He makes no mention at all about the part played by light-armed troops of both sides in the battle. Gomme, however, asserts that "The light-armed would not have been hindered by ῥύακες , but should have taken advantage of them against hoplites".[110] If Gomme's assertion, as seems probable, is true, why does Thucydides make no mention of them in his narrative of the battle?[111] The Boeotians, as we know, had a very large force of light-armed troops present on the wings of their phalanx and the Athenians had at least some 'psiloi' left with their main force: it seems inconceivable that Thucydides does not even give them a passing reference in his account of the actual fighting.[112]

After the Athenians were defeated in the hoplite battle, the Boeotian cavalry pursued them from the field. In the battle the Athenians lost a

little under 1,000 men, presumably hoplites, although they may have lost some cavalry, and a great number of 'psiloi' and 'skeuophoroi.'[113] It is possible that the Boeotian cavalry caught up with the great mass of Athenian 'psiloi' who were marching back to Athens, but I think that those referred to in this casualty list are those who stayed on the battlefield with the hoplites and that Thucydides probably means that a proportionately high number of the 'psiloi' present on the field were killed.[114] The presence of 'skeuophoroi' on the field can be explained by the fact that Hippocrates did not expect an attack and would not have had time to send them away; once they realized that a battle was about to take place, they almost certainly would have preferred to stay where they were under the protection of the hoplites rather than to make a run for it and risk the possibility of being cut down by the Boeotian cavalry.

The Boeotians then concentrated for an attack on the Athenian fortifications around the temple of Apollo at Delium. We are informed by Thucydides that they immediately sent for forces of 'akontistai' and 'sphendonetai' from the region of the Malian Gulf, presumably for the attack on the fortifications. Gomme understandably comments: "It is remarkable that the Boeotians, who had over 10,000 light-armed at Delion, should have needed these reinforcements".[115] The only possible answer is that the Boeotians felt that they needed more specialist missile-troops in addition to their force of peltasts. Egyptian, Assyrian and Roman slingers are depicted attacking fortified positions and Philip of Macedon used them to attack the city of Olynthus in 348 B.C.[116] Clay sling-shots could be heated to start a fire in an enemy camp, but this practice is not mentioned here.[117] The Athenian fortification was taken but again we are not told what part, if any, the Boeotian light-armed troops played in its capture.[118]

Campaigns in Chalcidice (424 - 423 B.C.):

In 424 B.C. the Spartan Brasidas advanced into Thrace and took the city of Amphipolis; several cities in Chalcidice joined his side.[119] Brasidas then decided to make an expedition against the city of Torone which was held by the Athenians. In his attack on Torone, which bears a striking resemblance to that of Demosthenes on the Long Walls of Megara, Brasidas used light-armed troops (psiloi) equipped with daggers and also peltasts in his storming party.[120]

Brasidas arrived at Torone with his army during the night and took up position at the temple of the Dioscuri which was about three stades from the city. The Pro-Spartan faction in Torone admitted into their city a storming party of 'psiloi' armed with daggers who killed the guards posted on the summit of the city and began to break down the postern-gate which faced the promontory of Canastraeum:[121] οἱ δὲ πράσσοντες αὐτῷ εἰδότες ὅτι ἥξοι, καὶ προελθόντες τινὲς αὐτῶν λάθρᾳ ὀλίγοι, ἐτήρουν τὴν πρόσοδον, καὶ ὡς ἤσθοντο παρόντα, ἐσκομίζουσι παρ' αὐτοὺς ἐγχειρίδια ἔχοντας ἄνδρας ψιλοὺς ἑπτά (τοσοῦτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀνδρῶν εἴκοσι τὸ πρῶτον ταχθέντων οὐ κατέδεισαν ἐσελθεῖν· ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Λυσίστρατος Ὀλύνθιος), οἱ διαδύντες διὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τείχους καὶ λαθόντες τούς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνωτάτω φυλακτηρίου φρουρούς, οὔσης τῆς πόλεως πρὸς λόφον, ἀναβάντες διέφθειραν καὶ τὴν κατὰ Καναστραῖον πυλίδα διήρουν.

(Thuc.IV.110.2).

Brasidas advanced nearer to the city with the rest of his army and sent forward one hundred peltasts to wait for any of the gates to be opened and the pre-arranged fire signal. Firstly, some peltasts were admitted through the postern-gate, in order to heighten the panic inside the city by means of a sudden attack in the rear. The Pro-Spartan faction then raised the fire signal and received the storming party of peltasts through the gates by the

market-place.[122] On seeing the signal Brasidas rushed forward with his entire army; some soldiers ran inside straight away, others occupied the walls. Brasidas ascended towards the highest part of Torone with his main force, while his remaining troops spread out over the rest of the city. While the majority of the citizens were panic-stricken, the Pro-Spartan faction joined the invading army. On the second day of fighting Brasidas captured the fort of Lecythus, which was held by an Athenian garrison, and thus gained total control of the city.[123]

Thus, we find Brasidas, a Spartan general, using light-armed troops to attack by surprise a fortified position at night - the very tactic which the Athenian Demosthenes had utilized earlier in the same year.

In 423 B.C.,when Mende and Scione revolted from Athens and the arrival of an Athenian force was imminent,we learn that "Brasidas, expecting a sea-borne attack from the Athenians, had the women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice and also sent over for them 500 Peloponnesian hoplites and 300 Chalcidian peltasts, all of whom were under the command of Polydamidas" (Thuc.IV.123.4). In this passage we find Brasidas making use of peltasts whomwe know for certain were native Chalcidians.[124]

In 423 B.C. we gain some insight into the manner in which Brasidas and his force combated an attack by light-armed troops. Brasidas, deserted by his Macedonian and barbarian troops, faced the army of Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyncestians of Upper Macedonia, and his allied Illyrian troops. He decided to retreat and formed his hoplites into a compact square with the crowd of light-armed troops (ψιλὸν ὅμιλον) in the centre.[125] The 'psiloi' were obviously unable to defend themselves and needed a formation in which they were protected by the hoplites. Brasidas ordered the youngest hoplites to sally out of their formation when the Lyncestians and Illyrians,

many of whom must have been lightly-armed, attacked, whilst he himself with 300 picked troops formed the rearguard to beat off the foremost of their attackers.[126] Brasidas, according to Thucydides, addressed his troops in a speech which is tinted with the typical Spartan view that the skirmishing tactics used by the Illyrian troops were cowardly.

When Brasidas began the retreat, the barbarians attacked his force but were driven off by successive charges by his young hoplites:

οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἰδόντες πολλῇ βοῇ καὶ θορύβῳ προσέκειντο, νομίσαντες φεύγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ καταλαβόντες διαφθερεῖν. καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς αἵ τε ἐκδρομαὶ ὅπῃ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπήντων καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων τοὺς λογάδας ἐπικειμένους ὑφίστατο, τῇ τε πρώτῃ ὁρμῇ παρὰ γνώμην ἀντέστησαν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιφερομένους μὲν δεχόμενοι ἠμύνοντο, ἡσυχαζόντων δὲ αὐτοὶ ὑπεχώρουν, τότε δὴ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ Βρασίδου Ἑλλήνων ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέσχοντο .... (Thuc.IV.127.1-2). Brasidas' tactics were very effective and in open countryside, which was suitable for the hoplite square and did not test its cohesion, the enemy could not attack the Spartan block with any success. Demosthenes could have adopted these tactics in his retreat from the Aetolian 'akontistai' in 426 B.C., but the terrain was probably not suitable for the defensive square formation and his men were already worn out.[127] We cannot tell if the barbarians' tactics would have been successful if they had persevered in their attacks; if the Lacedaemonians had become exhausted by continued sallies against the enemy, they could have suffered the same fate as the Spartan 'mora' did near Corinth in 390 B.C.[128]

It is remarkable to note that Brasidas did not employ his own light-armed troops in the engagement; they were safely surrounded by hoplites in the centre of the square formation. They were clearly regarded as not being capable of standing up to the barbarians: was this because they were poorly

equipped or more simply because they were heavily outnumbered by the barbarians? As we shall see with the army of the Ten Thousand, light-armed troops were used to constitute separate van- and rear-guards; since Brasidas had not learned to equip or train his light-armed infantry to fulfil these roles, he formed his rearguard out of hoplites.

In 423 B.C., the Athenians sailed out against the cities of Mende and Scione which had revolted. The Athenian generals Nicias and Nicostratus had under their command 1,000 citizen hoplites, 600 'toxotai', 1,000 Thracian mercenaries and some peltasts from their allies in Chalcidice.[129] We are not told if the 600 'toxotai' were Athenian citizens, allies or mercenaries. The 1,000 Thracian mercenaries are most likely to have been peltasts. Nicias tried unsuccessfully to attack a Peloponnesian force, which was encamped on a hill outside Mende, with his light-armed troops and 60 hoplites: καὶ αὐτοῖς Νικίας μὲν Μεθωναίους τε ἔχων εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν ψιλοὺς καὶ λογάδας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁπλιτῶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἅπαντας κατὰ ἄτρακτόν τινα τοῦ λόφου πειρώμενος προσβῆναι καὶ τραυματιζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐδυνήθη βιάσασθαι (Thuc.IV.129.4). 'Psiloi' and archers were well suited to fighting on uneven and steep ground and they were used by Nicias as shock troops in his attempt to carry the Peloponnesians' high position. The main Athenian force followed at the rear of these advanced 'psiloi', hoplites and archers but the attack failed, possibly because of confusion caused by the wounding of Nicias or perhaps because the Peloponnesian force had numerical superiority.[130]

Book Five of Thucydides: The Battle of Amphipolis (422 B.C.)

In 422 B.C., the Athenian general Cleon recaptured Torone and then sailed to Eion and from there he launched an attack on Stageirus and Galepsus. The capture of these two cities would have ensured the safety of Eion as a base of

operations against Amphipolis; Cleon, however, succeeded only in capturing Galepsus and decided to wait in Eion for reinforcements and requested Perdiccas to send him an auxiliary force; he also asked the king of the Odomantoi, Polles, to collect for him as large a force of Thracian mercenaries as possible.[131] When Brasidas learnt that Cleon was in Eion, he took up a counter position on a hill called Cerdylium, near Amphipolis, from which he could observe Cleon's movements.[132] Thucydides informs us that Brasidas had in his army 1,500 Thracian mercenaries, the majority of whom were most likely peltasts, the entire force of the Edonians, which consisted of peltasts and cavalry, 1,000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts in addition to his own force of hoplites (which was smaller than that of the Athenians) and his 300 Greek cavalry.[133] Brasidas stationed 1,500 troops on Cerdylium, while the remainder of his army was drawn up in order of battle in Amphipolis.

Cleon, according to Thucydides to satisfy the impatience of his soldiers, marched against Amphipolis and stationed his army on a steep hill above the city from which he could survey the land. Thucydides repeatedly asserts that he did not intend to fight an engagement and that he thought that he could leave his position whenever he liked.[134] When Brasidas saw the Athenians advancing, he led his force down from Cerdylium into Amphipolis. He did not want to fight a pitched battle with the Athenians because he regarded his own troops as being inferior in quality to the Athenian hoplites and the forces of their allies. To counteract the superior quality of the Athenian troops, Brasidas wanted to launch a surprise attack on Cleon's force before it retired and to fight a battle before the Athenians' reinforcements arrived.[135]

Brasidas picked a force of 150 hoplites and put the rest of his force under the command of Clearidas; with these troops Brasidas wished to charge at the main body of Athenians and while they were in panic Clearidas' troops would attack them from another gate. The plan was not without risk: if the Athenians held firm after the appearance of Clearidas' troops, Brasidas' own position, with the best Athenian hoplites arrayed against him,would have been

perilous, The plan also meant that his large forces of peltasts, who could not have been fully utilized in a pitched hoplite battle, could take part in a swift surprise attack for which they were well suited. Thus Brasidas, like Demosthenes at the battle of Olpae in 426 B.C., resorted to a surprise attack on two fronts which enabled him to avoid a pitched battle with the whole force of the élite Athenian hoplites.[136]

Cleon was warned that Brasidas was in the city with his whole army and that they might attack at any moment; he gave a general signal for retreat and at the same time ordered his forces on his left wing to retire towards Eion. The left retired so slowly that Cleon ordered his right wing, which should have acted as a rearguard, to wheel round and begin to retreat, even though this meant that their unshielded side was exposed to the enemy. Brasidas saw his opportunity and charged with his force of hoplites into the middle of the Athenian army and put them to flight. Clearidas then sallied from Amphipolis and charged at the Athenians; the two-pronged attack threw the Athenian left wing into complete confusion and it was set in full flight. Brasidas then initiated an attack on the Athenian right wing but was fatally wounded. The right wing of the Athenians stood its ground on the top of the hill and repulsed the troops of Clearidas two or three times. It was in this fighting, according to Thucydides, that Cleon fled and was killed by a Myrcinian peltast.[137] The Athenian right wing did not yield until they were attacked on all sides by a combined force of Chalcidian and Myrcinian peltasts and cavalry and put to flight under a shower of javelins: οἱ δὲ αὐτοῦ ξυστραφέντες ὁπλῖται ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον τόν τε Κλεαρίδαν ἠμύνοντο καὶ δὶς ἢ τρὶς προσβαλόντα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν πρὶν ἥ τε Μυρκινία καὶ ἡ Χαλκιδικὴ ἵππος καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ περιστάντες καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες αὐτοὺς ἔτρεψαν. οὕτω δὴ τὸ στράτευμα πᾶν ἤδη τῶν Ἀθηναίων φυγὸν χαλεπῶς καὶ πολλὰς ὁδοὺς τραπόμενοι κατὰ ὄρη, ὅσοι μὴ διεφθάρησαν ἢ αὐτίκα ἐν χερσὶν ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς Χαλκιδικῆς ἵππου καὶ τῶν πελταστῶν, οἱ λοιποὶ ἀπεκομίσθησαν ἐς τὴν Ἠιόνα. (Thuc.V.10.9-10).

The plan of Brasidas had been successful: the whole Athenian force had been routed with the loss of 600 men, while the Lacedaemonians lost only seven.[138] In the battle itself the peltasts on the Peloponnesian side took part in Clearidas' attack on the Athenian right wing in its high position. Like the Spartans in their last stand on Sphacteria, the Athenian troops of the right wing were surrounded by the peltasts who, in conjunction with a force of cavalry, rained javelins upon them and compelled them to flee. The swift peltasts also took part in the pursuit of the routed Athenian army.

In 420 B.C., the Athenians made an alliance with the Argive Confederacy. The terms of the alliance between Athens and Argos, Mantinea and Elis are recorded in Thucydides V.47. A fragment of the official Athenian copy of the terms of this alliance has been found, preserved on a slab of Pentelic marble, on the south slope of the Acropolis, near the Theatre of Dionysus.[139] In this treaty is set out the rate of pay for provisions for the soldiers in auxiliary forces: τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον, ἐπὴν ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ ταὐτά· ἢν δὲ πλέονα βούληται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη, διδότω σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὁπλίτῃ καὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ' ἱππεῖ δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν. (Thuc.V.47.6).

Note that in this treaty the hoplite, light-armed soldier (psilos) and archer all got the same allowance - we have evidence here that the 'psilos' and 'toxotes' were treated on an equal basis with the hoplite with respect to payment for supplies.[140]

In 419 B.C., Alcibiades led into the Peloponnese a small Athenian force which consisted of Athenian hoplites and 'toxotai'; this is one of the few occasions on which Athenian archers are specifically mentioned by Thucydides.[141]

Also in 419 B.C., the Argives on a flimsy pretext made war against the Epidaurians (Thuc.V.53); in the middle of the summer of 418 B.C. the Spartans, seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in great danger, marched against the Argives with their whole army. We are informed by Thucydides that the Boeotian contingent which marched with the Spartans consisted of 5,000 hoplites, 5,000 'psiloi', 500 cavalry and 500 'hamippoi'.[142] It is probable that the 'hamippoi', like the 'hippodromoi psiloi' in the force of Gelon, were highly mobile light-armed troops who were trained to operate interspersed among their own cavalry.[143]

In 418 B.C., the Spartans included large numbers of helots in their force which went to the aid of Tegea against the Argives: ἐνταῦθα δὴ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ οἵα οὔπω πρότερον (Thuc.V.64.2). The helots in the force were almost certainly used as 'psiloi' and camp-followers, not hoplites. The Spartans managed to equip the 700 helots under Brasidas' command with 'hopla', but I am very doubtful whether they could have provided 'τῶν εἱλώτων πανδημεὶ' with panoplies: it would have incurred enormous expense and the training of the whole helot force in the use of heavy arms would have created a great danger to Spartan internal security. The Spartans, along with the Arcadian allies, invaded the territory of their enemy Mantinea and proceeded to lay waste the land, presumably with their 'psiloi' who were ideally suited for such a task.[144] In the ensuing battle of Mantinea between the Spartans and their Arcadian allies and the Mantineans, Argives and Athenians, no mention is made by Thucydides of any light-armed troops. Note that Agis was particularly afraid that the Spartan left wing would be surrounded by the Mantineans and took measures to prevent what could have been a dangerous outflanking movement;[145] Agis' fear would suggest that the Spartan left wing had no light-armed troops protecting its flank. Furthermore, after the Spartans defeated the enemy force, we are informed by

Thucydides that they did not pursue their foes far or for a long time [146] - this was normal practice for victorious hoplites who usually contented themselves with gaining possession of the battlefield and stripping the enemy corpses; pursuit was dangerous for the relatively slow hoplites and invited counter-attack.[147] One would have thought that the light-armed helots would have been ideal to use to press home a pursuit but they are not mentioned in this role by Thucydides. The historian's total silence about the presence of helots in the battle of Mantinea would suggest that they were taken along on the expedition merely for the purpose of attending their hoplite masters and laying waste to enemy territory and not for the purpose of battle at all, but we should bear in mind that elsewhere Thucydides' silence about the presence and part played by light-armed troops is apparently not reliable.[148]

In 416 B.C., the Athenians made an expedition against the island of Melos and Thucydides informs us that their force consisted of "One thousand two hundred hoplites and three hundred 'toxotai' besides twenty 'hippotoxotai' of their own, and about one thousand five hundred hoplites provided by their allies in the island" (Thuc.V.84.1). Part of a decree which may relate to the Melian expedition has been discovered on two fragments of a stele of Pentelic marble from the Acropolis; the restored text runs as follows: [149]

line 14 πλευσάντων δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖ[ς] ναυσὶν
Ἀθην‖[αίων ἐν ἑκάστηι] τῆι νηὶ πέντε μὲν [ἑ]χ[ἑ]χ[ς
ἐθελοντῶ|[ν, ἐκ τοῦ καταλόγου δ]ὲ ὁπλῖται τετT[αρά]κ[ό]ντε
ἐν ἑκά[στηι τῆι νηὶ κατὰ]φυλάς, τοχ[όται δέ] κα, x,
πελτασT[α]ὶ δεκαπέντ' ἐχ[ς Ἀθη]ναί(ω[ν καὶ τῶν
χου]μμάχων

We know from Thucydides that the Athenians had thirty ships on the expedition and we can therefore obtain from the inscription the following results:

(Athenian) hoplites:	40 x 30 ships	=	1,200
archers :	10 (probably) x 30 ships	=	300
peltasts:	15 (uncertain) x 30 ships	=	450 (?)

Although the first two totals agree with those given by Thucydides, it comes as a great surprise to learn that peltasts (of uncertain number) are recorded by the inscription as being present on the expedition, yet are not mentioned by the historian in his narrative. Meritt has, however, suggested that the inscription does not relate to the force sent against Melos but to a fleet sent to collect tribute at the beginning of the Archidamian War.[150] The inscription is badly damaged and the section which may have referred to the twenty Athenian 'hippotoxotai' (if it is an inscription relating to the expedition of 416 B.C.) has not survived.[151] Note that the 'τοξόταις τριακοσίοις' and the 'ἱπποτοξόταις εἴκοσι' of Thucydides V.84.1 are to be taken with 'ἑαυτῶν', i.e. they were true Athenian 'toxotai' and 'hippotoxotai'.

Books Six and Seven of Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition (415 - 413 B.C.)

In 416 B.C., most Athenians favoured supporting the causes of Egesta against Selinus and of Leontini against Syracuse; they were ignorant of the size of Sicily and the great number of its inhabitants. Alcibiades spoke in favour of sending an expedition to Sicily and in Thuc.VI.17.3, on apparently no good grounds, Alcibiades is made to claim that the individual Sicilian had no heavy arms and armour (hopla); as we shall see, the Syracusans had large forces of light-armed troops, but they also had hoplites. Nicias opposed sending troops to Sicily and Thucydides informs us that he tried to change the people's mind by making an exaggerated estimate of the

forces required. In Thuc.VI.20.4, Nicias is made to comment that the Sicilians, especially the people of Selinus and Syracuse,"have great numbers of hoplites and 'toxotai' and 'akontistai'" and also a large number of hoplites and a big fleet. In 481 B.C. also, Syracuse had been strong in specialized light-armed troops: Gelon had large forces of 'toxotai', 'sphendonetai' and 'hippodromoi psiloi'.[152] Nicias is further made to inform the Athenians that large forces of archers and slingers were imperative to counter the large number of enemy cavalry. [153]

In Thuc.VI.25.2 we learn that Nicias required over 5,000 hoplites and that archers were to be raised from Athens and Crete and slingers. Cretan mercenary archers were renowned, especially in the later Classical Period.[154] Thucydides records that the actual Athenian force sent to Sicily in 415 B.C. contained 480 archers, 700 Rhodian slingers and 120 Megarians who served as 'psiloi':

... τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίοις (καὶ τούτων Κρῆτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν) καὶ σφενδονήταις Ῥοδίων ἑπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν (Thuc.VI.43). The Rhodians were expert slingers and were utilized in the retreat of the Ten Thousand.[155] We also possess a fragment from a marble stele preserving part of a decree relating to the Sicilian expedition of 415 B.C. which gives some information about the light-armed troops who took part in it:[156]

[22]μένας μιϛ[θ
[21 τ]ετταράκον[τα
[19 πελ]τάσταις χρ[
[22 τ]οξότας π[

(the 3rd to the 6th surviving lines of fragment a)

Note that specific mention is made in the inscription of peltasts (if πελ]τάσταις is the correct restoration) and archers. Thucydides in his account of the expeditionary force omits any mention of peltasts; he also does not tell us if there were any peltasts in the Athenian auxiliary forces of 413 B.C. (Thuc.VII.33-35; VII.42.1), although it is possible that the Lemnians and Imbrians were armed as peltasts.[157] The decree records special categories of light-armed infantry and seamen and appears to have contained precise numbers and would seem to be authentic - why then does Thucydides omit to mention the presence of peltasts in the Sicilian expeditionary forces when we have inscriptional evidence which would suggest that they did in fact take part? [158]

After the Athenians arrived in Sicily in 415 B.C., they frittered away the rest of the year in a number of small enterprises which led to nothing. The Athenians were determined to draw the whole Syracusan army as far as possible out of the city, and then in their absence to sail to Syracuse by night and take up a good position without the risk of being attacked. They knew that in the present situation an open landing would be almost impossible since they had no cavalry of their own, whilst the Syracusans had a large force which could be used to do great harm to the Athenian light-armed troops (psiloi) and camp-followers (ochlos).[159] Thucydides in his account of the Peloponnesian War makes it plain that light-infantry and also camp-followers were extremely vulnerable to cavalry attack, especially on level ground; [160] hoplites, provided they maintained their formation, were usually able to repel cavalry attacks. [161]

By a trick, Nicias lured the Syracusan army to Catana for the purpose of making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe that they would take unawares, while in the meantime the Athenians had gone on board the fleet and sailed off to the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Nicias landed and fortified his camp on the south-west side of the harbour, just

south of the temple of Olympian Zeus (VI.65).

When the Syracusans returned from Catana, both sides prepared for battle. In VI.67.1 Thucydides gives the Athenian order of battle: half of the Athenian army, drawn up eight deep, formed the van, while the other half was drawn up, likewise eight deep, close to their sleeping places in 'plaision' formation. In this defensive formation were placed the 'skeuophoroi', who were presumably very badly armed, or perhaps more likely carried no arms at all. The 'plaision' formation was used primarily to protect vulnerable camp-followers who might be attacked by cavalry or missile-troops and was normally used on the march; in Thucydides VII.78.2 we are informed that the forces of Nicias and Demosthenes marched in 'plaision' formation with the 'skeuophoroi' and the bulk of troops who were not hoplites (i.e. psiloi) inside.[162] In his account of the Syracusan army, Thucydides mentions that there were fifty 'toxotai' from Camarina. The Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai' were placed upon their right wing. It was most likely normal practice in Greek warfare to place light-armed troops and cavalry on both wings of a hoplite phalanx to guard against an outflanking movement by an enemy; in this case the cavalry and 'akontistai' appear to have actually formed a large section, if not all, of the right wing.[163]

Before the phalanx blocks of both sides engaged, the Athenian and Syracusan light-armed infantry rushed in front of them and skirmished with each other:[164] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων οἵ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν· (Thuc.VI.69.2).

It is evident from this passage that Thucydides regards the 'lithoboloi', 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai' as 'psiloi'. The historian has not previously mentioned the presence of 'sphendonetai' on the Syracusan side or 'lithoboloi' on either side; it is probable that the 'lithoboloi' were camp-followers who were utilized as crude 'psiloi'. In this type of skirmishing engagement, one

would have thought that the archers and slingers, whose missiles had a much greater range than the stones and rocks thrown by the 'lithoboloi', would have had a great advantage over the crude stone-throwers.[165] All light-armed troops, since they lacked proper body armour, were vulnerable to missiles and one would have thought that the position of the 'lithoboloi' would have been perilous if opposed by trained archers and slingers who could snipe at them from a distance. If the 'lithoboloi' of one side were to attack the archers and slingers of the other, they would have to approach them within a stone's-cast and thus leave themselves open to arrows and sling-bullets shot at close range; it seems likely to me that the 'lithoboloi' on both sides would have been best suited to harassing their opposing phalanx blocks, rather than to skirmishing with specialized missile-troops whose range they could not match.[166] The Syracusan 'akontistai' took no part in this skirmishing battle as they were positioned on the right wing of their army. Note the condescending tone of ' καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν '; Thucydides here, I think, betrays his prejudice against missile-troops whose effect on a normal battle he would often seem to regard as negligible. In the following clash of the Athenian and Syracusan phalanxes no mention is made of the light-armed infantry of both sides - did they form themselves upon the wings of their respective phalanxes or withdraw from the battle area?

In the spring of 414 B.C., after operations in the eastern region of Sicily, the Athenians received a force of 250 cavalry and thirty 'hippotoxotai' from Athens. The Athenians then concentrated their activities on the heights of Epipolae to the north of the city of Syracuse;[167] they defeated the 600 Syracusans who were guarding the heights and succeeded in fortifying a place called Labdalon (Thuc.VI.97).[168] The Athenians intended to put Syracuse under siege by running a wall across Epipolae towards the Great Harbour.

The Syracusans, having made a vain attempt to stop the building of the wall, started to build a counter-wall, beginning at the Temenites and running westward, to intercept the southern wall of the Athenians and prevent its reaching the harbour.[169] The Athenians decided to make an attack on the Syracusan counter-wall and for this task "Three hundred picked Athenian hoplites and some specially selected 'psiloi', who were given heavy arms, were instructed to run out against the counter-wall" (Thuc.VI.100.1). Speed was vital in an attack of this kind; if forewarned, the defenders could have congregated to repel the assault. Light-armed infantry were chosen and equipped for the attack on the stockade because faster runners were to be found among them than among the hoplites. The attack was a success.[170]

The Athenians proceeded to continue their wall southwards towards the Great Harbour.[171] The Syracusans started to build a second counter-wall but this was destroyed by the Athenians.[172] The Syracusans then attacked the Athenian wall on Epipolae but this attack failed as Nicias commanded the 'hyperetai' to set fire to the timber in front of the wall; the fire drove the Syracusans back.[173] The situation of the Syracusans looked bleak.

In 414 B.C. the Spartan Gylippus arrived at Himera with a relief force for the Syracusans. He managed to raise troops from Himera, Selinus, Gela and from among the Sicels and these included an undefined number of light-armed troops (psiloi).[174] Gylippus marched towards Syracuse, gained control of the heights of Epipolae, and entered into the city and took command of the Syracusan army. The Syracusans then built a third counter-wall to prevent the Athenians from hemming in the city by completing the northern section of their wall.[175] Meanwhile, the Syracusan cavalry managed to harass the Athenian sailors who acted as foragers; these foragers were lightly-armed or else carried no arms at all and thus were vulnerable to cavalry attack.[176]

The two armies were drawn up in front of their fortifications and in the engagement which followed the Syracusans were defeated in the confined space; Thucydides says that the reason for their defeat was that the Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai' could not operate in the confined space.[177] Cavalry and javelin-throwers evidently formed an integral part of the Syracusan army.

When the Syracusan counter-wall had almost passed the end of the Athenian wall, the Athenians were forced to fight the Syracusan army to capture their fortification on more open ground where they could use their cavalry and 'akontistai'. Gylippus placed his cavalry and 'akontistai' in the open space between the points at which their respective lines of wall stopped and in the ensuing conflict the Athenians were defeated.[178] The Syracusans carried their counter-wall past the works of the Athenians, thus depriving them of all hope of surrounding the city. With reinforcements arriving for the Syracusans, the chances of the Athenians taking the city became small. Nicias sent a letter, relating their dangerous position, to be read to the Athenian people. He stated that in the second recent battle with the Syracusans, the Athenian troops were overpowered by the large number of Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai';[179] once again we find that their cavalry and javelin-throwers were a very important part of the Syracusans' army.

The Syracusans completed their wall, while Nicias occupied Plemmyrium, the southern headland of the Great Harbour. Winter had now come and Gylippus spent it in raising fresh forces in Sicily: Corinth and Sparta sent more reinforcements. In the spring of 413 B.C., Gylippus returned to Syracuse with his allies and organized a Syracusan fleet. He then attacked and captured the Athenian fortifications at Plemmyrium, although his fleet was defeated by the Athenians in the Great Harbour.

In the early summer of 413 B.C., the Athenians prepared to send out an auxiliary force to Syracuse under the command of Eurymedon and Demosthenes. One thousand three hundred Thracian peltasts arrived at Athens for the expedition but they had come too late and were sent back home: Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πελτασταὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ τριακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι, οὓς ἔδει τῷ Δημοσθένει ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ξυμπλεῖν. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ὕστεροι ἦκον, διενοοῦντο αὐτοὺς πάλιν ὅθεν ἦλθον ἐς Θρᾴκην ἀποπέμπειν. τὸ γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας πόλεμον αὐτοὺς πολυτελὲς ἐφαίνετο· δραχμὴν γὰρ τῆς ἡμέρας ἕκαστος ἐλάμβανεν (Thuc.VII.27.1-2).

Thucydides informs us that the peltasts were of the Dian race: in II.96.2 he gives the name Dioi to the 'mountain Thracians' who inhabited the Rhodope range and who were 'machairophoroi'. The ceramic evidence would suggest that the 'machaira' was a peltast's secondary weapon; his primary offensive weapon was either the javelin or the thrusting-spear.[180] The Thracian mercenary peltasts, being well equipped and fully trained in the use of their weapons, would have been useful to counter the large number of Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai', but when they arrived in Athens Demosthenes had already set sail (Thuc.VII.27.2; .29.1). Demosthenes tried to make up for his loss of javelin-throwers by recruiting contingents of 'akontistai' on his way to Sicily;[181] Best rightly comments that the 'akontistai' whom Demosthenes picked up on his journey to Sicily must have compensated for the lack of the 1,300 Thracian peltasts as far as quantity was concerned, but as for quality, a strong detachment of peltasts would naturally have been preferable to units of 'akontistai' which had been hastily assembled from various places.[182]

Financial considerations made it impossible to use the Thracian mercenaries to combat ravaging attacks from Decelea and therefore they were

sent home under Dieitrephes, who was instructed to use them against the Euripus.[183] The Thracian peltasts showed their barbarity by butchering the population of Mycalessus, the modern Ritsona, and this bloodthirsty action shocked even Thucydides.[184] When news reached the Thebans of this disaster, they hurried to the aid of the people of Mycalessus and they pursued the Thracians, who were la den with spoil, towards the Athenian ships which were moored on the Euripus. The peltasts used their accustomed skirmishing tactics against the Theban cavalry but those who stayed in the city for plunder were cut down: ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀναχωρήσει οὐκ ἀτόπως οἱ Θρᾷκες πρὸς τὸ τῶν Θηβαίων ἱππικόν, ὅπερ πρῶτον προσέκειτο, προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ τάξει τὴν φυλακὴν ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν ἐν τούτῳ διεφθάρησαν. μέρος δέ τι καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτῇ δι' ἁρπαγὴν ἐγκαταληφθὲν ἀπώλετο. οἱ δὲ ξύμπαντες τῶν Θρᾳκῶν πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι ἀπὸ τριακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἀπέθανον. (Thuc.VII.30.2).

It is interesting to note that when the Thracians fled back to the Euripus, the Athenian ships abandoned them and anchored out of bowshot (ἐξω τοξεύματος , Thuc.VII.30.2). This must have been because some of the Theban troops were armed with bows.[185]

On his way over to Sicily, Demosthenes raised light-armed infantry to make up for his lack of trained javelin-throwers. He raised 'sphendonetai' and 'akontistai' from the Acarnanian area (VII.31.5), 150 Iapygian 'akontistai' of the Messapian tribe from the Choirad islands (VII.33.4), 300 'akontistai' from Metapontum (VII.33.5) and 300 'akontistai' from Thurii (VII.35.1). Meanwhile, reinforcements of light-armed troops came to aid the Syracusans; the Camarinaeans sent 300 'akontistai' and 300 'toxotai', while the Geloans sent 400 'akontistai' (VII.33.1). The large numbers of 'akontistai' on both sides make it evident that these troops were highly valued.

Gylippus began the main fighting of 413 B.C. by attacking the Athenian station at Plemmyrium both by land and sea. The assault on the Athenian positions by land was two-pronged: Gylippus attacked from the city of Syracuse with his forces whilst the troops who were stationed at the temple of Olympian Zeus, and included hoplites, cavalry and 'gymneteia' attacked from the opposite direction.[186] Thucydides in the same chapter mentions the large number of cavalry and 'akontistai' who rushed from the temple.[187] Thucydides apparently uses the term γυμνητεία only to describe light-armed troops from a Dorian community (Syracuse was a Dorian community founded by Corinth).[188] The fighting was indecisive and the Syracusans attacked the Athenians again on the next day by land and sea; in the sea-battle the Syracusan 'akontistai', who were posted on the decks of the warships and in little boats, did the Athenians great harm and were responsible to a large degree for their defeat in the engagement.[189]

At this point, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian reinforcements which consisted of 5,000 hoplites and ἀκοντιστάς τε βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀλίγους, καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ τοξότας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν ἱκανήν (Thuc.VII.42.1). Demosthenes decided on his arrival that he must take the Syracusan positions on Epipolae. The Athenians began to ravage the fields of the Syracusans about the river Anapus, probably with their light-armed troops; the Syracusans now feared to go out with their army to face the reinforced Athenian army and only sent out parties of cavalry and 'akontistai' from the temple of Olympian Zeus, presumably to combat the Athenian troops who were ravaging their land.[190]

Demosthenes was determined to attack Epipolae and Thucydides informs us that he took with him all the masons and carpenters in the army and also a 'παρασκευὴν τοξευμάτων'.[191] In the commentary of Gomme, Andrewes and Dover this phrase is interpreted as "corps of archers", but I feel that

it is better to simply translate it, as Jowett does, as "a supply of arrows" for the archers who were to be used to protect the masons, carpenters and troops building a fortification wall once Epipolae had been taken and to guard the wall once built.[192] In Thucydides' narrative of the ensuing night attack in which the Athenians were repelled, there is no specific mention of light-armed infantry on either side; in VII.43.2, he says that Demosthenes led out his whole force (τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν), but nothing in his account suggests that any troops other than the hoplites took part in the fighting. However, Diodorus, in his account of the attack, says that Demosthenes took with him 10,000 hoplites and 10,000 'psiloi.'[193] It is difficult to see how such a large force of missile-troops could have been used along with an army of hoplites in the dark, as there was a real danger that they might misjudge distances in the darkness and hit their own troops or mistake their own men for the enemy. Perhaps Demosthenes thought that missile-troops might have been more trouble than they were worth and so left them behind. In the commentary on Thucydides by Gomme, Andrewes and Dover there is a comment that "presumably the light-armed troops were held back at the foot of the ascent to Euryelus, ready to be brought forward in daylight as a protection against cavalry attacks when the hoplites had mastered the counter-wall and the forts".[194] It is possible that missile-troops, when used in conjunction with hoplites, could have been used to break up a cavalry charge, although when used on their own, light-armed troops were particularly vulnerable to cavalry. Archers, slingers and javelin-throwers certainly had the potential to kill horses and riders, but it is perhaps to be doubted whether they could, without the aid of hoplites, kill enough cavalry to break up a charge before they reached them.[195] If, as Diodorus asserts, Demosthenes took a large force of 'psiloi' with him on his attack on Epipolae, we have no information as to how they were used.

After the failure to retake Epipolae, Demosthenes saw that Syracuse could not be captured and that there could be no profit in remaining any longer where they were; Nicias refused to leave his post and considered that the Syracusans were heavily in debt because they kept many mercenary troops on whom they were dependent - many, perhaps, of the Syracusan light-armed troops were mercenaries.[196] When Gylippus returned to Syracuse with reinforcements, Nicias realized that their situation was hopeless and agreed to their withdrawal; in VII.57, Thucydides digresses and enumerates the allies of Athens and Syracuse.[197]

After some undecided fighting, both sides prepared to fight a major naval engagement; in the naval battle 'toxotai' and 'akontistai' and even stone-throwers were utilized by both sides.[198] The Athenians were heavily defeated and realized that they had to retreat from their position; if they had started at once they probably would have succeeded in reaching shelter at Catana or inland among the friendly Sicels, but the Syracusans tricked them into staying where they were by sending horsemen towards the Athenian lines who shouted that they were friends and that it would be best to wait and set out when better prepared. The Syracusans meanwhile blocked the roads.[199]

The Athenians finally set out on the retreat, leaving behind their wounded and their dead unburied, and marched along the western road which crosses the Anapus and passes the modern village of Floridia.[200] The aim was to reach friendly Sicel territory first and then to make for Catana because it would have been extremely dangerous to take the straight road to Catana, round the west of Epipolae under the Syracusan forts. The army was divided into two forces with Nicias leading the van, and Demosthenes the rear. The Athenians marched in 'plaision' formation with the baggage-bearers and 'ochlos' enclosed by the hoplites - no mention is made of how the 'psiloi' marched but possibly they are to be included in the term 'ochlos'.[201]

On the first day of the retreat, the Syracusan light-armed troops (psiloi) and cavalry attacked the Athenian force so incessantly with javelins that it only managed to advance four and a half miles.[202] On the second day of the retreat, the Athenians tried to obtain supplies of food and water, while the Syracusans blockaded a rugged pass, which formed the approach to a high point called the Acraean Cliff over which the road passed. On the following day, the advance of the Athenians was again severely impeded by the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai': Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προῆσαν, καὶ οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ ξυμμάχων αὐτοὺς ἱππῆς καὶ ἀκοντισταὶ ὄντες πολλοὶ ἑκατέρωθεν ἐκώλυον καὶ ἐσηκόντιζόν τε καὶ παρίππευον. καὶ χρόνον μὲν πολὺν ἐμάχοντο οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔπειτα ἀνεχώρησαν πάλιν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ στρατόπεδον. καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων. (Thuc.VII.78.6).

On the fourth day the Athenians found the Syracusans drawn up in the pass before their wall and unsuccessfully attacked them; the Syracusan 'akontistai' could hurl their javelins down at the Athenians withgreat velocity from their high position: καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐτειχομάχουν, καὶ βαλλόμενοι ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου ἐπάντους ὄντος (δεικνοῦντο γὰρ ῥᾷον οἱ ἄνωθεν) καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι βιάσασθαι ἀνεχώρουν πάλιν καὶ ἀνεπαύοντο. (Thuc.VII.79.2). This is the first occasion we hear of a high position being actively defended by light-armed troops.

On the fifth day of their retreat, the Athenians advanced again but the Syracusans tried to surround them using light-armed skirmishing tactics: Τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ προυχώρουν, καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι προσέβαλλόν τε πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς κύκλῳ καὶ πολλοὺς κατετραυμάτιζον, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπίοιεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑπεχώρουν, εἰ δ' ἀναχωροῖεν, ἐπέκειντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ὑστάτοις προσπίπτοντες, εἰ

πως κατὰ βραχὺ τρεψάμενοι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα φοβήσειαν (Thuc.VII.79.5). Since their way was barred by the Syracusans in the pass, the Athenians now moved southwards, and, abandoning the idea of reaching the Sicel hill-land from this point, marched to the Helorine road, which would take them in the direction of Camarina and Gela. They started fires and set off on a night march but fell into confusion; the force of Nicias, which led the way, kept together and marched on ahead, but that of Demosthenes, which was the larger half, got cut off from the other division and marched in a less orderly fashion.

When day broke, the Syracusans set off in hot pursuit of the Athenian army; they firstly caught up with the force of Demosthenes, which was about six miles behind that of Nicias, and drove it into a narrow space where it was surrounded by the Syracusan missile-troops: ἀνελιγθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χωρίον ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν, ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν [τε] καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο περισταδόν. τοιαύταις δὲ προσβολαῖς καὶ οὐ ξυσταδὸν μάχαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι εἰκότως ἐχρῶντο (Thuc.VII.81.4-5). The situation of the Athenians is like that of the Corinthians in 460 or 459 B.C., when they were caught in an enclosure, surrounded, and stoned to death.[203] The Athenians could not fight back and their casualties began to mount due to the missile weapons showered upon them from all sides by the Syracusans. The Athenian troops were finally worn down by the sustained attack of the Syracusan missile-troops and surrendered.[204] It is ironic that Demosthenes should have succumbed to the very tactics which he had utilized on Sphacteria in 425 B.C.

On the following day, Nicias was overtaken by the Syracusans, who told him that Demosthenes' force had surrendered and that his should do the same. Nicias, when he found out the truth, tried to negotiate a settlement but the Syracusans refused and "attacked and surrounded this army, as they had Demosthenes', raining missiles on them from all sides until the evening". (Thuc.VII.83.3). At dawn on the next day, his army moved forward and the

Syracusan light-armed troops immediately attacked them, hurling javelins and other missiles at them from all sides.[205] The Athenians hurried towards the River Assinarus, the modern Tellaro, and hoped to gain a little relief from the attacking forces once they had forded it; they, however, lost all order in crossing the river and the Syracusans stood upon the further bank, which was very steep, and hurled missiles down on them.[206] The Athenian force finally lost all formation under the hail of missiles and Nicias was compelled to surrender. Thucydides comments that a great many Athenians fell in the fighting around the River Assinarus and that many also had fallen in the frequent attacks of the Syracusan light-armed troops on the march.[207]

The Syracusan light-armed troops, especially their 'akontistai', had played a vital role in impeding and attacking the forces of Demosthenes and Nicias in their retreat; they were also particularly effective when used in conjunction with cavalry. The way in which they used their skirmishing tactics to slow down the Athenian advance and overwhelm them in the final conflict, suggests that they were highly trained and well organized troops.

Surprisingly, the Athenian archers, slingers and javelin-throwers are nowhere mentioned in Thucydides' account of the final retreat. This is extremely baffling when one considers the Athenians' position; they, as Greeks in the army of the Ten Thousand after the battle of Cunaxa, were in great need of missile-troops to protect them from the Syracusan 'akontistai' and cavalry (Nicias had specifically told the Athenians that large numbers of archers and slingers were imperative to counter the Syracusan cavalry!) and did in fact have in their army large forces of specialist light-armed missile-troops: why, then, if we are to trust the silence of Thucydides, did they not use them? Are we to suppose that they were so outnumbered by the Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai' that they were kept continually in the centre of the 'plaision' formation for their own protection? Yet, it seems to me that the need of the Athenians was so great that even if their light-armed troops

were outnumbered they would still have tried to utilize them. To my mind, there is no adequate explanation as to why the Athenians failed to use the large forces of specialist missile-troops in their army for their own defence and thus it seems more probable that Thucydides failed to mention their use.

Book Eight of Thucydides (413 - 411 B.C.)

In 412 B.C. the Athenians sent a force against Miletus, which had revolted, which consisted of 1,000 Athenian hoplites, 1,500 Argives, of whom five hundred were originally light-armed (psiloi), but the Athenians gave them heavy arms, and 1,000 troops of the allies.[208] The Argives had originally provided a force for the Athenians in which light-armed troops formed 33% of the total.

After the Oligarchic Coup of 411 B.C., the Spartan Agis thought that he would take advantage of the confusion in Athens and advanced against the Long Walls from Decelea; the attack, however, was repulsed by a combined force of Athenian cavalry, hoplites, 'psiloi', and 'toxotai': ὡς δὲ προσέμειξέ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ μὲν ἔνδοθεν οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν ἐκίνησαν, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας ἐκπέμψαντες καὶ μέρος τι τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ ψιλῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν ἄνδρας τε κατέβαλον αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἐγγυς προσελθεῖν καὶ ὅπλων τινῶν καὶ νεκρῶν ἐκράτησαν, οὕτω δὴ γνοὺς ἀπήγαγε πάλιν τὴν στρατιάν. (Thuc.VIII.71.2). In the engagement it was the Athenian 'psiloi' and 'toxotai' who shot down the Spartan hoplites with their missile weapons.[209] The Athenian archers and light-armed troops must have advanced in front of their hoplites, who are not mentioned in the action; the Athenian cavalry could have been used in close conjunction with these swift light-infantrymen. Were the cavalry, hoplites, 'psiloi' and 'toxotai' all from the Athenian forces of 'peripoloi'? 'Psiloi' and 'toxotai', with their long-range weapons, would have

been ideally suited to patrolling and guarding the Long Walls.[210]

In Thucydides VIII.98.1, we learn that Aristarchus, one of the leading oligarchs in Athens in 411 B.C., had a force of archers of the most barbarous sort:[211] Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ αὐτῶν μόνος (ἔτυχε γὰρ καὶ στρατηγῶν) λαβὼν κατὰ τάχος τοξότας τινὰς τοὺς βαρβαρωτάτους ἐχώρει πρὸς τὴν Οἰνόην . Thucydides does not mention whether the barbarous archers were Scythians or Northern Greeks - they were almost certainly mercenaries. Several stelai, dating to the period of the Peloponnesian War, have been found which record 'barbaroi tochsotai' who had fallen on Athenian service.[212]

We also possess an inscription dating to 412/411 B.C. from Thasos which records archers who took part in a Corinthian expedition.[213]

The Period 410 - 404 B.C.

In 410 B.C. Dorieus, the Rhodian who commanded the triremes from Italy, after he had quelled the tumult in Rhodes, set sail to join Mindarus on the Hellespont at Abydus.[214] When he was in the neighbourhood of Sigeium,the large Athenian force of 70 ships sailed out against him from Sestus; Dorieus, when he saw the size of the Athenian fleet, was alarmed and, in order to save his force, he put in at Dardanus. He then disembarked his soldiers and, according to Diodorus, speedily collected together a vast supply of missiles and posted his men on the prows of the ships and in advantageous positions on the shore (D.XIII.45.10) - evidently the troops of Dorieus were ready to meet any Athenian attack from the sea with a barrage of missiles.[215] We furthermore learn that archers and javelin-throwers took part in the sea battle which followed (D.XIII.46.1).

We find archers also being used in the battle of Cyzicus in 410 B.C.[216] A sea battle took place off Cyzicus by the sea of Marmara in which Mindarus

and the Peloponnesian fleet were hard pressed and forced to seek safety on land near a place called Cleri, where Pharnabazus had his army. The Athenians tried to drag the Peloponnesian ships from the land, while the troops of Mindarus and Pharnabazus tried to stop them. The Athenians landed their marines to engage the enemy and in Diodorus we hear about Thrasybulus, one of the Athenian commanders, waging a fierce battle against the troops of Mindarus and Pharnabazus with his own 'epibatai' and 'toxotai': ὁ δὲ Θρασύβουλος μετὰ τῶν ἐπιβατῶν καὶ τῶν τοξοτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εὐρώστως ὑπέστη τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀνεῖλεν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἐώρα πίπτοντας (D.XIII.51.2). More Athenian troops rushed to the aid of the 'epibatai' and 'toxotai' of Thrasybulus in the nick of time and enabled them to fight back and defeat the Peloponnesians and the troops of Pharnabazus. When Mindarus was struck down, the Peloponnesian troops gave way and the Athenians pursued them for a great distance and only stopped their pursuit when they realized that Pharnabazus was about to launch a cavalry attack against them.

As we noted in the narrative of Thucydides, Athenian archers were quite commonly included in sea-borne expeditions.[217] They must have fought well in conjunction with the marines to withstand the superior numbers of their enemies; being lightly-armed and swift, they may have taken part in the pursuit of the Peloponnesian troops. Xenophon in his account of the land battle does not specifically mention the Athenian 'toxotai'.[218]

In 410 B.C. the Spartan king Agis made an attack on the Long Walls of Athens from Decelea which is recorded by Xenophon.[219] Thrasyllus led forth the Athenian forces from the Lyceum but Agis was not willing to meet their challenge and withdrew hastily; the Athenian 'psiloi' harassed Agis' rear-guard troops and killed a few of them: ἰδὼν δὲ ταῦτα Ἄγις ἀπήγαγε ταχέως, καί τινες αὐτῶν ὀλίγοι τῶν ἐπὶ

πᾶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ψιλῶν ἀπέθανον (Hell.I.1.34). The Athenian 'psiloi' obviously operated in front of their own hoplites, who did not have the speed of foot to overtake the retreating Spartans. Were these 'psiloi' part of the Athenian 'peripoloi' forces as suggested in p. 165? [220]

Thrasyllus was present in Athens in 410 B.C. for a specific reason: after the sea battle at Abydus (411 B.C.) in which Alcibiades defeated a Spartan force, Thrasyllus had sailed to Athens to report the victory and to ask for an army and a fleet.[221] The Athenians, according to Xenophon, voted Thrasyllus one thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry and fifty triremes.[222] In 409 B.C., after having equipped five thousand sailors as 'peltastai', he set sail to Samos to take the reinforcements to Alcibiades.[223] It is clear from passages in Thucydides and other pieces of Xenophon that the crew of a ship could be armed to fight on a land raid.[224] Demosthenes had equipped the oarsmen of his ships with light shields made out of woven twigs in his defence of Pylos and in the landing on the island of Sphacteria all his oarsmen, with the exception of those of the lower benches, took part 'ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι'.[225]

After remaining at Samos for several days, Thrasyllus sailed to Pygela in Ionia and there laid waste the country and attacked the fortification wall of the town.[226] In this raid Thrasyllus utilized his light-armed troops, who were later attacked by a force of infantry from Miletus who came to the aid of the Pygelans; thereupon the 'peltastai' and two 'lochoi' of hoplites came to the aid of the Athenian 'psiloi' and succeeded in wiping out almost the whole force from Miletus. The Athenians captured about 200 shields and set up a trophy.[227] The light-armed troops of Thrasyllus were well suited to ravaging attacks and attacking the walls of Pygela. The Athenian 'psiloi' were particularly vulnerable to attack when scattered for plunder - when the Milesians in a body attacked them in the act of plunder, they put up no resistance and

fled (Hell.I.2.2). Best is puzzled by Xenophon's narrative in Hellenica I.2.3 - we are told that the 'peltastai' (who were 5,000 strong) and two 'lochoi' of hoplites came to the aid of 'psiloi', who have not previously been mentioned, against a force of Milesians which cannot have been much more than 200 men strong.[228] The number of Athenian hoplites in the auxiliary force presents no problems, but it does seem unlikely that Thrasyllus would have put ashore all five thousand 'peltastai' to combat such a small enemy force - presumably only part of the peltast force was engaged in the fighting. It also seems as if Xenophon, unlike Thucydides, uses the terms 'psiloi' and 'peltastai' indiscriminately here for the sailors equipped with 'peltai'.[229] Xenophon does not previously mention a distinct body of 'psiloi', but only the 5,000 sailors-cum-peltasts: the Athenian 'psiloi' who were engaged in the plundering and attack on the walls of Pygela were almost certainly part of the peltast force; it follows from this that Xenophon here uses the terms 'psiloi' and 'peltastai' as interchangeable.

Thrasyllus then sailed from Pygela to Notium and marched to Colophon; the Colophonians gave them their allegiance. The Athenian force next made a night raid into Lydia, burning many villages and seizing a great amount of plunder - light-armed troops, being swift and silent, would have been ideal to use on a surprise night attack.[230] The Persian Stages attacked the Athenian ravagers when they were scattered, killing seven and capturing one; the Athenian troops were saved by the swift supporting action of their cavalry. Thrasyllus led his men back to their ships and sailed to Ephesus. He then disembarked his hoplites at the foot of Mount Coressus, and his cavalry, 'peltastai', 'epibatai' and all the rest near the marsh on the opposite side of the city.[231] In the fighting which followed, the Ephesians and their allies firstly attacked and routed the Athenian hoplites at Mount Coressus, killing about 100 of them, and then engaged the rest of the Athenian force, which consisted mainly of 'peltastai' and 'epibatai', by the marsh, killing about 300

men.[232] A greater percentage of hoplites were killed (10% of hoplite force) than of the other troops (approx. 4.5 - 5%). This was probably due to the greater mobility of the cavalry and 'peltastai'. After this failure, Thrasyllus carried out no further operations on the mainland of Ionia, but set sail to Sestus, which was the main Athenian base in the Hellespont.

In 408 B.C., we learn that a small force of peltasts was included in a storming party by Alcibiades in his surprise attack against the city of Selymbria.[233] Plutarch's narrative of the capture of this city is very like Thucydides' description of Brasidas' occupation of Torone.[234] A Pro-Athenian group in the city agreed to Alcibiades that they would display a lighted torch and open one of the gates at night. However, one of the conspirators lost heart and the others were forced to give the signal before the Athenian force was ready. Alcibiades chose a shock force of 30 soldiers, reinforced by 20 peltasts, and rushed towards the gate, bidding the rest of his force to follow him. This force managed to get through the gate but the Selymbrians advanced against them with their full force: ἀνοιχθείσης δὲ τῆς πύλης αὐτῷ καὶ προσγενομένων τοῖς τριάκοντα πελταστῶν εἴκοσι παρεισπεσὼν εὐθὺς ἤθετο τοὺς Σηλυμβριανοὺς ἐξ ἐναντίας μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἐπιφερομένους (Plut.Alc.30.3). Alcibiades realized that his position was hopeless since the main Athenian army had not yet come to his support and he made a proclamation that the Selymbrians should not bear arms against Athens. The Selymbrians, since they thought that a sizeable part of the Athenian force was already in their city, negotiated for a peaceful settlement. Note that after the Selymbrians made it clear that they wanted peace, Alcibiades was afraid that his large force of Thracian troops might try to sack the city and consequently ordered it to withdraw (Plut.Alc.30.4-5) - were these Thracian troops peltasts? For operations in the Hellespont area it would have been better to recruit fully trained native peltasts than to convey

Athenian 'psiloi' from Athens or to make use of sailors who acted as poorly trained and badly organized peltasts. Peltasts and javelin-throwers were common in the area of the Hellespont and on the coast of Asia Minor and both Xenophon and Plutarch record the fact that Alcibiades recruited a large number of native troops of both Thracian and Greek origin in this area, although it is not specifically stated that these included peltasts or javelin-throwers.[235]

Also in 408 B.C., Agis, according to Diodorus, led his troops from Decelea on a night march against Athens. Diodorus informs us about his force: εἶχε δὲ πεζοὺς δισμυρίους ὀκτακισχιλίους, ὧν ἦσαν οἱ μὲν ἡμίσεις ὁπλῖται κατ' ἐκλογήν, οἱ δ' ἡμίσεις ψιλοί. (XIII.72.4). So Diodorus asserts that Agis took with him a force of 14,000 'psiloi' from Decelea in his attack on Athens. Commentators have doubted that Agis had such a large force of light-armed troops. Obviously they were not part of the permanent garrison but a special force which was most likely included in this attack, as Hanson suggests, for the purpose of ravaging the rich land near the walls of Athens.[236] We are not told if the 'psiloi' were helots, but it is probable that a proportion of them were; however, some may have been light-armed troops from the Boeotians (Diodorus XIII.72.4). The Spartans succeeded in taking some of the Athenian outposts which were situated near the city; the Spartan light-infantry may have rushed ahead of their hoplites and secured these postions. After one day spent in cavalry fighting, the Spartans advanced against the walls of Athens; they failed, however, to approach near them due to the hail of missile weapons thrown at them by the Athenian defenders.[237] Were missile-troops from among the 'peripoloi' used mainly in this defence rather than conventionally equipped hoplites, who may have lacked the mobility necessary to use missiles due to their heavy arms and armour? The Spartan troops then fell to ravaging the land of Attica and, when they had completed

this task, departed to the Peloponnese; as we have noted on numerous occasions, light-infantry were ideally suited to act as ravagers.

Xenophon informs us that the Athenians in 408 B.C. attacked the city of Byzantium both with missiles from a distance and by close assault (Hell. I.3.14). We hear no more about the actions of light-armed troops in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War (407 - 404 B.C.).

Conclusions to the Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 B.C.)

Archers:

We know from I.G.1^2.929 that already by 460 or 459 B.C. the Athenians had a force of citizen archers. In 431 B.C. we learn that Athens had a force of 1,600 archers; according to the figures given by Thucydides, the archers formed 5% of all the Athenian troops in 431 B.C. - in the figures in the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, which probably reflect the period before mobilization, archers represent 30% of all Athenian troops (Thuc.II.13.8; Ath.Pol.XXIV.3). From the fact that the 'toxotai' are mentioned as a distinct group in funerary stelai and in the lists given in Thucydides and the Ath.Pol., it would appear that they were regarded as a recognized corps in the army like the hoplites. The fact that they had archer commanders (toxarchoi) indicates that they were a well organized force (Thuc. III.98.1). Ordinary 'psiloi' are not mentioned as a group in any funerary stelai of the Peloponnesian War period and are not given in the lists of the armed force in 431 B.C. by Thucydides and the Ath.Pol.; we also have no references to commanders of 'psiloi'. It would seem probable that the archers were regarded by the Athenians as both militarily and socially superior to the crude 'psiloi'. In the period 431 - 410 B.C. archers in Athenian forces are mentioned on 24 occasions: on two occasions they are specified as being Athenians (Thuc.III.107.1; V.52.2); on three occasions they are specified as being non-Athenian (Thuc. IV.28.4 [ἄλλοθεν]; VI.25.2 = VI.43 [Cretan]; VIII.98.1 [barbarian]).

On 19 occasions their origin is undefined. We have further inscriptional evidence which would suggest that the Athenians recruited barbarian mercenary archers to supplement their own native forces of this arm (see pp.4 - 5).

We learn that archers were often included in Athenian expeditionary forces:

Thuc.II.23.2 (431 B.C.) Expedition round Peloponnese; 400 archers.

III.98.1 (426 B.C.) Athenian force against Aetolia.

III.107.1 (426 B.C.) 60 Athenian archers in force sent to Amphilochian Argos.

IV.9.2 (425 B.C.) Archers in original expeditionary force at Pylos.

IV.28.4 and .32.2 (425 B.C.) Archers in force sent to Pylos.

IV.129.2 (423 B.C.) Force sent against Mende and Scione included 600 archers.

V.52.2 (419 B.C.) Athenian expedition round Peloponnese.

V.84.1 (416 B.C.) 300 archers in force sent to Melos.

VI.25.2 and .43 (415 B.C.) 480 archers in original force sent to Sicily.

VII.42.1 (413 B.C.) Archers sent in auxiliary force to Sicily.

Diodorus XIII.51.2 (410 B.C.) Archers were present in the force of Thrasybulus.

The percentage of archers in these expeditionary forces varied greatly: II.23 = 29%; III.107.1 = 23%; IV.32.2 = 8%; IV.129.2 = less than 23%; IV.129.4 = 77%; V.84.1 = 10%; VI.43 = 7.5%. The only trend one can detect is that on expeditions the percentage of archers to Athenian hoplites (and where these were not present, to allied hoplites) does not vary greatly (with the exception of the force at Sphacteria, which is a special case): II.23 = 28.5%; III.107.1 = 23%; IV.129.2 = 37.5%; V.84.1 = 20%; VI.43 = 24%.

We also have descriptions of archers in Athenian forces fulfilling active combat roles:

IV.32.2 and IV.36.1 (425 B.C.) 800 archers in attack force on Sphacteria.

IV.129.4 (423 B.C.) Archers in strike force sent against a Peloponnesian army in a high position.

VI.69.2. (415 B.C.) Archers involved in skirmishing on Sicily.

VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Archers used in a force to beat off the Spartans from the long walls.

Diodorus XIII.51.2 (410 B.C.) Archers fought at battle of Cyzicus.

Archers on the Athenian side were probably used to guard fortified positions and may have been part of the 'peripoloi' force:

VII.43.2 (413 B.C.) Supply of arrows taken along on attack on Epipolae - these were to be used by archers to protect their comrades building a wall if the position was captured.

VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Archers were used near the Long Walls to fend off a Spartan attack.

Although archers were used to good effect against Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria (IV.34 and .36) and near the Long Walls (VIII.71.2) and appear to have been able to fend off attacks made on Athenian hoplites by Aetolian javelin-throwers for a time, they also had their failures: in IV.129.4 we learn that the Athenian archers and 'psiloi' sent to attack a Peloponnesian force outside the city of Mende were repulsed. The Athenian archers on the Sicilian expedition hardly feature in Thucydides' narrative of the fighting at all. Like all types of troops, the archers performed well in some engagements, and less well in others.

Thucydides says little about how the archers were employed in relation to the hoplites. In fighting near Syracuse we are informed that the archers, along with the 'lithoboloi' and 'sphendonetai', in the Athenian force fought with the Syracusan light-armed troops in front of the two phalanx blocks (VI.69.2).

After the Athenian and Syracusan phalanxes engaged, we hear no more about the light-armed troops; they must have withdrawn from their position in front of the phalanxes and either taken up position on the wings or at the rear of their own hoplites. In the attacks on the Poloponnesian forces on Sphacteria and near Mende the 'Athenian' archers operated in front of their own hoplites. We are given no further clues by Thucydides as to how archers operated in relation to hoplites.

Although references to archers in Athenian forces are predominant in the narrative of Thucydides, we do learn that other Greek states utilized archers on certain occasions: in 432 B.C. in a naval engagement off Cheimerion the ships of the Corinthians, Megarians and Ambraciots on one side and Corcyraeans and Athenians on the other, had many archers on board, although we cannot tell if all the states mentioned contributed these troops or whether it was only one state on each side which did (I.49.1);in 429 B.C. archers from the allies of Sparta were present in the siege of Plataea (II.75.5); in 428 B.C. Lesbos was awaiting a force of Scythian archers (III.2.2); in 425 B.C. the Spartans, after their defeat on Sphacteria, raised their own force of native archers (IV.55.2); in 420 B.C. we can be fairly sure that the forces of the Argive Confederacy contained some archers (V.47.6). Cretan archers, almost certainly mercenaries, were included in the Athenian army sent to Sicily (VI.25.2; VI.43); the Syracusans (VI.20.4) and the Camarinaeans (VI.67.2; VII.33.1) among the Sicilian Greeks also had forces of archers; in 413 B.C. there were archers in the Theban relief force which went to the aid of Mycalessus (VII.30.2) and in 412 - 411 B.C. archers took part in a Corinthian expedition (IG 12.8,no.402).

Other Light-armed Troops:

Other types of light-infantry - 'peltastai', 'akontistai', 'sphendonetai', 'lithoboloi', 'psiloi' (which could be used to describe a wide range of light-

armed troops, including archers) and 'gymnetes' (this term was apparently only used by Thucydides to describe light-armed troops on the Dorian side) - are frequently mentioned in the forces of both Athens and Sparta. The 'akontistai', 'sphendonetai' and 'true' peltasts were never, so far as we know, Athenian or Spartan citizens but allies or mercenaries. The crude light-armed troops of the Athenians (termed 'psiloi' by Thucydides in the battles of Megarid [460 or 459 B.C.], Sphacteria [425 B.C.] and Delium [424 B.C.]) were composed of the poorer citizens and also probably the metics and foreigners who were resident in Attica but could not afford a panoply. The light-armed troops of the Spartans were either provided by their allies or raised from the subject groups of Laconia and Messenia.

Light-armed troops were used in several types of operations:

1 In simple attacks:

Thuc.I.106.1-2 (460 or 459 B.C.) Athenian 'psiloi' attacked Corinthian hoplites.

II.79 (429 B.C.) Chalcidian peltasts, 'psiloi' and cavalry acted in conjunction against Athenian hoplites near Spartolus.

III.97f (426 B.C.) Aetolian 'akontistai' attacked Athenian force on rough terrain.

IV.32f (425 B.C.) Archers, slingers, peltasts and crude 'psiloi' of an Athenian force attacked Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria

[IV.93 (424 B.C.) Light-armed troops probably fought at the battle of Delium].

IV.125; 127-128 (423 B.C.) Lyncestians and Illyrians attacked a Peloponnesian army using tactics of light-armed troops.

IV.129.4 (423 B.C.) 'Psiloi' in an Athenian force took part in an attack on a Peloponnesian army near Mende.

VI.62.2 (415 B.C.) Athenian and Syracusan 'lithoboloi', 'sphendonetai' and 'toxotai' skirmished with each other.

VII.5.3; 6.2; 37.2-3; 42; 78f; 81.4-5; 83.3; 84.4 (414-413 B.C.) Syracusan 'akontistai', usually acting in conjunction with cavalry, attacked Athenians.

VIII.71.2 (411 B.C.) Athenian 'psiloi' attacked advancing Spartans.

X.H. I.1.34 (410 B.C.) Athenian 'psiloi' fended off an attack by Agis.

X.H. I.2.3 (409 B.C.) 'Peltastai' from Thrasyllus' army attacked Milesian force

X.H. I.2.7 (409 B.C.) 'Peltastai' of Thrasybulus took part in an attack against the Ephesians.

2 In ravaging attacks:

II.31.2 (431 B.C.) Athenian 'psiloi' used in ravaging expedition.

III.1.2 (428 B.C.) Spartan 'psiloi' took part in a ravaging attack on Attica.

IV.56.1 (425 B.C.) Athenian 'psiloi' were used to ravage Spartan territory.

X.H. I.2.2 (409 B.C.) 'Psiloi' of Thrasyllus' force laid waste to the land around Pygela.

3 In attacks on fortified positions:

III.23 (428 B.C.) Plataeans equipped as 'psiloi' attacked part of the Peloponnesian circumvallation during their escape.

IV.67.2 (424 B.C.) 'Psiloi' in Athenian force captured a gate in the Long Walls of Nisaea.

IV.100.1 (424 B.C.) Boeotians sent for 'akontistai' and 'sphendonetai' from the Malian Gulf to help in their attack on the Athenian fortification at Delium.

IV.III.1 (424 B.C.) Brasidas used 'psiloi' armed with daggers and a force of peltasts to spearhead his attack on the city of Torone.

VII.29 (413 B.C.) Thracian peltasts plundered the city of Mycalessus.

Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30.3 (408 B.C.) Peltasts from Athenian force spearheaded an attack on the city of Selymbria.

Xen.Hell. I.3.14 (408 B.C.) Athenian missile-troops took part in attack on Byzantium

4 In ambushes:

II.81.5 (429 B.C.) Acarnanians ambushed the Chaonians and barbarians of a Peloponnesian force (Acarnanians proficient slingers II.81.8).

III.100 and 112 (426 B.C.) Demosthenes placed a force of 'psiloi' and hoplites in ambush at the battle of Olpae and used his Amphilochian 'akontistai' to carry out a surprise night attack on Ambraciot hoplites.

V.10 (422 B.C.): At the battle of Amphipolis peltasts (V.6.4) and hoplites from the Peloponnesian force were used in a surprise attack to counter the superiority of the Athenian hoplites.

5 In the pursuit of enemy soldiers: III.98; III.110; IV.35; V.10; VII.78f.

We find that in the majority of cases, light-armed troops were successful against hoplites (see I.106.1-2; II.79; II.81; III.23; III.97f; III.110; III.112; IV.32f; V.10; VII.78f; VII.79.2; VII.81.4-5; VII.84.4; VIII.71.2; X.H.I.1.34; X.H.I.2.3); their strength lay in the fact that they could fight at a distance with missile weapons and thus did not come into combat with the heavily-armed infantry troops who had great superiority in close hand-to-hand fighting. Since they were lightly armed they had considerable speed of foot and could easily flee from the cumbersome and slower hoplites, who obviously could not run very fast owing to their heavy

arms and armour which restricted their movements. By continually attacking and retreating from a hoplite phalanx, the light-armed troops could slowly exhaust and fragment the tightly-packed body of heavily-armed troops. Such tactics were especially effective against hoplites when the light-armed troops were used in conjunction with cavalry and on rough terrain which was not suitable for the phalanx formation. The ultimate aim of the light-armed troops was to surround the body of hoplites completely so as either to annihilate them with their missile fire or to force them to surrender. If the light-armed troops did not completely surround the opposing hoplites but still managed to rout them, they were well suited to pursue their more heavily equipped foes.

Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus give us very little information about how light-armed troops would have been used in an engagement in the period of the Peloponnesian War in which the clash of two phalanx blocks formed the main part. They may have been posted on the extremities of the wings of a phalanx, as the Boeotian 'psiloi' and peltasts were at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C., to protect it against an attack by an enemy on one or both flanks; in Thuc.VII.6.2 we find Syracusan cavalry and 'akontistai' being posted opposite the wings of the Athenian phalanx so that they could attack its flanks. In several instances light-armed troops would appear to have actually formed a wing (e.g. Amphilochian 'akontistai' formed part of the right wing at the battle of Olpae; in Thuc.VI.67.2 Syracusan 'akontistai', along with their cavalry, formed a wing) rather than having been positioned at the end of one, although it should be noted that Thucydides does not draw a clear distinction between these two postings. It is also clear from Thuc.VI.69.2 that light-armed missile-troops could be used to skirmish with each other in front of two phalanx blocks before they engaged. We also find light-infantry being used in front of their hoplites in Thuc.IV.32f, VIII.71.2 and Xen.Hell.I.1.34.

How were light-armed troops armed in the Peloponnesian War? The specialist 'sphendonetai' were armed with slings and the 'peltastai' and 'akontistai' with javelins. It is not clear whether they were equipped with a secondary weapon such as a dagger, sword or hatchet for hand-to-hand fighting; depictions of peltasts and 'akontistai' on Classical Greek vases only rarely show troops of these two types armed with a secondary weapon. The peltasts at least were equipped with a wicker shield. It is more difficult for us to tell how the non-specialist light-infantry were armed. Some light-armed troops in this period acted simply as stone-throwers (Thuc.I.106.1-2; IV.32.4; VI.69.2). It is apparent that there was little uniformity in the arms carried by non-specialist light troops (c.f. Thuc.IV.94.1): in Thuc. III.22.3 we learn that some of the Plataean 'psiloi' were armed with only breastplates and daggers, whilst others carried a normal spear or javelins. In the fighting on Sphacteria, apart from the 'τοξεύμασι' and 'σφενδόναις' used by the archers and slingers, the other 'psiloi' threw stones and javelins (ἀκοντίοις and λίθοις, Thuc.IV.32.4) and at least some of them were equipped with small wicker shields (Thuc.IV.9.1). Brasidas used 'psiloi' armed only with daggers to take one of the gates of Torone (Thuc.IV.110.2).

In the Peloponnesian War, Athens and Sparta had no regularly equipped or organized forces of native light-armed troops other than bodies of archers but preferred to employ specialist allied and mercenary peltasts and 'akontistai' from the more backward parts of northern Greece and also from Asia Minor (Athens also obtained slingers from Rhodes). Why, then, did Athens, Sparta, and many other mainland city states fail to develop large, properly organized and equipped units of light-armed troops from among their own citizens? [238]

Let us first consider a geographical paradox: Greece is an extremely mountainous land and in certain areas there is very little level ground at

all - an ideal terrain, one would have thought for the lightly-armed mountain guerilla. Mardonius, according to Herodotus, realized the paradox, and is made to say that instead of finding the terrain where they might have the best chance of victory, "they declare war against one another, then find the fairest and most level land and go down to it and fight" (Herod.VII.9.β.1). Certain backward upland peoples such as the Acarnanians, Amphilochians, Aetolians, Ozolian Locrians, Thracians and many of the Thessalian tribes had developed highly trained light-armed troops who could dominate high and rugged terrain - they lived in scattered highland villages rather than in cities and learnt to use missile weapons to hunt and to protect their flocks from predators. In contrast, most Greek city states relied almost totally on heavily-armed infantrymen who fought in close-packed phalanx formation on the economically important plains, on which grew the crops vital for the cities' survival. It is certainly acceptable to state that the Greek states used hoplite tactics because they were well suited for the defence of these plains, but this certainly does not explain why no city state with a plain to defend developed a native light-armed corps to combat enemy hoplites in the hills before they reached the plain or on a rough and broken part of the plain. Most Greek city states had mountain barriers which must have been easily defensible against heavily-armed infantry who found it difficult to advance up slopes and to keep their phalanx block in order on rough, uneven terrain.[239] Admittedly, as Holladay points out, some cities of the Arcadian plateau, the coastal strip of the northern Peloponnese, and of Boeotia and Thessaly, had only fairly low hills between them and there are almost always several passes through the main mountain barriers, which meant that there were several routes which an invading force could take.[240] It may, however, be doubted whether the hoplite phalanx could retain its cohesion on the stony undulating ground, often interspersed with streams, of low hills under attack from an efficient body of light-armed missile-troops; a light-armed force could also be divided into mobile sector units, like the

'comitatus' of the Later Roman Empire, to defend several passes at strategic positions - being swift of foot, the light-armed troops at other points could move quickly to reinforce another of their units which was attempting to fend off an attack.

Holladay further argues that there was no point in having a force of light-armed troops guarding mountain passes, even if they were effective in repelling hoplites, since almost all Greek states were open to invasion by forces, which included hoplites, from the sea,so that the invading hoplites would have to be fought on flat ground anyway.[241] Admittedly, sea-borne raids were often carried out in the Classical Period, especially by Athens, but land-borne attacks were far more common (particularly by Sparta) and, with the exception of Athens' expedition against Syracuse, we never hear of any Greek state carrying out a mass invasion against an enemy by sea - before 480 B.C. and for some time after, few states would have had enough ships to carry out a large attack by sea and, as the unfortunate Anchimolius found out, an army during disembarkation and shortly afterwards could be in a perilous position if caught off guard;[242] the danger of storms at the beginning and end of the sailing season must have made sea-borne expeditions of any sort risky at these times.[243] Some cities such as those of Arcadia were immune from attack by sea.

In view of the fact that light-armed missile-troops had proved themselves effective in mountainous Aetolia and on the difficult ground on the island of Sphacteria, it is strange that we never hear of any mainland Greek state using light-infantry to defend high ground in the narrative of Herodotus of the Persian Wars or of Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus of the Peloponnesian War. During Xerxes' invasion the Greeks, if we can trust the silence of Herodotus, failed to use light-armed troops at all to guard high rugged positions: a force of 10,000 hoplites was sent to Tempe to guard the Tempe Gorge and

possibly the steep pass to Gonnos, but as far as we know there were no light-armed infantry. At Thermopylae a force of 1,000 Phocian hoplites was alloted the task of guarding the difficult Anopaea Path which ran across Mount Callidromus to the rear of the Greek position but Herodotus again does not mention the presence of any Greek light-armed infantry. Light-armed missile-troops would have been ideally suited for preventing Xerxes' troops from attempting to advance along the pass which led under the Trachinian Cliffs towards Phocis, but again Herodotus is silent about their existence. No attempt was made to defend the passes on the Cithaeron - Parnes line by light-armed guerillas, who could have tried to set up ambushes at strategic positions in the passes, inflict casualties, then retreat behind their own lines.

In Thucydides' narrative, the only city state to organize an effective defence of a hilly pass with light-armed troops was Syracuse (VII.79.2). Thucydides only rarely hints that Greek mainland city states attempted to defend mountain barriers and even when he does so, we are not told whether there were any light-infantry in the defending forces: in 457 B.C. we learn that the Spartan army in Boeotia could not get home because an Athenian naval force patrolled the gulf of Corinth and Athenian troops held Megara and Pagai and guarded Mount Geroneia.[244] This mountainous line of defence was lost with the loss of Megara, but the Athenians do not appear to have tried to hold the hills between Megara and Eleusis. It is also apparent that Athens' frontier forts were not intended to stop a large invader but were intended as an early warning system against attack and as a mode of combating smaller incursions.[245] As Gomme points out, Argos had an excellent mountain barrier against Sparta both on the south-west and on the west, if Spartan troops attempted an invasion through Arcadia, but the Argives in their wars with the Spartans never, so far as we know, attempted to defend this mountain barrier and the battles between these two states were always fought in the plains.[246]

If we accept that light-armed troops were well suited for countering hoplites on both rugged and hilly terrain, we must ask ourselves why, then, did the Greek city states not develop their own bodies of well-trained and properly armed light-infantry? It was certainly not due in most cases to a lack of manpower and probably not of financial resources either. Holladay's conclusion that "the truth seems to be that none of the Greek cities came to believe that the light-armed soldier was the all-purpose weapon of the future" seems correct, with certain exceptions, for the period before 426 B.C. but certainly not for the period after 426 B.C. when the Aetolians, Demosthenes and Brasidas had shown the frightening potential of specialist light-armed troops (indicated by Sparta's institution of a force of archers in 425 B.C.).[247] Despite their proven efficiency there seems to have been a deeply ingrained feeling, which was especially strong at Sparta and evidently felt at Athens also, that archers and other light-armed troops were cowardly and had no part in hoplite battles, which in certain aspects were almost ritual; this conception that light-armed modes of combat were cowardly must have been at least a factor in the failure to develop large units of light-armed troops.[248]

Economic, social and political factors also contributed to this failure: there was no mechanism for the 'polis' to train and equip large bands of light-armed troops and the majority of the men who would have been needed to form such units would have been employed in cultivating crops or watching herds and it is doubtful whether they would have had the time to spare for training, campaigns and guard duty. In almost all city states only fairly wealthy farmers, manufacturers, and traders could have afforded to buy a full panoply, while the poorer men, if called upon to fight, armed themselves as best they could and probably carried only simple arms such as a spear or knife, with no body-shield and certainly no expensive body-armour. In warfare, the hoplite classes were predominant and could retain their social and political superiority over the poorly equipped and untrained light-infantrymen, who

could not increase their social standing or political rights due to good service on the battlefield; this is reflected in the fact that in the sixth century B.C. the top three classes in Athens held political predominance, whilst the 'thetes' had comparatively little power.[249]

Let us consider the cases of Athens and Sparta:

1 Athens: Before the rich silver-strike at Laurium in 483-2 B.C. and the subsequent building of the large Athenian fleet, our sources, by their silence, would lead us to believe that the 'thetes' took no part in the military affairs of the state, which were dominated by hoplites. In the large new fleet which numbered about 200 ships in 480 B.C., the poorer sections of the community filled the vital role of oarsmen (approximately 40,000 were needed) and thus contributed to Athens' military affairs; there must indeed be some truth in Gomme's assertion that before the new naval tactics were developed, rowing was despised and hence hoplites would have been disinclined to serve as oarsmen.[250] With the growth of the military importance of the 'thetes' went increased political power. It has been argued that after the Persian Wars, such a high percentage of the poorer Athenians must have served as oarsmen in the fleet that Athens could not possibly have had the manpower both to fill all her ships with rowers and to form a large organized force of native light-infantry.[251] I would certainly agree that many poorer Athenians who could have been formed into light-infantry units were vitally needed in the fleet, but it seems probable that Athens did in fact have the potential manpower and resources to equip her triremes with rowers and to institute a force of native light-armed infantry[252] in 460 or 459 B.C., when Athens was heavily involved in the Egyptian campaign, she still managed to form a force of 'psiloi' which was large enough to surround a large section of the Corinthian army which had invaded the Megarid (Thuc.I.106.1-2); during the campaign of Delium in 424 B.C., the Athenian 'psiloi', who accompanied the 7,000 Athenian hoplites and cavalry, far outnumbered the 10,000 Boeotian light-infantry (Thuc.IV.94.1).

The failure to develop a regularly equipped and organized native light-infantry force at Athens must have been to a large extent due to the conservative influence of the hoplite classes, which dominated land warfare and regarded light-armed troops with part of the contempt felt towards them in Sparta. This obviously is only partly the truth as Athens had a force of archers at the battle of Plataea and had a large force of these troops by 431 B.C. and the general Demosthenes frequently used specialist light-armed infantry from other areas of Greece and from the islands of Crete and Rhodes. Conservatism also prevented the institution of a mechanism for the state to provide training, officers and arms for native Athenian light-infantry; even after the crushing hoplite defeats at the hands of light-armed troops in Aetolia and on Sicily and the success of their own light-armed on Sphacteria, the Athenian hoplites continued to regard their own military position within their state as supreme and made up for their own lack of trained native 'psiloi' by employing allied and mercenary archers, slingers, 'akontistai' and peltasts from the more backward parts of Greece, certain Aegean islands such as Rhodes and Crete, Asia Minor and from among non-Greek barbarians.

2 Sparta: Sparta had a large subject population from which she could have formed a sizeable force of organized light-infantry if she had wanted - but the Spartiates realized that if they did form such a force it would represent a considerable threat to their internal security and might lead to the destruction of their state.[253] Messenian helots armed as light-infantry might have revolted or deserted to the Athenians as they did when the Athenians held Pylos. Forces of helots armed as light-infantry accompanied and fought with the Spartan armies at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. and Plataea in 479 B.C. - they must have been fairly inefficient as Pausanias was in desperate need of the Athenian corps of archers at Plataea.

Throughout the Peloponnesian War, Spartan and allied light-armed troops accompanied Peloponnesian armies and were frequently used to devastate the land of an enemy. Brasidas was the first Spartan general to recognize the potential of specialized peltasts from northern Greece: he used a large force of Chalcidian and probably also Thracian peltasts in his defence of Amphipolis in 422 B.C. and a force of peltasts in the storming of Torone. Brasidas was an exception to the rule - Spartan generals did not normally make good use of light-armed troops in combat roles. The Spartans appear to have held all light-armed missile-troops in deep contempt and this must have been a main reason for Sparta's failure to develop a force of organized light-infantry and their late institution of a body of archers. So long as Sparta's enemies retained their large forces of hoplites and failed to make effective use of light-infantry, she had little need of light-armed troops.

Appendix to Thucydides

A. Percentages of Light-armed Troops and Archers Present in the Various Forces of the Peloponnesian War for which Thucydides Gives Figures:

1 432 B.C. Corinthian force sent to Potidaea (I.60.1)

Force of 400 'psiloi' and 1,600 hoplites

The 'psiloi' constituted 20% of the whole force.

2 431 B.C. The Athenian Army

	Thuc.II.13.8	Ath.Pol.XXIV
cavalry and 'hippotoxotai' :	1,200	1,200
'toxotai' :	1,600	1,600
combat hoplites :	13,000	hoplites: 2,500 (Peacetime quota for garrison duty: Rhodes on Ath.Pol.)
hoplites on garrison duty :	16,000	

Thuc.	Ath.Pol.
'Toxotai' as pc of whole force = 5%	'Toxotai' as pc of whole force = 30.2%
'Toxotai' as pc of all hoplites and 'toxotai' = 5.2%	'Toxotai' as pc of all hoplites and 'toxotai' = 39%
'Toxotai' as pc of mobile hoplites and 'toxotai' = 11%	

3 431 B.C. Athenian force sent round Peloponnese (II.23.2)

Force of 400 'toxotai' and 1,000 hoplites

The 'toxotai' constituted 28.6% of this force.

4 426 B.C. Athenian force sent against Ambraciots (III.107.1)

Force of 60 Athenian 'toxotai' and 200 Messenian hoplites

The 'toxotai' constituted 23% of this force.

5 425 B.C. Athenian assault force on Sphacteria

Force of 800 archers and 800 peltasts (IV.32.1-2) and the majority of oarsmen from more than 70 ships, including all but the lowest rank, armed as 'psiloi' (c.7,700 men+), and a force of about 800 hoplites (see Wilson, Pylos 425 B.C., pp.104-5).

The 800 archers, 800 peltasts and c.7,700 oarsmen/'psiloi' constituted over 92% of the whole force.

6 424 B.C. The Battle of Delium

a. Boeotian force at the Battle of Delium (IV.93.3)

7,000 hoplites
1,000 cavalry
500 peltasts
10,000 'psiloi'

Light-armed troops ('psiloi' and peltasts) as a pc of whole force = 57%
Light-armed troops ('psiloi' and peltasts) as a pc of hoplites and light-armed = 60%

b. Athenian army:

7,000 hoplites
300+ cavalry (at temple; how many on wings?)
10,000+ 'psiloi'

The Athenian 'psiloi' almost certainly constituted over 50% of the whole force.

7 423 B.C. A Peloponnesian force sent to aid Mende and Scione (IV.123.4)

Force of 500 Peloponnesian hoplites and 300 Chalcidian peltasts.
The Chalcidian peltasts constituted 38% of the whole force.

8 423 B.C. An Athenian force sent against Mende and Scione (IV.129.2)

1,000 citizen hoplites

600 'toxotai'

1,000 Thracian mercenaries (peltasts?)

? Allied peltasts (number undefined)

'Toxotai' as a pc of citizen hoplites and archers = 38%

'Toxotai' as a pc of hoplites, Thracian mercenaries and archers = 23%

'Toxotai' and Thracian mercenaries as a pc of hoplites, Thracians and archers = 62%

Light-armed troops, including an undefined number of allied peltasts, must have constituted well over 62% of the total force.

9 423 B.C. Athenian strike force sent against a Peloponnesian Army (IV.129.4).

120 'psiloi' from Mende

60 Athenian hoplites

600 archers

'Toxotai' as a pc of the whole force = 77%

'Toxotai' as a pc of the archers and hoplites = 91%

Light-armed troops as a pc of the whole force = 92%

10 422 B.C. The Battle of Amphipolis (V.6.4)

Brasidas' force:

1,500	Thracian mercenaries (probably peltasts)
?	Edonian cavalry and peltasts
1,000	Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts
?	other Chalcidian troops in Amphipolis
2,000	hoplites
300	cavalry

The peltasts probably constituted more than 50% of the whole force (this assumes that the 1,500 Thracian mercenaries were peltasts).

11 419 B.C. Boeotian contingent of a Spartan force (V.57.2)

5,000 hoplites

500 cavalry

5,000 'psiloi'

500 'hamippoi' (I understand these to be light-armed)

The light-armed troops (psiloi and hamippoi) constituted 50% of the whole force.

12 416 B.C. Athenian expedition against Melos (V.84.1)

1,200 Athenian hoplites

300 archers

20 'hippotoxotai'

1,500 Melian hoplites

Infantry archers and 'hippotoxotai' as a pc of the whole force = 11%

Infantry archers as a pc of Athenian hoplites and archers = 20%

13 415 B.C. Sicilian Expedition (VI.43)

Original Athenian force:

480 archers (80 of whom were Cretans)

700 slingers

120 Megarian 'psiloi'

5,100 hoplites

30 cavalry

Light-armed troops (archers, slingers and 'psiloi') as a pc of the whole force = 20%

Archers as a pc of the whole force = 7.5%

Archers as a pc of archers and 1,500 Athenian hoplites = 24%

Slingers as a pc of the whole force = 11%

14 413 B.C. Athenian auxiliary force sent to Sicily

(See VII.31.5; VII.33.4; VII.33.5; VII.35.1; VII.42.1)

5,000 hoplites

1,000+ 'akontistai'

VII.31.5 Acarnanian 'akontistai' (number unknown)

VII.33.4 150 Iapygian 'akontistai'

VII.33.5 300 'akontistai' from Metapontum

VII.35.1 300 'akontistai' from Thurii

? other 'akontistai'

? 'sphendonetai' (Acarnanians)

? 'toxotai'

'Akontistai' as a pc of 'akontistai' and hoplites = 20%+

Light-armed troops (including 'sphendonetai' and 'toxotai') must have been substantially more than 20% of the whole force.

B Archers in Athenian Expeditionary Forces

(numbers refer to examples given in section A)

3	28.5%
4	23%
8	38%
12	20%
13	24%

On Athenian expeditions the pc of archers to Athenian hoplites (and where these were not present, to allied hoplites) does not vary greatly (with the exception of the force on Sphacteria, which was a special case).

In Athenian and Peloponnesian forces the percentage of all light-armed troops ranged widely:

5	92%+	(Athenian)
6b	50%+	(Athenian)
8	62%	(Athenian)
9	92%	(Athenian)
13	20%	(Athenian)
14	20%	(Athenian)
1	20%	(Corinthian)
7	38%	(Peloponnesian)
10	50%+	(Peloponnesian)

At the battle of Delium in 424 B.C. (6a) and on campaign with a Spartan force in 419 B.C. (4), the Boeotian light-armed troops as a percentage of their whole force remains not much different - 57% at Delium and 50% in 419 B.C.; since we have only these two sets of figures it is dangerous to draw any inferences from them.

C H A P T E R S I X

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE FORCES OF OPPOSITION TO THE THIRTY TYRANTS AT ATHENS (404 - 403 B.C.)

Light-armed infantry took part in the events of 404 - 403 B.C. which resulted in the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens.[1] The Thirty became hated because of their indiscriminate murder of innocent men and their confiscation of land. In Xenophon's Hellenica we learn that the tyrants began to confiscate the properties of smallholders (II.4.1); they first banned from Athens itself all who were not on the roll of the Three Thousand, then drove them from their villages so that they could seize their farms for themselves and their friends. The dispossessed smallholders fled to the Piraeus but were driven away and sought refuge in Megara, Corinth and Thebes.[2] Thrasybulus, the leader of the exiles, marched from Thebes with seventy Athenian supporters and succeeded in occupying the small fort of Phyle, under Mount Parnes.[3] The Thirty marched out of Athens with the Three Thousand and some of their troops began to attack the high enemy position at Phyle, but could not take it and suffered some losses;[4] as we shall see in Xenophon's description of the battles on the hill of Munychia, Thrasybulus made good use of his light-infantry to defend his elevated position and it is probable that he used them also in his defence of Phyle. When their attack failed and bad weather prevented them from erecting a wall round the fortress, the troops of the Thirty returned to Athens.

The Thirty, through fear of plundering raids by the soldiers of Thrasybulus, sent almost all the Laconian guard and two units of Athenian cavalry to protect the outlying districts.[5] These troops encamped in a bushy, wooded spot in the deme of Acharnae, not far from Phyle. Thrasybulus marched at night with his forces, which had now grown to 700 in number, against these troops and just before dawn charged at them, killing more than 120 hoplites and 3 cavalrymen. It seems likely that some at least of Thrasybulus' troops were light-armed skirmishers since the pursuit of the fleeing Laconian and Athenian troops was pressed for about a mile;[6] also note that Thrasybulus' soldiers were careful to gather all the 'hopla' of the routed troops - this

was because the Thirty had confiscated all the heavy arms and armour except those of the Three Thousand.[7] Light-armed infantry were ideally suited for swift night attacks and ambushes - in the bushy and wooded ground the hoplites of the Laconian garrison and Athenian cavalry must have been at a disadvantage to any light-infantrymen who were in Thrasybulus' force. Perhaps significantly the Tyrants sent a force of cavalry, who would not have been able to operate effectively against hoplites arrayed in a tight-packed phalanx formation, to combat the exiles: as we have seen on many occasions in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, light-armed infantry were very vulnerable to cavalry attack.[8]

Soon afterwards, Thrasybulus with an army now of one thousand men, carried out a night march from Phyle to the harbour town of Piraeus and stationed his army on the hill of Munychia, a strong defensive position.[9] The Thirty, with their hoplites and cavalry and also the Laconian guard, advanced against the troops of Thrasybulus who had gathered in a compact body on the hill where they could only be attacked on a narrow front. The troops of the Thirty drew up for battle in a mighty phalanx block approximately fifty men deep and then began to ascend the hill. Thrasybulus in turn drew up his troops on top of the hill with care: he positioned his hoplites, ten men deep, in front and behind these his large forces of 'peltophoroi' and 'psiloi akontistai' and behind them his 'petroboloi' (Xen.Hell.II.4.12). The speech of Thrasybulus before the battle, which Xenophon probably heard (from the wrong side) and probably reflects reasonably accurately what he said, indicates that he knew well the potential of light-armed missile-troops in an elevated position:[10] "And now the gods have brought us to a position where our enemies, because they are advancing up hill, cannot hurl either spears or javelins over the heads of those drawn up in front of them, while we, throwing spears, javelins and stones downhill, shall reach them and fell many of their number. And although one might have thought that we should be compelled to fight with

the soldiers of their front ranks on even terms, yet if you let fly your missiles energetically, as you should, no man will miss his mark since the road is packed with them and they, in their attempts to put up a guard against these missiles, will be continually cowering under their shields. You will therefore be able, just as if they were blind men, to strike out at them wherever you wish and then to leap upon them and lay them low". (Xen.Hell.II.4.15-16).

This long exhortation to his missile-troops is perhaps indicative of the fact that Thrasybulus regarded these troops as vital in compensating for his 5 - to - 1 disadvantage in hoplites.[11] Xenophon informs us that there were many light-armed troops in the force of the exiles and that many of these came from the area around the Piraeus: these men were probably mainly disaffected smallholders and metics.[12] Let us now look at the various types of light-armed infantry in Thrasybulus' force and their mode of operation in relation to their own hoplites. We are informed that there were 'peltophoroi', 'psiloi akontistai' and 'petroboloi' (Xen.Hell.II.4.12) but there is no mention of the archers and slingers who were to take part in the battle with Pausanias' troops in the following year (Xen.Hell.II.4.33); perhaps the men equipped with slings mentioned in the latter passage could be included under the term 'petroboloi' or perhaps even 'peltophoroi'. Archers could not have been included under any of the terms which Xenophon gives in Hell.II.4.12 - were there really none of these troops present in this battle with the Thirty or does Xenophon simply omit to mention them?

Now let us consider the mode of operation of these light troops: they were positioned behind their own hoplites (Xen.Hell.II.4.12) and shot their missile weapons over their heads (Xen.Hell.II.4.15). We have only one earlier reference in Greek literature to light-armed infantry operating from behind more heavily-armed soldiers: this comes in Iliad N712 - 722, where Locrian archers and slingers are described as operating from behind the conventionally armed Achaean infantry. Onasander specifically notes

that 'psiloi' positioned behind their own troops were ineffectual and also could "do more damage to their own soldiers than to those of the enemy" (The General, XVII). We are so rarely informed by our sources of the position of Greek light-armed troops in battle that we cannot say if it was, or was not, regular practice for them to operate from behind their infantry. On a flat plain and if their infantry was arranged in a deep formation, there must have been, as Onasander notes, a danger of light-armed troops positioned behind their conventional infantry shooting short and hitting their own front ranks, but since Thrasybulus' missile-troops were positioned higher up the slope of Munychia and since they had a clear view of the enemy, the danger of hitting their own hoplites in the back must have been minimal.

In the battle which followed, the troops of the Thirty were routed and pursued down the hill of Munychia to level ground - over seventy soldiers in the army of the Thirty were killed. Again Thrasybulus' men took the much needed heavy arms and armour from the dead hoplites.[13] Xenophon's description of the battle is very brief and does nothing to clarify the roles of Thrasybulus' hoplites and light-armed troops in the main fighting.

During 403 B.C., many more men flocked to join the exiles and Thrasybulus tried to equip more of his men with hoplite arms and armour. Some of Thrasybulus' followers who lacked shields made make-shift shields of wood and woven willow twigs which they painted white. Were these shields light 'peltai' and were they used by the troops which Xenophon terms 'peltophoroi' in Hell. II.4.12? [14]

A large section of Thrasybulus' force went out from the Piraeus area and made foraging expeditions on the land around the city. We are informed that there were 'πολλοὶ ὁπλῖται' and 'πολλοὶ γυμνῆτες' in one foraging party; the men in the city sent out cavalry squadrons to try to

hamper these parties.[15] With more citizens and metics and other foreigners flocking to join Thrasybulus, the position of the exiles seemed strong and they even made attacks on the walls of Athens, but in August 403 B.C. Pausanias set out with a Spartan army for Attica to crush them;[16] all the Spartan allies except the Boeotians and Corinthians sent contingents.[17] Meanwhile Libys, the admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, tried to stop supplies reaching the Piraeus by sea. The Spartans encamped on the plain of Halipedon near the Piraeus in order of battle, with Pausanias and his Spartan hoplites on the right and Lysander and his mercenaries on the left. When the exiles refused to disperse to their homes, Pausanias led an irresolute attack against them which accomplished nothing.[18]

Lysander had not attempted to wall off the Piraeus and the naval blockade had not been effective enough to force the capitulation of the exiles in the Piraeus. Pausanias realized that a wall was necessary and set out with a large reconnaissance unit to see where it could best be built;[19] he took along with him two 'morai' of Spartan hoplites, apparently one third of all Spartan troops and possibly amounting to around 2,600 men, and three tribal units of Athenian cavalry.[20] As Pausanias' troops were returning to camp, they were attacked and harassed by some of Thrasybulus' light-infantry. Pausanias sent the Athenian cavalry and young Spartan hoplites to chase after them at speed, while he and the other hoplites would follow along behind at a slower pace. Pausanias' van-guard managed to kill thirty of the light troops and pursued the rest to the theatre of Dionysus on the lower slopes of the Munychia hill. There the whole of Thrasybulus' light-armed troops and hoplites were waiting. It seems as if Pausanias fell into a trap: the

καὶ οἱ μὲν ψιλοὶ εὐθὺς ἐκδραμόντες ἠκόντιζον, ἔβαλλον, ἐτόξευον, ἐσφενδόνων· οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐτιτρώσκοντο, μάλα πιεζόμενοι ἀνεχώρουν ἐπὶ πόδα (Xen.Hell.II.4.33). The Spartans suffered many

ἐπὶ πόδα (Xen.Hell.II.4.33). The Spartans suffered many

casualties from the missile weapons and began to give ground. When the light-armed troops saw that the Spartans were giving ground, they attacked them all the harder with a hail of missile weapons. In this attack, the Spartans lost the polemarchs of both 'morai', Chaeron and Thibrachus.

When Thrasybulus saw that his light-armed troops were forcing the Spartans to retreat and were causing many casualties, he formed his hoplites in a phalanx formation eight-deep and led them downhill in front of his 'psiloi'. His light-armed infantry withdrew behind their hoplite ranks and possibly continued to harass the Spartan troops with missile weapons shot over the heads of their own heavily-armed soldiers. Pausanias was forced to retreat four or five stades to a hill where he sent orders to all his other troops to join him in full force. There he formed an extremely deep phalanx and advanced against the shallower phalanx of the exiles, who now felt confident enough to risk a close-fought phalanx engagement. The Spartans succeeded in breaking Thrasybulus' phalanx block, pushing a section of the enemy into the marsh of Halae, and killed about 150 of his troops.[21] After this victory, which was probably dearly won, Pausanias quickly came to terms with the men in the Piraeus without further bloodshed and then marched with his troops out of Attica.

Thrasybulus' light-armed troops give the impression of being competent skirmishers: not only did they have the nerve to attack and drive back the Spartan hoplites, inflicting casualties in the process, but they also acted in conjunction with their own hoplites by withdrawing to the rear of their own phalanx when the Spartans were retreating, and so allowed their own hoplites to get to grips with the Spartans when they were most vulnerable. Best thinks that this was the first occasion on which true Athenian light-infantry used skirmishing tactics, but some at least of the light-troops who used such tactics on Sphacteria in 425 B.C. were Athenians.[22] A little must be said about Xenophon's terminology of the light-armed troops engaged

in this battle: we find that Xenophon, before Hell.II.4.33 uses the terms 'gymnetes' and 'psiloi' to refer to Thrasybulus' light-infantry; in II.4.33, however, Xenophon divides the exiles not into 'hoplites and gymnetes' or 'hoplites and psiloi', but into 'hoplites and peltastai', even though he has not previously informed us that there were any true peltasts in Thrasybulus' force. Immediately afterwards, Thrasybulus' light-infantry are again termed 'psiloi' even though they are obviously the same troops as those who were called 'peltastai' in the prece ding sentence. It follows, then, that Xenophon uses the term 'peltastai' loosely in this passage, not to refer to true peltasts but to describe all Thrasybulus' light-armed troops. Interestingly, a fragmentary inscription referring to a 'peltastes' has been found on part of a stele of Pentelic marble from a late context west of the northern part of the Odeion and it has been suggested by D.W. Bradeen that this was the monument of one of Thrasybulus' light-infantrymen who fell in the strife of 404 - 403 B.C:[23]

[ ]τέλην τῶιδε ΟΜ[ ]
[ ]ονίοισι[24] δὲ τῆς [ ]
[π]ελταστὴς ἔθα [νε]
[μα]ρνάμενο [ς]

It may be in this inscription also that the word 'peltastes' does not indicate a true peltast but simply denotes a light-armed infantryman of any type.

Another archaeological discovery is of great interest to us: the Peribolos tomb of the Lacedaemonians in the Kerameikos.[25] Xenophon in Hellenica II.4.35 informs us that the Spartans suffered many casualties at the hands of Thrasybulus' missile-troops before the phalanx blocks came together and further informs us that both Spartan polemarchs, Chairon and Thibrachus, and Lacrates, a winner in the Olympic games, and the other Lacedaemonian dead, were buried in the Kerameikos, in front of the gates of

Athens. In 1930, German archaeologists in their excavations in the outer Kerameikos found an impressive ashlar masonry structure which was crowned by a cornice block with the following inscription (IGII², 11678):



This inscription, written in the Lacedaemonian alphabet and retrograde, indicated for certain that this was the grave of the Spartans buried in the Kerameikos since it names the polemarchs Thibrachus and Chairon. The tomb is a peribolos in form and differed from those of private burials in its internal division into three chambers; the burials were carried out beneath its irregularly laid foundations. The spacing of the capital letters (which formed the inscription: ΛΑ[ΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΙ]) with one placed between each two names made the archaeologists think that at least thirteen or fourteen men were buried in the tomb - in fact during the excavation thirteen skeletons were found in the grave enclosure. Franz Willemsen was convinced that the Spartan dead numbered many more and suggested that a stretch of 50 metres in the Kerameikos was filled with Lacedaemonian dead.

The excavators found three skeletons in the centre chamber of the tomb who had been laid out with great care - these skeletons are most likely those of Chaeron, Thibrachus and Lacrates. An astonishing discovery was made when the other skeletons were excavated: two of the skeletons still carried the heads of the weapons with which they had been wounded. One skeleton was found with an iron spearhead lodged in its left rib-cage, whilst another had two bronze arrowheads lodged deeply in its right leg. The arrowheads were so deeply imbedded in the latter's leg that it seems probable that he was shot at fairly close range by one of Thrasybulus' archers; the two wounds in the leg of the Spartan hoplite must have crippled him and left him open to a coup de grâce.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE ARMY OF THE TEN THOUSAND

(401 - 400 B.C.)

A The Hoplite in the Army of the Ten Thousand

The hoplite, as the name suggests, was an infantryman who was equipped with heavy arms and armour.[1] However, we know for certain from literary and archaeological evidence that hoplites in the age of Xenophon were becoming more mobile and less heavily armed - this was probably due, as Snodgrass suggests, to the increased prestige of the peltast and consequently the new more mobile role demanded of the hoplite: they were expected to follow close behind the peltasts in running attacks on both flat and difficult terrain.

The use of metallic and metallic-plated body armour declined. We learn in Anabasis I.2.16 that when Cyrus paraded his Greek hoplites for the benefit of the queen of Cilicia, they had bronze helmets, red tunics, greaves and shields. The generals had been ordered to draw up their soldiers in battle line, and presumably they were also armed for battle. Tunics were regularly worn under body-armour, but Xenophon only mentions the red tunics and no body-armour. Some at least of the hoplites wore the 'spolas', a light cloth or leather jacket (Anab.III.3.20; IV.1.18) - a number of hoplites on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument of Xanthus (c.400B.C.) wear the 'spolas' and so do some of the archers, whilst other hoplites and archers are simply clad in tunics.[2] When the small body of Greek cavalry was formed during the retreat after Cunaxa, Xenophon expressly notes that 'spolades' and 'thorakes' were provided for the cavalrymen (Anab.III.3.20). Presumably, therefore, not all these soldiers had body-armour when they served in the infantry. At about the same period in Sicily, Dionysius I of Syracuse provided body-armour for his officers, cavalry and guards, but not for his normal infantry, when equipping his forces to fight against the Carthaginians.[3]

There is also evidence that at this period some hoplites were abandoning the heavy, uncomfortable and hot bronze helmet for a light pointed hat called

the 'pilos' which became a common motif in works of painting and sculpture at the end of the fifth century B.C.[4] The 'pilos' seems to have been worn by light-armed troops and the servants of hoplites also.[5] It was probably in most cases made of stiffened felt or leather, although metal 'piloi' have been found at Dodona.[6]

Snodgrass notes that few examples of metal greaves have been found dating to this period and there are also few depictions of the metal greave.[7] The dispensation of the use of greaves would have made hoplites far more mobile.

In conclusion,we may say that from literary and archaeological evidence it is evident that the panoply of the hoplites in the age of Xenophon was becoming lighter. This was due most probably to the increased importance of the peltast and the more mobile role which was expected of the hoplite if he was to act in close conjunction with the peltast. The lighter panoply must also have cost less to produce and increased the comfort of the hoplite.

1 Greek Archers in the Army of the Ten Thousand

Xenophon reports that at Celaenae Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian exile, arrived with a force which included 200 Cretan archers (Anab.I.2.9). J. Roy supposes that Clearchus recruited this body of professional mercenary archers in the Chersonese.[8] We may infer that the force of Cretan archers was well organized from the fact that they had a special commander, a Cretan named Stratocles.[9] Cretan archery and archers, to judge from the frequency of the literary allusions, must have been famous in mainland Greece.[10] The force of Cretan archers in the army of the Ten Thousand was small and it amounted to only 1.6% of all the troops at Celaenae (and as a percentage of the other light-armed troops, 8.6%).[11]

We hear nothing about the actions of the Cretan archer force until after the battle of Cunaxa. The Cretan archers probably were present at the battle and are to be included in the term 'peltastikon' of Anabasis I.8.5 - if so, they were positioned on the extreme right of the Greek force with the other light-troops, to prevent an outflanking movement by the troops of Artaxerxes' left wing. It is clear from Xenophon's account of the battle of Cunaxa that, as we should expect, archers were present in Artaxerxes' force and also that they were used against the Greeks.[12] Although Xenophon has the troops of Artaxerxes fleeing before they ever came to close grips with the Greeks, Diodorus differs from him here in his account of the battle:[13] "When the two armies were about half a mile apart, the Greeks raised the paean and at first advanced slowly but as soon as they were within range of the Persian missiles they began to run very quickly. Clearchus, the Spartan, had ordered them to do this, thinking that, if they did not run from a great distance, he would keep his warriors fresh for the battle and that, if they advanced at a run from close quarters, the arrows and other missiles shot by the Persians would fly over their heads. When the soldiers with Cyrus approached the King's army a great many missiles were shot at them, as one might expect from a force of 400,000. Nevertheless, they fought for a short time with missiles and then for the remainder of battle joined in hand-to-hand combat" (Diodorus XIV.23.1-2). It would appear, then, from the account of Diodorus that the Greeks of the Ten Thousand adopted the tactics used by the Athenians and Plataeans at the battle of Marathon in order to reduce their losses due to missile fire.[14]

On their homeward march the Greeks were attacked by a force of 200 Persian archers and slingers, under the command of Mithridates, after they had crossed the Zapatas River. Xenophon informs us that when the Persian archers and slingers were inflicting many wounds on the Greek rearguard, the force of Cretan archers was unable to ward them off effectively: οἱ δὲ

ὀπισθοφύλακες τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔπασχον μὲν κακῶς, ἀντεποίουν δ' οὐδέν· οἵ τε γὰρ Κρῆτες βραχύτερα τῶν Περσῶν ἐτόξευον καὶ ἅμα ψιλοὶ ὄντες εἴσω τῶν ὅπλων κατεκέκλειντο, ... (Anab.III.3.7).

The Cretan archers on this occasion operated from inside the 'plaision' formation since they had no armour to protect them from the missiles fired by the Persians and also had a shorter range than the Persian archers. The most probable reason why the Cretans had a shorter range was because they used a large and heavy 'boss-and-barb' type of arrowhead, whilst Oriental arrowheads were comparatively small;[15] both the Cretans and Persians used the composite type of bow.[16] The Cretan archers must either have operated over the heads of the hoplites or through gaps in the 'plaision' formation.

In Anabasis III.4.13f., Xenophon informs us that not far from the ruined city of Mespila, Tissaphernes attacked the Greeks with his large force of archers, slingers and cavalry - they did not approach near, but shot their missile weapons from a safe distance. We are informed that the Cretans picked up the Persian arrows which were fired at them and used them for high trajectory long-range shots (Xen.Anab.III.4.17). The Persian force, which was numerous and covered a wide area, presented an ideal target for such high trajectory shooting.[17]

The Greek archers and slingers, however, did not hold the upper hand when attacked by the Persian missile-troops from a high position while crossing a mountain: "The Persians not only inflicted many wounds, but they got the better of the Greek gymnetes and shut them up within the formation of their hoplites so that the Greek slingers and archers were mixed up with the mass of camp-followers and were rendered useless for the whole of that day" (Xen.Anab.III.4.26). The Persians inflicted so many casualties that the Greeks had to appoint eight doctors to attend those wounded by the missiles.[18]

On the march through the Carduchian mountains we are informed by Xenophon that all the 'gymnetes' were positioned in the van - this almost certainly included the Cretan archers; they would have been useful for countering any attack by enemy missile-troops on the ascending Greek army.[19] The Carduchians then attacked the Greeks by shooting huge armour-piercing arrows and large sling-shots at them. The penetrative power of the Carduchians' arrows is astounding and Xenophon and Diodorus would have us believe that they could pass through both shields and cuirasses.[20] The bows of the Carduchians may have been similar to the Medieval long-bow which was capable of firing arrows which could penetrate thick metallic armour.[21] Xenophon notes specifically that the Cretan archers were of great use in combating the Carduchians (Anab.IV.2.28). In crossing the River Centrites in their march out of the territory of the Carduchians into Armenia, the Greeks were harassed by archers from the forces of the Persians Orontas and Artuchas and also by the Carduchians.[22] The Greek archers, slingers and peltasts were used to frighten their opponents on the opposite bank.[23]

In Anabasis IV.8.15, Xenophon describes how the Greeks drew up for battle against the Colchians: "When the officers were at their own positions and had formed their lochoi in column, there were about eighty companies of hoplites with each company numbering near one hundred men; they formed the peltastai and archers into three divisions, one on the extremity of the left wing of the hoplites, the second on the extremity of the right, and the third in the centre, each division numbering about 600 men." The Greek archers, along with the other light-troops, were to protect the wings of the Greek phalanx, threaten the wings of the enemy and give added support to the centre.[24]

Xenophon informs us that the Greek archers took part in the attack on the mountain fortress of the Drilae.[25] Greek archers, wearing Greek bronze helmets and the 'spolas' or tunic, are depicted on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument from Xanthus (c.400 B.C.) giving covering fire to hoplites

climbing a ladder to attack a city.[26] Compare to this representation the scene depicted on the British Museum's silver bowl from Amathus, a Phoenician work of the mid-seventh century B.C. - this shows long-robed Asiatic archers covering a column of hoplites which has placed its scaling ladder against the walls of a city.[27] Both representations would suggest that archers could be used to protect hoplites in their attacks on city walls; the depiction on the Nereid Monument would suggest that by the fifth century B.C. both Greek mercenary hoplites and specialist missile-troops became sought-after by Asiatic potentiates, whereas the Amathus Bowl might perhaps suggest that at an earlier date it had only been the Greek hoplites in whom they had been interested.

In Anabasis V.2.28-32, Xenophon recounts a trick which the Greeks played on the Drilae so that they could carry on their descent to Trapezus in safety. A Mysian soldier took ten of the Cretans and laid a mock ambush in some undergrowth[28] the Cretans were to flash their 'peltai' (which were 'chalkai' - probably 'bronze-faced' rather than 'of bronze') out of the bushes, so that the Drilae would be terrified that the Greeks were setting up a large ambush against them. Were these Cretans equipped with both 'peltai' and bows?[29] The Cretans who came to their rescue were certainly armed with bows (Xen.Anab. V.2.32). Cretan archers, being lightly-armed and mobile, would have been ideally suited to this type of mock ambush.[30]

In their march against the hostile Mossynoecians, the 'lochoi' of hoplites were formed in parallel columns with the archers placed in the intervals between them.[31] When the hostile group of Mossynoecians ran down a hill and pelted the Greeks with stones, they were held back and repulsed by the Greek archers and 'peltastai'. It is clear that the Greek archers played an important role in fending off enemy missile-troops from their own hoplites. In Anabasis V.6.15, Xenophon comments on the numbers and efficiency of the archers and other light-troops and also of the cavalry.

In conclusion,we may say that Cyrus employed a specialist corps of 200 mercenary Cretan archers who were under a regular commander; this was a small force and only represented 1.6% of the Greek army at Celaenae. It cannot have been uncommon for Greek mercenary archers to be hired by Asiatic potent ates: Greek archers wearing 'spolades' and Greek metallic helmets are depicted on the Nereid Monument from Xanthus. Although not specifically mentioned as having taken part in the battle of Cunaxa, the Cretan archers did perform a very useful role on the homeward march by countering enemy missile-troops, even though their arrows had a shorter range than those fired by the Persian archers due to the heavy type of arrowhead which they used. The Greek archers operated well in rough terrain and Xenophon specifically states that the Cretan archers were of great use in combating the Carduchian troops in their mountainous homeland (Anab.IV.2.28) - only when they met stiff resistance from numerically superior missile-troops were they forced to take shelter in the defensive 'plaision' formation. It is also evident from Xenophon's description of the attack on the mountain fortress of the Drilae and the scenes on the Nereid Monument that archers were well suited to taking part in attacks on fortified positions.

2 Greek Slingers in the Army of the Ten Thousand

The Greeks were attacked by Persian archers, slingers and cavalry on their homeward journey after they had crossed the Zapatas River. Xenophon comments that the Persians attacked with impunity because their archers had a greater range than their Greek counterparts and their slingers could shoot further than the Greek 'akontistai' could throw their javelins (Anab.III.3.7). The Greek light-troops and hoplites could not catch up with the Persian archers and slingers, who were extremely nimble, and consequently they suffered so badly from the Persian harassing attacks that they only managed to march about two and a half miles in one day.[32] Xenophon realized the urgent

need of slingers (and cavalry) to combat the Persian missile-troops, and therefore wished to find out which soldiers already had slings in their possession, offering payment to these men to act as slingers, and to anyone else who was willing to manufacture slings. He addressed his men thus:

ἡμεῖς οὖν εἰ μέλλοιμεν τούτους εἴργειν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι βλάπτειν ἡμᾶς πορευομένους, σφενδονητῶν τὴν ταχίστην δεῖ καὶ ἱππέων. ἀκούω δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι ἡμῶν Ῥοδίους, ὧν τοὺς πολλοὺς φασιν ἐπίστασθαι σφενδονᾶν, καὶ τὸ βέλος αὐτῶν καὶ διπλάσιον φέρεσθαι τῶν Περσικῶν σφενδονῶν. ἐκεῖναι γὰρ διὰ τὸ χειροπληθέσι τοῖς λίθοις σφενδονᾶν ἐπὶ βραχὺ ἐξικνοῦνται, οἱ δὲ Ῥόδιοι καὶ ταῖς μολυβδίσιν ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι. ἢν οὖν αὐτῶν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες πέπανται σφενδόνας, καὶ † τούτῳ † μὲν δῶμεν αὐτῶν ἀργύριον, τῷ δὲ ἄλλας πλέκειν ἐθέλοντι ἄλλο ἀργύριον τελῶμεν, καὶ τῷ σφενδονᾶν ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ ἐθέλοντι ἄλλην τινὰ ἀτέλειαν εὑρίσκωμεν ἴσως τινὲς φανοῦνται ἱκανοὶ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖν.

(Xen.Anab.III.3.16-18).

In Anabasis III.3.20 we are informed that a force of 200 Rhodian slingers was formed. The Rhodians were famed slingers and were used by Athens in the Sicilian Expedition.[33] Xenophon tells us that they had a range of not less than twice that of their Persian counterparts and could use both stones and lead-bullets as missiles.[34] This is our first reference in Greek literature to the use of the lead sling-bullet, which was termed in Greek 'μολυβδίς' or 'μολύβδαινα'. Lead is a very suitable material from which to manufacture such objects, as it is easy to cast and provides the maximum weight in a small volume. Our archaeological evidence for the early use of the lead bullet is extremely limited and no Classical lead sling-bullet which can be dated with any certainty to before the end of the fifth century has been published. Lead bullets which may have dated to the Archaic Period were found at Olympia, but their context is not properly

known, whilst the lead sling-shots which are said to have been found on the battlefield of Marathon are of extremely doubtful authenticity.[35] The Persian slingers, like the Assyrian, Balearic and Roman slingers, used large stones as projectiles which had a much shorter range than the small lead sling-bullets.[36] The Persian sling-stones which were "the size of a fist" must have had the potential to crush a man's skull even when protected by a metallic helmet or to cripple unprotected limbs - Peruvian slingers used large stone sling-shots to good effect against Spanish Conquistadors.[37]

The Rhodians formed a corps of 200 slingers; the Cretan archer force also numbered 200 men - was this the regular size of a unit of archers or slingers in Xenophon's time?[38] When Xenophon appealed for slingers he specifically mentioned the Rhodians - were there any other forces in the army of the Ten Thousand who could have supplied these troops? A small collection of lead bullets found in Crete and dating approximately to this period, might suggest that the Cretans could have supplied slingers - but they must primarily have been needed for their skill at archery.[39] One of the 'taxiarchs' was an Acarnanian and there may well have been more Acarnanian troops, whom Thucydides notes were skilled slingers, in the army of the Ten Thousand; if some Acarnanians did act as slingers, Xenophon is silent about this point.[40]

Near the city of Mespila, the Greeks were attacked by the troops of Tissaphernes and Orontas, who did not approach near them, but shot at them with their slings and bows. The Persian missile-troops were driven off by the Rhodian slingers and Cretan archers who fired withering volleys into their ranks. The Persian troops speedily withdrew out of range. Xenophon realized that the Rhodian slingers played a major role in preventing the Persian missile-troops from harming the Greeks on the march and comments that this was because they had a longer range than both the Persian slingers and archers (Anab.III.4.16). The fact that on several Assyrian reliefs

slingers are positioned behind archers would suggest that they out-ranged them. [41]

In the villages near Mespila the Greeks found sinews and lead in abundance, which were used by their slingers to make slings and bullets.[42] Xenophon again states in Anabasis III.4.18 that the troops under Tissaphernes had the worst of missile fighting and were more wary about attacking the Greeks. However, when attacked by the Persian slingers and archers from high positions on a mountain, the Greek slingers, along with their forces of archers and other 'gymnetes,' were shut up inside the defensive 'plaision' formation and rendered useless.[43] The Greek light-troops offered no resistance to their Persian counterparts and as a result the Greeks suffered many casualties. The Persians realized a fact which the mainland Greeks throughout the fifth century failed to comprehend - light-armed missile-troops were ideally suited to defending mountain barriers against hoplites.[44]

On their march through the mountains of Mesopotamia the Greeks were attacked by the native Carduchians, who shot large rocks at them from slings;[45] only 'staff-slings' could be used to project heavy rocks and it seems probable that the Carduchians used this type of sling rather than the conventional sling - there is some evidence that the Ancient Greeks, as well as the Romans, had knowledge of the staff-sling, although there is no evidence, as far as I know, that it was used by barbarian peoples.[46] We are informed by Xenophon that the Greek slingers, acting in conjunction with their archers and peltasts, were used to frighten their opponents who were positioned on the opposite banks of the River Centrites. Xenophon ordered his troops to charge when their shields rang with the noise of sling-shots fired by the enemy - it must have been a frightening experience for the Greek hoplites to be attacked by slingers using stone-bullets which may have been about the size of tennis balls.

Greek slingers also took part in an attack on the highland fortress of the Drilae. Xenophon ordered the 'peltastai' to advance with their fingers in the thongs of their javelins, the 'toxotai' to have their arrows on their bow-strings and the 'gymnetes' to have their bags full of stones (Anab.V.2.12), We are informed that when the light-armed troops charged, they let fly their spears or javelins and their arrows and sling-shots (σφενδόναι) and ordinary stones which they had collected (Anab. V.2.14). In Anabasis V.2.12 we are informed that there were Greek 'peltastai' armed with javelins, archers with arrows and 'gymnetes' with bags full of stones; there is no reference to slingers standing ready with their slings, yet we must infer their presence from the σφενδόναι of Anabasis V.2.14 - were the 'gymnetes' really slingers equipped with bags which they filled with small stones and, if so, why does Xenophon term them 'gymnetes' rather than 'sphendonetai'? [47] Xenophon may have regarded the slingers and ordinary stone-throwers as crude light-armed troops which he termed 'gymnetes', whereas he may have thought of the 'toxotai' and true 'peltastai' as specialist forces which were separate entities. We last hear of the Greek 'sphendonetai' in Anabasis V.6.15, where Xenophon views the Greek light-armed troops and comments that they had become very efficient.

As an appendix to this section on Greek slingers in the army of the Ten Thousand we may consider the question of whether the satrap Tissaphernes learnt from his exposure to the Greek lead sling-bullets and employed these efficient projectiles and perhaps even a force of Greek mercenary slingers. A small lead sling-bullet, of roughly the same weight and dimensions as many later Greek bullets, bearing the inscription ΤΙϹϹΑΜΕΡ[-----] (written crudely: ), has been found reportedly at the modern Görde̊s in the territory of Ancient Lydia.[48] The last letters of the inscription are totally illegible, but would probably have contained the genitive ending of the name Tissaphernes. It is virtually certain that

this bullet is genuine and not a counterfeit, and must have been issued by Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, from 413 to 395 B.C., or by some other Persian of the same name. We know of two other men named Tissaphernes but these seem unlikely candidates since they inhabited the central provinces of the Persian empire in an earlier age and, as far as we know, had no dealings with the Greeks.[49] It seems most likely, then, that the inscription refers to the Lydian satrap Tissaphernes who in his fighting with the army of the Ten Thousand after Cunaxa gained first hand experience of the Greek lead sling-bullet. He must have realized that the large stones which the Persian slingers used had a far shorter range than the lead projectiles of the Rhodian slingers. When Tissaphernes returned to Asia Minor after the withdrawal of the Ten Thousand from Persian territory, he may well have wanted his own slingers in his army to employ these new efficient sling-bullets which had been used against him. These lead bullets may even have been issued for the use of Greek mercenary slingers in the employment of Tissaphernes[50]- Greek archers, wearing Greek helmets and 'spolades', are depicted on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument from Xanthus in Lycia fighting alongside Greek hoplites in an attempt to capture a walled city; these are obviously Greek mercenaries in the service of an Asiatic ruler - if Asiatic potent ates employed Greek mercenary archers in addition to hoplites, they may well have employed Greek slingers too. According to Xenophon a Rhodian named Timocrates rose to a high position under Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes to the satrapy of Lydia, but it is not known if he was a commander (and if he was, could he have been in command of a contingent of Rhodian light-troops - slingers?).[51] The composition of the Ten Thousand itself shows that Cyrus was willing to employ not only Greek hoplites but a full range of Greek light-armed infantry.

Another hypothesis is that this type of lead sling-bullet was issued by Tissaphernes between 401 and 395 B.C. for the use of slingers from the

city of Aspendus in Pamphylia, which was situated in his own satrapy. It is perhaps significant that silver staters portraying on the reverse a slinger, clad only in a tunic, with his sling poised above his head in the starting position for casting, were first struck by the city of Aspendus in around the year 400 B.C. and not before.[52] Aspendus was a large Persian naval base and it is highly probably that the city supplied soldiers to the satraps. To judge by their silver staters, the people of Aspendus prided themselves on their slingers - since the people of Aspendus wrote in the Greek alphabet, it may be that Tissaphernes issued lead sling-bullets to them with his name inscribed in Greek. In 375 - 370 B.C.,Selge, another Pamphylian city situated about 20 miles up the River Eurymedon from Aspendus, began to strike a virtually identical coinage to the Aspendian and the slinger appeared on their silver staters also.[53] It seems possible, then, that slingers from Aspendus or Selge used lead bullets of the same type as the sling-shot with the inscription to Tissaphernes.

In conclusion,we may state that in order to counter attacks by Persian missile-troops, the Greeks in the army of the Ten Thousand formed a force of 200 Rhodian slingers who knew how to sling both stones and lead bullets; this is the first reference in Greek literature to lead sling-bullets (Anab. III.3.17). These lead bullets carried twice as far as the larger stones used by the Persian troops as sling-shots and probably had a range of somewhat less than 400m. In the engagement described in Anabasis III.4.2f the Greek light troops, with their archers and newly-formed body of slingers, acted in conjunction with their cavalry and hoplites to rout the Persian cavalry, archers and slingers. Tissaphernes and Orontas feared to approach near the Greek force after this defeat and Xenophon specifically mentions the usefulness of the Rhodian slingers in Anabasis III.4.16. The slingers could operate well on rough terrain and even against mountain fortresses - only when they met with stiff resistance from numerically superior missile-

troops firing from nigh positions were they forced to take refuge in the defensive 'plaision' formation (Anab.III.4.26).

We may infer from a lead bullet found at Gördes with an inscription TICCAΦEP[---] that Tissaphernes learnt from his exposure to the efficient lead sling-bullets and that between 401 and 395 B.C. he issued similar lead bullets with his name inscribed on them for the use of mercenary slingers from mainland Greece, or possibly of slingers from Aspendus or Selge.

3 Other Types of Light-armed Infantry in the Army of the Ten Thousand

As well as using the terms 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai' to describe specific types of specialist light-armed troops, Xenophon also uses the terms 'akontistai', 'peltastai', 'psiloi' and 'gymnetes';[54] the term 'akontistai' denotes javelin-throwers who may, or may not, have been equipped with shields (it is very probable that Xenophon regarded this term as mutually interchangeable with 'peltastai'), whilst Xenophon generally uses the terms 'peltastai', 'psiloi' and 'gymnetes' as collective nouns to refer to all types of light-infantry.[55]

On several occasions Xenophon does in fact make a distinction between the 'peltastai' and other light-armed troops:

Anabasis	I.2.3	'peltastai'/'gymnetes'
	V.2.12	'peltastai' distinguished from 'gymnetes' and 'toxotai'
	V.2.16	'peltastai'/'psiloi'

Xenophon apparently only once in the Anabasis counts 'peltastai' among the 'gymnetes' (IV.1.16), but in the Oeconomicus (VIII.4 and VIII.6) we find Xenophon including 'peltastai', 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai' under the term 'psiloi'.

However, in the majority of cases where Xenophon makes a distinction between hoplites and light-armed units, all the light-armed troops are considered to be 'peltastai':

Anabasis I.2.9, I.7.10 In enumerating totals Xenophon divided the army into hoplites and 'peltastai', despite the fact that the 'gymnetes' and 'toxotai' would have been included in the totals.

I.8.5

1.10.7

VI.2.16

It would seem that Xenophon in the Anabasis prefers in general the collective noun 'peltastai' to 'psiloi' or 'gymnetes'. Contrast Xenophon's usage of the term 'peltastai' to that of Thucydides, who maintains a clear distinction between true peltasts and other types of light-armed infantry throughout his narrative.

The hoplites, we learn, were commanded by 'lochagoi',[56] and for the first time in Greek history we hear of light-armed troops, as opposed to a force of archers with their 'toxarchos',[57] under the command of regular officers; we hear of four of these: Aeschines, the Acarnanian (IV.8.18; termed 'commander of the peltastai'), Aristeas, the Chian (IV.1.28 and IV.6.20; 'taxiarch' and 'commander of gymnetes'), Episthenes, the Amphipolitan (I.10.7; 'commander of the peltastai') and Nicomachus, the Oetaean (IV.6.20; 'commander of gymnetes'). The light-armed troops in the army of the Ten Thousand had their own regular commanders and we may infer from this that they were well organized. The known commanders of the light-armed, with the exception of Aristeas, the Chian, all came from mountainous areas where light-armed troops were plentiful.[58]

The light-infantry constituted by no means a negligible part of the army of the Ten Thousand. In Anabasis I.2.3f, Xenophon enumerates the Greek contingents which joined Cyrus; some of the contingents consisted in part of light-armed troops - in I.2.3 we learn that Proxenus had 500 'gymnetes' in his force, whilst Paison, the Megarian, had 300 'peltastai'. At Colossae,

Menon, the Thessalian, arrived with 500 'peltastai', consisting of Dolopians, Aenianians and Olynthians.[59] At Celaenae the Spartan Clearchus arrived with 800 Thracian peltasts and Cyrus held a review and made an enumeration of the Greek mercenaries who amounted to 11,000 hoplites and about 2,000 'peltastai' (Anab.I.2.9) - according to the figures which have been previously given, the exact totals are 10,600 hoplites and 2,300 light-infantrymen.[60] The light-infantry formed 19.3% of the Greek force at Celaenae. Thracian and Olynthian peltasts are mentioned in Thucydides, but this is the first reference to 'peltastai' from Dolopia and Aenis[61] these two areas, which were bordered by Amphilochia on the west and Aetolia on the south, were among those areas whose development had lagged behind the rest of Greece and which might be expected to have used light-armed troops rather than the conventional hoplites. The light-armed troops were clearly recruited locally by each commander who had them in his force - Menon in Thessaly raised bodies of Dolopian, Aenian and Olynthian 'peltastai', while Clearchus in the Chersonese recruited Thracian 'peltastai'.[62]

We have very little information as to whether the forces of light-armed troops were broken down into smaller more manageable units like the hoplites, who in Anabasis IV.8.15 are said to have formed 80 'lochoi' with 100 men in each 'lochos'. The Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers were both manageable units of 200 men - is it mere coincidence that there was the same number of men in both units? Again in Anabasis IV.8.15 we learn that the Greek 'peltastai' (here simply equal to 'light-armed' in the broader sense, not the specific sense of true peltasts) and 'toxotai' were formed into three divisions, "with about six hundred men in each division" - the number in each division must be a vague approximation as it gives a total of one thousand eight hundred, as compared with an original two thousand three hundred (the 'peltastai' must have suffered losses, but I doubt whether Xenophon means us to suppose that they had lost 500 men). Were these larger units of 600 men further subdivided into units of 200 men such as the Cretan

archers and Rhodian slingers? Such subdivision would have made the light-armed force more manageable and efficient. Modern commentators such as Anderson, Best, Parke and Roy do not deal with the question of the organization of the light-armed units.

Let us now consider the military role of the light-armed infantry in the army of the Ten Thousand.[63] We frequently hear of Greek light-infantry (termed 'peltastai', 'gymnetes', 'psiloi' or 'akontistai') being used in active roles:

1 In simple attacks:

Anabasis	I.8.5; I.10.7	Greek 'peltastai' at the battle of Cunaxa.
	III.3.7	Greek 'akontistai' attempt to counter an attack by enemy archers and slingers.
	III.3.8	Greek 'peltastai', in conjunction with hoplites, attack Persians.
	IV.3.28	Greek 'akontistai', acting in conjunction with 'toxotai', make an attack on Carduchians from a river bank.
	IV.4.20	Greek 'peltastai' attack Tiribazus' camp.
	IV.8.16-18	Greek 'peltastai' take part in an attack on the Colchians.
	V.4.22-24	Greek 'peltastai' and archers fend off hostile Mossynoecians.
	VI.3.4	Native Thracian 'peltastai' wipe out two companies of Greeks.
	VI.3.6f	Native Thracian 'peltastai' and cavalry try to surround a force of Greeks.
	VI.5.26	Greek 'peltastai' charge against Bithynians.
	VII.3.44	Seuthes uses his 'peltastai' in an attack.

2 In attacks on high positions (and for dominating high ground):

III.4.38f	Greek 'peltastai', with the backing of cavalry, dislodge enemy from a high position.
IV.6.20 and .6.25	Greek 'gymnetes'/'peltastai' take part in an attack on a high position along with hoplites.
IV.8.18	Greek 'peltastai' take the summit of a hill from Colchian troops.
V.2.4f	Greek 'peltastai'/'gymnetes' take part in an attack on a mountain fortress of the Drilae.
VI.3.15	Greek 'gymnetes' are used to dominate high ground.
VI.5.29-31	Greek 'peltastai' take part in the pursuit of Persian and Bithynian cavalry up a hill.

3 In attacks on fortified positions:

I.2.3	A force of 300 'peltastai' are used in an attack on the city of Miletus.
V.2.4f	Greek 'peltastai'/'gymnetes' take part in an attack on a fortress of the Drilae.

4 In pursuits:

III.3.7-8	Greek 'akontistai', acting in conjunction with archers and hoplites, pursue Persian troops - Xenophon uses the terms 'psiloi' and 'peltastai' here as collective nouns to refer to light-infantry.
III.4.3f	Greek hoplites and 'peltastai', reinforced by their new cavalry force, successfully pursue the Persians.
IV.3.22	Greek cavalry and 'peltastai' pursue the Persians.
V.4.24	Greek 'peltastai' pursue the hostile Mossynoecians.

5 In ambushes:

IV.6.17 Greek 'gymnetes' successfully set an ambush.

V.2.28f Cretans, equipped with 'peltai' plated with bronze, set up a mock ambush - these may have been archers.

VII.4.14f The Thynians, armed with javelins and clubs, carry out a night attack.

6 For ravaging enemy land:[64]

VI.3.15 Greek 'gymnetes' were ordered to burn everything which they found that could be burned.

VII.4.1 Seuthes' troops - 'peltastai' and cavalry - burn up villages.

In carrying out these active roles many of the light-armed troops were killed. Whereas 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 'peltastai' were present at the last rollcall which Cyrus held before Cunaxa (Anab.I.7.10), at Heracleia the Greek force only amounted to 7,600 hoplites and 1,000 'peltastai' (VI.2.16). If these two groups of figures are accurate we must conclude that 27% of the hoplites had been killed, compared to 60% of the 'peltastai'.

An important question which is not treated in any detail by Best is the position of the Greek light-armed troops in the battle formation and on the march. Let us firstly examine the question of their position in military operations - in the battle of Cunaxa the Greek 'peltastai' along with 1,000 Paphlagonian cavalry were drawn up on the outside of the right wing formed by the Greek hoplites.[65] Their role in the fighting was obviously to counter any outflanking movement which Artaxerxes' left wing, under the command of Tissaphernes, might make.[66] In the battle the Greek hoplites routed the forces under Artaxerxes. Tissaphernes had not fled with the rest of the Persian left wing, which he had flanked with his cavalry, but charged along the River Euphrates through the Greek 'peltastai', who were protecting their

own wing. The Greek light-armed did much harm to the Persian cavalry by striking them with their weapons and showering javelins on them.[67] Tissaphernes thought it safer to ride on to the rear of Cyrus' troops then to return by running the gauntlet of missiles which the Greek 'peltastai' threw.

In Anabasis IV.8.15, we learn that the light-armed troops and archers were formed into 3 contingents of about 600 men in each. We are further informed that two of these contingents flanked the left and right wings of the hoplites, whilst the third contingent was positioned in front of the centre of the hoplites. In the battle against the Colchians which followed, the Greek peltasts played a large part: when the Greeks attacked, the 'peltastai' on the Greek wings made an encircling movement, thus threatening the Colchians' flanks. The Colchians in the centre came to the aid of their men on the wings, leaving a large gap in the middle of their line. The Greek 'peltastai', who were drawn up in front of their own centre, advanced at the double to the top of the mountain, thinking that the enemy were running away. When the enemy saw that these troops were backed up by Arcadian hoplites, they fled. This is the first occasion on which we hear of light-armed troops being used to outflank the wings of an enemy, who were forced to give aid to their own troops on the wings, so leaving a gap or weakened front for the Greek 'peltastai' positioned in front of their own centre to rush through - these tactics indicate the high degree of organization of the light-armed troops in the army of the Ten Thousand. In Anabasis VI.5.25 we again learn that the Greek 'peltastai' were positioned on either flank of their army. In Anabasis VII.1.23 the Greek 'peltastai' are yet again described as being positioned on either wing of their hoplite force. Thus on four occasions in the Anabasis we hear of Greek light-armed troops positioned on the wings of Greek hoplites - these troops were used to counter or take part in a flank attack.

We also hear on several occasions of Greek light-armed troops operating in front of their own hoplites rather than on their wings, although of course these troops may have fanned out from the wings. In Anabasis IV.6.25 we hear of Greek 'peltastai' charging at a run in front of their own hoplites; in IV.8.18-19 the 'peltastai' of the Arcadian division charged in front of their hoplites; in V.2.4 we hear of 'peltastai' running five or six stades in front of their hoplites and in VI.5.26 Greek 'peltastai' charged in front of their own hoplites in no order against Bithynian forces.

Thus it appears that the Greek light-armed troops had two main roles when operating in conjunction with hoplites:

1 When positioned on the wings, they were used to counter or take part in a flank attack.

2 When positioned in front of the phalanx block, they were used to soften up the front ranks of the enemy by their skirmishing attacks with missile weapons.

Only in Anabasis IV.8.15 do these two roles appear to have been combined at one time.

Let us now consider the position of light-armed troops on the march. On relatively flat ground the Greek 'peltastai' were used mostly in the rear-guard to combat enemy attacks (Anab.III.3.8; III.4.40). In hilly country the light-troops were positioned mainly in the van, to counter enemy attacks from high positions (e.g. Anab.IV.1.6 [gymnetes]; IV.4.20 [peltastai]). In Anabasis VII.3.37 we learn that the nature of the terrain dictated whether hoplites or 'peltastai' or cavalry were to lead the army - at night it was Greek practice for the slowest troops to lead. When under attack from missile-troops we learn that the Greek light-armed were shut up in a defensive 'plaision' formation of hoplites along with the 'ochlos' of camp-followers;[68] we frequently hear in the Anabasis of the Greeks in 'plaision' formation during the march.[69]

We learn that the crowd of camp-servants sought refuge in the 'plaision' formation - were these camp-servants armed as make-shift light-infantry? Greek attendants, some of whom Roy suggests were slaves (based on Anab.II.5.32), attempted to protect the camp of Cyrus and the Greeks during the battle of Cunaxa against plunderers from the army of Artaxerxes.[70] A Milesian concubine of Cyrus fled πρὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τοῖς σκευοφόροις ὅπλα ἔχοντες καὶ ἀντιταχθέντες πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἁρπαζόντων ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον· οὐ μὴν ἔφυγόν γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην ἔσωσαν καὶ τἆλλα, ὁπόσα ἐντὸς αὐτῶν καὶ χρήματα καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐγένοντο, πάντα ἔσωσαν. (Anab.1.10.3).

Although Xenophon says that these men who fought around the baggage train were armed with 'hopla', I think that this term almost certainly does not specifically denote heavy arms but simply any arms which they managed to pick up.[71] Light-armed attendants, usually armed with one or two spears (javelins?) are frequently shown on Attic fifth century vases fighting beside their hoplite masters.[72]

We have little information about the status of the Greek light-armed troops. There is no evidence that the Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers (who had previously been hoplites) bore any social stigma. The 'peltastai' under Menon and Clearchus were the normal type of infantry from Thessaly and Thrace. However, in Anabasis IV.8.4 we learn that one of the 'peltastai' had been a slave at Athens - we must infer from this that at least some of the 'peltastai' were of servile or lowly background.

In conclusion, I would state that I have concentrated on certain aspects of the Greek light-armed infantry which Best does not cover fully in his book on Thracian peltasts. Xenophon's terminology for the various types of light-armed troops, apart from archers and slingers, is not as accurate as that of Thucydides. Although in some places Xenophon distinguishes between

true peltasts and other light-armed troops, he most often considers all light-troops to be 'peltastai'. Perhaps at this period the prestige of the true peltasts was growing so greatly that all light-armed troops became associated with their famous counterparts. A fairly large force of light-infantry were present in the army of the Ten Thousand - they numbered 2,300 at Celaenae (19.3% of the whole force). The 'peltastai' of Menon were Thessalians, those of Clearchus Thracians. The light-armed troops in the Greek force appear to have been well organized - they were set under the command of regular officers and were most probably broken down into manageable units. It is probable that some of the camp-followers were used as crude light-troops.

Best gives a case by case study of the peltasts by following in detail the narrative of the Anabasis, whilst I have attempted to study thematically certain roles of the Greek 'peltastai' so as to try to clarify some of their military uses. Just as we find in Thucydides, light-armed troops in the Anabasis were used for simple attacks, operations on high ground, attacks on fortified positions, pursuits, ambushes and ravaging expeditions. They were actively engaged in many operations and suffered high casualties - if the figures which Xenophon gives are accurate, we may assume that approximately 60% of the 'peltastai' were killed.

Two points of interest which I have tried to elucidate are the position of light-armed troops on the battlefield and on the march. On the battlefield the light-infantry appear to have had two main roles in the Anabasis (only in IV.8.15 do we find these two roles combined):

1 When positioned on the wings, they were used to counter or take part in flank attacks.

2 When positioned in front of the phalanx block, they were used to soften up the front ranks of the enemy by their skirmishing tactics with missile weapons.

On the march the light-armed troops generally formed part of the rear-guard on relatively flat ground, and the van on hilly terrain. During a night march they must have been positioned between the hoplites and cavalry. When under attack from resolute enemy missile-troops firing from commanding positions, the Greek light-armed infantry, who were not equipped with effective defensive armour, sought protection with the camp-followers in the defensive 'plaision' formation of hoplites.

I would like to end this section with a comment about the Persians and other native peoples who stood opposed to the Greeks in their retreat after Cunaxa: they realized a fact which, if we are to trust the silence of our sources, the mainland Greeks in the Classical era before the 370s failed to comprehend - lightly-armed missile-troops were ideally suited for defending mountain barriers against hoplites. When the Greeks of the Ten Thousand tried to force their way through mountain passes, they always suffered heavy losses and only the specialist Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers prevented their force from being decimated like Demosthenes' in Aetolia; the adversaries of the Greeks in their high positions must have suffered relatively light casualties.

CHAPTER EIGHT

LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY IN THE PERIOD 400 - 362 B.C.

1 Archers in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.

Literary references to archers in the years 400 - 362 B.C. are disappointingly very few. We have, however, pictorial evidence for the use of Greek archers in Asia Minor by Oriental potentates at the very beginning of this period: Greek archers are depicted on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument from Xanthus in Lycia which dates to about 400 B.C.[1] On slab number 869 two archers (badly damaged) are depicted covering two advancing hoplites who hurl rocks;[2] on slab number 859 a single archer, wearing a tunic and Greek plumed bronze helmet, covers the advance of a hoplite; on slab number 855 an archer, wearing a Greek plumed bronze helmet and apparently carrying a 'hoplon' on his left arm, aims a high shot; on slab number 881 an archer, wearing a Greek helmet and a tunic, advances with a hoplite against some enemy hoplites. On slab number 866 two crouching archers give covering fire to a column of hoplites who are climbing a ladder to attack a city; both archers wear Greek bronze helmets and have what appear to be quivers on their backs (in the majority of cases in vase paintings Greeks are shown carrying their quivers over their backs) and one of them wears a 'spolas', the other a tunic. The archers shoot high at the defenders on the city walls.[3] The depictions of archers on the second frieze of the Nereid Monument would suggest that they were well suited to giving covering fire to advancing hoplites and to operating against defenders positioned on the fortification walls of cities.

Our first literary reference to archers in a Greek force in the years after 400 B.C. comes in 395 B.C. when Agesilaus collected together his army at Ephesus and there, "wishing to train it, he offered prizes to the hoplite units for the unit which should have the fittest men and to the cavalry brigades for the brigade which should show the best skill at riding; and he also offered prizes to the peltastai and the toxotai, for those of their number who should show themselves most skilled in their respective duties.

Thereupon one might have seen all the gymnasia packed full of men exercising, the hippodrome full of men riding, and the peltastai and archers practising their shots." (Hell.III.4.16).[4] Best suggests that the archers in the force of Agesilaus came from Asia Minor, but there is no evidence for the nationality of these archers.[5] We hear no more about the operations of the archers of Agesilaus in the warfare against the Persians.

In Hellenica IV.2.1-5 we learn that when Agesilaus was called back to Greece in 394 B.C. because Sparta was being threatened by a coalition of the hostile cities of Corinth, Athens and Thebes, he took back his force of 'toxotai' with him. In 394 B.C. when the Spartans advanced into Corinthian territory, the 'gymnetes' of the Corinthians and their allies, including a force of archers, did the Spartans much harm by attacking them on their unshielded side from high positions: ἐμβαλόντων δὲ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἐπιείκειαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν ὑπερδεξίων βάλλοντες αὐτοὺς καὶ τοξεύοντες μάλα κακῶς ἐποίουν οἱ γυμνῆτες τῶν ἀντιπάλων (Hell.IV.2.14). In this passage we find Corinthian archers making use of hilly terrain to attack Lacedaemonian troops - if Greek city states realized that missile-troops positioned on high ground could attack with impunity hoplites on more level ground, why do we never hear of them using these troops to guard high mountain passes against invading hoplites?[6] In Hellenica IV.2.16 Xenophon enumerates the contingents in the large Lacedaemonian force and informs us that the army included a corps of about 300 Cretan archers. These were undoubtedly mercenaries like the 200 Cretan archers who joined the army of the Ten Thousand. Pausanias claimed that the Spartans made use of Cretan archers as early as the First and Second Messenian Wars, but his account of their use at this date is not reliable: possibly he did preserve a genuine later tradition that the Spartans had used Cretan mercenary archers at some undefined period in earlier ages.[7] In this Lacedaemonian force of 394 B.C. the Cretan archers formed an insignificant percentage of all the troops -

only 2%. In the battle of Corinth which followed, Xenophon makes no specific mention of the archers on the Corinthian or Lacedaemonian sides.

Xenophon also informs us that when the Spartan Agesipolis made an expedition against the Argives in 388 B.C., he had a force of Cretan archers under his command. Agesipolis' troops chased a body of Boeotian cavalry right under the walls of Argos and Xenophon comments that "if it had not happened that the Cretans were away at the time on a plundering raid on Nauplia, many cavalrymen and their horses would have been shot down by their arrows" (Hell.IV.7.6). The Cretan archers, since they used a large type of arrowhead, had the capability of shooting down both men and horses and must have been able to break up a charge by cavalry. They were used in a plundering expedition against Nauplia: in the narrative of Thucydides we frequently hear about archers used in ravaging expeditions.[8]

In Hellenica VII.5.10, we learn that a Cretan scout warned Agesilaus that Epaminondas and his Theban force were marching on Sparta (362 B.C.). Unfortunately, we are not told whether this Cretan scout was an archer.[9]

The typical Spartan contempt for archers, which we found in both Herodotus and Thucydides, is reflected in a saying which Plutarch asserts that Agesilaus made when forced to give up his expedition against the Persian king because of the anti-Spartan coalition of Thebes, Corinth and Argos, which was funded by Persian money. Persian coins were stamped with the figure of an archer and Agesilaus, making a pun on the noun 'toxotes', claimed that the king of Persia was driving him out of Asia with a myriad of mere 'toxotai' - a bitter pun on the cowardly archers and the coin bearing the stamp of the 'toxotes.'[10]

In conclusion,we may say that Xenophon surprisingly mentions archers very rarely in his narrative of the years 400 - 362 B.C. It is possible that archers were included on some occasions by Xenophon in the term

'peltastai', which he often uses to denote all types of light-armed troops rather than true peltasts. It is quite striking that no Athenian archers are mentioned, but only Corinthian archers and Cretan mercenary archers in the employment of Sparta. We must bear in mind the strong possibility that Xenophon's silence about the presence of archers may not reflect reality but rather his pro-Spartan sentiments; although the Spartans did utilize a corps of Cretan archers, it is still probable that they retained their long-held belief that archers were cowardly and did little to influence the outcome of a battle.

2 Greek Slingers in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.

As with archers, literary references to slingers in the years 400 - 362 B.C. are extremely few. We have virtually no archaeological evidence to supplement the information given by our literary sources: there are, as far as I know, no Greek portrayals of slingers engaged in combat dating to this period. Sling-bullets are notoriously hard to date with any certainty but we know for certain that the Rhodians, and possibly also the Cretans, used lead bullets by the end of the fifth century B.C.[11]

In 394 B.C. when the Spartans advanced into Corinthian territory, the large Lacedaemonian force included a body of not less than 400 slingers: καὶ μὴν σφενδονῆται Μαργανέων καὶ Λετρίνων καὶ Ἀμφιδόλων οὐκ ἐλάττους τετρακοσίων (Hell.IV.2.16). The mountain villages of Margania, Letrinia and Amphidolia had revolted from Elis at the time of Agis' invasion six years earlier. The exact position of the villages is not known but they appear to have been situated in the Pisatis, in the hills around Pyrgos. Letrinia has been associated with a site near Hagios Ioannis, west of Pyrgos, where ancient objects have been found, but the identification is far from certain.[12] We would expect that the inhabitants of such mountain villages, through their links with pastoral

farming and hunting, to have had knowledge of the sling.[13] The slingers formed an insignificant percentage of all the troops of this large Lacedaemonian army - only 2.7%.

In 389 B.C. the Acarnanians, who were allies of the Athenians, along with some Boeotian and Athenian soldiers, made an expedition against the Achaeans who dwelt in Calydon.[14] The Achaeans appealed for aid to Sparta and Agesilaus, with a Lacedaemonian force, joined the Achaeans in an attack against the Acarnanians. Agesilaus made a successful lightning attack against the place where the Acarnanians kept their herds but was forced by Acarnanian slingers and other missile-troops to withdraw from his camp on a mountain-side to the plain, where his hoplites were capable of forming their phalanx formation on the level ground: τῶν μέντοι Ἀκαρνάνων πολλοὶ πελτασταὶ ἦλθον, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ὄρει σκηνοῦντος τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου βάλλοντες καὶ σφενδονῶντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκρωνυχίας τοῦ ὄρους ἔπασχον μὲν οὐδέν, κατεβίβασαν δὲ εἰς τὸ ὁμαλὲς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καίπερ ἤδη περὶ δεῖπνον παρασκευαζόμενον (Hell.IV.6.7). Note that Xenophon calls the Acarnanian missile-troops and slingers 'peltastai', even though they probably did not carry 'peltai' - a shield would inhibit the movement of a slinger. It is obvious that he uses the term to mean light-armed troops in general.[15] In Thucydides we hear of Acarnanian slingers attacking Peloponnesian hoplites and forcing them to retreat - they certainly were most effective slingers.[16] Just like the Marganians, Letrinians and Amphidolians, the Acarnanians were mountain-dwellers who lived, in part at least, by pastoral farming.[17] The Acarnanian slingers and other missile-troops were extremely nimble and swift on high ground and harassed the Lacedaemonian troops under Agesilaus as they retreated through the mountain passes from their country. It was difficult for the Lacedaemonian hoplites to catch up with them.[18] The Acarnanians' strength lay in their slingers and missile-troops, as their hoplites performed less well in battle.[19]

Diodorus in his account of the preliminary cavalry action at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. informs us that the Thebans had a force of 'sphendonetai' from the regions around Thessaly in their army and that the Theban cavalry were victorious over those of the Athenians because they were supported by light-armed troops ('psiloi') who outnumbered those of the Athenians three-to-one: [20] οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππεῖς τοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων ἐπελάσαντες ἠλαττοῦντο οὐχ οὕτω ταῖς τῶν ἵππων ἀρεταῖς οὐδὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις εὐψυχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἐμπειρίαις· ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἅπασιν οὐκ ἦν καταδεέστερον τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππικόν· τῷ δὲ πλήθει καὶ τῇ παρασκευῇ τῶν ψιλῶν καὶ τῇ στρατηγικῇ συντάξει πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐλείποντο. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὀλίγους εἶχον ἀκοντιστάς, οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι τριπλασίους σφενδονήτας καὶ ἀκοντιστὰς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν Θετταλίαν τόπων ἀπεσταλμένους. οὗτοι περιττότερον ἐκ παίδων ζηλοῦντες τὴν ἐν τούτοις μάχην, μεγάλην ῥοπὴν ποιεῖν εἰώθεισαν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις διὰ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐμπειρίαν. διόπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατατιτρωσκόμενοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ψιλικῶν, καταπονούμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθεστηκότων, ἅπαντες ἐτράπησαν.
(Diodorus XV.85.4-5). Diodorus, following the account of Ephorus, gives us the impression that the Theban 'psiloi' played a vital role in the battle, but Xenophon tends to minimize their importance. [21]

We learn that the Thessalians and other Theban allies were positioned in the centre of the Theban line (Diodorus XV.85.2); some of the other allies such as the Messenians (cf. Pausanias IV.26.1) and Malians (cf. Thuc.IV. 100.1) and less likely the Euboeans (cf. West, Archilochus, frag.3) may have had some slingers in their light-armed forces. Diodorus informs us that the peoples around Thessaly were highly skilled in the use of their missile weapons and consequently were accustomed to exercise great weight in warfare. The Thessalian slingers and other light-armed troops of the Theban centre

harried to exhaustion the Athenian cavalry, who turned and rode off. Slingers could be particularly effective when used against cavalry - in Thucydides VI.22, we learn that Nicias before the Sicilian expedition had told the Athenians that large forces of slingers, as well as of archers, were imperative to counter the large number of enemy cavalry, and Korfmann notes that Peruvian slingers could fire sling-shots with such force that they could kill horses.[22] We are not told by Xenophon or Diodorus if any of the light-armed troops on the side of Sparta, Arcadia and Athens in the battle of Mantinea were armed with the sling.[23]

In conclusion, we may say that there are very few references to Greek slingers in our sources for the period 400 - 362 B.C. In the Hellenica of Xenophon we have references to Marganian, Letrinian and Amphidolian slingers in a Peloponnesian army of 394 B.C., and to Acarnanian slingers in 389 B.C. These slingers all came from hilly areas where they most probably used the sling to protect their flocks from predators or for the purpose of hunting. We also learn from Diodorus that there were slingers from the regions around Thessaly present in the Theban force at the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. Xenophon does not mention their presence and it is likely that they are to be included in his terms 'hamippoi pezoi' and 'peltastai' (Xen.Hell.VII.5.23-25). In Hellenica IV.6.7 Xenophon also terms Acarnanian slingers 'peltastai'. It consequently seems very likely that we are missing references to slingers in the works of Xenophon, whom he simply includes in the terms 'peltastai', 'psiloi' or 'gymnetes'.

3 Other Light-armed Infantry in the Period 400 - 362 B.C.

The skirmishing tactics of peltasts reached a peak of efficiency when in 390 B.C. Iphicrates' peltasts inflicted extremely heavy casualties on a Spartan 'mora' near Corinth. We must consider the method of combat of the peltasts, which is recounted in this instance by Xenophon in greater detail

than any other source which we have yet studied: an Athenian force, consisting of both hoplites and peltasts, which was positioned in Corinth, learnt of the approach of a 'mora' of 600 Spartan hoplites. The Spartan force was on its return journey from Sicyon to Lechaeum and it had been arranged that a force of cavalry, which had escorted the Amyclaeans for part of their journey home, would join them later. Callias, the commander of the Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates, the leader of the peltasts, decided to attack the relatively small force of Spartan hoplites on their unprotected side with their highly mobile peltasts, who could operate with impunity since the Spartans at this stage had no support from either cavalry or light-infantry (Hell.IV.5.13). Callias drew up his hoplites not far from Corinth in case the peltasts got into trouble, while Iphicrates' men attacked the Spartans, killing some immediately with their javelins. The Spartan pole-march ordered the hoplites who were in the age groups 20 to 30 to charge their attackers, but these failed to catch up with the swift peltasts. When these Spartans turned back towards their main body, Iphicrates' men hurled javelins at them from the front and ran along their unshielded side, shooting them down with their javelins. Iphicrates' peltasts give the impression of being highly-trained light-armed troops: ὁ δὲ πολέμαρχος ἐκέλευσε τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἥβης ἀποδιῶξαι τοὺς προσκειμένους. ὡς δὲ ἐδίωκον, ἥρουν τε οὐδένα ἐξ ἀκοντίου βολῆς ὁπλῖται ὄντες πελτασταί· καὶ γὰρ ἀναχωρεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε, πρὶν τοὺς ὁπλίτας ὁμοῦ γίγνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεχώρουν ἐσπαρμένοι, ἅτε διώξαντες ὡς τάχους ἕκαστος εἶχεν, ἀναστρέφοντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰφικράτη, οἵ τε ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πάλιν ἠκόντιζον καὶ ἄλλοι ἐκ πλαγίου παραθέοντες εἰς τὰ γυμνά. καὶ εὐθὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διώξει, κατηκόντιζον ἐννέα ἢ δέκα αὐτῶν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο ἐγένετο, πολὺ ἤδη θρασύτερον ἐπέκειντο (Hell.IV.5.14-15).

When the Spartans continued to suffer heavy losses, the polemarch ordered the hoplites in the age groups 20 to 35 to charge,but in falling back from this pursuit even more men were struck down by the peltasts' javelins than on the previous occasion. The Spartan cavalry then arrived but these failed to press hometheir pursuit of the peltasts and the Lacedaemonians continued to suffer losses and began to lose heart (Hell.IV.5.16). The Spartans in their desperation withdrew to a hill near the sea about two miles from Lechaeum. When they were incessantly harassed by Iphicrates' peltasts and saw the Athenian hoplites advancing against them, they broke all formation and some of them dashed to the sea and were probably taken on board their ships, whilst others attached themselves to the cavalry and escaped to Lechaeum. Two hundred and fifty Lacedaemonian hoplites were shot down by the peltasts - 42% of the Spartan force (Hell.IV.5.17). The spectre of their defeat on Sphacteria had returned to haunt the Spartans. The peltasts of Iphicrates, who almost certainly outnumbered the Spartan force, used their skirmishing tactics on fairly level ground with such efficiency that they were able to wipe out almost half of a unit of the finest hoplites in Greece.

The stunning success of Iphicrates' peltasts against the Spartan 'mora' near Corinth has fired the minds of many historians, and consequently many detailed analyses of the true peltasts of this period have been produced.[24] Rather than summarizing their detailed expositions, I should prefer to give a brief thematic study of the role of the light-infantry in the period 400 - 362 B.C. in general:

1 Light-armed troops were used in various types of attacks:

Hellenica: III.2.3 (399 B.C.) Bithynian 'peltastai' and cavalry made an attack on Dercylidas' camp and slaughtered a great number of his troops.

III.4.23 (395 B.C.) Agesilaus' 'peltastai' led an attack at a run against Persian cavalry.

IV.1.21f (395 B.C.) Paphlagonians, who were peltasts, were used in a dawn attack on Pharnabazus' camp.

IV.2.14 (394 B.C.) Corinthian 'gymnetes' attacked a Lacedaemonian force from high ground.

IV.3.22-23 (394 B.C.) Locrian light-armed troops attacked the rear of a Lacedaemonian force from high ground with javelins and other missiles.

IV.5.11-17 (390 B.C.) Iphicrates' peltasts heavily defeated a Spartan 'mora' near Corinth.

IV.6.7-11 (389 B.C.) Acarnanian slingers, javelin-throwers and other missile-troops (all termed 'peltastai' by Xenophon) attacked a Lacedaemonian and Achaean force from high ground. In Xenophon's Agesilaus (II.20) we are informed that the high position of the Acarnanians was taken by Agesilaus' 'psiloi', although we are informed in the Hellenica (IV.6.11) that it was taken by his hoplites. Light-armed troops were more suited than hoplites to carry high positions and it is probable that the words τοῖς ψιλοῖς are a correction by Xenophon.

IV.8.37-38 (389 B.C.) Iphicrates' 'peltastai' (see IV.8.34) were used in an ambush on Anaxibius' Lacedaemonian force on a hillside.

V.1.11-12 (388 B.C.) Chabrias set an ambush with his light-armed missile-troops against a Lacedaemonian force - some at least of these troops were armed with the javelin.

V.4.54 (377 B.C.) Mercenary 'peltastai' in the employment of the Thebans attacked a force of Agesilaus.

VI.2.20 (373 B.C.) Corcyraeans threw javelins from tombstones at a Lacedaemonian force.

VI.4.9 (371 B.C.) 'Peltastai' of the Phocians took part in an attack on the camp-servants of the Boeotians.

VI.5.13 (370 B.C.) Orchomenian javelin-throwers attacked Mantinean troops.

VI.5.26 (370 B.C.) The troops of the Spartan commander Ischolaus were wiped out by missile weapons and close combat with Arcadian troops.

VII .1.19 (369 B.C.) Corinthian 'psiloi' throwing javelins and using other missiles routed a Theban force.

Diodorus XV.85.4-5 (362 B.C.) In the preliminary cavalry battle before the battle of Mantinea, the Athenian cavalry suffered badly due to the attacks of Theban 'psiloi' who were armed as javelin-throwers ('akontistai') and slingers ('sphendonetai') and apparently acted in close conjunction with the cavalry.[25]

2 In the period 400 - 362 B.C. we find light-armed troops being used for the first time in mainland Greece to guard passes and dominate high ground:

V.4.14 (379 B.C.) Athenian 'peltastai' guarded the pass of Eleutherae; note also that Cleombrotus used his peltasts to dominate high ground.

V.4.37 (378 B.C.) Mercenaries, who were most probably peltasts (see Best, Thracian Peltasts, pp.98-99), occupied Mount Cithaeron for Agesilaus.

V.4.59 (379 B.C.) Cleombrotus' 'peltastai' went ahead of his army in an unsuccessful attempt to occupy the heights above the road through Cithaeron.

3. Light-armed troops, as in Thucydides, were used for ravaging expeditions and plundering:[26]

III.2.2 and 2.5 (399 B.C.) Odrysian 'peltastai', acting in conjunction with cavalry, raided the country of the Bithynian Thracians.

III.2.8 and 2.10 (398 B.C.) Thracians, probably mainly light-armed, continually pillaged the Chersonese.

Isocrates, Paneg., IV.144 (398 B.C.) Three thousand 'peltastai' plundered the Mysian plain.

III.4.24 (395 B.C.) After a victory over the Persian cavalry, some Greek 'peltastai' turned to plundering (cf. Xen., Ages, I.32)

IV.4.16 (391 B.C.) Iphicrates' peltasts plundered many districts of Arcadia.

Plutarch, Agesilaus, 31.1-2 (370 B.C.) Many light-armed troops ('psiloi') were included in Epaminondas' force which laid waste Laconian territory.

Light-armed troops and other soldiers were extremely vulnerable to cavalry attack when broken up into ravaging parties.[27]

4 It is in the period 400 - 362 B.C. that we are specifically informed for the first time that Greek light-armed troops were used to defend fortified positions:

III.1.22 (399 B.C.) Missile-troops were positioned on the towers of the city of Gergis.

III.5.23 (395 B.C.) The Lacedaemonians could not recover the bodies of their men who had fallen near the walls of Haliartus because of the missile-troops positioned on the towers.

V.3.5 (381 B.C.) Lacedaemonian cavalry and 'peltastai' were forced to retire from the walls of Olynthus owing to missile fire which was directed against them.

VII.2.7 (369 B.C.) Missile-troops were positioned on the walls and towers of the city of Phlius.

It is strange that no historical writer specifically mentions any Greek missile-troops defending a city's wall before Xenophon (their presence in the defence of Plataea in 429 - 427 B.C. may, however, be inferred from Thucydides' narrative of the escape of a body of Plataeans)[28] - archaeological

information makes it certain that Greek archers were used in the defence of cities. Why then do our sources fail to mention their presence before 399 B.C.? [29]

We can glean more information in the period 400 - 362 B.C. about the position of light-armed troops in relation to hoplites and cavalry, although we hear little of 'peltastai' in pitched battles. Only once do we hear of 'peltastai' being arrayed on either wing of their hoplites - in Hellenica III. 2.16 Dercylidas arranged his 'peltastai' thus, along with his cavalry, for an engagement (which did not come about) with the troops of Pharnabazus in 397 B.C. On several other occasions we hear of 'peltastai' advancing in front of their own hoplites:

Hellinica III.4.23 (395 B.C.) Agesilaus' 'peltastai' lead an attack at a run in front of their own hoplites against some Persian cavalry (cf.Xen.Ages. I.31).

V.4.43 (378 B.C.) 'Peltastai' of Phoebidas operated in front of his hoplites against the Thebans.

VII.4.22 (365 B.C.) Archidamus' 'peltastai' ran in front of his hoplites.

In the period 400 - 362 B.C. we again find 'hamippoi' being utilized battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C.: [30] καὶ μὴν τοὺς ἱππέας οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι ἀντιπαρετάξαντο ὥσπερ ὁπλιτῶν φάλαγγα βάθος ἐφ' ἓξ καὶ ἔρημον πεζῶν ἀμίππων· ὁ δ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας παῦ καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ ἔμβολον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο, καὶ ἐφ' ἁμίππους πεζοὺς συνέταξεν αὐτοῖς, νομίζων τὸ ἱππικὸν ἐπεὶ διακόψειεν, ὅλον τὸ ἀντίπαλον νενικηκὼς ἔσεσθαι· ἁμίππους πεζοὺς συνέταξεν αὐτοῖς, νομίζων τὸ ἱππικὸν ἐπεὶ διακόψειεν, ὅλον τὸ ἀντίπαλον νενικηκὼς ἔσεσθαι·

(Hell.VII.5.23-24). Diodorus in his account of the preliminary cavalry engagement before the main battle of Mantinea makes it plain that the Athenian cavalry suffered badly due to the attacks of the strong and skilful force of

Theban 'psiloi'. It is almost certain that these Theban 'psiloi' are the 'pezoi hamippoi' in the Hellenica of Xenophon; note that they were armed as 'akontistai' and 'sphendonetai' and that they were extremely well trained.[31]

As in the Anabasis, Xenophon tends to regard all light troops, whether they were slingers, archers or 'akontistai', as 'peltastai'. It is often impossible for us to tell if Xenophon means true peltasts equipped with 'peltai' and javelins, or not. In Hellenica IV.6.7 Xenophon terms the Acarnanians who fought with slings 'peltastai'. Xenophon also appears to regard the terms 'peltastai' and 'akontistai' as mutually interchangeable - we find this in Hellenica III.4.16, where the 'peltastai' are obviously the same men as the 'akontistai'.[32] In Hellenica VI.1.9 a messenger is made to say: "Indeed, Thessaly is a very flat land and the tribes round about are subject to her whenever a Tagus is established there; and almost all who live in these neighbouring places are akontistai, so that it is likely that our force would be superior in peltasts (πελταστικῷ)". Here again Xenophon regards 'akontistai' as 'peltastai'.

As we have found before, the Greek specialist light-armed troops generally came from small villages and towns which were situated on high ground (e.g. Acarnanians, Thracians, Marganians, Letrinians, Amphidolians) in areas which lagged behind the rest of Greece both politically and socially. The small village units positioned on high and rough terrain had more need of light-armed missile-troops to defend them than hoplites. In these areas weapons such as the bow, sling and javelin were probably closely associated with pastoralism and hunting.[33] Thessaly, like Thrace, was fragmented into tribal groups and had a vast number of native 'peltastai'.[34] Thessaly was unusual in that it had a larger than usual area of plain and its 'peltastai' must have been used more often on flat, rather than difficult, terrain.[35] Many of these 'peltastai' must certainly have been 'penestai', of whom the Thessalians had a vast number. The 'penestai' were Thessalian serfs, whose

serfdom was much milder than that of the Laconian helots and they seem for the most part to have been fairly stable, although we know of infrequent revolts and trouble with them.[36] The Spartans also in part must have depended on their own subject groups to supplement the light-armed troops of their allies and light-armed mercenaries in their employment (Cretans) - in Hellenica III.3.7, we learn of the Spartans' fear of their own subject groups being armed with swords, spits, axes, hatchets and sickles. In Hellenica VI. 5.29 we also hear about the fear of the Spartans at 6,000 newly enrolled helots being in their ranks when the Thebans invaded their territory in 370 B.C. - but these remained true. Xenophon informs us that members of their subject groups acted as shield-bearers[37] and camp-followers and it seems probable that these were armed in some crude fashion: the camp-followers, attendants and slaves of the Spartan Mnasippus turned back the Corcyraeans from attacking their camp in 373 B.C.[38] It is probable that most hoplite armies, not only Spartan, of this period were followed by camp-attendants and squires whom we may expect to have been lightly-armed for emergencies; these followers could not have stood up to a charge of hoplites, but could have been used to protect any defences round a camp.[39] Although the Spartans used light-armed infantry widely,they obviously still felt, as we found in passages of Herodotus and Thucydides, contempt for light-troops and more especially for troops of this type who gave way under attack.[40]

The types of arms used by light-infantry in this period seem to have been as varied as the types found in Thucydides: slings, bows, javelins and less frequently daggers, swords and crude make-shift weapons.[41] However, now,with the rise of the specialist 'true' peltast, the javelin took on a very important role and tended to supersede all other missile weapons, even the bow.

I have not attempted to examine the dubious reforms of peltast equipment by Iphicrates since much has already been written by modern historians

on this issue and little more can be said.[42] I am uncertain as to what weight we should give to Diodorus' testimony:[43] the lighter shield and cuirass may simply reflect the lightening of the hoplites' equipment due to the more mobile type of warfare but on the other hand Diodorus may genuinely be describing a new heavier type of peltast who represented a half-way house between the normal peltast and the hoplite.[44] Without any new evidence Iphicrates' reforms will continue to baffle historians.

Appendix

Missile-Troops in the Fictional Battle of Thymbrara

Before the fictional battle of Thymbrara in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon, Cyrus expresses his wish to position his 'akontistai' behind his more heavily-armed infantrymen ('thorakophoroi') and his 'toxotai' behind his 'akontistai'.[45] He reasons that his heavy infantry will act as a shield in front of the 'akontistai' and 'toxotai', while they fire their missiles with impunity over the heads of the men positioned in front of them: ἀκοντιστὰς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς θωρακοφόροις τάξω, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς τοὺς τοξότας. τούτους γὰρ πρωτοστάτας τί ἂν τις τάττοι, οἳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσι μηδεμίαν μάχην ἂν ὑπομεῖναι ἐκ χειρός; προβεβλημένοι δὲ τοὺς θωρακοφόρους μενοῦσί τε, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀκοντίζοντες, οἱ δὲ τοξεύοντες, ὑπὲρ τῶν πρόσθεν πάντων λυμανοῦνται τοὺς πολεμίους. ὅ τι δ' ἂν κακουργῇ τις τοὺς ἐναντίους, δῆλον ὅτι παντὶ τούτῳ τοὺς συμμάχους κουφίζει.
(Xen. Cyropaedia, VI.3.24)

In 404 B.C. Thrasybulus' tactic of drawing his light-armed missile-troops up behind his hoplites on the hill of Munychia had been employed to good effect,[46] but it is to be doubted whether missile-troops drawn up behind hoplites on level ground would have enjoyed the same success: as Aeneas Tacticus notes, the danger of hitting their own heavily-armed infantry in the back was great.[47] On level ground the missile-troops positioned behind other infantry could only shoot blindly up into the air and, unless they used heavy arrowheads or sling-shots, the force of their missiles was spent before they fell on the enemy and so they did little damage. Note also that in the first action against Mithridates during the retreat of the Ten Thousand, the Cretan archers had proved ineffective when compelled to shoot from behind their hoplites.[48]

In the fictional battle of Thymbrara it is clear that Xenophon imagined the light-armed troops as being organized in special units under their own officers. Xenophon also regards the 'akontistai' of Cyrop.VI.3.26 as 'peltastai': ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς τ', ἔφη, ὡς παραγγέλλω τάττεσθε, καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ τῶν πελταστῶν ἄρχοντες ἐπὶ τούτοις ὡσαύτως τοὺς λόχους καθίστατε, καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ τῶν τοξοτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πελτασταῖς ὡσαύτως.

CHAPTER NINE

SICILIAN LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY FROM THE SEVENTH CENTURY B.C. TO CIRCA 367 B.C.

We first hear of light-armed infantry in Sicily under the tyrants of the Archaic Period. [1] Our information about these troops however derives from Polyaenus, a particularly untrustworthy source - Polyaenus was a Macedonian rhetorician who lived in the second century A.D. and who compiled a collection of stratagems in eight books which he dedicated to the Emperors Marcus and Verus to aid them in Verus' Parthian War in 162 A.D. Most of the stories may possibly have a grain of truth in them,but this,in most cases,has obviously been embroidered with fantasy. [2] The first tyrant who, according to Polyaenus, used light-armed troops was Panaetius, who set himself up as tyrant in Leontini in the last decade of the seventh century. [3] Panaetius supported the unprivileged section of the Leontine population against the oligarchical factions who controlled the state. [4] Polyaenus in Book V chapter 47 informs us that Panaetius was a military leader (polemarchos) and that he sowed dissension between the poor who constituted the 'pezoi' and the rich who made up the 'hippeis'. In lines 9 to 18 Polyaenus tells how Panaetius seized power with the aid of 600 'peltastai' and the cavalry-men's servants. The details of the coup are suspect, especially the trick by means of which Panaetius disarmed the 'hippeis' and brought about their slaughter. It is highly unlikely that the troops used by Panaetius for his coup were true peltasts as the distinctive Thracian peltast equipment of 'pelte', 'machaira' and 'Zeira' would have been unknown at this date, but they may have been ordinary 'psiloi' armed with javelins; [5] 'akontia' were the main weapon of the true peltasts and this fact may have prompted Polyaenus to call Panaetius' light-armed infantry 'peltastai'. [6] As we shall see, Sicilian 'akontistai' played a large part in the fighting of 415 - 13 B.C.

Polyaenus also informs us that Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas, who probably ruled in the period c. 570 - 550 B.C., was supported in his initial attempt at tyranny by foreign mercenaries and slaves.[7] The slaves acted as crude light-infantry and fought with only stones and two different types of axes (V.1). The details of Phalaris' coup are very dubious, but it just possible that Polyaenus was following a true tradition that Phalaris was helped to power by foreign mercenaries and slaves who were equipped as crude 'psiloi' with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on.[8]

Polyaenus also asserts that a certain Theron, a son of a man named Miltiades, was supported in his attempt to become tyrant of Selinus by slaves who acted as crude light-armed troops.[9] Polyaenus in I.28.2 informs us that after the people of Selinus had been defeated by Carthaginian forces and their fallen had been left unburied on the battle-field, Theron volunteered to cremate the bodies where they lay if given three hundred household slaves equipped for wood cutting.[10] These slaves were equipped with scythes and different types of axes and Theron persuaded them to support him in a coup against his opponents in the city. At evening they returned to Selinus and the guards posted on the walls let them in. Theron then ordered his slaves to kill the guards and slaughter a great many citizens in their sleep; by thus getting rid of his opponents Theron made himself tyrant of Selinus. Yet again this story could possibly have some grain of truth, but many of the details are dubious; note that according to Polyaenus both Phalaris of Acragas and Theron of Selinus made use of slaves armed with very crude weapons in their attempts at tyranny.

We next hear of light-armed troops under the tyrant Gelon who instituted his tyranny at Syracuse in about 485 B.C.[11] In 481 B.C. when a Persian invasion of mainland Greece was imminent, the Greeks sent an

embassy to Gelon at Syracuse to ask for military aid. Herodotus records the military assistance which Gelon was willing to give the Greeks if he was given the supreme command of the Greek forces against the Persians: ἀτιμίης δὲ πρὸς ἐμέων κυρήσας οὐκ ὁμοιώσομαι ὑμῖν, ἀλλ' ἕτοιμός εἰμι βοηθέειν παρεχόμενος δεκκοσίας τε τριήρεας καὶ διομυρίους ὁπλίτας καὶ διακιλίην ἵππον καὶ διακιλίους τοξότας καὶ διακιλίους σφενδονήτας καὶ διακιλίους ἱπποδρόμους ψιλούς· (Herod. VII.158.4)

When the Greeks refused to give him command of either the navy or the army Gelon withdrew his offer. Despite what Herodotus would lead us to believe, it seems unlikely that Gelon would have sent any help to Greece: Xerxes, a far off Persian King, posed no threat to him and he had to fend off imminent Carthaginian military aggression. Gelon, we learn, had large forces of specialist light-armed troops at his command and according to Herodotus was willing to send to the Greeks, in addition to hoplites and cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers and 2,000 light-armed troops who were trained to run with the cavalry.[12] Note that there is no mention of 'akontistai' - these troops, as we shall see, played a large part in the fighting of 415 - 413 B.C. How and Wells are sceptical about the numbers given for the light-armed infantry, but, as we shall again see in the strife around Syracusein 415 - 413 B.C., the Sicilians were especially strong in troops of this arm,and so I think that we should accept as possible the numbers given by Herodotus.[13] Many historians regard the light-armed troops in Gelon's army as specialized mercenaries.[14] Macan further hypothesises that some may have been foreign mercenaries and in particular that the 'sphendonetai' may have been Balearic mercenaries.[15] It is uncertain how many of Gelon's troops were mercenaries but Diodorus informs us that he admitted about 10,000 of them to citizenship.[16] Dunbabin also suggests that some of the 'psiloi' of Gelon

came from the Sicels whom Gelon had conquered; many of the Sicels, who dwelt on high ground and practised pastoralism, would almost certainly have used weapons such as the bow and sling to protect their flocks and for the purpose of hunting.[17]

Let us examine in more detail the various types of light-infantry in Gelon's force: Herodotus informs us that Gelon had a large force of 2,000 archers. In Polyaenus (I.27.2) we again hear of Gelon's 'toxotai' and learn that they had a commander named Pediarchus: if this information is true it would suggest that the archers were a well organized unit. One piece of archaeological evidence proves that archers were in existence on Sicily at this period: a double-edged and barbed type of arrowhead, which can be dated to the beginning of the 5th century B.C., has been found on the island.[18] As we shall see, the Syracusan army of 415 - 3 B.C. included a force of archers.

According to Herodotus Gelon had a force of 2,000 slingers. It is uncertain whether the slingers were Syracusan citizens, Balearic mercenaries or Sicels who dwelt in the hills and practised pastoralism. In the fighting of 415 -13 B.C. slingers formed part of the Syracusan force and later clay sling-shots have been found on Sicily.[19]

Gelon also had 2,000 'hippodromoi psiloi' in his army. There is some doubt as to what type of troops these exactly were. Some commentators regard them as light-cavalry but I prefer to follow How and Wells, Adcock, Burn and Sekunda who interpret them as light-armed infantry who operated interspersed among the cavalry like the Boeotian 'hamippoi'.[20] Adcock thinks that a formation consisting of cavalry interspersed with light-infantry was more suited to skirmishing than a vigorous charge; Caesar used the tactic of intermingling infantry with cavalry at the battle of Pharsalia- he copied this formation from certain tribes in Gaul.[21]

Interestingly this tactic was also used by the Scots Greys and Highlanders at St. Quentin during the First World War.[22] In Thucydides' account of the struggle of 415 - 413 B.C. near Syracuse, we find that 'akontistai', who often acted in conjunction with cavalry, on the Syracusan side, were prominent[23] it seems strange then that Herodotus does not mention them in his account of Gelon's forces: were there really no 'akontistai' in the Syracusan army of 481 B.C. or are we to regard the 'hippodromoi psiloi' as 'akontistai' who operated in close conjunction with the cavalry? In view of the fact that 'akontistai' of the Syracusan side are very often described as acting with cavalry in the narrative of Thucydides, I would be more inclined to believe the second suggestion.

In 480 B.C. Carthage invaded Sicily in strength. Diodorus informs us that Gelon led an army of 50,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry against Hamilcar.[24] Herodotus says nothing about the course of the fighting in which the Syracusan forces were victorious but Diodorus gives a fairly detailed account of the battle of Himera in which the role of the Syracusan cavalry is stressed; he makes no mention of any light-armed troops on the Syracusan side in this account.[25] Polyaenus in I.27.2 tells a story of how Gelon dressed up a certain Pediarchus, the commander of his force of archers, and sent him with a contingent of archers, who had their bows concealed below their special garments, to offer sacrifice in front of their army. When Hamilcar likewise went out to offer sacrifice he was shot down.[26] This tale perhaps reflects some tradition that the Syracusan archers had taken part in some surprise action during the battle of Himera which Herodotus and Diodorus do not record.

It is not until 463 B.C. that we learn of any troops on Sicily acting as light-armed infantry. In the fighting in the years between the death of Gelon in c. 478 B.C. and 463 B.C., Diodorus simply divides armies into

'pezoi' and 'hippeis' and gives no information about how the 'pezoi' were equipped. In 463 B.C., 7,000 foreign mercenaries who had been given citizenship of Syracuse by Gelon revolted from the rest of the city population.[27] We are told by Diodorus in XI.73.3 that the mercenaries lacked their proper equipment and we can assume that at least a proportion of them fought as light-armed troops with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on. It is evident that the foreign mercenaries were more efficient soldiers than the other citizens of Syracuse. After a hard fight the Syracusans finally defeated the foreign mercenaries in 461 B.C. [28]

In 415 B.C. the Athenians sent their famous expeditionary force against Syracuse which was destroyed along with subsequent auxiliary forces in 413 B.C.[29] Diodorus in his narrative of the fighting around Syracuse in the years 415 - 413 B.C. (Diodorus XIII.2.1 - 19.3) never mentions any light-armed troops on the side of the Syracusans and is very vague about the Athenian light-armed forces. The obscurity of Diodorus' account of the fighting is dispelled by our primary source for the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides - we learn from his history that the Syracusans had under their command large forces of 'akontistai' and 'toxotai' (Thuc. VI .20.4) and also bodies of 'sphendonetai' and 'lithoboloi' (Thuc. VI.69.2). Syracusan 'akontistai', usually acting in conjunction with cavalry, were used to combat ravaging troops (Thuc. VII.42.6) and to protect the Syracusan and threaten the Athenian flanks (Thuc. VII.6.2). The Syracusan 'akontistai' and cavalry also seem in Thucydides VI.67.2 to have actually formed a section if not all of a wing. The full potential of the Syracusan 'akontistai' is revealed in their harassment and defeat of the retreating Athenian forces.[30] We furthermore hear in Thucydides of Syracusan 'akontistai' defending successfully a high mountain pass (VII.79.2)-

light-armed troops of mainland Greece were surprisingly never used to defend mountain barriers at this period.[31] In contrast to the frequent references to the Syracusan 'akontistai' in the narrative of Thucydides we hear very little about the Syracusan archers, slingers and stone-throwers. We are informed in only one passage about their mode of operation: in Thucydides VI.69.2 we learn that the Syracusan 'toxotai', 'sphendonetai' and 'lithoboloi' rushed out in front of their phalanx block to engage their Athenian counterparts. In the ensuing battle of the two phalanxes there is no mention of these light-armed troops and we must assume (if we can trust the silence of Thucydides here) that they withdrew from the main fighting - did they move to protect the wings of their own phalanx or retire to its rear and throw missiles over the heads of their own hoplites? It seems very likely that a proportion of the Syracusan light troops who fought in the conflict of 415 - 13 B.C. were mercenaries, although Thucydides does not give us any direct information to this effect.[32] We also hear of other Sicilian city states which possessed forces of light troops in the narrative of Thucydides of the Sicilian expedition: Selinus and Camarina had forces of 'toxotai' and 'akontistai' and Gela also had 'akontistai' (Thuc. VI.20.4; VII.33.1).

In 409 B.C. Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, collected together a large army and landed in Sicily.[33] He first marched against the city of Selinus and used a great many archers and slingers in his attack on the walls.[34] The defenders of Selinus in turn shot missiles (βέλη) at the Carthaginians; [35] Nicias specifically pointed out that the city of Selinus, in addition to having large forces of cavalry and hoplites, possessed a very large number of 'toxotai' and 'akontistai'[36]- in the desperate struggle to defend their walls the 'toxotai' and 'akontistai' of the Selinuntians must have taken a large part. After heavy fighting the Carthaginians took Selinus and butchered any of the inhabitants whom they caught. [37]

In 406 B.C. the new Carthaginian general Himilcon raised a huge army and invaded Sicily.[38] After taking Acragas, Himilcon turned his attention to attacking the city of Gela.[39] Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse raised a large force of 30,000 'pezoi' and 1,000 'hippeis' from among the Syracusan citizens, mercenaries and allies to help the Geloans.[40] We learn that Dionysius used his hitherto unmentioned 'psiloi' to engage the Carthaginians in skirmishing attacks and to prevent them foraging over the countryside.[41] We do not know what proportion of Dionysius' troops were light-armed - Snodgrass hypothesises that the majority of his 'pezoi' were probably light-armed.[42] We learn that in an attack on the Carthaginian camp near Gela, Dionysius placed archers on board his ships which sailed just off the shore, and that these gave covering fire to the Italiot Greeks who were fleeing on land.[43] Dionysius then decided to evacuate the citizens of Gela during the night and left 2,000 of his 'psiloi' in the city to make the Carthaginians believe that the inhabitants were still there and also probably to guard his own retreat; the 'psiloi' later joined up with the main Syracusan force.[44] In Diodorus XIII.113.2 we learn that some of Dionysius' mercenaries were armed with javelins. In 404 B.C. Dionysius concluded a peace treaty with the Carthaginians.

We next hear of light-armed troops in 403 B.C. when Dionysius managed to break into the city of Enna with his force of 'psiloi' - as we have seen in mainland Greece, light-infantry were ideally suited for surprise attacks.[45] In 401 B.C. Dionysius again prepared for war with Carthage. For the purpose of building fortifications on Epipolae he gathered 60,000 able-bodied peasants from the countryside around Syracuse - Dionysius clearly had the manpower potential to form a vast force of light-armed troops.[46] We also learn that Dionysius' workmen invented new types of missiles (bele) and mass produced 140,000 daggers, helmets and shields; 'thorakes' were also produced for certain prestigious troops [47] - note that

the majority of troops did not wear breastplates and there is no reference to any Syracusan troops wearing greaves; it would appear that few Syracusans at this period were equipped with a full panoply of hoplite arms.[48]

In 398 - 7 B.C. Dionysius moved against the cities in the far west of Sicily which were held under Carthaginian dominion. In the fighting which followed, in which the Syracusans and their allies were victorious over the Carthaginians, there is only one reference to Syracusan light-armed troops - we are informed that in preparation for a sea battle Dionysius had placed on his ships a great number of 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai'.[49] The Carthaginian Himilcon was held back by the great barrage of missiles which these troops shot. Although Dionysius led many campaigns between 396 B.C. and his death in 368/7 B.C. we are unfortunately not told by Diodorus of the presence of any light-armed troops in the tyrant's forces. Diodorus, where he enumerates Dionysius' troops, simply divides them into 'pezoi' and 'hippeis' as we have found before. Diodorus, or his source for this period, does not seem to have been interested in breaking down the Sicilian 'pezoi' into classes of hoplites and light-armed, as Thucydides and Xenophon were, and consequently references to previously unmentioned light-armed troops, which have been included in the term 'pezoi', crop up unexpectedly in Diodorus' narrative of Dionysius' campaigns.[50] Finley is also unimpressed by Diodorus' set piece battles which seem almost conventional, his very high figures for the Sicilian and Carthaginian forces and his chronology which is weak in places.[51] Diodorus as a military historian certainly has his drawbacks - our clearest picture of Sicilian light-armed troops and their modes of combat comes from Thucydides' narrative of the Syracusan expedition of 415 - 413 B.C.

Archaeological evidence can add very little to our knowledge of missile-troops in Sicily in the Classical Period: only a small number of

arrowheads dating to this period have been published and the clay slingshots which have been excavated are of a late date.[52]

In conclusion, I would say that there were several differences in the armies and equipment of the Sicilian Greeks and the Greeks of mainland Greece; note that Gelon had under his command a wide range of light-armed troops which formed almost one quarter of the infantry force which, according to Herodotus, he was willing to send to the mainland Greeks. In our historical sources we are not told of any Greek mainland city state at this period of Classical Greek history which could put into the field as many specialist light-armed troops as 2,000 slingers, 2,000 archers and 2,000 'hippodromoi psiloi'. Macan comments on Herodotus VII.158.4 : "The large proportion of light-armed troops and cavalry in the forces of Gelon show how far his military establishment was ahead of the Greeks of old Hellas",[53] and How and Wells comment "The large proportion of light-armed troops and cavalry shows the higher level of military science in the West. The Sicilian tyrants, making large use of mercenaries, can put in the field a well-equipped force of all arms, not the mere hoplite - phalanx and ill-armed light troops mustered to meet Xerxes".[54]

The Sicilian tyrants also used a vast number of foreign mercenaries - a practice which was not carried out on the same large scale in mainland Greece during the Classical Period.[55] Some at least of these mercenaries were equipped with light arms (Diodorus XIII.113.2 and cf. XI.73.3).

There were also differences in equipment: it is very probable that many Syracusan hoplites were not equipped with a full panoply such as was worn by most mainland Greek hoplites in the fifth century; in 401 B.C. we learn that only certain prestigious troops wore 'thorakes' and greaves do not appear amongst the pieces of equipment made by armourers at all. The fact that the Sicilian panoply was lighter than that of mainland Greece was probably due in part to expense but we should also bear in mind the

possibility that it was due to the more mobile warfare which the Sicilians practised with their large forces of light-armed troops and cavalry.

CHAPTER TEN

THE GREEKS' VIEWS OF LIGHT-ARMED INFANTRY

The view that missile-troops, and in particular archers, were cowardly is a recurrent motif in Ancient Greek literature. It would, however, be too simplistic to state that our sources uniformly hold this view: there is an acceptance of the bow as a weapon by several of the heroes in the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer.[1] In the Iliad, the warrior aristocrats Teucer, Odysseus, Meriones, Philoctetes, Paris, Pandarus, Helenus and Dolon are all described on certain occasions as being equipped with the bow and in the majority of these passages there is no hint that it was regarded as a disreputable weapon. There is, however, an echo of the belief that the bow was the weapon of a coward in Λ 385 - 390:

τοξότα, λωβητήρ, κέραι ἀγλαέ, παρθενοπῖπα,
εἰ μὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης,
οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσμῃσι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί·
νῦν δέ μ' ἐπιγράψας τανσὸν ποδὸς εὔχεαι αὔτως.
οὐκ ἀλέγω, ὡς εἴ με γυνὴ βάλοι ἢ πάις ἄφρων·
κωφὸν γὰρ βέλος ἀνδρὸς ἀνάλκιδος οὐτιδανοῖο.

The rebuke 'ἰόμωροι' (Δ 242; Ξ 479) also seems to derive from the use of the bow and arrow. Strabo also records what he thought was an early agreement between Chalcis and Eretria not to use missile weapons in a war over the Lelantine Plain (Strabo 10.1.12); it may be that Archilochus in frag.3 (West) refers to the same agreement which apparently limited or banned the use of the sling or bow. At any rate the 'Lords of Euboea' mentioned in Archilochus frag.3, felt that the battle would be decided by aristocratic sword-fighting and not by the use of missile weapons.[2]

In the Classical Period the view that archers and other light-troops and their tactics were cowardly is expressed in several of our historical sources. In contrast, the hoplite and the phalanx formation appear to be accepted as the heroic type of soldier and battle formation; hoplites could run away or

fight badly but there is no notion that the 'hoplite' or his tactics were considered cowardly - rather, as in the poetry of Tyrtaeus, th was the main combatant in any battle, whilst lighter troops ma

The view that missile-troops and their skirmishing tactic cowardly appears to have been most strongly felt in Sparta,whe obviously a great emphasis placed on hand-to-hand combat with sword.[3] Dieneces, a Spartan hoplite at Thermopylae in 480 B. sneeringly to a fellow from Trachis who informed him that the the Persian arrows would obscure the sun - "All the better", exclaimed Dieneces, "We'll be able to come to grips with those Persians in the shade" (Herod.VII.226.1-2). Callicrates, a Spartan hoplite who was shot in the side by a Persian arrow while sitting in his rank at Plataea in 479 B.C., is reported to have said: οὐ μέλει μοι τοῦτο ὅτι ἀποθανοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπὸ γύννιδος τοξότου καὶ μηδὲν πράξας. (Plut.Mor. 234 E(46)).

spoke sneeringly a
τε μὴ εἶναι
καί τινος ἐ
ξυμμάχων δ
αἰχμαλώτων
ἀπεκρίνατο α
τὸν οἰστόν, εἰ
ὅτι ὁ ἐντυγχ
(Thuc.IV.40.2)

During the Peloponnesian War the Spartans obviously held the same opinion of light-armed troops: a Spartan captured on Sphacteria in 425 B.C. spoke sneeringly about the Athenian's use of missile weapons: ἀπιστοῦντές τε μὴ εἶναι τοὺς παραδόντας τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ὁμοίους, καί τινος ἐρομένου ποτὲ ὕστερον τῶν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμάχων δι' ἀχθηδόνα ἕνα τῶν ἐκ τῆς νήσου αἰχμαλώτων εἰ οἱ τεθνεῶτες αὐτῶν καλοὶ κ'ἀγαθοί, ἀπεκρίνατο αὐτῷ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιον εἶναι τὸν ἄτρακτον, λέγων τὸν οἰστόν, εἰ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς διεγίγνωσκε, δήλωσιν ποιούμενος ὅτι ὁ ἐντυγχάνων τοῖς τε λίθοις καὶ τοξεύμασι διεφθείρετο. (Thuc.IV.40.2).

In 423 B.C., when Brasidas was attacked by Lyncestians and Illyrians, he addressed his troops and in his speech poured scorn on their enemies' skirmishing tactics: "In action they are not the men they look, if their

opponents will only stand their ground; for they have no regular order, and therefore are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they are hard pressed; to fly and to advance being alike honourable, no imputation can be thrown on their courage. When every man is his own master in battle he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance is a better plan than to meet us hand-to-hand; else why do they shout instead of fighting? You may easily see that all the terrors with which you have invested them are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of sight and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good order, keeping your ranks, you will sooner arrive at a place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valour". (Jowett: Thuc.IV.126.5-6).

In 395 B.C., when Agesilaus was forced to give up his expedition against the Persian king because of the anti-Spartan coalition of Thebes, Corinth and Argos which was funded by Persian money, Plutarch asserts that he exclaimed that the Persian king was driving him out of Asia with a myriad of mere 'toxotai' - a bitter pun on the cowardly archers and the Persian coins which had a depiction of a 'toxotes' stamped on them (Plut. Agesilaus,15.6).[4]

The view that light-troops were cowardly is not expressed by any Athenian figure in the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon. Thucydides himself does, however, speak slightingly about the skirmishing tactics of light-armed troops: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρων οἵ τε λιθοβόλοι καὶ σφενδονῆται καὶ τοξόται προυμάχοντο καὶ τροπὰς οἵας εἰκὸς ψιλοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐποίουν·

(Thuc.VI.69.2).

It seems probable also that Thucydides wished his readers to think that the death of Cleon at Amphipolis was shameful, not only because he was killed (or so he asserts) while fleeing, but also because he fell at the hands of a peltast (Thuc.V.10.9).

The Athenian tragedians Sophocles and Euripides also show an awareness in their works of the idea that missile-troops were cowardly. In the Ajax of Sophocles, Menelaus shows contempt for the bow which Teucer defends:

MEN: ὁ τοξότης ἔοικεν οὐ σμικρὸν φρονεῖν.
TEY: οὐ γὰρ βάναυσον τὴν τέχνην ἐκτησάμην.
MEN: μέγ' ἄν τι κομπάσειας, ἀσπίδ' εἰ λάβοις.
TEY: κἂν ψιλὸς ἀρκέσαιμι σοί γ' ὡπλισμένῳ. (Ajax 1120-1123).

MEN: It seems that the archer has no small opinion of himself.
TEU: What of it? It is no shameful skill which I have.
MEN: If you were given a shield, would you boast!
TEU: Even lightly-armed, I would be a match for you heavily-armed.

It is clear from line 1122 that Menelaus upbraids Teucer because he, as an archer, was not willing to meet his foe in a close fight - the 'aspis' was a hoplite shield, of no use to an archer who needed one hand to hold the bow and the other to draw it. Teucer, however, maintains resolutely that archery is a special skill and is by no means to be despised; it is almost as if Teucer is speaking out against a commonly held conception of archery - he claims his 'techne' is not 'banausos'; 'banausos' not only denotes that the art is unworthy but also that it is servile - Plato in Laws 644A associates 'banausos' with 'aneleutheros'; the bow may have become closely connected in the minds of many Athenians with barbarian mercenary or servile archers (cf. Aristophanes, Lysistrata 436).

Euripides in his Heracles sets out two contrasting views, through the speeches of Lycus (157 - 164) and Amphitryon (188 - 203), about the acceptability of archery on the battlefield and reflects, I think, the confused attitude of the Greeks to 'toxotai', who failed to conform to the Tyrtaean criteria of hoplite valour, yet nevertheless were extremely effective in inflicting casualties with impunity.

Lycus speaks scathingly of Heracles' use of the bow, the weapon of a coward; steadfastness in hoplite ranks during hand-to-hand combat is the only true criterion for valour:

ὁ δ' ἔσχε δόξαν οὐδὲν ὢν εὐψυχίας
θηρῶν ἐν αἰχμῇ, τἄλλα δ' οὐδὲν ἄλκιμος,
ὃς οὔποτ' ἀσπίδ' ἔσχε πρὸς λαιᾷ χερὶ
οὐδ' ἦλθε λόγχης ἐγγὺς ἀλλὰ τόξ' ἔχων,
κάκιστον ὅπλον, τῇ φυγῇ πρόχειρος ἦν.
ἀνδρὸς δ' ἔλεγχος οὐχὶ τόξ' εὐψυχίας
ἀλλ' ὃς μένων βλέπει τε κἀντιδέρκεται
δορὸς ταχεῖαν ἄλοκα τάξιν ἐμβεβώς.

"Heracles who, although of no account, got the reputation of being brave by fighting with mere wild beasts, but in other types of fighting he was of no prowess - he never carried a shield on his left arm, nor came within spear-thrust, but equipped with the bow, that most cowardly weapon, he was very well prepared to run away. The bow is no test of a man's braveness, but the brave man is he who stands firm once he has taken up his station and looks with unflinching eye upon the enemy spear which cuts a swift furrow in his ranks".

Amphitryon understands well the ethos of light-armed combat: the archer's success was actually due to his non-conformance to the very principles which Lycus sets out in lines 161 - 164:

τὸ πάνσοφον δ' εὕρημα, τοξήρη σαγήν,
μέμφῃ· κλύων νυν τἀπ' ἐμοῦ σοφὸς γενοῦ.
ἀνὴρ ὁπλίτης δοῦλός ἐστι τῶν ὅπλων
θραύσας τε λόγχην οὐκ ἔχει τῷ σώματι
θάνατον ἀμῦναι, μίαν ἔχων ἀλκὴν μόνον·
καὶ τοῖσι συνταχθεῖσιν οὖσι μὴ ἀγαθοῖς
αὐτὸς τέθνηκε δειλίᾳ τῇ τῶν πέλας.
ὅσοι δὲ τόξοις χεῖρ' ἔχουσιν εὔστοχον,
ἓν μὲν τὸ λῷστον, μυρίους οἰστοὺς ἀφεὶς
ἄλλοις τὸ σῶμα ῥύεται μὴ κατθανεῖν,
ἑκὰς δ' ἀφεστὼς πολεμίους ἀμύνεται
τυφλοῖς ὁρῶντας οὐτάσας τοξεύμασιν
τὸ σῶμά τ' οὐ δίδωσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις,
ἐν εὐφυλάκτῳ δ' ἐστί. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μάχῃ
σοφὸν μάλιστα, δρῶντα πολεμίους κακῶς
σῴζειν τὸ σῶμα, μὴ 'κ τύχης ὡρμισμένον.

(188 - 203).

"You find fault with that all-wise invention, the bow! Listen then to my words and be made wise. A man in heavy armour is a slave of his heavy equipment: if he breaks his spear-shaft, he has no means of saving his body from death since this weapon is his only means of defence. And when those who are drawn up beside him are cowardly, he loses his life through the cowardice of these very men who are positioned by him. But the man who possesses a hand skilled in archery has one great advantage: when he has shot a myriad of arrows he can still defend himself with yet more arrows so that he does not die; he also stands at a distance and wards off the enemy, wounding those of them who watch with unseen shafts and he does not expose his own body to the enemy, but is on good guard. Now this is supremely wise in battle - to do the enemy most harm, but to preserve one's own person, independent of the luck inherent in a close battle."

The Heracles was written in about 420 B.C. and it seems as if Amphitryon speaks with the insight which the expeditions to Aetolia (426 B.C.) and Sphacteria (425 B.C.) had given Euripides. Euripides in the Iphigenia in Tauris (produced in 413 or 412 B.C.) shows a knowledge of the effectiveness of light-armed tactics, although no comment is made in the play about the acceptability of these tactics.[5] Some herdsmen attacked the nobles Orestes and Pylades when Orestes, tormented by the Furies, started to slaughter their flocks. A great number of herdsmen gathered together and, although they thought that they were no match for the two nobles in a normal fight, they pelted them with missiles and struck them when one of them fell. The second noble tried to shield his fallen comrade who cried out that they were going to die (l. 301f). One of the herdsmen narrates the defeat and capture of the two nobles:

..... ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ ἀνίεμεν πέτροις
βάλλοντες, ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν προσκείμενοι.
οὗ δὴ τὸ δεινὸν παρακέλευσμ' ἠκούσαμεν·
Πυλάδη, θανούμεθ', ἀλλ' ὅπως θανούμεθα
κάλλιστ'· ἔπου μοι, φάσγανον σπάσας χερί.
ὡς δ' εἴδομεν δίπαλτα πολεμίων ξίφη,
φυγῇ λεπαίας ἐξεπίμπλαμεν νάπας.
ἀλλ', εἰ φύγοι τις, ἄτεροι προσκείμενοι
ἔβαλλον αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ τούσδ' ὠσαίατο,
αὖθις τὸ νῦν ὑπεῖκον ἤρασσεν πέτροις.
ἀλλ' ἦν ἄπιστον· μυρίων γὰρ ἐκ χερῶν
οὐδεὶς τὰ τῆς θεοῦ θύματ' εὐτύχει βαλών.
μόλις δέ νιν τόλμῃ μὲν οὐ χειρούμεθα,
κύκλῳ δὲ περιβαλόντες ἐξεκόψαμεν
πέτροισι χειρῶν φάσγαν', ἐς δὲ γῆν γόνυ
καμάτῳ καθεῖσαν.

(318 - 333)

In lines 324 - 333 Euripides shows that he understood how effective skirmishing tactics could be and also the mode of utilizing light troops: the first task of the light-armed was to wear down an enemy's resistance by attacking, and retreating when attacked in turn. When the enemy became exhausted, the light-armed troops could use their numerical superiority to surround their more heavily-armed foes and to pin them down; they could then bombard them from a safe distance with missile weapons until they either received their surrender or killed them. There are many echoes in this piece of the plight of the small force of Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria in 425 B.C. and I do not think that it is too fanciful to suggest that Euripides had this in mind when he composed this piece - the victory on Sphacteria was looked on as one of Athens' greatest and the Athenians were very proud of it: a victory monument, which consisted in part of captured Spartan arms, was set up in the agora. [6]

The Athenian tragedians Sophocles (through the mouth of Menelaus in the Ajax) and Euripides (through the mouth of Lycus in the Heracles) then show an awareness of the belief that archers were cowardly. Euripides, through the contrasting speech of Amphitryon in the Heracles, examines the effectiveness of the archer's tactics and in the Iphigenia in Tauris, the effectiveness of light-armed skirmishing tactics in general.

Aristophanes' comical caricatures of barbarous Thracian peltasts and Scythian archers were primarily designed to raise a laugh and it is difficult to judge if there was any real hatred in them. The Thracian peltast in the agora is depicted as being rapacious and ferocious (Lysistrata 563 - 4), whilst the Odomanti in the Acharnians (155f), who are willing to peltasticize all Boeotia to the ground, are depicted as being lustful. [7] There appears to be no real trace of hatred in these comical portrayals, but Aristophanes could not have foreseen the frightening cruelty of these troops, which

shocked even Thucydides, when he was writing the Acharnians.[8] Aristophanes likewise pokes fun at the Scythian archer-police at Athens: he portrays them as violent, lustful, drunken and of having set gazes and speaking in comically broken Greek.[9] There are hints in Aristophanes that these Scythian archers were in reality unpopular (Acharnians 703 - 707; frag. 411) - they were obviously regarded as totally barbarous and servile. After one of the oligarchs employed barbarian archers in his bodyguard in 411 B.C., the Athenians must have looked on such archers with great suspicion.[10]

I think we should bear in mind the possiblity that a deeply ingrained feeling that missile-troops were cowardly, mirrored in certain pieces of Homer, the Greek historians and the tragedians Sophocles and Euripides, may have been a factor in the failure of certain states to develop large units of native light-armed infantry. Our historical sources show that this psychological factor was strongest in Sparta and the fact that Sparta, according to Thucydides, instituted a force of archers late (not till after Sparta's disastrous defeat on Sphacteria - the fact that we hear nothing about its actions in the Peloponnesian War indicates that it was either disbanded or of negligible effectiveness) would seem to confirm that this factor was of some importance. It may also help to account for why our primary sources for the Classical Period apparently fail to mention the presence of light-armed troops on certain occasions when we have archaeological, inscriptional or literary evidence which would strongly suggest that they were present. They, or their sources, seem primarily to have been interested in the actions of hoplites in battles and they often seem only to mention the presence of light-armed infantry in passing.

C O N C L U S I O N

As we have seen in chapter one, there is quite a large amount of evidence for the use of archers by the Greeks at an early date: in the Iliad, Homer frequently refers to archers from among both the nobles and the masses. Aristocratic archers appear to have acted on their own or with single infantrymen who protected them with their shields. Homer would also lead us to believe that a section of the 'laoi' were organized into bodies of archers. Only once does the poet make clear how he visualized the archers from among the masses being used in open battle: he describes the Locrian archers operating, in conjunction with a body of slingers, by shooting their missiles over the heads of the more conventionally armed infantry, who were positioned in front of them. There is,furthermore,archaeological evidence which proves that Greek archers were in existence throughout the Mycenaean Period and the Dark Age. The evidence for the late Mycenaean Period and early Dark Age is, however, fairly small.

There is a limited amount of evidence for the use of slingers by the Greeks at an early date: the sling is mentioned in two passages of the Iliad and in the Locrian passage, as mentioned above, Homer clearly visualizes slingers operating in a body, in conjunction with archers, by firing their sling-shots over the heads of their own conventionally armed infantrymen. The depiction of slingers on the silver Siege Rhyton and the finds of sling-shots dating to the Mycenaean Period indicate that the Mycenaeans had knowledge

of, and probably made use of, slingers. Sling-shots found in Thessaly and on the island of Thera prove that slingers were in existence in these two places in the Dark Age.

In the Archaic Period, as we have seen in chapter two, there is evidence that a wide range of Greek light-armed troops were in existence: the early Greek elegiac and lyric poets Archilochus, Tyrtaeus, Callinus and Alcaeus all refer to various types of light-infantry or their weapons. Archilochus of Paros (fl.c. 680 - 640 B.C.) shows a knowledge of a wide range of missile-troops: archers, slingers, javelin-throwers and probably also stone-throwers. Tyrtaeus of Sparta (fl. mid. 7th century B.C.) refers to "gymnetes" and "gymnomachoi", who were apparently armed with javelins and stones; Tyrtaeus describes these troops running forward in front of their ranks in one fragment, and crouching down behind shields (it is uncertain whether the shields are their own or belong to the hoplites) near to troops armed with full panoplies in another. Callinus of Ephesus (fl. mid. 7th century B.C.) refers to javelin-throwers and Alcaeus of Lesbos (fl. c. 600 - 570 B.C.) shows some knowledge of missile-troops when he describes the greaves as "a protection against the powerful missile."

Archaeological evidence confirms the fact that missile-troops played a part in the battles of the Archaic Period: we possess seventh century depictions of archers, stone-throwers, javelin-throwers and one portrayal of a slinger. Finds of Archaic Greek arrowheads have occurred at Perachora,

Olympia, Sparta and on the islands of Delos, Chios, Samos, Rhodes (at Lindos), Crete and Cyprus and at some of the Greek settlements on the coast of Asia Minor, in Cyrene Egypt and Syria.

In the later Archaic Period, as we have seen in chapter three, several Greek tyrants employed bodies of specialist light-armed troops - from ceramic evidence we can tell that the Peisistratids at Athens used bodies of Scythian archers and peltasts, who were probably Thracians, from c. 540/530 - 510 B.C. Polycrates of Samos (c. 538 - 522 B.C.) also had a large force of 1,000 archers. In chapter nine we have also seen that the early tyrants of Sicily, if we are to believe the assertions of Polyaenus, had the support of light-armed troops: Panaetius of Leontini, Phalaris of Acragas and Theron of Selinus. We also learn in the narrative of Herodotus that Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, had large specialist bodies of light-armed infantry in 481 B.C.; these consisted of archers, slingers and light-armed men who ran with the cavalry.

In the early Classical Period, which has been studied in chapter four, we have evidence that light-armed troops were used by some Greek states in the Persian Wars of 499 - 479 B.C. Archaeological evidence proves that the Ionian Greek defenders of Paphos had the support of archers in 498 or 497 B.C., and possibly also had a number of slingers and javelin-throwers. Pausanias asserts that the slaves of the Athenians fought on their masters' behalf at Marathon in 490 B.C. and, if they did so, it seems most probable that

they fought as crude light-infantry. During Xerxes' invasion of 480 - 479 B.C. we learn that Athens had a force of archers and that these probably fought at both Salamis and Plataea; we know very little about these archers, but must bear in mind the possibility that they were Cretan mercenaries. Archaeological evidence would suggest that Greek archers also took part in the defence of Olynthus and we may possibly infer from the tale of Timoxenus in Herodotus that the Potidaeans had archers who helped in the defence of their city. We also learn that many Greek states in 480 - 479 B.C. had forces of non-specialist light-armed infantry: the Spartan helots who fell at Thermopylae and Plataea (described as 'psiloi' by Herodotus) must have acted as crudely-armed skirmishers. Athenian stone-throwers took part in the attack on the island of Psyttaleia after the battle of Salamis. The collective Greek forces at the battle of Plataea comprised of roughly the same numbers of 'psiloi' as hoplites (Herodotus further informs us that each Spartan citizen was accompanied by seven light-armed helots). The total force of Greek light-armed troops present at the battle of Plataea, if we are to believe Herodotus, amounted to a vast 71,300 men (adding the 1,800 Thespians to the 69,500). Herodotus unfortunately tells us nothing about the role of these troops in the battle or about their organization, arms or equipment.

The next period we have studied is that of the Peloponnesian War (431 - 404 B.C.). As we have seen in chapter four, a very wide range of light-armed infantry are mentioned by

Thucydides in his narrative of the Peloponnesian War: specialist archers, slingers, peltasts, javelin-throwers and crude stone-throwers and troops armed with a variety of make-shift weapons.

In the Thucydidean narrative we hear on most occasions of archers used by the Athenians: in addition to native Athenian archers, Athens also made use of Cretan and barbarian archers, who were most probably mercenaries. We also hear occasionally of other Greek states using archers: the forces of the Corinthians, Megarians, Ambraciots and Corcyraeans in 432 B.C. contained archers (there is also evidence ((inscription)) that there were archers in a Corinthian force in 412 - 411 B.C. and that some of the Corcyraeans in the democratic faction were armed with the bow in 425 B.C. ((Thuc. IV.48.2))); in 429 B.C. some of the allies of Sparta were armed with the bow and in 425 B.C., after the crushing defeat on Sphacteria, Sparta herself raised a corps of archers; in 428 B.C. the Lesbians sent for a force of mercenary Scythian archers; in 420 B.C. there were archers present in the forces of the Argive Confederacy; in 415 B.C. the Syracusans and Camarinaeans possessed forces of archers and in 413 B.C. there were probably archers present in a Theban force which went to the aid of Mycalessus.

Other specialist troops such as 'sphendonetai', 'peltastai' and 'akontistai' generally came from the more backward parts of central and northern Greece and also from Asia Minor (mercenary slingers also came from the island of Rhodes).

We find in Thucydides that upland peoples such as the Acarnanians, Amphilochians, Aetolians, Ozolian Locrians, Thracians and many of the Thessalian tribes,had developed large bodies of specialist slingers and javelin-throwers who could fight well on high and rugged terrain; these areas had lagged behind the rest of Greece in social, political and military affairs and we find that the inhabitants of these districts lived in scattered hill-top settlements and most probably used missile weapons for hunting and protecting their flocks, as well as for warfare. Greek city states, who lacked their own specialized bodies of light-armed troops, or who wished to supplement their own, recruited mercenaries from these regions.

As for the cruder types of light-armed troops who were armed with make-shift weapons or simply threw stones, we learn on several occasions in the Thucydidean narrative that the Athenians mobilized large forces of these troops (which probably consisted of poorer citizens who could not afford 'hopla' and also metics) and also the Spartans, who could draw upon their subject populations to fight for them in campaigns which were fought some distance from Sparta (helots, who were almost certainly light-armed, were present at Decelea; helots were also equipped as hoplites for certain distant campaigns).

Light-armed troops are mentioned very rarely by our sources Xenophon and Diodorus in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War (411 - 404 B.C.); these two sources are much less detailed than Thucydides and appear to be very

selective about the details which they give about armies and military actions. After the end of the Peloponnesian War, as we have seen in chapter six, a wide range of Athenian light-armed troops took part in the fighting against the Thirty and the Spartans (404 - 403 B.C.): archers, slingers, stone-throwers, 'psiloi akontistai' and 'peltophoroi.'

In the army of the Ten Thousand in 401 - 400 B.C., as we have seen in chapter seven, there were contingents of Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers and also large forces of other light-armed infantry, who were mainly javelin-throwers: we learn in the Anabasis of Xenophon that there were peltasts from Olynthus, Thessaly and Thrace.

In the period 400 - 362 B.C., as we have seen in chapter eight, missile-troops, and in particular peltasts, took part in a large number of actions and we may infer from this that their importance in these years had increased. We are specifically informed by our sources on only a small number of occasions that archers and slingers took part in the fighting of this period: in 395 B.C. and 388 B.C. Cretan archers were included in Spartan forces and in 394 B.C. archers were present in a Corinthian force. In 394 B.C. slingers from the mountain villages of Margania, Letrinia and Amphidolia, which were situated in the Pisatis (probably in the hills around Pyrgos), were included in a Spartan force. In 389 B.C. Acarnanian slingers attacked with some success a Peloponnesian force on hilly terrain. Slingers from the regions around Thessaly, according to Diodorus, were present on the Theban side in the

battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. We must allow for Xenophon's more summary treatment of military affairs than Thucydides, since he covers the period c. 401 - 362 B.C. in only five books (Hellenica, III - VII); it also seems probable that archers and slingers are included on some occasions by Xenophon in the term 'peltastai', which he often uses to denote all types of light-armed infantry rather than simply true peltasts.

On Sicily, as we have seen in chapter nine, light-armed troops, many of whom must have been mercenaries, played an important part in warfare from the seventh to the fourth centuries B.C.: crude light-armed infantry, if we are to believe the assertions of Polyaenus, were used by several Sicilian tyrants of the late seventh and the sixth centuries B.C. - Panaetius of Leontini, Phalaris of Acragas and Theron of Selinus. In 481 B.C. Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, possessed large forces of specialist light-armed infantry: archers, slingers and 'light-armed infantry who ran with the cavalry'. Syracusan 'akontistai' figure prominently in the Thucydidean account of the conflict of 415 - 413 B.C. - there were also forces of archers, slingers and stone-throwers present in the Syracusan army of these years. The cities of Selinus and Camarina also had forces of archers and javelin-throwers and Gela had javelin-throwers in the fighting of 415 - 413 B.C. In the last decade of the fifth century B.C. Sicilian 'toxotai', 'akontistai' and 'psiloi' took part in the desperate fighting against the Carthaginians. In 398 - 397 B.C., when Dionysius

moved against the cities in the west of Sicily which were held under Carthaginian dominion, we are informed that the tyrant had forces of 'toxotai' and 'sphendonetai' in his army. Our sources are silent about the presence of light-armed infantry on Sicily from 396 B.C. to the death of Dionysius in 368/7 B.C.

What roles did light-armed troops perform in Greek warfare and where were they positioned on the battlefield? In the fifth century B.C., we learn from the narratives of Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus that Greek light-armed infantry were used in various types of operations: simple attacks, ravaging attacks, attacks on fortified positions, ambushes and pursuits. It is not until the period c. 400 - 362 B.C. that we are specifically informed by any historical source that light-infantry from mainland Greece were used to guard mountain-passes and to defend fortified positions. Light-armed troops, especially when they were used in large numbers, on rough terrain, and in conjunction with cavalry, often proved successful against hoplites in the roles mentioned above; this was mainly because they could use their speed of foot and missile weapons to skirmish with hoplites from a distance and thus were never compelled to fight at close quarters with their heavily-armed adversaries.

Where were light-armed troops positioned on a battlefield? Homer in the Iliad, possibly based on an Assyrian model, informs us that the Locrian archers and slingers were positioned behind their more conventionally armed infantry and shot their

missiles over the heads of these troops at the enemy. Tyrtaeus in one fragment informs us that the 'gymnetes' stood close to their hoplites, and in another that the 'gymnomachoi' ran forward (presumably in front of the ranks of their own hoplites). Although Herodotus tells us that there was a vast force of Greek 'psiloi' present at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C., he incredibly gives us no information about where this force was positioned on the battlefield. In the period of the Peloponnesian War we are given very little information by our sources, Thucydides, Xenophon and Diodorus, about the positioning of light-armed infantry in various battles. However, we are informed that at the battle of Delium in 424 B.C., the Boeotian 'psiloi' and peltasts were posted on the extremities of their phalanx, presumably to protect it from flank attack or to initiate attacks on the flanks of their enemies. In several instances light-armed troops would appear to have actually formed a wing (e.g. Amphilochian 'akontistai' formed part of a wing at the battle of Olpae; in Thuc. VI. 67.2, Syracusan 'akontistai', along with cavalry, formed a wing). We also learn in Thucydides VI. 69.2 of Athenian and Syracusan light-armed infantry skirmishing in front of their own phalanx blocks.

In the events of 404 - 403 B.C. which led to the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants from Athens, we are informed on two occasions of the position of light-armed troops: in 404 B.C. for the battle with the troops of the Thirty on the hill of Munychia, Thrasybulus placed his light-infantry behind his

hoplites so that they could shoot their missiles over the heads of their own men at the enemy - since the missile-troops were shooting downhill and had a clear view of the enemy, the danger of hitting their own men in the back must have been negligible. In 403 B.C., in the battle with the Spartans, Thrasybulus' light-armed troops skirmished in front of their own hoplites.

In the Anabasis of Xenophon we learn that light-armed soldiers in the army of the Ten Thousand (401 - 400 B.C.) were on several occasions drawn up on the extremities of their own wings, either to counter or to take part in a flank attack. We are also informed that light-infantry were on other occasions positioned in front of a phalanx to soften up the front ranks of the enemy with their missile fire. Only in Anabasis IV.8.15 do we find light-armed troops both positioned on the wings and skirmishing in front of the centre of their own phalanx.

In the period c. 400 - 362 B.C. we only once learn of light-armed troops arrayed on either wing of a phalanx for combat. However, we do learn that light-armed infantry advanced in front of their own hoplites on several occasions.

The spectacular victories of light-armed troops over hoplites in Aetolia in 426 B.C., on Sphacteria in 425 B.C., on Sicily in 413 B.C. and near Corinth in 390 B.C., demonstrate the frightening military potential of these troops.[1] There is much evidence that the mainland Greek city states were beginning to realize fully the potential of these troops, and in particular the javelin-thrower, in the final period which we

have studied (c. 400 - 362 B.C.): javelin-throwers and other missile-troops are frequently mentioned in this period and we have seen that the equipment of the hoplite became lighter from around the end of the fifth century, probably because the hoplite had to fulfill new roles of acting with, and combating, peltasts, whose role in warfare was increasing dramatically. In view of the fact that light-armed troops had shown themselves to be very successful against hoplites in the campaigns in Aetolia, and on Sphacteria and Sicily, it is very surprising that Athens and Sparta did not raise large forces of regularly equipped and organized native light-armed troops in the Peloponnesian war (with the exception of the Athenians' archer force, some of whom we know were Athenian citizens). Athens did raise forces of crude light-infantry for certain short campaigns from among her citizens and Sparta also armed helots as skirmishers for some campaigns, but no attempt was made by these and other Greek city states to form fully-trained bodies of light-armed troops. Obviously there was a fear in Sparta of giving weapons and training to the subject groups since this would have presented a danger to Sparta's internal security, but there were other factors which acted together in Sparta and other Greek city states which prevented the formation of large bands of organized native light-infantry. I have argued in chapter ten that the psychological factor may have been very important: there appears to have been a widely held belief, which is reflected in many ancient sources, that missile-troops and their tactics were cowardly - this factor appears to

have been felt most strongly in Sparta. Social and political factors also tended to exert a conservative influence in many city states: there was no mechanism for the 'polis' to train and equip large bands of light-armed infantry and the hoplites, who paid for their arms and dominated the military, social and political affairs of most city states, wanted to preserve their privileged position and consequently must have opposed change. The crude light-armed troops, who were probably thought to have little military value, could not have increased their social standing or political rights due to good service on the battlefield. The economic factor was also probably important: to obtain a fully trained force of light-armed troops, much time would have to be spent training the poorer members of a city state in the use of missile weapons and in skirmishing tactics - the time needed to train an archer or a slinger would almost certainly have been greater than the time needed to train a hoplite. The majority of the men who would have been needed to serve as light-armed troops were needed to cultivate crops and guard flocks and it is perhaps to be doubted whether they had enough free time to undertake a full training in the use of missile weapons and light-armed tactics. All the above factors must have interacted to various degrees in the different Greek city states to impede the development of large units of fully-trained native light-infantry.

This lack of interest in light-armed troops is patently evident in our historical sources of the Classical Period, who in many cases omit to mention the presence of these troops when

we have inscriptional or archaeological evidence which would strongly suggest that they were present or seem to be very selective about the information which they give us about these troops: we have archaeological evidence which would suggest that Greek archers took part in the defence of Old Smyrna in c. 600 B.C., Paphos in 498 - 497 B.C. and Olynthus in 480 - 479 B.C., yet their presence is not mentioned by Herodotus; we have inscriptional evidence which would suggest that there were peltasts sent, in the Athenian forces, to Melos in 416 B.C. and to Sicily (inscription dated to 416/415 B.C.) and that there were archers in a Corinthian force at Thasos in 412/411 B.C., yet these troops are not mentioned by Thucydides or any other source. As mentioned above, all our historical sources of the Classical Period appear to be very selective about the occasions when they refer (or do not refer!) to light-armed troops and about the information which they give us about their actions: perhaps the most startling omissions by our sources are of the actions of the vast force of 'psiloi' at the battle of Plataea in 479 B.C. and of the large forces of Athenian light-armed infantry in the final retreat from Syracuse in 413 B.C. Such omissions are baffling and we should not conclude by them, as some modern commentators have done, that light-armed troops, especially specialized troops such as archers, slingers and peltasts, were of negligible military value - the victories of light-armed infantry over hoplites in Aetolia in 426 B.C., on Sphacteria in 425 B.C., on Sicily in 413 B.C. and near Corinth in 390 B.C.,disprove conclusively this fallacy. Whatever the

reasons for the omissions by our sources, we may be sure that light-armed troops took part in many battles in which their presence is not specified and that their role in warfare throughout our period of study may have been greater than we will ever realize.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Depictions of archers equipped with shields are extremely rare - some Cretan archers may have carried the light 'peltai', see Nick Secunda, The Ancient Greeks: Armies of Classical Greece in the 5th and 4th Centuries B.C. (1986), p. 50 (top Plate) and p. 45.

2. The two primary articles on the range of ancient bows are: W. McLeod, The Range of the Ancient Bow, Phoenix 19 (1965) pp. 1-14; McLeod, The Range of the Ancient Bow: Addenda, Phoenix 26(1972) p. 78f, esp. pp. 78-80. McLeod in Phoenix 19(1965) p.1, n.1 gives a full bibliography of other works which attempt to define the range of ancient bows.

3. On the range of the long-bow see McLeod, Phoenix 19 (1965) p.14, n.37.

4. McLeod, Phoenix 19(1965) p.14, n.38.

5. McLeod, Phoenix 19(1965) p.14.

6. McLeod, Phoenix 19(1965) p.8.

7. Luigi Moretti, Iscrizioni agonistiche greche (1953), pp. 82-84, no.32.

8. Inscription: Hesperia 1956, p. 370f.; rate of pay: G. T. Griffith, Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World (1935), pp. 294-5 and cf Aristophanes, Peace 1210f (prob. exaggeration in high figures).

9. see e.g. the Calydonian Boar Hunt on the François Vase - J. Boardman, Athenian Black Figure Vases (1974), Pls. 46 and 46.3; also CVA Italy 42 (Firenze - Museo Nazionale V) III - H; Tav. 7.2; D.C. Kurtz, Athenian White Lekythoi: Patterns and Painters (1975), pl. 67.4b; CVA France I (Louvre I) III DC; Pl. 3.5.

10. On Ancient Greek javelins in general see: E.N. Gardiner, Throwing the Javelin, JHS 37(1907) pp. 249-273; H. A. Harris, Greek Javelin Throwing, GR 10(1963) pp.26-36; A. M. Snodgrass, Early Greek Armour and Weapons (1964), pp. 136-139, 198-199.

11. Pindar, Pythian 1.84; Nemean 7.105.

12. cf Plut., Aristeides, XIV.5 and Thuc. II.4.3.

13. Anacharsis, 32.

14. Clear depictions of the throwing-thong:
CVA Belgium 2; III 1c; Pl. 14a, c, d.
Canada 1 (Toronto 1); Pl. 27.17-18.
Copenhagen 3 (Musée Nat.) III I; Pl. 128.1a.
France 1 (Louvre 1) III DC; Pl.3.5.
France 8 (Louvre) III IC; Pl. 28.5.
Italy 1 (Villa Giulia 1) III ce; Tav. 1.1 and 2.1. and see also Tav. 1.3, 1.4 and 4.3.
Italy 20 (Napoli - Museo Nazionale) III HC; Tav. 18.3.
Italy 42 (Firenze - Museo Naz.5) III H; Tav. 7.2.
USA 4 (Robinson Collection) III He; Pl.22, 1c.
see also Kutz, op.cit., Pl. 67.4b;
AA 4 (1889) p. 93, no. 8; JHS 27 (1907), Pl.17.

15. In Plutarch, Philopoemen, 6 we learn that the unfortunate Philopoemen was struck through both legs with a javelin which had a thong attached and that the javelin could not be pulled out of the wound because the fastening of the thong hampered this.

16. see Gardiner, op.cit., p.251.

17. see Gardiner, op.cit., p.251 and Harris, op.cit., p.30.

18. Method of hurling the javelin in war, hunting and athletics:

CVA France 17 (Louvre) III He; Pl.105.7.
Deutschland 11 (Schloss Fasanerie); Taf. 11.1.
Netherlands 3 (Leiden 1) III H; Pl.45.
Switzerland 4 (Basel 1) III H; Taf. 49.1.
USA 17 (Toledo Museum of Art 1); Pl.17.2.
Belgique 2; III 1c; Pl.14 a,c,d.
Canada 1 (Toronto 1); Pl.27.17-18.
Copenhagen 3; III 1; Pl.128.1a.
France 8 (Louvre) III 1c; Pl.28.5.
France 9 (Louvre) III 1c; Pl.40.11.
France 10 (Paris-Bib. Nat.); Pl. 96.2.
France 28 (Louvre 19) III 1b; Pls. 41.2;50.1;63.2 and .3.
Deutschland 13 (Mannheim 1); Taf. 22.1 and .2; 32.1.
Deutschland 21 (Berlin 2); Taf. 55.1,55.4-5.
Deutschland 29 (Gotha 2); Taf. 52.1.
Deutschland 30 (Frankfurt 2); Taf.68.
G.B. 1 (BMI); III He; Pl.2.2b.
G.B. 4 (BM3) III 1c; Pl.3.2b.
G.B. 6 (Cambridge: Fitz. Mus.) III I; Pl.26.1a.
G.B. 14 (Oxford 3); Pl. 29.2.
G.B. 15 (Castle Ashby); Pl.30.2.
Italy 2 (Villa Giulia 2) III 1c; Tav. 36.3.
Italy 10 (Rodi: Museo Dello Spedale dei Cavalieri); III 1c; Tav. 7.5.
Italy 13 (Fienze) III I; Tav. 38.4; 40.4; 41.3.
Italy 25 (Mus. Naz. Tarquiniense 1) III I; Tav. 7.1.
Italy 26 (Mus. Naz. Tarquin. 2) III I; Tav. 15.1.
Italy 28 (Mus. Civico 1) III I; Tav. 17.5.
Italy 37 (Ferrara - Mus. Naz.1); Tav. 14.2.
Italy 39 (Roma - Musei Capitolini 2) III I; Tav. 29.1.
Italy 50 (Palermo - Collezione Mormino 1) III Y; Tav. 3.1 and .2.
Italy 57 (Fiesole - Collezione Costantini 1) Tav. 45.2. and 45.4.
Netherlands 1 (Mus. Scheurleer - La Haye) III 1b; Pl.6.5.
Poland 1 (Goluchów, Mus. Czartoryski); Pl.17.1a and .1c.
Switzerland (Basel 2) III I; Taf. 14.1 and 15.1 and 15.2.
USA (Toledo Mus. of Art 1); Pl. 52.2.

For the underarm throw see Gardiner, op.cit, p.252; Harris, op.cit, pp.35-36; see also CVA GB 2 (British Museum 2) III He; Pl.8.1a.;CVA Copenhagen 8; III H; Pl. 325 1e = J. Best, Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare (1969), Pl.1b.

19. Range of javelin: W. Rüstow and H. Köchly, Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens von der ältesten Zeit bis auf Pyrrhos (1852) p.131; Gardiner, op.cit, p.258; F. E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (1957), p.15; Harris, op.cit, pp.30-34; Julius Jüthner, Die athletischen Leibesübungen der Griechen, 2.1. (S.B. Wien (Phil-Hist. Kl) 249.2, 1968), p. 343, n.116.

20. I have found only one depiction of a Greek slinger who wears some hoplite equipment: BSA 12 (1905), Pl.9 = R. M. Dawkins et. al., The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, (JHS Supp. 5-1929), Pls. 15 and 16.

Works which contain general information about the sling: G. Fougères, 'funda' and 'glans' in Daremberg - Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines (1896); M. Korfmann, The Sling as a Weapon, Scientific American, 229, 4 (October 1973) pp. 35-42; C. Foss, A Bullet of Tissaphernes, JHS 95(1975) p.25f.

21. On the composition of the sling and method of firing see Korfmann, pp. 37-38; Foss, p.26.

22. Korfmann, p.40.

23. Ability to kill horses: Korfmann, p.40. On the method of extracting sling-bullets from the human body see Celsus, De Medicina, VII 5.4.

24. On this question see: Xen. Anab. III.4.16; Strabo 8.3.33; Dio Cass. 49.26.2; Hypotheseis (Excerpta Polyaeni, ed. Joannes Melber, Leipzig 1887) 11.2; Strategemata Ambrosiana (ed. J. - A. de Foucault, 1949) 11.2. See also Fougères, op.cit, 'funda', p. 1366; Korfmann, p. 37; Foss, p.27; E.C. Echols, The Ancient Slinger, CW 43 (1949-50) pp. 227-230, 245.

25. Epitoma Rei Militaris, 2.23.

26. Guiness Book of Records: "The greatest distance recorded for a sling-shot is 1,147 ft. 4 in. (349.7 m) using a 34 in. (86 cm) long sling and a 7½ oz (212 g) stone".

27. Korfmann, p. 40 (Balearic slingers).

28. see 1 Samuel 17.15; 17.20; 17.35. I follow the views of Korfmann, p.35; Foss, p.25 and Y. Yaddin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (1963), pp. 9-10.

29. CVA France 14 (Louvre) III Fa; Pl.1.1.

30. Heracles with sling: CVA G B 4 (BM 3) III He; Pl.29.1a and .1c. = Boardman, ABFV, Fig 95 = Sir J. Beazley, Attic Black-figure Vase-painters (1956) 134,28 (cf Pygmies using slings against cranes: Boardman, ABFV, Fig 46.8 = Beazley, ABV, 76.1).

Sling being used to scare birds in Mediaeval England: R. J. Unstead, Looking at History (1975) 2 (The Middle Ages) p.19 (bottom Pl.). An Etruscan slinger is portrayed shooting at birds in the Tomb of Hunting and Fishing at Tarquinii (Late 6th Century B.C.).

31. See e.g. Foss, p.25.

32. Stone-throwers:
CVA France 9 (Louvre) III 1c; Pl.41.2 and 41.3.
Deutschland 7 (Karlsruhe); Taf. 26.5.
Greece 1 (NMA 1) III J b; Pl.1.2.
Italy 23 (Capua-Museo Campano 2) III I; Tav. 8.1.
Italy 28 (Adria-Museo Civico 1) III I; Tav. 33.1.
New Zealand 1; Pl.27.4.
Yougoslavia 4 (Sarajevo); Pl.44.1 and 44.2.
Kurtz, op.cit., Pl.14.1; N. Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, pp. 20-21 with p.16 (Pl.), p.21(Pl.), p.23 (Pl.).

33. McLeod, Phoenix 26 (1972) p. 79, n.3.

34. γυμνὸν is used to describe land made bare in the Works and Days, 391-392.

35. There are however several occasions on which Xen. does make a distinction between 'peltastai' and other light-armed troops: Anab. I.2.3; V.2.12 and 2.16.

CHAPTER ONE

1. There are many discussions of these questions. See e.g.: P.A.L. Greenhalgh, Early Greek Warfare (1973), pp, 156-172; J.V. Luce, Homer and the Heroic Age (1975), passim; M.M. Willcock, The Iliad of Homer (Books 1-12 [1978]. pp. IX-X; G.S. Kirk, The Iliad: A Commentary (Vol.I: books 1-4 [1985]), pp. 1-16.

2. A.M. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece (1971), pp. 5-7. Other commentators on date of Homer: H.L. Lorimer, Homer and the Monuments (1950), p.462f; G.S. Kirk, The Songs of Homer (1960), pp. 282 - 287; V.R. d'A. Desborough, The Greek Dark Ages (1972), p. 321; Greenhalgh, EGW, p. 157; Luce, Homer and the Heroic Age, p. 10; N. Coldstream, Geometric Greece (1977), pp. 341 and 343; C.A. Trypanis, The Homeric Epics (1977), p.52f; Willcock, The Iliad (Books 1-12), p. IX; J. Griffin, Homer (1980), p. 6; O. Murray, Early Greece (1980), p. 22; Kirk, The Iliad (Vol. 1) pp. 1-10.

3. see p. 39 and n. 117 on Troy VIIa.

4. The names of some men, places and things, some of which may have been transmitted to the Homeric Epics from the Mycenaean Period, are also survivals of the Mycenaean World.

5. see pp. 33-34.

6. see p. 16.

7. On bow types see appendix 2, p. 44f.

   Lorimer, HM, p. 289.

8. Hunting: Δ 105-108; Λ 475-480; cf Odyssey ι 156-158. Shooting Contests: Ψ 859f; cf Odyssey φ (passim) - nobles try to string bow in order to use it in contest.

9. Arrow and other missile wounds: Δ 126f; Δ 213-219 (Machaon the physician is skilled in the mode of extracting barbed arrowheads); E95-100; E110 and 112; E206-208; E393f (mythical); E795; Θ 81-86 (Paris hits horse on head with arrow); Θ 270; Θ 274-276; Θ 297-298; Θ 302-303; Θ 312-313; Θ 514; Λ 191 and Λ 206; Λ 375-378; Λ 397-8 (pain involved in drawing out arrow); Λ 583-584; Λ 662; Λ 664; Λ 810; Λ 812-13 (painful and deep arrow-wound); Λ 829; Λ 843-848; M387-389; N650-652; N660-3 and 671-2; O451; Π 27; Π 511; Φ 113 (allusion to the arrow-wound which is going to kill Achilles).

10. cf Celsus, De Medicina, VII.5.2 and see W. Leaf, The Iliad, Vol. 1 (1886), p. 152 on διαμπερές.

11. see Δ 213-219; E111-113; Λ 397-8; Λ 514-515; Λ 829; Λ 843-848.

12. Λ 375-378 (arrow passes through foot); N650-652 (arrow passes right through the body of Harpalion).

    Fatal wounds: Θ 270; Θ 274-276 (Teucer shoots dead Orsilochus, Ormenus, Ophelestes, Daetor, Chromius, Lycophontes, Amopaon, Melanippus); Θ 302-303 (Gorgythion hit in chest by Teucer); Θ 312-315 (Teucer hits Archeptolemus in chest); N650-652 (Meriones kills Harpalion with an arrow through the bladder); N660-3 and 671-2 (Paris kills Euchenor by hitting him on the head with an arrow); O451 (Paris kills Cleitus with an arrow which hit him in the back of the neck); Φ 113; cf. Odyssey χ 15-16; χ 82-83; χ 116-118.

13. On the Homeric bow, see appendix 2, p. 44f.

14. See Yadin, AWBL, p. 196 = H. Carter and P.E. Newbery, The Tomb of Thoutmosis IV (1904), Pls. 10-11; for the type of scaled-armour which the arrow penetrates see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 196-7; cf also N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Ken-Amun at Thebes Vol. 1 (1930), Pls. 16 and 24; R.F.S. Starr, Nuzi (1937) Vol. 1, pp. 475-80; Vol. 2, Pl. 126B; H.E. Winlock, The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes (1947), p. 163, Pl. 29.

15. Syria 20 (1939), pp. 280 - 281 (find dates to the first half of the fourteenth century B.C.)

16. B.M. exhibits WA 132144; WA132143. Lachish was captured by the Assyrians in c.701 B.C.

17. see Athens, Acropolis Museum inv. no. 291 = G. Ahlberg, Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art, Acta Instituti Atheniensis Regni Sueciae, Series in 4°, XVI (1971), Fig. 4 (an archer is pierced in the abdomen with an arrow and by the position of his legs it seems that he is about to fall backwards. Another figure has been wounded in the shin by an arrow).

CVA France 18 (Louvre II) III Hb; Pl. 5.7 = Ahlberg, Fig.6 (on this krater are depicted two men who have been hit in the head by arrows).

CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pl. 8.6 = Ahlberg, Fig.10 (a figure transfixed by an arrow in the stomach is in the process of falling; he tries to pull the arrow out with on of his hands).

E. Kunze, Bruchstücke attischer Grabkratere, Neue Beiträge zur klassichen Altertumswissenschaft (1954), p. 55, Pl. 9.2 = Ahlberg, Fig. 12 (a warrior who has been hit in the head and stomach by two arrows is depicted; he tries to pull the arrow from his stomach and is in the act of falling to the ground).

CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat. 2) IIIH; Pl. 73.4b = Ahlberg, Fig. 33 (an archer shoots man in head at point blank range).

CVA France 18 (Louvre II) IIIHb; Pl. 7.7 = Ahlberg, Fig. 34 (a warrior who has been hit in the waist by an arrow is depicted in this fragment. The warrior on the left who is drawing his sword has been shot through the neck by an arrow).

18. cf also Ⓗ 279 (archery of Teucer destroying the Trojan ranks).

19 cf also Iliad 0707-712: a special occasion on which the ordinary Achaeans and Trojans will not fight with the bow; and see Odyssey Θ 215-220 - many of Odysseus' companions were aiming the bow at the enemy.

20. cf K428.

21. Teucer: Ⓗ 266f; Ⓗ 279; Ⓗ 300f; Ⓗ 323-4f; M350; M363; M372; M388; M400-1; N313-4; 0422f; 0458f; Ψ 862f (archery competition).

Odysseus: K260 (quiver); K500; K514 - cf Odyssey Θ215-220; K262; Φ passim; Χ15-16; Χ 82-83; Χ116-118.

Meriones: N650-652; Ψ 871 (archery competition).

Philoctetes: B718, cf Odyssey Θ 219.

Paris: Γ17; Z322; Ⓟ 81f, Λ 370f; Λ 507; N660-3; N671-2.

Pandarus: B827; Δ105f; E97; E171f; E245.

Dolon: K333; K459.

Helenus: N583f

Most of these figures must not simply be regarded as archers since they were equipped with more conventional heroic arms in other passages: on the Greek side,Teucer fights at the beginning of Z as a spearman and we find him in M in this role. In N177 he fights with his spear,and when the string of his bow breaks,he yet again uses his spear (Ο482). Odysseus in the Iliad primarily fights with spear and sword (Δ496; Z31; K261; Λ421f; Λ 447f; Λ 661). Meriones in the early part of book N fights primarily as a spearman,and,after using the bow,he again reverts to using the spear (ττ342f). Only Philoctetes is regarded as foremostly an archer.

On the Trojan side Paris is most often portrayed as an archer, although he is equipped on several occasions with spear and sword. In Γ 18 he has a sword and throwing-spears as well as a bow (cf Sophocles, Trachiniae, 511-12); he puts on conventional equipment for his duel with Menelaus (see Γ137, Γ 254, Γ 334, Γ 338, Γ 346), and,when recalled to the fight by Hector,he goes out at the end of Z in normal heroic equipment. In 0341-2 he also makes a spear-cast. Pandarus also is portrayed primarily as an archer,

although he is described as fighting with the spear when he is killed by Diomedes (E238; E280). On the night expedition Dolon takes with him not only a bow but also a spear (K335) and Helenus in N576-7 fights with a large Thracian sword.

22. Bow: see above.

Spear: A290; B530; Γ 18 (2 spears); Γ 78; Γ 137; Γ 179; Γ 254; Γ 338; Γ 345; Γ 346; Γ 355; Γ 380; Γ 431; Γ 436; Δ 87; Δ 461; Δ 479; Δ 490; Δ 496; Δ 525; Δ 527; E15; E17; E40; E45; E50f; E73; E145; E280; E293; E297; E336; E495 (2 spears); E533; E563; E568; E579; E611; E658f; E856; Z11; Z31; Z32; Z44; Z65; Z104 (2 spears); Z126; Z319-20; H11; H14; H54; H213; H244f; H249f; Θ 111; Θ 258; Θ 495; K24; K31; K76 (2 spears); K135; K178; K335; K369f; Λ 43; Λ 95; Λ 108; Λ 144; Λ 180; Λ 212 (2 spears); Λ 233; Λ 251; Λ 253f; Λ 265; Λ 321; Λ 338; Λ 349; Λ 361; Λ 421f; Λ 435; Λ 447f; Λ 503; Λ 541; Λ 577; Λ 821; M117; M128; M183; M189; M250; M298 (2 spears); M394; M405; M464-5 (2 spears); N159; N177-8; N183-4; N190; N241; N296; N370; N397; N403; N438f; N442f; N503; N506-7 and N509; N516; N529; N542; N557; N562; N574; N583; N605; N609; N646; Ξ 12; Ξ 38; Ξ 402-403; Ξ 443; Ξ 449; Ξ 451; Ξ 461; Ξ 476; Ξ 494; 0282; 0420; 0429; 0482; 0523; 0528; 0542; 0573; 0650; Ππψ139 (2 spears) Ττ 284; Ττ 309; Τ 315; Τ 317-8; Τ 319; Τ 323; Τ 335-6; Τ 346; Τ 399; Τ 404 and 406; Τ 466; Τ 597; Τ 608; Τ 699; Τ 734; Τ 801; Τ 806; Τ 820; P7f; P44; P296; P304; P344; P347; P516; P523 and 525; P574; P598; P604; P607; P608f; T387; Υ 163; Υ 267f; Υ 273; Υ 386f; Υ 423; Υ 446f; Φ 17; Φ 67; Φ 139; Φ 145 (2 spears); Φ 582; Χ 243f; Ψ 821.

Sword: A190f; B45; Γ 272; Γ 344; Γ 361; E81; E146; E584; H273; Θ 88; K256; K261; K484f; Λ 29; Λ 109; Λ 146; Λ 240; Λ 265; Λ 541; M190; N576-7; N610; Ξ 496; Τ 115; Τ 135; Τ 332-333; Τ 337; Τ 473; T252-253; T372; Υ 284; Υ 459f; Φ 19f; Φ 116; Φ 173; Χ 306f.

Stone: H264; H268-70; Θ 321; Λ 265; Λ 541; M380; M445; Ξ 409f; Ττ 411; Ττ 578; Ττ 734; Υ 285.

23. Leaf, The Iliad 2, p.46 on N721; cf Lorimer, HM, P.301.

24. Lion Hunt Dagger, see n. 97 (ch.1).

Terra-cotta group, see Lorimer, HM, Pl. 22.3.

25. see Yadin, AWBL, p. 430 (top) = Korfmann, p. 36 (top Pl.); BM, Room XIV, panels 8-11.

26. cf Xen.Hell.II.4.15-16; Cyrop, VI.3.24.

27. see P. Christison, Bannockburn (1960), p. 25.

28. see King, Sennacherib and the Ionians, JHS 30 (1910) p. 327f; on the Greek king of Philistia see E. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterums (1937-9) Vol.3, pp. 42-43; cf W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part 4 (1985), pp.32-33. On the influences of Near Eastern battle scenes on fighting scenes on Attic Late Geometric pottery see Ahlberg, pp. 71-106.

29. Likewise with Achaeans could have defended the rampart around their ships with a force of archers; see M387-389, where Teucer shoots Glaucus from the Achaean rampart.

30. K. Müller, Tiryns Vol.3 (first published 1930; reprint by Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut Athen 1976), pp. 49 and 66-67.

31. Egyptian archers defending fortified positions, see:

1 Painting from Beni-hasan, Tomb 17 (Tomb of Khety) - c.1900 B.C.: P.E. Newbery, Beni Hasan 2 (1894), Pl. 15 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 158-9.

2 Relief in the Ramesseum at Thebes (c.1290-1223 B.C.): W. Wreszinski, Atlas zur altägyptischen Kulturgeschichte 2 (1935), Taf.108 = J.B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament (1954), no. 333 = Yadin, AWBL, p.229.

3 Relief from Luxor (c.1290-1223 B.C.): Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf.84 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 238 (top).

Archers on Assyrian reliefs defending fortified positions:

1 Reliefs from the Palace of Ashurnasirpal II (883-859 B.C.) at Nimrud -

i. A.H. Layard, The Monuments of Nineveh 1 (1849), Pl. 13 = E.A.W. Budge, Assyrian Sculptures in the British Museum (1914), Pl. 18.1 = H. Frankfort, The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Orient (1954), Pl. 84 = R.D. Barnett, Assyrian Palace Reliefs and their Influence on the Sculptures of Babylonia and Persia (1960), Pl. 25 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 383, no. 6.13.

ii. Layard 1, Pl. 19 = Budge, Pl. 24.1 = C.J. Gadd, The Stones of Assyria (1936) p. 135 (14B).

iii. Layard 1, Pl. 17 = Budge, Pl. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A).

iv. Layard 1, Pl. 33 = Budge, Pl. 13.2 = Gadd, p. 133 (6A).

2 Reliefs from the Palace of Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 B.C.) at Nimrud:

i. E. Unger, Die Reliefs Tiglatpilesars III aus Nimrud (1917), Nr.13, Taf.4 = Gadd, p. 155, Pl. 12 = R.D. Barnett and M. Falkner, The Sculptures of Tiglath-Pilser III (1962), Pls. 31-34 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 408.

ii. Layard 1, Pl. 66 = Gadd, p. 158 = Barnett and Falkner, Pls. 90-91.

3 Reliefs from the Palace of Sargon II (721-705 B.C.) at Khorsabad: see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 416 - 417; Hall V, Gate S, 10 (418) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 418.
Hall V, Gate O, 6 (423) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 423.
Hall XIV, 12 (422) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 422.

4 Reliefs from the Palace of Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.) at Nineveh: Yadin, AWBL, p. 431 (top).

5 Reliefs from the S.W. Palace of Ashurbanipal (c.668-630 B.C.) at Nineveh:
Gadd, p.196 = Yadin, AWBL, p.448.
Gadd, p.204 = Yadin, AWBL, p.449.

32. cf Z433-439; likewise the Trojans could have used their archers to try to clear the rampart around the Greek ships of defenders with their fire; on the arrowheads see pp. 39-40.

33. see p. 39. Archers in Egyptian and Assyrian works of art attacking fortified positions:

1 Tomb of Khety (c.1900 B.C.): Newberry, Pl. 15 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 158-9.

2 Ramesseum (c.1290 - 1223 B.C.): Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf.108 = Yadin, AWBL, pp.228-9.

3 Relief from Medinet Habu, 20th Dynasty, Rameses III (1192-1160 B.C.): H.H. Nelson, Medinet Habu 2 (1932), Pls. 88-89 = Wreszinski, Atlas 2, Taf.151 = Pritchard, ANEP, p.116, no.344 = Yadin, AWBL, p.346.

4 Ashurnasirpal II (883-859 B.C.), Nimrud:

i. Layard 1, Pl. 20 = Budge, Pl. 23.2 = Gadd, p. 135 (13B).

ii. Layard 1, Pl. 19 = Budge, Pl. 24.1 = Gadd, p. 135 (14B).

iii. Layard 1, Pl. 17 = Budge, Pl. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A).

iv. Layard 1, Pl. 33 = Budge, Pl. 13.2 = Gadd, p. 133 (6A).

5 Bronze doors of the gates of Shalmaneser III (858-824 B.C.) from Balawat:
L.W. King, Bronze Reliefs from the Gates of Shalmaneser King of Assyria (1915), Pls. 20 and 50 = Barnett, Pls. 140 and 162 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 400-401.

6 Tiglath-pilser III (745-727 B.C.), Nimrud: see eg. Unger, Nr. 13, Taf. 4 = Gadd, p. 155, Pl. 12 = Barnett, Pl. 38 = Barnett and Falkner, Pls. 31-34.

7 Sargon II (721-705 B.C.), Khorsabad: Yadin, AWBL, pp. 416-19, 422.

8 Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.), Nineveh: Yadin, AWBL, pp. 430-31 (top).

9 Ashurbanipal (c.668-630 B.C.), Nineveh: Gadd, p. 204, Pl. 36 = Yadin, AWBL, p. 499.

34. There is one exception:in Θ 81-86 Paris wounds a horse in the head with an arrow.

35. On Mycenaean works of art and Late Geometric pottery, archers also stand very close to their targets - this stylistic feature is probably due to a lack of space on the pot or other artistic object and to a desire to portray a coherent group of figures.

36. see pp. 22-23.

37. wounds: see n.9. (ch.1).

38. Leaf, The Iliad 1, p. 271 on Θ 267.

39. 1 Ashurnasirpal II (883-859 B.C.), Nimrud:

i. Layard 1, Pl. 20 = Budge, Pl. 23.2 = Gadd, p. 135 (13B) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.

ii. Layard 1, Pl. 19 = Budge, Pl. 24.1 = Gadd, p. 135 (14B) = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 388-9.

iii. Layard 1, Pl. 18 = Budge. Pl. 18.2 = Gadd, p. 136 (15B) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.

iv. Layard 1, Pl. 17 = Budge, Pl. 13.1 = Gadd, p. 133 (5A) = Yadin, AWBL, p. 388.

2 Tiglath-pileser III (745-727 B.C.), Nimrud:

i. Layard 1, Pl. 63 = Unger, Nr. 8,11, Taf. 2 = Smith, Assyrian Sculptures in the British Museum, From Shalmaneser III to Sennacherib (1938), Pls. 13-14 = Barnett, Pls. 40-41 = Barnett and Falkner, Pls. 37 - 40 = Yadin, AWBL, p.407.

ii. Yadin, AWBL, p. 409 = BM no. 118902.

3 Sargon II (721-705 B.C.), Khorsabad: see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 416 - 19, 422, 424-425.

4 Sennacherib (704-681 B.C.), Nineveh: see Yadin, AWBL, p.431 (top) and pp. 434-5.

5 Ashurbanipal (668-630 B.C.), Nineveh: H.R. Hall, Babylonian and Assyrian Sculptures in the British Museum (1928), Pl. 40 = Gadd, p. 196 = H. Brunner, Ein assyrisches Relief mit einer ägyptischen Festung, Archiv für Orientforschung 16 (1952-53), p.253f, Abb.1. = Pritchard, ANEP, p.5, no. 10 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 462-463.

40. see n.24(i).Lorimer, HM, pp. 297-298.

41. see p.19.

42. see chapter 10.

43. see eg. B692, Υ188.

44. On the meaning and derivation of δημιοεργοι see Leaf, The Iliad Vol. 1, pp. 129-130 on Δ 242 and Kirk, The Iliad Vol. 1, p. 395 on Δ 242.

45. see eg. Odyssey Θ 215-220; Φ 38f.

46. see appendix 2. Homer unfortunately gives us no information about the type of bow used by the 'laoi', although it is possible to argue from the efficiency of the Locrians that they used the composite bow.

47. For general comments on the sling in the Iliad, see Leaf, The Iliad Vol. 2, p. 38 on N600 and pp. 45-46 on N712-721; Lorimer, HM, p. 301; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 167; Korfmann, p. 35; Foss, p. 25.

48. The fact that a 'therapon' of Helenus has a sling in his possession does not necessarily mean that it was a weapon used by lowly men - Patroclus is described as the attendant of Achilles in the Iliad.

49. see p. 16.

50. On the sling-cord, see Korfmann, p. 38 and Foss p. 26.

51. e.g. Lorimer, HM, p. 301.

52. On the evolution of the sling see O.R. Sellers, Sling Stones of Biblical Times, The Biblical Archaeologist II, 3-4 (1939), pp. 41-44 and most importantly V.G. Childe, The Significance of the Sling for Greek Prehistory in Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson (1950), I. pp. 1-5. Korfmann (The Sling, p. 42) develops his theories and considers the world wide distribution of Prehistoric sling-shots.

53. H. Schliemann, Ilios (1881) p. 437f (on Troy II) and Troja (1889), pp. 118-119,with Fig. 47 (on Troy III).

54. G. Fougères, 'glans' in Daremberg-Saglio, op.cit. p. 1668f.

55. Costis Davaras, Guide to Cretan Antiquities (1976), pp. 263 and 343.

56. NMA, inv. no. 1369. For a reproduction of two possible Mycenaean sling-bullets of unknown provenance, see G. Perrot and C. Chipiez, La Grèce primitive, p. 129, Fig. 27.

57. Sir Arthur Evans, The Palace of Minos, Vol. 2 (1928), pp. 344-345,with Fig. 196.

58. Lead bullets were found at Olympia, a site which has produced a great many finds of archaic date, but their context has not been properly described: Olympia, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen, Vol. 4, p. 178.

59. see BSA 31 (1930-31), pp. 9,38 (no. 25), 41 (no. 37),with Fig. 16, no. 25.

60. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece, p. 275.

61. see Lorimer, HM, p. 142, Fig. 4; E. Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age (1964), pp. 100-105,with Pl. 14; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 167.

62. On the position of the slings of Hittite slingers on the orthostats from the palace of Kapara at Tell Halaf (10th century B.C.): M. Vieyra, Hittite Art (1955), Pl. 96; W.F. Albright, Anatolian Studies, VI (1956), p. 75f; Yadin, AWBL, p. 364; Korfmann, p. 37.

63. Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 167.

64. Evans, PM2, p. 345 n1.

65. Corinthian alabastron: Ecole française d'Athènes, Délos x (1928) p. 137, Fig. 3; Spartan Pithos fragment: see pp. 57-59.

66. Yadin, AWBL, p. 430 (top) = Korfmann, p. 36 (top Pl.). For other depictions of Assyrian slingers see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 452 and 458 (reliefs from Ashurbanipal's palace at Nineveh) and see pp. 431, 434-35.

67. Ranges, see pp. 1-2 and 5.

68. see n. 66(i).Egyptian slingers also shown attacking a fortified position on the Tomb of Khety from Beni-hasan: see n. 31,1(i).

69. General works on Homeric arms and armour: A. Lang, The World of Homer (1910), pp. 60-80; Lorimer, HM, p. 132f; A. Wace and F. Stubbings, A Companion to Homer (1962), pp. 505-518; Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 170-179; Snodgrass, AAG, pp. 11,37,47; Greenhalgh, EGW, chapter 3, passim; Luce, Homer and the Heroic Age, pp. 101-108; C. King, Military Equipment in Homer (1976); cf on spear: A. Shewan, Homeric Essays (1935), pp. 441-443 and on body-armour: H. Catling, AA (1970) pp. 441-449; P. Greenhalgh, Antiquity 54 (1980), pp.201-208.

70. see eg. Λ566-568 (Aias); M43-50 (Hector); O615f (Hector); P730f (two Aiantes). On the form of the Homeric battle see G.S. Kirk, War and the Warrior in the Homeric Poems, in J-P. Vernant Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne (1968); Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 7-33.

71. J. Griffin, Homer, p. 33; cf Pritchett, GSW IV, p. 7.

72. see e.g. P. Oxy. 47 (1980) no. 3316, 1.14; Thuc.VI.69.2.

73. François Vase:see JHS 27 (1907) p. 253, Fig. 3.
Black-fig. Kylix: CVA G B 2 (B.M.2) IIIHe; Pl. 8.1a.
Pithos frag. : see pp. 57-59.

74. It should however be noted that Pausanias is not a trustworthy source for this early period; chapter 2, n. 38.

75. Best, pp. 4-5, 7-12, 15-18; Euripides, Rhesus, 309-313, 375.

76. K438; 474-475; 501-506; Υ 484-489.

77. Δ 532-535; Φ 155; B848; K428.

78. K257-258; 335; 458.

79. K133-134.

80. Best, p.8; see esp. CVA Munich 1; 3H, Pl. 9.3; Dietrich von Bothmer, Amazons in Greek Art (1957), Pl. 72.5; CVA Baltimore 2; 3I, Pl. 10.1b; W. Kraiker, Die rotfigurigen attischen Vasen (1931), Pl. 13.78; F. Brommer, Satyrspiele; Bilder griechischer Vasen (1944), p. 49, Pl. 50.

81. Best, pp. 9-11. This hypotheses is based on J. van Leeuwen, Ilias (1912) on book 5, 453; cf Herodotus VII. 91 - he observes that the Cilicians had λαισήια made of raw oxhide instead of 'aspides'.

82. Lorimer, HM, p. 147, Pl. III.1b; H. Müller-Karpe, Zur spätbronzezeitlichen Bewaffnung in Mitteleuropa und Griechenland, Germania 40 (1963) p. 258, Pl. 1; p.283, Pl. 10.7; Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 57-58 and AAG, pp. 30-33,with Figs. 10-11.

83. Ψ 807-808 and cf N576-577. On the 'machaira' see G. Roux, Meurtre dans un sanctuaire sur l'amphore de Panaguriste, Antike Kunst 7 (1964), pp. 30-40 and Snodgrass, AAG, Fig.50; cf also Thuc.II.96.2; 98.4.

84. Φ 139f; On the phenomenon of two spears , see pp. 33-34.

85. A list of graves in which two or more spearheads have occurred is given in Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 136-137; add AJA(1963) pp. 35-40 (Gr.23, Tiryns).

86. see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 136-9 and AAG, pp. 38-39.

87. Mycenaean Graves (small head found mainly in combination with large head):
i. AE (1904), p. 48, Fig. 11.
ii. BSA37 (1936-7), pp. 187-91.
iii. Archaeology in Greece (1957), p. 11.

Athens, Agora Grave XVII - Hesperia 21 (1952), p. 281, Pls. 75c2 and 75c3; Figs. 3.2 and 3.3
Athens, Dipylon Grave - AM13 (1888), p. 298, Fig. 5.

88. Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 137-8.

89. cf AA4 (1889) p. 93, no. 8 = Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl. 33 = AAG, Pl. 28.

90. see e.g. Lorimer, HM, p. 257, n.5 and p. 258, nn.1 and 2; Bulletin des Musées Royaux (Brussels) Vol. 23 (1951), p. 32, Fig. 1; Brenton, BSA (1953), p. 345; AA78 (1963), p. 210f, Figs. 1 and 3.

91. CVA France 25 (Louvre 16) IIIHb; Pls. 27.1 and 2; 52.3 .
CVA France 27 (Louvre 18) IIIHb, Pl. 23.1.
CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat.2) IIIH; Pls. 72.4b and 74.1.
cf. G. Perrot and C. Chipez, Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité (1890-1914), Vol. 7, p.179, Fig. 63 (man wounded in knee by spear).

92. The suggestion that the Mycenaeans may have used javelins is an inference from n.87.

93. In Δ 297-300 the 'kakoi pezoi', sandwiched between the cavalry and first-rate infantry, are possibly infantrymen of the masses.

94. Egyptian, Anatolian and Assyrian bows: see Yadin, AWBL, pp. 46-48, 62-64, 80-83; W.E. McLeod, The Bow in Greece with particular reference to the Homeric Poems, Diss. Harvard Univ. (1966); summary of diss. in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 71 (1966), pp. 329-331.
The Egyptians used two types of composte bow:

1 The triangular type; see e.g. N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Rekh - mi-Re at Thebes (1943), Pl. 23; H. Carter and P.E. Newberry, The Tomb of Thoutmosis IV (1904), Pls. 10- 11 = Pritchard, ANEP, p. 103, nos. 314-315; N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Ken-Amun at Thebes, Vol. 1 (1930), Pls. 22-24.

2 The recurved type; see e.g. W. Wreszinski, Atlas zur altägyptischen Kulturgeschichte, Vol. 1 (1923), Taf. 1.26 and Vol. 2 (1935), Taf. 104; Pritchard, ANEP, p. 137, no. 390 = J.A. Wilson, The Burden of Egypt (1951), Fig. 21a; B. Van de Walle, Chronique d'Égypte XIII (26) (1938), col. 234f, Fig. 3; A. Rowe, The Four Canaanite Temples of Beth-Shan (1940), pp. 27-28, Pl. 38 = B. Parker, Cylinder Seals from Palastine, Iraq II (1949), p. 13, Pl. 4.30; N.M. Davies and A.H. Gardiner, Ancient Egyptian Paintings (1936), Pls. 78 and 82.

95. On the Homeric Bow, see p. 44f
On the structure of the composite bow see: H. Balfour, The Structure and Affinities of the Composite Bow, JAI, Vol. 19 (1890), p. 266f; H. Balfour, The Archer's Bow in Homeric Poems, JAI 51 (1921), p. 296, with Figs. 4 and 5; W.E. McLeod, An Unpublished Egyptian Composite Bow in the Brooklyn Museum, AJA 62 (1958), pp. 397-401.

96. A word of warning is perhaps necessary: one must bear in mind that the depictions of the bows under discussion are often very small and sometimes crudely worked. We must remember that the complex shape of the composite bow would have been much harder to portray than the shape of the composite bow. See Lorimer, HM, p. 278 and Snodgrass, AAG, p. 17.

97. Dagger: see British Museum: A Guide to the Exhibition Illustrating Greek and Roman Life (3rd edition: 1929), p. 70, Fig. 60; Evans, PMIV, p. 575, Fig. 557; Snodgrass, AAG, Fig.2.

98. JHS 45 (1925) p. 34, Fig. 35.

99. E. Vermeule, Greece in the Bronze Age (1964), Pl. 14 = Bury and Meiggs, A History of Greece (4th edition: 1975), Pl. 1.13.

100. Evans, PM II, p. 48, Fig. 23, a,b, and c.

101. Evans, PM I, p. 652, Fig. 483, no. 11.

102. Evans, PM I, p. 680, Fig. 500f.

103. Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 143.

104. On all Mycenaean arrowheads see: H-G. Buchholz, Der Pfeilglätter aus dem VI Schachtgrab von Mykene und die helladischen Pfeilspitzen. Mit 15 Abbilidungen, JdI 77 (1962), pp. 1-58. On the arrow-shaft-polisher see Buchholz, op.cit., p. 4f.

105. Snodgrass, AAG, p. 17.

106. Snodgrass, AAG, p. 23.

107. On the tablets and weapon finds see Evans, PM IV, pp. 832-41, with Figs. 816a,b; 817; 818a,b; M.G.F. Ventris and J. Chadwick, Documents in Mycenaean Greek (1956) p. 361; L.R. Palmer and J. Boardman, On the Knossos Tablets (1963), p.XIV, pp. 78-80, 157-159, 161-162 with Pl. 15a.

108. Lorimer (HM, p. 279) thinks that the arrows were used for hunting. I disagree and follow Evans (PM IV, p. 832) and Snodgrass (AAG, p. 23).

109. see Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 292, Fig. 1; Evans, PMIV, p. 832f.
Ugarit text: "Let me vow birch-wood from Lebanon,
Let me vow tendons from wild bulls,
Let me vow horns from wild goats
And sinews from the locks of bulls".
(adapted from the translation of Y.Yadin, AWBL, p.81).

110. see p. 37.

111. Evans, PMIII, p. 106, Fig. 59.

112. Lorimer, HM, p. 279.

113. Lorimer, HM, pp. 279 - 280; Costis Davaras (Guide to Cretan Antiquities (1976), pp. 18-19) disagrees with this view.

114. Evans, PM IV, p. 575, Fig. 556.

115. see BCH, 85 (1961), pp. 769-770 with Fig. 21.

116. see Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 249, n.9 on this bow type.

117. Bochholz,JdI 1962, note 8 and especially type VIIc ; Snodgrass, AAG, pp. 29-30.

118. On the date of the fall of Troy VIIa see C.B. Mee, Aegean Trade and Settlement in Anatolia in the Second Millenium B.C., Anatolian Studies 28 (1978), p. 147; J. Mellaart, Troy VIIa in Anatolian Perspective in The Trojan War: its Historicity and Context (Papers of the First Greenbank Colloquium, Liverpool, 1981), p. 63.

119. see Blegen, Boulter, Caskey, Troy IV (1958), Vol. 1 (text), pp. 9,12,13,51 and Vol. 2 (Pls.), Fig. 219 (inv.no. 35-486); Luce, Homer and the Heroic Age, p. 21, Fig. 14.

120. see AJA 59 (1955) p. 33, Pl. 25, Fig. 7 and also Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 145, Fig. aI. Troy IV, Vol. 1 (text), p. 12.

121. Early Geometric = c.900-850 B.C. for Attic.
Middle Geometric = c.850-760 B.C. for Attic.
Late Geometric = c.760-700 B.C. for Attic.
(Dates from Greenhalgh, EGW, p. xii).

122. V.R. d'A.Desborough, The Greek Dark Ages (1972), Pl. 42.

123. K. Kübler et al., Kerameikos, die Ausgrabungen, Vol. 4 (1943), p. 27, Pl. 38 (inv.no. M34); Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 148 - Snodgrass notes that the arrowhead it not socketed as is stated in BSA 48 (1953), p. 343.

124. AAA 1968, I, 22 (T.X); A.M. Snodgrass, The Dark Age of Greece (1971), p. 263.

125. Hesperia 17 (1948), p. 206 with Pl. 72. B10.

126. AM 78 (1963), p. 41.

127. AD 17 (1961-62), p. 287, Fig. 10 (bottom left); Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 148; Desborough, op.cit., p. 219.

128. A. Papapostolou, AD 23 (1968), A83 no. 37, Pl. 38A.

129. BSA 38 (1937 -38), Pl. 29 (no. 672); Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 147.

130. Snodgrass, DAG, pp. 274-275.

131. BCH 80 (1956), p. 376; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 155 (type 5b) and DAG, p. 275,with Pl. 46a.

132. C. Frödin and A.W. Persson, Assine: Results of the Sweedish Excavations (1922-30), p. 333, Fig. 225.2; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 150 (type 3A2).

133. Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 143.

134. Y. Bequignon, Recherches archéologiques à Pheres (1937) p. 52 (tomb 85-86); Snodgrass, DAG, p. 275.
ii. J.K. Brock, Fortetsa: Early Greek Tombs Near Knossos (BSA, Suppl. Paper No. 2 - 1957), Pl. 171, no. 574.
Arkades: Annuario della R. Scuola archeologica di Atene 10-12 (1927-9), Pl. 11.

135. Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 148.

136. Kavousi: AJA 5 (1901) p. 145, n.1
Dreros : H. van Effentere, Nécropoles du Mirabello, Études Cretoises, VIII (1947), p. 65, Pl. 23.D.58; cf BCH 61 (1937), p. 24, Fig. 15. 6-8.
Arkades: Annuario RSA, 10-12 (1927-9), Pl. 7 (bronze).

137. Idaean Cave: F. Halbherr, Antro di Zeus Ideo, p. 76.
Dictaean Cave: J. Boardman, The Cretan Collection in Oxford (1961), p. 30, no. 125, Fig.11.
Prinias: Memorie del Reale Istituto Lombardo 22 (1912), p. 226, Pl. 10; Figs. 33-34.
Giamalakis Collection: Kretiká Chroniká 4 (1950), pp. 114 and 125 and Pl. E2.

138. see Jantzen, Griechische Greifenkessel, Pl. 64. 1-2.

139. On the depiction of archers on Attic Late Geometric pottery see G. Ahlberg, pp. 44-45.

140. Self-type: see e.g.
B. Graef, Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen (1909), p.x, no. 291.
Louvre, inv.no. A534.
C. Waldstein, The Argive Heraeum 2 (1905), p. 13 and Pl. 57.10 and 57.13.
École Française D'Athènes: Fouilles de Delphes, 5 (1908), p. 138, Fig. 538.
Single-curved type: CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat.) IIIH; Pl. 73.4a and 73.4b; see also Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 249, no. 7.

Double-curved type: Arch.Zeit, 1885, Pl. 8.1 = Perrot and Chipiez, Histoire de l'Art dans l'Antiquité, Vol. 7, p. 179, Fig. 63.
Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum, N.Y. 29 (1934) p. 170, Fig. 1; AE (1953-4) I, Pl.5.1.
CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pls. 3.7, 6.2, 6.4, 6.9, 7.1, 7.7.
CVA Warsaw 1, Pl. 2.7.

141. Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 143 and AAG, p. 40; cf also Lorimer, HM, pp. 282 and 285; G. Rausing, The Bow. Some Notes on its Origin and Development, Acta Lund. series in 8°,6 (1967); P. Courbin, La guerre en Grèce à haute époque d'après les documents archéologiques in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne (1968), p. 77; Ahlberg, p. 44.

142. A. Land-battles in which archers are depicted or whose presence may be inferred from figures wounded by arrows:
1. NMA, inv.no. 194 = P. Kahane, AJA (1940), p. 476, Pl. 23.2 = H. Marwitz, JdI 74 (1959), p. 86, Fig. 8 = Ahlberg, Fig. 3.
2. C. Waldstein, The Argive Heraeum 2 (1905), p. 133, no. 10 with Pl. 57.10 = Ahlberg, Fig. 4.
3. Athens, Acropolis Mus. inv.no. 291 = B. Graef and E. Langlotz, Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen Vol. 1 (1925), p. 29, no. 291, Pl. 10.291 = Ahlberg, Fig. 5.
4. Louvre, Krater A519 = CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pl. 5.7 = Ahlberg, Fig. 6.
5. Louvre, Krater frag. A560 = CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pl. 8.6 = Ahlberg, Fig. 10.
6. NMA, inv.no. 802 = E. Kunze, Bruchstücke attischer Grabkratere, Neue Beiträge zur klassichen Altertumswissenschaft (1954), p. 55, Pl. 9.2 = Ahlberg, Fig. 12.

B. Battles during sea-borne landings in which archers are depicted:
1. Ahlberg, Fig. 29.
2. CVA Copenhagen 2 (Mus.Nat.2) III H; Pl. 73.4a = Ahlberg, Figs. 31-33 - Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig. 40.
3. E. Pernice, AM 17 (1892), p. 287, no. 24 and p. 302, Fig. 8 = Kunze, Neue Beiträge, p. 52, Pl. 9.2 - Ahlberg, Fig. 40.
4. CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pl. 7.7 = Ahlberg, Fig. 34.
5. Waldstein, The Argive Heraeum 2, p. 113, no. 13 with Pl. 57.13 = Ahlberg, Fig. 41.
6. A. Skias, AE 1898, p. 110, Pl. 5.1 = Lorimer, HM, Pl. 20.1a and 1b = Ahlberg, Figs. 42 and 43.

7. CVA France 18 (Louvre 11) III Hb; Pl. 3.8 = Ahlberg, Fig. 45.

143. see Ahlberg, pp. 25-38, 42-43, 45-48 on this motif.

144. Paris, Bibl.Nat. M5837, L2.2 = Coldstream, Geometric Greece, Fig. 50b.

145. Snodgrass, AAG, p. 40.

146. Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 142-143 and AAG, p.40.

147. On the Homeric bow, especially that of Pandarus, see:
Balfour, The Archer's Bow, pp. 289-309; Lorimer, HM, pp. 276-300; Wace and Stubbings, A Companion to Homer, p. 519; Snodgrass, EGAW, pp. 141-144, 174-175 (and AAG, pp.39-40); McLeod, The Bow in Ancient Greece with particular reference to the Homeric Poems (Diss. Harvard); Kirk, The Iliad 1, pp. 341-343.

148. On ' ἐσύλα τόξον ' see Kirk, The Iliad 1, p. 341,on Δ 105.

149.
παλίντονος see e.g.: Il. Θ 266,0443, K459; Od. φ 11
ἀγκύλα see e.g.: Il. E 209.
καμπύλα see e.g.: Il. Γ 3, E97, K333, 372, Φ 502
Od. ι 156, φ 359, φ 362.
εὔξοον see e.g.: Il. Δ105, N594, Od. Θ 216, 586, φ 92, 281, 286, 326, χ 71.

150. φ 176-180; 245-6.

151. On goathorns used 'in part' for bows in Crete,see Milchhöfer, Archäologische Zeitung 1880, p. 213; Balfour, The Archer's Bow, pp. 298-301; Lorimer, HM, p. 290f, Kirk, The Iliad 1, pp. 341-342,on Δ110; see p. 38.

152. Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 294, Fig. 2.

153. Various North American Indian tribes used this type of bow and it was also common among the Eskimo - see Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 295.

154. Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 296.

155. cf. Homer, Iliad Λ 385; Theocritus 25.206.
cf also Vergil, Aeneid,XI, 859; Ovid, Metamorphoses,IV, 302-303.

156. see Lorimer, HM, p. 291.

157. see e.g. N. de G. Davies, The Tomb of Ken-Amun at Thebes Vol. 1 (1930), Pls. 22-24 and 35-36 = Yadin, AWBL, pp. 198-199; see also Yadin, AWBL, p. 185 (lower scetch).

158. Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 303.

159. Balfour, The Archer's Bow, p. 304.

160. Odyssey φ 125-127; 148-151; 245-255.

161. This method of stringing the composite bow is depicted on Greek vases: see e.g.
CVA Deutschland 20 (München 5); Taf. 226.17.
Italy 30 (Frienze-Mus.Archeol.3) III 1; Tav. 75.2.
It is also depicted on Greek coins: see e.g. Balfour, The Archer's Bow, Fig. 13,a,b,c and Kraay, ACGC, Pl. 19, no. 352 (didrachma from Thebes, c.440 B.C.).

162. Tomb 17, east wall. P.E. Newberry, Beni Hasan Vol. 2 (1894),Pl. 15. The non-composite English long-bow could be bent by resting one end on the ground and then putting pressure downwards on the other (see Lorimer, HM, p. 291).

163. Lorimer, HM, p. 290.

164. see pp. 37-40.

165. see p. 37.

166. see p. 42.

167. Lorimer (HM, p. 289) notes a strong Cretan tinge throughout the Odyssey. In the Iliad Pandarus' draw at Δ 123 is described by scholia B and T as the Cretan draw.

168. Note that the most renowned archers on the Greek side in the Iliad dwelt near the sea-coasts and may perhaps have had knowledge of foreign bow forms due to their accessibility to influence from over seas - Odysseus inhabited Ithica, Philoctetes Mount Hermaeus, Teucer Salamis and Meriones Crete.

169. Iliad N650; N662; O465.
Odyssey ∝ 262; Φ423.

170. Iliad Δ123.

171. see e.g. Iliad E393, Λ507 and cf Θ 297. On the meaning of τρυχώχις see: Lorimer, HM, p. 285 with Fig. 36 and pp. 294-295; Sulimirski, Artibus Asiae 17 (1954), pp. 370-371; W.E. McLeod, AJA 64 (1960), pp. 370-71; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 153 and Fig. 3B (especially no. 4).

172. Mycenae: AE 1888, Pl. 9.2 and A.J.B. Wace, Chamber Tombs at Mycenae, Archaeologia 82 (1932), pp. 59, 187 and Pl. 30.
Thebes: AD 3 (1917) p. 160, Fig. 119 (2) and p. 173, Fig. 127 (2,8).
Kakovatos: AM 1909, p. 292.
Prosymna: BSA 25 (1921-23) p. 335, Fig. 68m.
Knossos: The Prehistoric Tombs of Knossos, Archaeologia 59 (1905), p. 422; Fig. 28; The Tomb of the Double Axes and Associated Group at Knossos, Archaeologia 65 (1913-14) p. 42, Fig. 54.2f. Davaras, op.cit., p. 18.
Asine: C. Frödin and A.W. Presson, Bull.Soc. R. d. Lettres de Lund., 1924-5, Pl. 38.2; Frödin and Presson, Asine: Results of the Sweedish Excavations (1922-30), p. 390.
Dendra: A.W. Presson, The Royal Tombs at Dendra, near Midaea, p. 103, 16; p. 105, Fig. 80 and New Tombs at Dendra, near Midaea, pp. 29 and 48.
Malthi: The Sweedish Messenia Expedition, pp. 357 and 370.

173. W. Kraiker and K. Kübler, Kerameikos, die Nekropolen des 12 bis 10 Jahrhunderts, Vol. 4 (1958), pp. 27 and 35, Pl. 38.

174. see Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 175 and Kirk, The Iliad 1, p. 343, on Δ 123-4.

175. see pp. 40-42.

176. see Lorimer, HM, p. 285f; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 153.

177. Perachora: Perachora: The Sanctuaries of Hera Akraia and Limenia Vol. 1 (1940), p. 181, Pl. 82.16.
Delos: Delos 18, p. 209, Fig. 240; Pl. 556 (bottom right).

Olympia: Kunze and Schleif, Olympische Forschungen I (1944), Pl. 69, q,r.
Cyrene: Africa Italiana 4 (1930), p. 197, Fig. 21.

On the arrow-plates see Sulimirski, Artibus Asiae 17 (1954), p. 312; Snodgrass, EGAW, p.153.

178. see pp. 39-40.

179. We must bear in mind the possibility that archers at an early date may have dipped their arrows in poison before firing: see Odyssey ∝ 262 and cf. Iliad Δ 134-50 (Menelaus' shallow arrow wound caused panic - was this because it was feared that the arrowhead may have been dipped in poison?) cf. Aeneas Tacticus, Frag. 4 (Loeb) and Sophocles, Trachiniae, 574.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Date of Archilochus: see F. Jacoby, The Date of Archilochus, CQ 35 (1941), pp.97-109; on the floruit of Archilochus and the archaeological evidence for the foundation-date of Thasos, see A.J. Graham, The Foundation of Thasos, BSA 73 (1978), pp.61-98; cf. also D.A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry (1967), pp.136 - 138; Greenhalgh, EGW, p.90, with n.13; Murray, Early Greece, p.24.

2. Oinom.Eusebius Praep.Evang. 6.7.8.

3. cf. Late-Geometric vase from Eretria which may depict hoplites: AE 1903, p.13f, Fig.7 = Boardman, EEPH, p.29.

4. Discussions of frag.3 (West): Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, pp.115-118; Boardman, EEPH, p.29; Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.179-180; Murray, Early Greece, pp.76-78; R. Renehan, The Early Greek Poets: Some Interpretations, Harvard Studies in Classical Philosophy 87 (1983), pp.1-2.

5. Boardman, EEPH, pp.27-29; Murray, Early Greece, pp.76-78.

6. On agreements of this kind, cf Polybius 13.3.4.

7. Renehan (The Early Greek Poets, p.2) stresses the lowly position of the bow. On the use of the sword in Euboea see AE 1903, p.9. For swords in the 'transitional' period see Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig.41; CVA Berlin 1, Pls.43.1 and 44.2 (The Hymettus Amphora); CVA Berlin 1, Pls.30.1-2 and 34.2 = Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig.44.

8. see p.151.

9. Greenhalgh, EGW, p.93.

10. see p.42.

11. Aryballos from Lechaion: Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl.15b = AAG, Fig.26. Aryballos from Perachora: Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, Fig.7.

12. see p.29.

13. West 98 = IG 12(5).445; AIV, 42-58 = P.Oxy. 2313,fr.3(a).

14. West 113 = P.Oxy.2314,col.ii.
West 139 = P.Oxy.2313,fr.5.

15. Boardman, EEPH, p.29.

16. see Diodorus VIII.36 and Athenaeus 14.630E.

17. see Pausanias IV.15.1 and IV.23.4. I follow J.F. Lazenby (The Spartan Army (1985), p.75) in suggesting a mid seventh century date for the Second Messenian War: this is based on Pausanias IV.27.9 and IV.23.4 (fall of Eira); VIII.39.3 (capture of Phigalia) and cf. Plut., Moralia, 194b.

18. On the date of Tyrtaeus see: Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, p.121; Snodgrass, EGAW, p.203 and AAG, p.66; P. Cartledge, Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare, JHS 97 (1977), p.25; Murray, Early Greece, p.24; Lazenby, p.68; Pritchett, GSW IV, p.37.

19. see e.g. Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, p.121f; Snodgrass, EGAW, p.181 and AAG, pp.66-67; N.G.L. Hammond, The Creation of Classical Sparta in Studies in Greek History (1973), p.65f; Greenhalgh, EGW, p.94; Cartledge, Hoplites and Heroes, pp.25-27; J.Salmon, Political Hoplites? JHS 97 (1977), p.91; Murray, Early Greece, pp.24-25; Lazenby, p.70f.

20. On the hoplite weapons and armour in Tyrtaeus see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.181-2.

21. J. Boardman, Artemis Orthia and Chronology, BSA 58 (1963), pp.1-7; cf. R.M. Dawkins (et al.), The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, JHS, Supplement 5 (1929), p.249f.

22. see Cartledge, Hoplites and Heroes, p.26, Fig.1.

23. Contrast to this view Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.181-182 and AAG, p.67. I do not find any problem in the fact that Tyrtaeus says that warriors could fight with the spear or the 'machaira' (see Lazenby, The Spartan Army, pp.76-77) - the sword could have been used by a hoplite in a phalanx formation if his spear had been broken (see Greenhalgh, EGW, p.72, Fig.44 and on the early use of the words μάχαιρα and ξίφος, see H. Trümpy, Kriegerische Fachausdrücke, im griechischen Epos,(Diss.Basel 1950), pp.127-8 and S. Foltiny in Archaeologia Homerica 1:E2 (1980), pp.240-243). There is no problem with the large shield described by Tyrtaeus (11.23-24): the proto-hoplite shields could be very large, see Salmon,JHS 1977, p.86, Fig.1.
On the First Messenian War see Lazenby, p.70.

24. On Tyrtaean 'arete' see W. Jaeger, Tyrtaeus on true arete, in Five Essays (Casalini Montreal 1966 - originally published in German in 1932), pp.101-142.

25. On the 'gymnetes' see Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, pp.127-128; Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.181 - 182 and AAG, p.67; Greenhalgh, EGW, p.94; Lazenby, pp.76-78; Pritchett, GSW IV, pp.38 and 40.

26. see p.61.

27. Greenhalgh, EGW, p.94.

28. cf. sling-shots used by Assyrian slingers, Korfmann, p.36 (top Pl.).

29. see BSA 12 (1905-6),p.292,with Pl.9 and AO, Pls.15-16.

30. A.J.B. Wace, BSA 12 (1905-6), p.292 - cf. Assyrian practice.

31. see p.103.

32. Pritchett, GSW IV, p.38.

33. On the lead figures of archers see AO, pp.262,269,276,278; Lorimer, HM, p.283; L.F. Fitzharding, The Spartans (1980),p.121,with Fig.150; J.T. Hooker, Ancient Spartans (1980), Fig. 37.

34. For depictions of the 2 types of self-bows, see AO, Pls.183.16 and .17; 191.18 and .19; 197.33; 198.19.

35. see AO, Pl.196.2 and 3; p.272, Fig.125h. See also Pl.198.18 and .19 (fifth century).

36. AO, p.201, Pls.87h and 88g (dating to seventh and early sixth century).

37. see n.29.

38. Pausanias IV.8.3; IV.10.1; IV.19.4. On the historicity of Pausanias see M.W. Haslam in P.Oxy. Vol.47 (1980), p.1. On the untrustworthyness of late sources on Messenian history see Murray, Early Greece, p.164.

39. see pp.78-79.

40. Lazenby, p. 76

41. Pritchett, GSW IV, p.40 n.131.

42. In line 6 it seems probable that the hoplites were also compared to some animal.

43. see P.Oxy. Vol.47 (1980), pp.1-6 (no.3316). Pritchett (GSW IV, p.38) says that he will discuss this fragment in detail in his forthcoming Topography 5.

44. In Pausanias' account of the Battle of the Trench,the Spartans were opposed only by the Messenians and Arcadians - he does not mention the Argives.

45. The last surviving four lines of the papyrus fragment accord well with a battle fought by the Spartans with a trench at their backs; the meaning of these lines seems clear: the enemy will kill a great many Spartans if they break and try to flee across the trench which is positioned at their rear.

46. M.W. Haslam (P.Oxy. 47 (1980), p.5, on line 14) comments: " γ]υμνομάχοι suits the traces well and is hardly to be doubted".

47. cf. comments of Onasander, see pp.18-19.
Pausanias purports to describe light-armed tactics in the First Messenian War: see esp. IV.11.2f (Messenian psiloi armed as sphendonetai and toxotai; Arcadian psiloi armed as akontistai) - see also Pausanias IV.3.3; IV.7.4; IV.7.5; IV.8.3; IV.8.7; IV.8.12f; IV.10.1; IV.11.1 (helots); IV.16.8; IV.19.4.

48. Snodgrass AAG, p.79.

49. Lazenby (The Spartan Army, p.77) asserts that the Spartan army was "an army of hoplites except the few and unimportant gymnetes".

50. see chapter ten (passim). For 'hopla' as a status symbol, cf. the corslet of Timomachus, supposedly an ancient relic, which was displayed at the festival of Hyacinthus at Amyclai (Pindar, Isthmian 6 (7) 18f and schol.ad loc. = Aristotle, frag.532 (Rose)).

51. see chapter 2, n.49.

52. On the date of Callinus see: T. Hudson-Williams, Early Greek Elegy (1926), pp.11-18 (passim); Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, p.120; D.A. Campbell, Greek Lyric Poetry (1967), p.161; Snodgrass, AAG, p.64; Murray, Early Greece, p.127; Pritchett, GSW IV, p.25.

53. cf. pp.66-69 and p.86; T.B.L. Webster (From Mycenae to Homer (1958), p.215) understands the javelins to be the weapons of Cimmerians. The majority of commentators take them to be the arms of Ionian Greeks.

54. Note that the vocabulary of this poem is Homeric (see Pritchett, GSW IV, pp.35-36) and that it is impossible for us to tell if Callinus is describing men in phalanx formation from lines 9-11.

55. see p.2.

56. On this transitional phase see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.180-181; AAG, p.64; cf. AA4 (1889), p.93, no.8 = Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl.33; Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig.44; Chigi Vase - Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl.36 (some of the hoplites (far left) have javelins with throwing-loops attached to them, whilst others carry two spears).

57. see Pausanias, IX.29.4; Murray, Early Greece, pp.24 and 127. His floruit is given by the Suda as 632-629 B.C.

58. see Hammond, JHS 70 (1950), p.52; Murray, Early Greece, p.127; Pritchett, GSW IV, p.33.

59. On frag.13a see Snodgrass, EGAW, p.261, n.45. On frag.14 see Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 34-35.

60. Epic tinge: see Jacoby, Hermes 53 (1918), p.288; J.M. Cook, Old Smyrna, BSA 53/54 (1958-9), p.28; Pritchett, GSW IV, p.34 (Pritchett suggests that fragment 14 is based on Agamemnon's exhortation of Diomedes in Iliad Δ.370f.).
On the contribution of frag.14 to our knowledge of the Smyrnians mode of combat, see West CR 96 (1982) p.136 and Pritchett, GSW IV, pp.34-35.

61. J.M. Cook, BSA 53/54 (1958/9), pp.27-28; Murray, Early Greece, p.24
On the date of Alyattes' expedition see G.L. Huxley, The Early Ionians (1966), p.77.

62. see HW1, p.62 on I.16.2.

63. On the excavations in the neighbourhood of the Lydian siege mound see R.V. Nicholls, Old Smyrna: The Iron Age Fortifications, etc. - Section 6: The Lydian Capture of Smyrna, BSA 53/54 (1958-9), pp.128-134.

64. A few iron arrowheads were found - see Nicholls, p.129, with n.118.

65. On the stone sling-shots see Nicholls, op.cit., p.129, with n.116.

66. On the arrowhead types see Nicholls, op.cit., pp.129-131, with footnotes 119-127; Snodgrasss, EGAW, pp.146-7, 150-151.

67. An example of this type is illustrated in BSA 1958-9, Pl.6d (right). See chapter 10,n.8.

68. An example of this type is illustrated in BSA 1958-9, Pl.6d (left).

69. cf. H.B. Walters, Catalogue of the Bronzes (Greek, Roman and Etruscan) in the British Museum (1899), p.346f, Type E.

70. see Snodgrass, AAG, Fig. 35, Early examples of this type have also been found at Olympia and Olynthus: Olympia, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen (1890-1896) Vol.4, p.178, Pl.64, no. 1095; Olympische Forschungen, Vol.1 (1944), p.160f, Pl.69b.
Olynthus X, Pls.120-122.

71. Note that Nicholls(op.cit.,p.131) suggests that they may represent a quiverful of arrows dedicated to the goddess on some earlier occasion. But seven is a small number of arrows to fill a quiver and, as Nicholls himself notes, although the seven arrowheads are typologically the same,they are not identical in size or shape - this would suggest that they were not in fact from the same quiver.

72. It is possible that the Lydians utilized other types of arrowheads to a lesser extent - see Nicholls, p.132. The arrowheads of the 'leaf' type were probably the 'pikra belea' described by Mimnermus in 14.8 (West).

73. On the temple pylon see BSA 1958-9, p.24.

74. Nicholls, op.cit.,pp.89 and 132.

75. Nicholls, op.cit.,p.132.

76. Nicholls, op.cit.,pp.133-4.

77. 12 'leaf' and 7 'barbed and tanged' heads were found in this area. A large number of what are presumed to be javelinheads were also found - the excavators do not express an opinion as to whether these were used by the Greek or Lydian troops. The Ionian Greeks in the 7th century B.C. certainly used them: cf. Callinus, 1.1-5 (West).

78. 10 'triangular' heads were found in the temenos area.

79. Nicholls, op.cit., pp.132-133.

80. cf. pp.85-87 and p.99.

81. Note also that it is not possible for us to tell whether it was the Greeks or Lydians who used the sling-stones found at Smyrna.

82. On the history of Lesbos in Alcaeus' time see: D.L. Page, Sappho and Alcaeus (1955), p.147f; A.Andrews, The Greek Tyrants (1962), pp.92-99; Murray, Early Greece, pp.148-152.

83. Studies on the arms mentioned in this fragment: Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.182-183 and AAG, pp.64-65.

84. cf. Iliad E. 316 ἔρκος ..... βελέων ; Δ 137 ἔρκος ἀκοντων.
Homer does not use ἰσχυρός , but cf Iliad E 104 - κρατερὸν βέλος.

85. The metal greave was known to the Mycenaeans - see Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.72,86-87, 173, 177, 209-210,with Pl.28. Bronze greaves have been associated with the plate armour from the warrior's grave at Dendra - see Snodgrass, AAG, pp.24-25.
The metal greave reappears as a piece of military equipment in the early part of the seventh century B.C. - see CVA Berlin 1, Pls.30.1-2; 34.2; 43.1 and 44.2. Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl.33 = AAG, Fig.28.

86. For illustrations of this see: K.F. Johansen, Les Vases Sicyoniens (1923), Pl.33.1f (archer aims low at legs); R. Hampe, Frühe Griechische Sagenbilder in Böotien (1936), Pl.14 (archers wounded on knee and shin by arrows); Lorimer, The Hoplite Phalanx, Fig.7 (archer hits hoplite on the shin); Lorimer,HM, Pl.21.2 (warrior struck by an arrow in the back of the leg below the calf).
Note that in the Iliad Paris shot Diomedes in the foot and is destined to hit Achilles in the heel; cf. Kerameikos burial, p.201 (skeleton with 2 arrowheads lodged in leg).

87. On the development of the greave in backward parts of Greece see Snodgrass, AAG, p.104.

88. Javelin-throwers: see Snodgrass, EGAW, Pl.33 = AAG, Fig. 27.
Stone-throwers: see e.g. Snodgrass,EGAW, Pl.15b = AAG, Fig. 26 (figure on extreme left).

CHAPTER THREE

1. Herod.I.59; Ath.Pol. XIV.1 and see J. Boardman, Herakles, Peisistratos and Sons, Rev. Arch.I/1972, p.60.

2. On the chronology of the tyrants Peisistratus and Hippias see P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (1981), pp.191 - 199.

   On the club-bearers see Boardman, Herakles, Peistratos and Sons, pp.57 - 72, esp. pp.62-63; 66 - 67, 71 - 72 and cf Plutarch, Solon, 30.

3. Herod.I.60.

4. On the date of Pallene, see Herod.I.53f, I.62, and Rhodes, CAAP, p.195. The Ath.Pol.(XV.2) dates it to 536-535 B.C.

5. Sigeion: Herod.V.94.2; Naxos: Herod.I.64; Ath.Pol.XV.3; Schol.Aristophanes, Vespae, 335.

6. Herod.V.62; Ath.Pol.XIX.3.

7. Herod.V.64-65; Ath.Pol.XIX.5-6.

8. e.g. NMA: Ap.34 (c.520B.C.); Ap.3071 (c.520B.C.); Ap.33 (c.510B.C.); Ap.29 (end of 6th century B.C.) = Snodgrass, AAG, Pl.39; Ap.3892.

9. On Mt. Pangaeum see: S. Casson, Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria: Their Relations to Greece from the Earliest Times down to the Time of Philip, Son of Amyntas (1926), pp.63 - 66; Rhodes, CAAP, p. 207; cf Herod.I.64.1.

10. On the use of peltasts at an early date, see Best, pp.15 - 16.

11. CVA Munich I; 3H, Pl.9.3; CVA Baltimore 2, 3I, Pl.10.1b; JdI 10, p.194, Pl.A and Pl.4; D. von Bothmer, Amazons in Greek Art (1963), Pl.72.5; Coll.Astarita, 632, Naples, Pl.B; Coll.Cahn, 101, Basle, Pl.c; BSA 14, Pl.14; W. Kraiker, Die rotfigurigen attischen Vasen (1931), Pl.13.78; F. Brommer, Satyrspiele; Bilder griechischer Vasen (1944), p.49, Pl.50.

    On Thracian peltasts under the Peisistratids, see Best, pp.5 - 7 and Rhodes, CAAP, pp.207 - 208.

12. CVA Copenhagen 8, pp.253 - 4, with Pls.324, 1a and 325, 1e-f. See also K.F. Johansen, Eine attische Trinkschale, Acta Archaeologica 31 (1960), pp.129 - 145, with Pl.3.7-8, and Best, pp.5-6, with Pl.1a - c.

13. For two throws, see p.5.

14. Fixed amentum, see p.3.

15. According to Johansen this beard is characteristic of Thracians, see op.cit., p.142, with n.39 and CVA Copenhagen 8, p.253.

16. CVA Munich 1; 3H, Pl.9.3.

17. On the dress and equipment of Thracian peltasts, see Herod.VII.75.1 and Xen.Anab.VII.4.4; Best, p.6, n.25 and p.7.

18. see Best, p.6.

19. Best, pp.6 - 7.

20. Best, p.7, n.26.

21. see e.g. pp.233 - 234.

22. see p.79.

23. see pp.79 - 80.

24. see e.g. pp.141f, 170.

25. see p. 173.

26. On the Scythian archers see also: A. Plassart, Les archers d'Athènes, REG 26 (1913), p.152f (passim); Snodgrass, AAG, pp.83 - 84.

27. On the dress of these archers, see Vos, pp.40 - 51 and on their nationality, see Vos, pp.52 - 60, with Pl.18.
    Contrast to Plassart, op.cit., p.156f and p.172f.

28. See Vos, pp.62 - 69. Contrast to: W. Helbig, Les ἵππεις Athéniens, Mémoires de l'institut national de France, Acad. d'inscr. et belles lettr. 37, I (1904), p.192; P. Coussin, Les institutions militaires et navales, La vie publique et privée des anciens Grecs, 8 (1932) p.30; H. Schoppa, Die Darstellung der Perser in der griechischen Kunst bis zum Beginn des Hellenismus (diss. Heidelberg 1933), p.20.

29. see e.g. CVA Louvre 5 ; 3He, Pl.55.5.
Louvre 10 ; 3Ib, Pls.9.7 and 10.3.
Louvre 11 ; 3He, Pls.150.6 and 151,2,4,5.
Munich 1 ; Pls.39 and 45.2.
Heidelberg 1 ; Pl.34.2 and 34.13.
Mus.Rodin ; Pl.10.2 and 10.6.
Villa Giulia 2 ; 3He, Pl.14.9 and 14.11.
Cambridge 1 ; 3He, Pl.21.1b.
USA 5 ; Pls.23.1 and 24.1a.
USA 11 ; 3He, Pl.24.38a.
see also Vos. pp.70 - 80,with Pls.6a,7,8.

30. see Yadin, AWBL, p.430 (top); Persians: see p.98.

31. Vos, p.71; cf Lucian, Hermotimus, 33.

32. see e.g. Vos, Pl.6a and 8.

33. On the Scythian battle-axe see Vos, Pls.1b,3,16b and d, 17a, 19b, 20 (far right).

34. e.g. CVA Switzerland 6 (Basel 2) III I; Pls.9.2 and 46.2; Vos, Pl.6a; NMA inv.no.14691.

35. Vos, Pl.6b = Snodgrass, AAG, Pl.38; Vos, Pl.8.

36. The mobility of the Scythian archers is shown in several pictures in which they are portrayed running:
CVA Mus.Rodin, Pl.10.2 and 10.6.
CVA Heidelberg 1; Pl.34.13.
CVA USA 5; Pl.23.1 and 24.1a.
B. Graef and E. Langlotz, Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen, Vol.1 (1909), Pl.80, no.1499; Beazley, ABV, 288.16.

37. see Vos, pp.45, 76-77.

38. On the absence of a Scythian archer force at Athens by c.490 B.C. see Vos, pp.81 - 88.

39. cf. p.76.

40. Herod.IV.80-142 (passim).

41. cf. Herod.VI.40 - the Scythians later attacked Miltiades and drove him from the Chersonese.

42. see Herod.V.99 - 102.

43. see also Plassart, op.cit., p.285; Lorimer, H.M., p.285.

44. On the historical inaccuracies in this passage see K.J. Maidmont, Minor Attic Orators 1 (Loeb C.L. 1941),p.500f (notes).
From pottery evidence (see e.g. Greenhalgh, EGW, Figs. 64,65,68,69,79) we can also be fairly certain that there had been cavalry at Athens at an early date (cf. Ath.Pol.IV.2-3; VII.3-4). As we have seen, Scythian archers had almost certainly been used by the Peisistratids.

45. Polyaenus,I.23.2.

46. Herod.III.122.2.

47. Herod.III.39.3-4.

48. see p.173.

49. Herod.III.44-48; 54-56.

50. In Herod.III.145f we learn that after Polycrates' death the 'epikouroi' continued to serve under Maeandrius.

51. Herod.III.54.2.

52. B.A.v. Groningen in his commentary on Herodotus (III.39.3) regards them as household troops and adds "whether they were Samian or foreign archers, is not clear" (translated). How and Wells (Herodotus 1, p.267,on III.39.3), H.W. Parke (Greek Mercenary Soldiers - From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus (1933), p.9) and A. Sélincourt (Herodotus: The Histories (Penguin Classics, 1954), p.222) regard these archers as native Samians.

53. Helbig, Eine Heerschau des Peisistratos, p.288.

54. cf. Plato, Hipparchus, 228b.

55. See Snodgrass, EGAW, p.147 and p.250,n.23 for the Geometric arrow-mould found on Samos. Archaic arrowhead: H.P. Isler, Samos IV (1978), Taf.39.22.

56. Some examples of marine-related blazons:

Prow:	CVA British Museum 6;	3He, Pls.94.3 and 95.3.	
Trident:	Villa Guilia 1;	3He, Pl.1.4.	
Fishing-fork:	JHS 1949, p.23, Fig.6.		
Anchor:	CVA British Museum 3;	3He, Pl.33.3a.	
	British Museum 4;	3He, Pl.71.3a-d.	
	British Museum 6;	3He, Pl.93.3.	
	Compiegne 1;	3He, Pl.6.7.	
Polyp:	British Museum 3;	3He, Pl.31.1b.	
	Bologna 2 ;	3He, Pl.13.2 and 13.4.	
Fish and Dolphins:	Mus.Rodin ;	3He, Pl.11.1 and 11.7.	
	British Museum 4;	3He, Pls.47.1c-d and 66.3b.	
	British Museum 6;	3He, Pls.77.1; 94.3; 95.3.	
	USA 1 ;	Gallatin Coll, Pl.4.2 and Hoppin Coll, Pl.4.11.	
	Rhodes 1 ;	3He, Pl.2.2.	

CHAPTER FOUR

1. On the Ionian Revolt see Herodotus, Books V - VI and the following general historical examinations: G.B. Grundy, The Great Persian War (1901), chapter III, pp. 79 - 144; A.R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks (first edition 1962; second edition 1984), chapter 10, pp. 193 - 220.

2. Herod. V. 104f; date uncertain, see Burn, p. 202.

3. Herod. V. 110 - 113.

4. Herod. V. 111 - 112.

5. On the excavations at Paleopaphos see primarily : F. Maier and V. Kavageorghis, Paphos (1984), pp. 192 -202.
See also : F. Maier, A Thousand Years of Old Paphos, Illustrated London News, CCLVII, 6846 and 6848 (1970), pp. 32 - 33 and 26 - 27; Burn, pp. 203 - 205.

6. On the mound, see primarily Maier and Kavageorghis, op.cit., p 196 (Figs. 183 - 184); also Burn, pp. 203 - 204.

7. See Illustrated London News 18/4/53, p 616, Fig. 6 - second row, third from the right; Snodgrass, EGAW, p. 152, Fig. 3B, 3 (and a type which Snodgrass terms 'pyramidical' - Fig. 3C). On all the types of arrowheads excavated from the siege mound, see Maier and Kavageorghis, op.cit., p. 195, Fig. 182.

8. Marathon : K. Schumacher, Beschreibung der Sammlung antiker Bronzen (Karlsruhe 1890) p. 144f, no. 748, Pl. XIV. 28.
British Museum : Guide to Greek and Roman Life (1929), Fig. 102 (top row, third to fifth from left).
Walter, AA 1940, p. 200.
Thermopylae : C.M. Robertson, JHS 59 (1939), pp. 199 - 200.
A.R. Burn, Warring States of Greece (1968), p. 92, Fig. 89.
Athens : O. Broneer, Excavations on the North Slope of the Acropolis, Hesperia 2 (1933), p. 341, Fig. 13.a-c and Hesperia 4 (1935), p.144, Fig. 4 (middle row and left part of upper row).

9. The Swedish Cyprus Expedition (1934 and 1935). IA, Pl. LXVI, nos. 21, 22, 35, 42; IB, Pl. CXLII, nos. 11, 12; IIB, Pl. CXLIX, nos. 7 - 11; Maier and Kavageorghis, op.cit., Fig. 182.

10. See pp. 68 -69 (javelinheads found at Old Smyrna).

11. The staff-sling could propel greater weights than normal slings, see : J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Heerwesen and Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (1928). p. 234, Fig. 70; Snodgrass, AAG, p. 124; Korfmann, p. 38 with p. 39 (Fig.); cf also Polybius, XXVII. 9 and Livy, XLII. 65.9.
Balearic slingers with normal slings could propel a load of around 450 grams - a staff-sling could handle much heavier loads. Although some of these stones from Paphos weigh slightly over 2 k.g. (probably a manageable load for a staff-sling), others weigh as much as 21.8 k.g.

12. c.f. Greek defenders of Old Smyrna, see pp. 66 - 69.

13. On Mardonius' expedition, see Herod. VI. 44.2 - 45 and Grundy, p. 150f and Burn, pp. 222 - 223. On the location of the Brygians, see W.W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, Vol 2 (1912), p. 80 on VI.45.1.

14. See Best, pp. 15 - 16.

15. Xenophon, Anabasis, VII.2.22; c.f. VII.4.14 - 19; Polyaenus, II.2.6.

16. Herod. VI. 94 - 95.

17. Herod. VI. 100 - 102.

18. On the disposition of the Athenian and Plataean forces and on the battle itself, see Herod. VI. 108.6 - 117.1 and also : J.A.R. Munro, The Campaign of Marathon, JHS 19 (1899), pp. 185 - 197; Grundy, pp. 187 - 194; F. Maurice, The Campaign of Marathon, JHS 52 (1932), pp. 13 - 24; C. Hignett, Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (1963), pp. 55 - 74; N. Whatley, On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and other Ancient Battles, JHS 84 (1964) pp. 119 - 139; N.G.L. Hammond, The Campaign and Battle of Marathon, in SGH (1973), pp. 170 - 250 (a revision of JHS 88 (1968), pp. 13 - 57); Burn, pp. 236 -257 and pp. 606 - 607 (of postscript by Lewis).

19. See p. 204

20. See H. Schliemann, Das sogenannte Grab der 192 Athener in Marathon, Zeitschr. für Ethnologie 16 (1884); B. Staës, AD 1890, pp. 65 - 67, 123 - 32 and 1891, pp. 34, 67 and 97 and Ath. Mitt. 18 (1893), pp. 46 - 63. See also Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 126 - 127.

21. See primarily excavation reports : Marinatos in AAA 3 (1970), pp. 164 - 166; 353; 357 - 366. See also S. Marinatos/Brooke, New Light on Marathon, in Illustrated London News (1972) CCLX no. 6887, pp. 54 - 55; Hammond, SGH, pp. 197 -198; Koumandis, AAA 11 (1978), pp. 232 - 237; K-W. Welwei, Das sog. Grab der Plataier im Vranatal bei Marathon, Historia 28 (1979), pp. 101 -106 ; Burn pp. 606 - 607 (by D.M. Lewis); Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 127 -129.

22. See AD 1890, p. 123 and Pl Δ ; Ath. Mitt. 1893, pp. 46 - 63, with Pls II - V - compare to AAA (1970), Figs. 19 - 30.

23. The skeleton of a man aged about 40 was found; above its head was a stele with ΑΡΧΙΑ written in crude letters. The skeleton of a child of ten was also found - although this find has raised doubts about the identification of the mound as the tomb of the Plataeans in the minds of some historians, it may be the body of a slave boy who was used as a scout; for a depiction of a small body caught up in a hoplite battle see CVA Poland 9 (Varsovie - Mus. Nat. 6) IV B, Pls. 47.3, 48.5 and 48.6.

24. Hammond, SGH, p. 198, no. 2.

25. Pritchett, GSW IV, p. 129.

26. See BM publication : A Guide to the Exhibition Illustrating Greek and Roman Life (1929), p. 96, Fig. 96 (top right). In 1888 the British Museum acquired 10 Greek sling-bullets, supposedly from Marathon, and since 1906 has acquired several more (there are a few passing references to them by E.J. Forsdyke in Society of Antiquaries, vol. 32 (1919-20) p. 146f). There is also another inscribed sling-bullet in the Ashmolean Museum (unpublished) which is said to be from Marathon, see also G. Fougères, 'glans', in Daremberg-Saglio, p. 1609 and Snodgrass, AAG, p. 99.

27. c.f. καὶ ἕτερος Πλαταιεῦσι Βοιωτῶν (Paus. I.32.3). The bullet is unpublished - it is inscribed with a beta on one side and an omicron and possibly an iota on the other. Foss is dubious about associating these bullets with the campaign of 490 B.C. (op.cit., p. 27, n. 14) - he thinks that even if they were found on the plain of Marathon, we should associate them most probably with the Chremonidean War. In this war fortresses were built in the vicinity of Marathon - see J. McCredie, Fortified Military Camps in Attica (1966), pp. 35 - 46, 102 - 115. On sling-bullets from the Chremonidean War, see I. Varoukha - Christodoulou, Symbole eis ton Chremonideon Polemon, A E (1953-4), part 3, pp. 332-4.

28. Hauvette, Hérodote, historein des guerres médiques (1894), p. 247 and n. 5.; H. Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst. I : Das Altertum (1920), p. 65, n. 3.; Hignett, p. 59; Hammond, SGH, pp. 179, 197 and n. 2, 227; Burn, pp. 242, 248 - 249.

29. Hammond, JHS 1968, p. 34 = SGH p. 206.

30. Plataeans : Pausanias, I. 32.3; Athenians : Pausanias, VII.15.7.

31. c.f. Thuc. IV. 94.1.

32. Burn, pp. 248 -249.

33. Burn, pp. 248 and 250.

34. Hammond, SGH, p. 197. c.f. the view of G. Cawkwell (with which I do not agree) on the hoplite phalanx in his book Philip of Macedon (1978), chapter 10 (esp. pp. 150 - 153).

35. On the number of Persian troops, see Hammond, SGH, pp. 202 - 203.

36. Thuc. IV. 93.4; c.f. Thuc. VI. 67.2; Xen. Anab. IV. 8.15, VI. 5.25, VII. 1.23 and Hell. III. 2.16.

37. Herod. VI. 111.1; Burn, p. 607 (of postscript by Lewis) and cf Marinatos AAA 3 (1970), p. 165 and Marinatos/Brooke, Illustrated London News (1972) CCLX no. 6887, p. 54.

38. Pritchett does not think that this is the tomb of the Plataeans or that the tumulus is anywhere near where the Greek left wing was stationed (GSW IV, pp. 127 -129). The truth of Lewis' statement " It must be confessed that, even with the latest additions to our knowledge, many details about Marathon are likely to remain the subject of arguments among scholars for the foreseeable future." (Burn 2nd ed., pp. 606-7) is apparent.

39. Persica, 26.

40. Cretan archers : see pp. 58 - 59, with notes for earlier history and chapter 5, n. 154 for later history.

41. See Beazley, ARV, pp. 207, no. 138; 227, no. 11; 231, no. 76 = Boardman, ARFV, Fig. 167; 263, no. 43; 296, no. 6; 402, no. 16; 417, no. 1 = Boardman, ARFV, 280.2; 417, no. 4; 441, no. 184; 530, no. 23; 571, no. 77; 590, no. 12; 599, no. 2; 600, no. 17; 615, no. 1; 649, no. 47; 654, no. 2; 818, no. 17; 837, no. 2; 881, no. 29; 1173, no. 3. See also P.E. Arias, M. Hirmer and B.B. Shefton, History of Greek Vase - Painting (1962), Pls. 139 and 179. Later depictions : Beazley, ARV, p. 592, no. 33 and p. 571, no. 79 = Boardman, ARFV, Pl.326.
The shield-apron appears first in Clazomenian painting after the middle of the 6th century B.C., when the collapse of Lydia left the Greeks of Asia Minor open to Persian attack; see : R.M. Cook, A List of Clazomenian Pottery, BSA 47 (1952), p. 139, no. 19 and cf Cook, CVA, Great Britain, XIII. 54. See also : CVA Deutschland 36 (Tübingen1); Taf 18.1 and CVA G.B. 13 (BM); II. D.q.; Pl. 1.1.

42. HW 2, p. 151 - class III.

43. Herod. VII. 72.1.

44. Herod. VII. 73.

45. Herod. VII. 74.1.

46. Herod. VII.79. The Alaradioi and Saspeires were armed in similar manner. The name of another people armed with javelins has dropped out of VII. 76. Note that the Milyae were armed with Lycian bows.

47. Herod. VII. 77 and .91.

48. Herod. VII. 92.

49. See p. 73f.

50. See Michel B. Sakellariou, La migration grecque en Ionie (1958), p. 434, n. 5.

51. Homer, Iliad, B 862 - 863; 185 - 187. For the Mysians and Phrygians, see Herod. VII. 73; Strabo, VII. 3.2; VII, fr. 25; X. 3.16; XII. 4.8; Arrian, Bithynica, 19.

52. Thuc IV. 75.2; Xen. Anab. VI. 2. 17-18; Hell. I. 3.2; III. 2.2; Plut, Alcibiades, 37; Diodorus, XIV. 38.3; Strabo, VII. 3.2; XII. 3.3; Arrian, Periplous, XIII. 6; Bithynica, 19; Polyaenus, II. 30.3.

53. Xen. Anab. IV. 7.4; V. 2.28-29; VI. 1.9-10; VII. 8.15; Hell. III. 2.16; III. 4.24; IV. 1.1; IV. 1.3; IV. 1.21.; Xen, Agesilaus, III .4; Plut, Agesilaus, 11; Isocrates, Paneg. IV. 144; see also Parke, GMS, p. 45 and Best, pp. 14 - 15.

54. Best, p. 15 and c.f. Xen. Anab. VII. 8.15.

55. Beazley, ARV, p. 156, no. 54.

56. Best, p. 14,but see note 81.

57. Herod. VII. 157 -162.

58. c.f. Thuc. IV. 94.

59. Herod. VII. 169 and .171.

60. Herod. VII. 173 - 174.

61. On the topography of this region see Burn, pp. 341 -344,with map on p. 340,and also Hignett, pp. 105 -110, with Map 2. See also on this expedition : N. Robertson, The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C, JHS 96 (1976) pp. 100 - 120.

62. See p. 100f.

63. For general accounts of the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium : see Hignett, chapter 2 and 3, pp. 105 - 192; J.F. Lazenby : The Strategy of the Greeks in the Opening Campaign of the Persian War, Hermes 92 (1964), p. 264f; Burn, chapters 18 and 19, pp. 378 -422; and c.f. A.W. Gomme, A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy, JHS 53 (1933),pp. 16 - 24 and P. Connolly , Greece and Rome at War (1981), pp.13 - 24.

64. Herod. VII. 202 - 203.

65. Burn, p. 379, n. 2 and p. 421.

66. HW2, p. 231,on VII. 229.1. I am not of course arguing that helots did not perform menial tasks, see Herod. VI. 80; IX. 80.1 and also Xen. Hell. IV. 5.14; IV. 8.39.

67. See p. 100f.

68. Burn, p. 379,with n. 2. I follow R. Hope-Simpson (Leonidas' Decision, Phoenix 26 [1972] p. 8, n. 41) in doubting Burn's assertion.

69. See p. 100f.

70. Wallace, Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots and Arcadia, JHS 74 (1954), pp. 32 - 35.

71. HW2, p. 231,on VII. 229.1.

72. Herod. VII. 215 - 218; c.f. Thuc. VII. 79.1 - 2.

73. c.f. Burn, P. 409.

74. Thuc. IV. 100.1; Diodorus actually mentions the presence of 1,000 Malians in the force of Leonidas (Diodorus XI. 4.7). On the Malians, see Burn,p. 380.

75. HW2, p. 231, on VII. 229.1; J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (1985), p. 56.

76. Grundy, p. 273.

77. Mycenaeans : Pausanias, X. 20.1.

78. There may well be anti-Theban bias in Herodotus' account of the final battle.

79. Lazenby, Spartan Army, p. 93 also suggests the presence of a contingent of 'perioikoi', but Herod. makes no mention of these.

80. c.f. Simpson, Phoenix 1972, p. 8, n. 41 : "The epitaph, being in verse, could hardly be expected to give a precise record of those who took part". See also HW2, p. 241, on VIII. 25.

81. Burn, p.379.

82. HW2, p.222, on VII. 202.

83. See S. Marinatos, Thermopylae (Athens, 1951).

84. c.f. Plut, Aristeides, XIV. 5; see also Best, Fig. 1b - The bare - headed peltast on this Little-Master cup holds a javelin which appears to have spiked butt.

85. Herod. VII. 266.1-2; Plutarch, Moralia, 225, B (6). c.f. also Aristophanes, Wasps, 1084.

86. Herod. VIII. 51.2 - 53.

87. Plutarch, Themistocles, 14.1; Troizen Inscription, line 25 (T.I. = Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, no. 23, pp. 48 - 49).

88. Aeschylus, Persae, 459 - 461.; Heord. VIII. 95; Paus. I. 36.2.

89. c.f. pp. 91 - 92.

90. Persae, 556; c.f. Thuc. III. 98.1.

91. Burn, pp. 496 - 7.

92. See D.M. Robinson, Excavations at Olynthos, Part X : Metal and Minor Miscellaneous Finds (1941), pp. 378, 383 - 388 (types D, D1), with Pls CXX (bottom row) and CXXI (top row) and c.f. Snodgrass, AAG, Fig. 35.

93. Robinson, Olynthos X, p. 379, Types A, A1, A2 (possibly Oriental), Type F (possibly Oriental).

94. On this perplexing question see Snodgrass, AAG, p. 81 and see p. 69.

95. On the total see pp. 106 - 107.

96. c.f. HW2, p. 323 (Thespians classed as light-armed) and p. 300, on IX. 30 "being without hopla, they fought as ψιλοί".

97. On the 'perioikoi' and retainers, see Hignett, p. 285.

98. Lazenby, pp. 100 - 102.

99. On mass mobilization of helots in 418 B.C, see Thuc. V. 64.2.

100. Hignett, p. 280 - see also p. 437.

101. The conclusion also of HW2, p. 298, on IX. 28.2.

102. H. Delbrück, Geshichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Vol. I (19 20), p. 36; Hignett, pp. 48 - 49; Burn, pp. 505 and 511.

103. c.f. Spartan light-armed troops in Tyrtaeus, see p. 54f.

104. Plut, Aristeides, XIV. 5; c.f. Herod. IX. 22.2.

105. In emergencies the javelin could also be used as a stabbing weapon - see CVA Munich I; 3H, Pl. 9.3.

106. Lazenby, pp. 100 - 102 and Hignett p. 48; see also HW2, p. 298, on IX. 28.2 and W.W. How, Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian War, JHS Vol. 43 (1923), p. 121.

107. Burn, p. 521; Lazenby, p. 102.

108. See Delbrück, p. 34; J. Kromager and G. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (1928), IV, p. 88f.

109. See pp. 89 - 90; c.f. HW2, p. 298, on IX. 28.2 (ἐφύλασσον).

110. Hignett, pp. 48 - 49; c.f. Onasander ref on p. 18.

111. HW2, p. 298, on IX. 28.2 - note the view of K.W. Krüger.

112. c.f. Thuc. VI. 69.2.

113. see also pp. 92 - 93 and p. 105f.

114. D.J.F. Hill, Grecian and other Bow-shots, Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 6(1963), p. 29; c.f. W. McLeod, Phoenix 19 (1965) p. 4 (McLeod further hypothesises that the Athenian archers used the Scythian type of bow).

115. HW2, p. 295, on IX. 22.1. But W. How in Arms, Tactics and Strategy in the Persian War, JHS 43 (1923), p. 131, suggests that Cretan bowmen were used to supplement native Athenian archers; c.f. also Burn, pp. 439 - 440.

116. c.f. p. 99.

117. c.f. p. 99.

118. G. Rawlinson, History of Herodotus, Vol. 4 (1862), p. 323, n. 4.

119. Hauvette, Hérodote, historein des guerres médiques (1894), p. 461; E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altherthums Vol. 3 (1901), pp. 360 and 480; J.A.R. Munro, Some Observations on the Persian Wars, JHS 24 (1904), p. 147; R.Macan, Herodotus (1908), on IX. 60, note 14; Hignett, p. 49.

120. Munro, JHS 1904, p. 147. 200 ships : see Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, no. 23, pp. 48 - 49, lines 14 and 37; c.f. Herodotus VIII. 44.1 (180).

121. A.E. Wardman, Tactics and Tradition of the Persian Wars, Historia 8 (1959), pp. 49 - 60 (esp. pp. 55 - 60).

122. Wardman, op.cit, p. 58.

123. Wardman, op.cit, p. 60.

124. See Wardman, op.cit, p. 57, n. 20 and p. 58 on the possible pro-Athenian bias of Pausanias' message.

125. Burn, p. 517.

126. For archers operating behind the shields of hoplites of the front rank c.f. Scythians (chapter 3).
The Persians did not fight in phalanx formation but rather loosely, so that there was not so urgent a need for a very tight formation on the part of the Greeks.

127. Plutarch, Moralia (Sayings of the Spartans), 234 E (46); c.f. Herod. IX. 72; Plut, Aristeides, 27.7. Note that Callicrates was killed while sitting in the ranks - this indicates that the Spartans probably knelt down behind their shields to reduce their losses due to Persian missile-fire.

128. Herod. IX.100 - 106.1. For general accounts of the battle see Grundy, p. 524; Hignett, p. 256f and Burn, pp. 547 - 551.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. cf. Thuc.VII.81.4-5.

2. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, pp.73 - 76, no.33 = IG1², 929. On the four archers see Wernicke, Hermes 26 (1891), p.71.

3. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, pp.89 - 94, no.40 = IG1².10 and cf. IG1².11; .12/13a.

4. Thuc.I.49.1; on the site of the bay of Cheimerion see: A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol.1 (1945), pp.165 - 166; 179 - 181.

5. see p.42.

6. Thuc.I.60.1.

7. Thuc.I.63.1.

8. 'Hippotoxotai': this is the first reference to Athenian 'hippotoxotai'. They were probably 200 in number, since there were almost certainly 1,000 ordinary cavalry (Aristophanes, Equites,225). There are two other references in Thucydides to 'hippotoxotai' in Athenian forces (V.84.1; VI.94.4) and one to Thracian 'hippotoxotai' (II.96.1); see also D.W. Bradeen,for the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, The Athenian Agora Vol.17, Inscriptions - The Funerary Monuments (1974), p.27, Stele C, col.II. and Xenophon, Hipparch. 9.3.

   It is uncertain whether the 'hippotoxotai' in Athenian forces were Athenian citizens or barbarians,such as Scythians or Thracians: see Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig. 76; CVA Deutschland 22 (Berlin 3), Taf.104.3 and.4 (depictions of 'hippotoxotai' dressed as Greeks).

   B. Graef, Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen (1909), Pl.31 = Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig.58; Snodgrass, AAG, Fig.40 (barbarian'hippotoxotai').

9. Commanders: Thuc.III.98.1; differentiation on stelai: Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, pp.73 - 76, no.33.

10. Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia,24.3.

11. Gomme (HCT.2, p.41,on II.13.8) takes the view that they were mainly Athenian citizens.

12. see pp.111 - 112.

13. Vos, pp.68 - 69.

14. see p.81.

15. IG1² 944; see J. Hondius, Mnemosyne 49 (1921), pp.202 - 204; A. Raubitschek, Hesperia 12 (1943), pp.25 - 27; B. Meritt, Hesperia 21 (1952), pp.340 - 41 (no.1) and Pl.87; Bradeen, The Athenian Agora, Vol.17, pp.20 - 21 (no.17).

16. Frag e: D.W. Bradeen, Hesperia 33 (1964), pp.35 - 38, no.9,with Pl.5; Bradeen, The Athenian Agora, Vol.17, pp.17 - 18, no.14.

17. B. Meritt, Hesperia 21 (1952), pp.341 - 342, no.2,with Pl.88; Bradeen, The Athenian Agora, Vol.17, pp.25 - 27, no.22 (stele C, col.II).

18. Thuc.II.23.2.

19. Thuc.II.29.5; on the general role of the Thracian peltast in the Peloponnesian War see Best, op.cit., pp.17 - 35.

20. Thuc.II.31.2; on the capabilities of light-armed troops for ravaging see: V.D. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (1983), pp.21 - 25, 30, 36, 69, 70, 72, 74, 81, 84, 104 - 106, 114, 124 - 145.

21. Thuc.II.79.

22. HCT 2, p.213, note on II.79.4.

23. Thuc.II.79.4.

24. Thuc.II.79.7.

25. Best, p.20.
26. HCT 2, pp.213 - 4,on II.79.7.
27. Thuc.II.81.
28. cf. Korfmann, p.40.
29. On the topographical position of Stratus see HCT 2, p.215,on II.80.8.
30. see WACG, p.23.
31. Thuc.III.2.2.
32. see pp.114 - 115.
33. Thuc.III.27.2.
34. Thuc.III.17.4.
35. see chpt.7, n. 72.
36. Thuc.II.4.3.
37. see p.134.
38. W. Rüstow and H. Köchly, Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens von der ältesten Zeit bis auf Pyrrhos (1852), p.131, n.63.
39. Thuc.III.20.3.
40. McLeod, Phoenix 19 (1965), p.5.
41. Thuc.III.22 - 24.2.
42. Thuc.III.34.3.
43. Thuc.III.73.
44. Thuc. III.94f.
45. Thuc.III.94.4.
46. Thuc.III.95.2.
47. Thuc.III.95.3f. The exact site of Aegitium is not known but it was probably situated on one of the rugged mountains south of Mornos; see HCT 2, pp.405 - 406,on III.97.2.
48. Thuc.III.98.4.
49. cf. Aristotle, Politics,V.2.12, 1303 b.12.
50. Thuc.III.98.1.
51. Persae, 556.
52. On these operations see Hammond, Military Operations in Amphilochia in SGH, pp. 471 - 485 = (first published as) The Campaigns in Amphilochia during the Archidamian War, BSA 37 (1940), pp.128 - 140.

    On the topography of the Amphilochian campaign see also HCT 2, pp.426 - 428.
53. Thuc.III.105 - 106.
54. Thuc.III.107.1.
55. HCT 2, p.419,on III.107.1.
56. Thuc.III.107.3.
57. Thuc.III.107.4.
58. HCT 2, p.420,on III.107.4.
59. Hammond, SGH, pp.479 and 483; Gomme (HCT 2, p.420,on III.107.4) takes a different view of the constitution of Demosthenes' force.

60. Thuc.III.111.3: the Peloponnesians stole away under truce, leaving their Ambraciot allies to be slaughtered. The Acarnanians at first thought that they were running away without making a truce and pursued them. Some of the generals tried to keep them back and tell them what had been arranged but the Acarnanians suspected treachery and one soldier (presumably an Acarnanian) actually threw a javelin at them. cf. Thuc.II.81.1 and VII.31.5.

61. On Idomene, see Hammond, SGH, pp.482 - 483 and HCT 2, pp.426 - 427.

62. The passages Thuc.III.98.1 - 3 and III.112.6 - 7 display similar terminology.

63. On this campaign, see J.B. Wilson, Pylos 425 B.C. (1979).

64. Thuc.IV.8.

65. Thuc.IV.9.1.

66. Thuc.IV.9.2.

67. Thuc.IV.28.4; on the question of whether the troops from Lemnos and Imbros were peltasts see Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1; Lemnos and Imbros originally lay within the Thracian sphere of influence.

68. cf. H.-P. Stahl, Thukydides, die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess, Zetemata 40 (1966), p.151, n.76; Best, p.21.

69. Best, pp.21 - 22.

70. see p.130f.

71. see Wilson, op.cit., pp.106 - 109 on the Spartan dispositions and the Athenian landing places.

72. On the 800 archers see HCT 3, p.474, note on IV.32.2; cf. Wilson, op.cit., p.105.

73. On the equipment of these crude 'psiloi' see HCT 3, p.475, on IV.32.2.

74. See Wilson, op.cit., pp.104 - 105. By his total of about 8030 (p.105) I assume that he thinks that around 72 ships actually took part in the landing.

75. Pausanias, IV.26.1.

76. On the position of the Athenian hoplites see Wilson, op.cit., p.113.

77. Thuc.IV.33.1 - 2.

78. On the verb ἀκροβολίζομαι and the inferred presence of light-armed helots, I follow Wilson, op.cit., pp.115 - 116.

79. see p.100f.

80. Lazenby, p.119; Wilson, op.cit., p.116.

81. Wilson, op.cit., p.116.

82. The helots, like their counterparts at Plataea, were almost certainly not armed with bows but probably with javelins and stones - see p.100f.

83. Thuc.IV.34.1.

84. Thuc.IV.34.3.

85. On the position of the fort and Mt. Elias, see Wilson, op.cit., pp.117 - 123 and map D (with p. 146).

86. Thuc.IV.35 - 36.

87. Paus.IV.26.1.

88. Spartan losses: Thuc.IV.38.5.
Athenian losses: Thuc.IV.38.5 and cf. IG1² 949 which has been considered to be a list of dead at Pylos; G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte (1893 - 1904), Vol.3, p.1109.5; HCT 3, p.478, on IV.38.5 and pp.492 - 493, on IV.44.6.

89. Thuc.IV.40.2.

90. see chapter 10, passim.

91. see p.106.

92. see WACG, p.22.

93. Thuc.IV.48.2.

94. Thuc.IV.66.

95. Thuc.IV.67.2.

96. see Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1. He thinks that the 'peripoloi' were light-armed troops and "inlcuded poorer citizens who were supporting themselves on the pay (cf. Aristophanes, Aves, 1367)"; see also G. Busolt - H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde in Müller's Handbuch (1920 - 6) Vol.2, p.1195, notes 2 and 3; HCT 3, p.529,on IV.67.2; cf. Thuc.VIII.92.2 and 92.5; Aristophanes, Aves, 1174 - 9; Lysias, XIII.71; Eupolis, fr.341; Aischines,II.167; Xenophon, Poroi, 4.47, 52.

97. Thuc.IV.72.2; see WACG, p.23.

98. Thuc.IV.89.

99. Thuc.IV.90.1. The 'xenoi' were probably also used for the building of the fortification walls - see HCT 3,p.558,on IV.90.1. The more wealthy metics were possibly armed as hoplites.

100. HCT 3, p.559,on IV.90.4.

101. Thuc.IV.90.4.

102. Thuc.IV.93.3.

103. P.A. Seymour, Note on the Boiotian League, CR 36 (1922),p.70 and Further Note on the Boiotian League, CR 37 (1923),p.63.

104. Thuc.IV.93.4.

105. HCT 3, p.564,on IV.94.1. For a terracotta figure of a 'skeuophoros' wearing a sword see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, p.63.

106. A. Καραμόπουλλος, Εἰκονες πολεμιστῶν τῆς ἐν Δηλίῳ μάχης, AE 1920, pp.1 - 36,with Pls.1 - 3; Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 132 - 133.

107. K. Demakopoulou and D. Konsola, Guide to the Archaeological Museum of Thebes (1981), p.75, no.56.

108. Demakopoulou and Konsola, op.cit., p.75, no.55.

109. Thuc.IV.96.2.

110. HCT 3, p. 566,on IV.96.2.

111. As we have seen, light-armed troops could operate on the steep, wooded hills of Aetolia and on the rugged and overgrown terrain of Sphacteria.

112. The presence of Athenian 'psiloi' on the battlefield is inferred from Thuc.IV.94.1 and IV.101.2.

113. Thuc.IV.101.2.

114. Gomme (HCT 3, p.571,on IV.101.2) does not hold this view.

115. HCT 3, p.571,on IV.100 - 1.

116. See chapter 1, n.33. Roman slingers shooting high at a city wall: Sir Ian Richmond, Trajan's Column (BSR 1982), p.41, Pl.16-cxiii and p.20, n.25.
Olynthus: Robertson, Olynthus X, pp.418 - 443; Snodgrass, AAG, p.117; Korfmann, p.41.

117. Foss, p.26.

118. Thuc.IV.100.

119. Thuc.IV.109.

120. see p.135f.

121. Brasidas' 'psiloi' and peltasts were almost certainly from Thrace or Chalcidice. The commander of the 'psiloi' was Lysistratus, an Olynthian; Olynthian peltasts are referred to on several occasions in Greek literature (see e.g. Thuc.II.79.4; Xen.Anab.I.2.6; Xen.Hell.V.2.14; V.3.6 and Parke, GMS, p.84, n.3). It is evident that both the Spartans and Athenians, when operating in or near Thrace, made use of troops from these regions which consisted largely of peltasts: e.g. -
Thuc.IV.109 Before the capture of Torone, Greek and barbarian cities on Acte contributed troops to Brasidas - did the barbarians contribute 'psiloi' and peltasts?
Thuc.IV.123.4 Brasidas had a force of 300 Chalcidian peltasts.
Thuc.IV.129.2 Nicias had 1,000 Thracian mercenaries and peltasts from Athenian allies in the neighbourhood of Chalcidice and possibly Thrace also.
Thuc.V.6.2 Cleon tried to get Thracian mercenaries and Macedonian troops.
Thuc.V.6.4. Brasidas had 1,500 Thracian mercentaries, Edonian (N.W. of Chalcidice) peltasts, and 1,000 Myrcinian and Chalcidian peltasts.

122. Thuc.IV.111.

123. Thuc.IV.112 - 116.

124. see chpt.5, n.121.

125. Thuc.IV.125.2.

126. Thuc.IV.125.3 - 4.

127. see p.121f.

128. see p.232f.

129. Thuc.IV.129.2.

130. Thuc.IV.129.4 - 5.

131. Thuc.V.6.1 - 2.

132. On the position of Cerdylium, see HCT 3, p.636, on V.6.3.

133. Thuc.V.6.4 - 5.
The Edonians were traditionally hostile to the Athenians: Herod.IX.75; Thuc.I.100.3, IV.102.2; Diodorus, XI.70.5; Paus.I.29.4.

On the town of Myrcinus and the possibility that a peltast force is alluded to in V.6.4, see HCT 3, pp.636 - 637.

134. Thuc.V.7.3 - 4. Delbrück (Strategie des Perikles (1890), p.206) and Busolt (Griechische Geschichte (1893 - 1904) Vol.3, p.1178) think that Cleon was intending to make his Macedonian and Thracian allies attack Brasidas' position on Cerdylium, using light-armed skirmishing tactics against his flanks and rear; this, as Gomme points out (HCT 3, pp.639 - 640, on V.7.3), is mere speculation.

135. Thuc.V.8.

136. see p.124f.

137. On the course of the main battle see Thuc.V.10 and HCT Vol.3, pp.647 - 8, on V.10.3 and pp.653 - 4, on V.10.12.

Diodorus (XII.74.2) has Cleon killed as he fights bravely against Brasidas.

138. Thuc.V.11.2.

139. IG1² 86; M.N. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions (1933), no.72.

140. Nothing is provided for the hoplite's servant, as it was in III.17.4; this is probably because the servant was lightly-armed and counted as a 'psilos'. On the rate of pay see HCT 4, p.56, on V.47.6.

141. Thuc.V.52.2.

142. Thuc.V.57.2.

143. see pp.247 - 248.

144. Thuc.V.64.5.

145. Thuc.V.71.

146. Thuc.V.73.4.

147. cf. Murray, Early Greece, p.122.

148. see pp.276 - 278.

149. IG1².97; Tod (GHI, no.76) comments "Mutilated though it is, this inscription may be confidently brought into connexion with the composition and dispatch of the famous Melian expedition" and "The agreements between certain phrases of our decree and the account given by the historian can hardly be due to mere coincidence".

150. B.D. Meritt in Robinson Studies Vol.2, pp.298 - 303. For inscriptional evidence for the possible use of peltasts in the mid 5th century to 430s B.C. see Bradeen in Phoros: Tribute to B.D. Meritt (1974), pp.29 - 35; Raubitschek, Grazer Beiträge 9 (1980), pp. 21 - 22 and cf. IG1³,60.

151. For the possible use of these 'hippotoxotai' see HCT 4, p.155, on V.54.1.

152. see p.245f.

153. Archers and slingers could be effective against cavalry:
Archers: Herod.IX.22.1; Xen.Hell.IV.7.6.
Slingers: Diodorus, XV.85.3 (Mantinea 362 B.C.). The Athenian cavalry suffered badly due to Thessalian 'sphendonetai'. See Korfmann, p.40 - a Spanish conquistador comments on Peruvian slingers: "With the sling they propel a large stone with such force that it could kill a horse."
cf. Best, p.27, n.33: "It is remarkable that Nikias had asked for hoplites, archers, and slingers, but not for javelin-throwers and peltasts."

154. Cretan archers: see pp.58 - 59 for early history and cf. Ctesias, Persica, 26.
On the use of Cretan mercenary archers in the Sicilian Expedition see also Thuc.VI.43 and VII.57.9. The Peloponnesian War did not involve Crete, except for a minor Athenian intervention in 429 B.C. (Thuc.II.85.5f). This may have been because the Cretan cities, which were dependent economically on a subject population (perioikoi), could not afford to take part in a war which might weaken Crete and so spark off a revolt of the 'perioikoi'.

For Cretan archers in the later Classical Period see Xen.Anab.I.2.9; III.3.7; III.4.17; IV.2.28; V.2.32; Hell.IV.2.16; IV.7.6.

On Cretan archers see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, p.45 with p.49 (Fig.) - based on M. Guarducci, Inscriptiones Creticae, Vol.2, vi, 7, p.88.

Cretan coins frequently portray the bow, quiver and arrowhead: see B.V. Head, Historia Nummorum (1911) [some of the dates are not accurate]:

1 Aptera (p.458): the half-drachma (c.400-300 B.C.) shows the bow. Later bronze coinage has an arrowhead motif.

2 Ceraea (p.460): coinage of the third and second centuries B.C. portrays an arrowhead and a spearhead within a wreath.

3 Knossos: coinage of period c.350-200 B.C. depicts a square labyrinth with a spearhead or arrowhead on one side (p.461, Fig.243) and a quiver with a strap and a quiver with a bow (p.463).

4 Cydonia: stater (c.400-300 B.C.) portraying a naked archer stringing his bow (p.463) and tetradrachma (c.200-167 B.C.) depicting the head of Artemis and a bow and quiver (p.464).

5 Eleutherna: coins (c.450-300 B.C.) showing Apollo and Artemis with the bow (p.464f) and others (c.400-300 B.C.) containing an arrowhead motif (p.465).

6 Hyrtacina: coins (c.400-300 B.C.) with arrowhead motif (p.469).

7 Lisus: fourth century coinage depicts a bow and quiver (p.471).

8 Phaestus: coinage of the period c.430-300 B.C. shows Heracles with the bow and quiver (p.471).

9 Polyrhenium: coinage of the period c.330-280 B.C. depicts an arrowhead and bow (p.475).

10 Praesus: coinage of the period c.450-400 B.C. portrays Heracles with the bow and of the period c.400-148 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.475).

11 Priansus: coinage of the period c.430-200 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.476).

12 Rhithymna: coinage of the period c.400-300 B.C. shows Apollo with the bow (p.477).

13 Tarra: fourth century coinage contains an arrowhead motif (p.478).

14 Tylisus: coinage of the period c.400-300 B.C. contains an arrowhead motif (p.478).

155. K.J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte [2nd edition 1912-1927] Vol.2, p.290) questions the text and thinks that 700 is a large number for a force which achieved so little.

In 412 B.C. the Peloponnesians tried to win over the island of Rhodes and one of the reasons given by Thucydides for this move is its large supply of land forces - the Peloponnesians possibly wanted to get supplies of specialist light-armed infantry, such as slingers, from the island (Thuc.VIII.44.1).

There were Rhodians who acted as slingers in the army of the Ten Thousand: see p.209f.

156. Meiggs and Lewis, GHI, p.237, no.78 = I.G.1^2.99.5; cf. I.G.1^2.97.17 and Bradeen, The Athenian Agora 17, p.178, no.1028.

157. Lemnians and Imbrians - see Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1; cf. Thuc.VII.27.1-2.

158. see pp.149-150.

159. Thuc.VI.64.1.

160. cf. At the battle of Bannockburn in 1314,Keith with 500 Scottish cavalry charged the large force of English archers,who were deployed against the Scots' left flank,and easily routed them; this action took place on level ground. See P.Christison, Bannockburn (5th edition, 1974), p.25.

161. For what would happen if they broke their formation see Herod.IX.69.

162. On the 'plaision' formation see HCT 4, p.343,on VI.67.1.

163. On the Syracusan light-armed troops and their disposition see Thuc.VI.67.2.

164. see p.179.

165. Ranges: see Introduction, passim.

166. cf. Modern day rioters throwing stones and bricks can severely harass French and British riot police carrying large perspex shields and protective helmets.

167. On Epipolae see HCT 4, p.470f.

168. On the position of Labdalon see HCT 4, pp.473-4.

169. On the Athenian wall and first Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.473-6.

170. Thuc.VI.100.2-3.

171. On the harbour area see HCT 4, p.478f.

172. On the second Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.481-2.

173. Thuc.VI.102.2.

174. Thuc.VII.1.5.

175. On the third Syracusan counter-wall see HCT 4, pp.476-478.

176. Thuc.VII.4.6.

177. Thuc. VII. 5.3.

178. For the positioning of the Syracusan 'akontistai' and cavalry in this battle, see Thuc. VII.6.2.

179. Thuc.VII.11.2.

180. On the 'machaira' see Snodgrass, AAG, pp.97 - 98, with Fig.50.
Thracian peltasts armed primarily with javelins: see e.g. CVA Deutschland 3 (München 1); 3H, Taf.9.3.
Thracian peltatsts with thrusting-spears: see Best, Pls.3,4,7,8 and A and C.

181. see p.158.

182. Best, p.28.

183. On the pay of the peltasts see Best, pp.27-28.
On Dieitrephes see HCT 4, p.409, on VII.29.1. Pausanias apparently saw a bronze statue of Dieitrephes struck by arrows in Athens (Paus.I.23,3f) - was he wounded by Theban archers after the attack on Mycalessus (Thuc.VII.30.2)?

184. Thuc.VII.29; on the apparent revulsion of Thucydides, see HCT 4, p.410, on VII.30.3.

185. see McLeod, Phoenix 19 (1965), p.1. For a grave stele (first half of 4th century B.C.) of a hunter with a bow in the Archaeological Museum of Thebes, see Demakopoulou and Konsola, op.cit., Fig. 25.

186. Thuc.VII.37.2; on the position of the temple of Olympian Zeus, see HCT 4, p.480.

187. Thuc.VII.37.3.

188. cf. p.7f.

189. Thuc.VII.40.5.

190. Thuc.VII.42.

191. Thuc.VII.43.2.

192. HCT 4, p.422, on VII.43.2. B.Jowett, Thucydides (1881) Vol.1, p.515.

193. Diodorus, XIII.11.3.

194. HCT 4, p.422, on VII.43.2.

195. cf. At Bannockburn the English archers, who operated in open order six paces apart and could lay down a concentrated barrage, were quickly routed by the Scottish cavalry.

196. cf. Thuc.VII.48.5.

197. The Athenians were followed by the Lemnians and Imbrians, who were colonists and may have been influenced by Thracian military tactics (Best, p.21, n.13 and Parke, GMS, p.18, n.1). Rhodians also accompanied the expedition - they were armed as slingers (VI.43). The Messenians, inhibitants of Naupactus, were also present and there is a possibility that they were equipped as slingers (see Pausanias, IV.26.1 and IV.11.2f, on Messenian slingers). The Cretans and Aetolians served Athens as mercenaries. The Acarnanians, who had 'akontistai', 'sphendonetai' and possibly also 'toxotai', served with Demosthenes (VII. 31.5 and VII.57.10). The forces supplied by the people of Metapontum and Thurii (VII. 57.11) consisted of javelin-throwers (VII.33.4; VII.35.1). The Iapygians mentioned in VII.57.11 were mercenaries armed as javelin-throwers (VII.33.4). In VII.58 Thucydides informs us about the allies of the Syracusans. The Camarinaeans mentioned in VII.58.1 provided a force of javelin-throwers and archers (VII.33.1) and the Geloans also mentioned in VII.58.1 sent a force of javelin-throwers (VII.33.1) Ambraciots, possibly armed as javelin-throwers, also accompanied the Lacedaemonian force.

198. Thuc.VII.60.4; VII.70.5.

199. Thuc.VII.73 - 74.

200. On the probable mass burial of Athenian dead in the Sicel rock-tombs on Plemmyrium, see Paolo Orsi, Scoperte di antichità nel territorio Siracusano (xvi, Avola; xix Not a), Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità (1891), pp.345-348.

201. Thuc.VII.78.2.

202. Thuc.VII.78.3.

203. see p.111.

204. Thuc.VII.82.

205. Thuc.VII.84.1.

206. Thuc.VII.84.3-5.

207. Thuc.VII.85.

208. Thuc.VIII.25.1.

209. I have inferred that the dead Lacedaemonians were hoplites from the 'hopla' taken from the corpses (VIII.71.2).

210. see chapter 5, n.96.

211. cf. Xen.Hell.I.7.28.

212. see pp.114 - 115.

213. IG 12.8 (1909), no.402.

214. Thuc.VIII.44; Diodorus,XIII.38.5 and XIII.45.1.

215. cf. Xen.Hell.I.1.2-8; Xenophon does not mention missile weapons.

216. On the battle of Cyzicus, see Diodorus,XIII.50.1 - 51.7; Xen.Hell.I.1.14-18.
See also: R.J. Littmann, The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus, Transactions of the American Philological Association 99 (1968), pp.265-72; A.Andrewes, Notion and Kyzikos: The Sources Compared, JHS 102 (1982), pp.15 - 25 (esp.p.19f).

217. see pp.173-4.

218. Xen.Hell.I.1.18. On the sources see Andrewes, Notion and Kyzikos (passim).

219. Xen.Hell.I.1.33-34; cf. Diodorus,XIII.72.4; Thuc.VIII.71.2.

220. Best, p.36 suggests that the 'psiloi' on this occasion may have been non-Athenian; this suggestion rests on no literary evidence.

221. Xen.Hell.I.1.18.

222. Xen.Hell.I.1.34; Diodorus,XIII.52.1 gives 1,000 hoplites, 100 cavalry and 30 instead of 50 triremes.

223. Xen.Hell.I.2.1, on Thrasyllus' make-shift peltasts see Best, pp.36-41.

224. e.g. Thuc.: IV.9.1; IV.32.2; VIII.17.1; Xen.Hell.I.1.24.

225. see pp.128-9.

226. Xen.Hell.I.2.2.

227. Xen.Hell.I.2.2-3.

228. Best, p.38.

229. cf. p.9.

230. cf. e.g. p.125, p.141f.

231. Xen.Hell.I.2.7.

232. Xen.Hell.I.2.8-9; Diodorus,XIII.64.1.

233. On the attack on Selymbria see Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30.2-5; Best, p.48.

234. see p.141f.

235. cf. Xen.Hell.I.3.10; Diodorus,XIII.66.4; Plut.Alc.30.4-5.

236. cf. WACG, p.23.

237. Diodorus,XIII.73.2.

238. On this question see: HCT 1, pp.10-15; G.E.M. de Ste Croix, Origins of the Peloponnesian War (1972), pp.190 - 196; A.J. Holladay, Hoplites and Heresies, JHS 102 (1982), pp.97 - 103.

239. cf. Aristotle, Politics, V.2.12, 1303 b 12.

240. Holladay, op.cit., p.98.

241. Holladay, op.cit., p.99.

242. Herod.V.63; Ath.Pol.19.5; in Geometric art the fight beside a beached ship is a common motif, see p.42,with notes 142 and 143.

243. cf. the destruction of part of the Persian fleet in stormy weather off the Magnesian coast: Burn, pp.388 - 390; Hignett, pp.169 - 173.

244. Thuc.I.107.3.

245. Holladay (Hoplites and Heresies, p.98) thinks that the garrisons of these forts were probably hoplites. See also Chandler, The North-West Frontier of Attica, JHS 46 (1926), pp. 1-21; HCT 1, pp.13 - 14.

246. HCT 1, p.13.

247. Holladay, op.cit., p.101. The Peisistratids at Athens, Polycrates on Samos,and Gelon at Syracuse,had developed units of specialist light-armed troops.

248. see p.263.

249. cf.Ath.Pol.4.2; 7.3 and 7.4.

250. HCT 1, p.15.

251. G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of his Age (1911), p.311,with n.3; HCT 1, p.15.

252. cf. Holladay, op.cit., p.103.

253. When Sparta's military affairs were not going well Brasidas used 'perioikoi' and liberated helots as hoplites - but these were used for distant campaigns where they could pose no threat to Sparta's internal security.

CHAPTER SIX

1. General accounts of the Thirty and their expulsion: J. K. Anderson, Xenophon (1974) pp. 47-60; P. Krentz, The Thirty at Athens (1982), esp. chapt 5 'Civil War' (pp. 89-101).

2. Diodorus XIV . 32.1; Aeschines 2 (On the Embassy). 148.

3. Xen. Hell. II. 4.2; Diodorus XIV. 32.1; Arist. Ath.Pol. 37

4. Xen. Hell. II. 4.2

5. Xen. Hell. 4.4. - 7; cf Diodorus XIV. 33.1

6. Hoplite armies did not usually press pursuits after a victory but contented themselves with taking possession of the battlefield, stripping the corpses and setting up a trophy - see Murray, Early Greece, p.122; cf Plut., Moralia, 228E (Lycurgus 30).

7. Xen. Hell. II. 4.7; confiscation of arms Xen. Hell. II. 3.20

8. see WACG, pp. 23, 104-106; see eg. Thuc. VI. 64.1; Aeneas Tacticus 16.4-7; Xen. Hell. V. 3.1-2.

9. Xen. Hell. II. 4.10; Diodorus XIV. 33.2.

10. cf Thuc. VII. 79.2.

11. Thrasybulus in this speech does not make the normal exhortation to the hoplites to stand firm.

12. Xen. Hell. II. 4.12.

13. Xen. Hell. II. 4.19.

14. Xen. Hell. II. 4.25; of Lysias, XXI, 15-16.

15. Xen. Hell. II. 4.25-26.

16. Xen. Hell. II. 4.27.

17. Xen. Hell. II. 4.30.

18. Xen. Hell. II. 4.31; on Pausanias' attitude to the exiles see: A. P. Dorjahn, On Pausanias' Battle with Thrasybulus, C. J. 20 (1925) pp. 368-9; G. Cawkwell, C Q 26(1976) p.74f.

19. Xen. Hell. II. 4.31f.

20. On the Spartan 'morai' see Lazenby, pp. 5-9 and cf Xen. Hell. VI. 4.17.

21. Xen. Hell. II. 4.34.

22. Best, p. 43; see pp. 126-133.

23. D. W. Bradeen (for the American School of Classical Studies at Athens), The Athenian Agora, Vol 17: Inscriptions - The Funerary Monuments (1974), no. 1023. Date of the inscription: Bradeen, p. 178 - but note that the slanting nu would seem to suggest a date in the third quarer of the fifth century.

24. [Λακεδαιμ]ονιοις (?)

25. On this tomb see: La Rue Van Hook, The Tomb of the Spartans in the Kerameikos, A J A 36(1932) pp. 290-292; F. Willemsen, Zu den Lakedämoniergräbern in Kerameikes, A M 92 (1977), pp. 117-157; Pritchett, GSW IV, pp. 133-134.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Snodgrass, AAG, pp.109-110; see also J.K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (1970), pp.13-42.

2. see e.g. A.H. Smith, Catalogue of Greek Sculptures in the British Museum (1901) Vol.II, nos. 866,869,872,931.

3. see pp.251-2.

4. see e.g. CVA Deutschland 18 (Altenburg 2); Taf.70.6; G.M.A. Richter, Catalogue of the Greek Sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (1954), no.82 = MTPAX, Pl.10; Beazley, ARV, p.1471, no.3 = MTPAX, Pl.19; Demakopoulou and Konsola, op.cit.,pp.74-76,with Pl.39; Smith,op.cit.,vol.2, no.869 = MTPAX, Pl.13A.

5. see e.g. CVA Österreich (Wien, Kunsthist Museum 2) III 1; Taf.94.5.
CVA Italy 37 (Ferrara-Mus.Naz.1); Tav.38.1
CVA Italy 60 (Chiusi-Mus.Arch.Naz.2); Tav.38.1
CVA Yougoslavia 4 (Sarajevo); Pl.44.1 and 44.2

   See also Beazley,ARV,pp.598, no.1; 1016, no.42; 1042, no.4; 1043, no.4 and O.Benndorf and G.Niemann, Das Heroön von Gjölbashi-Trysa (1889), Pls.xi.B, block 8; xvi.A, block 3.

6. Best, Fig.6.

7. Snodgrass, AAG, p.110.

8. J. Roy, The Mercenaries of Cyrus, Historia 16 (1967), p.307.

9. Xen,Anab,IV.2.28.

10. see chapter 5, n.154.

11. Parke, GMS, p.26.

12. see Xen,Anab, I.8.9; I.8.19; I.8.20; II.1.16.

13. On the battle of Cunaxa see Anderson, Xenophon, pp.98-112.

14. cf p.87; cf also Xen.Anab. VII.8.18,where the Greeks marched in a curved line (lit.circle) in order to keep their shields facing the Persian archers and slingers.

15. Cretan arrowhead: Snodgrass, EGAW, pp.144-8 and AAG,pp.81, 108,with Pl.35.

16. For the Cretan use of the composite bow at this period see Snodgrass, AAG, p.108.

17. Xen.Anab.III.4.15.

18. Xen.Anab.III.4.30-31.

19. Xen.Anab.IV.1.6.

20. Xen.Anab.IV.1.18 and IV.2.28; cf Diodorus XIV.27.3.

21. Special armour-piercing arrows called 'Bodkins', which were fired by the long-bow, were produced in Medieval times (e.g. Tower of London: Arms Collection - invent.nos. XI,95f, 95g, 95h, 95i, 95j) - the 'Bodkin' was a long and thin head.

   It is probable that ancient Greek arrows could at close range penetrate shields and armour: on a Chalcidian vase kept in the Museum of the Hermitage, Leningrad, the shield of a hoplite is portrayed with an arrow penetrating right through it; the Greek 'hippotoxotes' who has fired the arrow is equipped with what appears to be a composite bow (see Greenhalgh, EGW, Fig.76). Archaeological evidence would also suggest that Greek metallic armour could be penetrated by certain types of arrowheads - the Crowe corslet from Olympia has two small square holes in it,which were probably made by narrow, four-sided arrowheads (On the corslet see H. Hoffmann, Early Cretan Armourers (1972), Pl.25a; on the type of arrowhead which would make such holes: Snodgrass, EGAW, p.154 (type 4)). cfp.12f.

22. Xen.Anab.IV.3.2; IV.3.18; some of the Greeks were wounded: IV.3.33-34.

23. Xen.Anab.IV.3.27-28.

24. Xen.Anab.IV.8.16-17.

25. Xen.Anab.V.2.12-15.

26. On Nereid Monument, see p.226.

27. J.L. Myres, The Amathus Bowl, JHS 53 (1933), pp.25-39.

28. c.f. Beazely, ABV 536,41 = Vos, Pl.8.Hoplite and archers (Scythian) stoop down among some shrubs - are they lying in ambush?

29. For a depiction of an archer with a shield see: CVA Switzerland 6 (Basel 2) III 1; Taf. 32.7 and cf Polybius,X.29.6 and X.30.9,where we learn that some Cretan troops were used in Antiochus' army as shield-bearers to provide cover for missile-troops. On the question of whether Cretan archers carried shields,see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, p.45,with p.50 (pl.).

30. cf. Xen.Anab.V.2.31.

31. Xen.Anab.V.4.22.

32. Xen.Anab.III.3.8-11.

33. see p.151,with n.155.

34. On Rhodian sling-shots (generally of a later date and in many cases undated) see: M. Michon in Bulletin de la Soc. nationale des Antiquaries de France, 65 (1894), pp.268-7 (some of the bullets are from Rhodes, others from Eleusis and Athens). A. Maiuri, Nuova silloge epigrafica di Rodi e Cos (1925), pp.249-252 (undated bullets from Camirus on Rhodes). M.Segre and G. Pugliese - Carratelli, Tituli Camirenses, Annuario 11-13 (1949-51), p.274f.

35. Olympia - Olympia, Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen (1890-1896), Vol.4, p.178; Marathon - see p.89.

36. Assyrian: Korfmann, p.36, top Fig: Balearic: Korfmann, p.39; Roman: Korfmann, p.36, bottom Fig.

37. Korfmann, p.40.

38. see p.203, cf Thuc.IV.32.3 - Demosthenes divided his strike-troops, who were almost certainly light-armed, into units of about 200 men.

39. J. Boardman, The Cretan Collection in Oxford (1961), p.124 and p.127, no.547f.

40. Xen.Anab.IV.8.18; cf pp.117-8.

41. see eg. Korfmann, p.36 (top Fig).

42. Xen.Anab.III.4.17.

43. cf. p.203.

44. see p.180f.

45. see Diodorus XIV.27.5.

46. see chapter 4, n.11.

47. It must have been quite common for slingers to have bags,in which they placed their projectiles: cf 1 Samuel 17,40 and Korfmann, p.34 (Plate) and p.36 (lower Fig.).

48. On the bullet,see C. Foss, A Bullet of Tissaphernes, JHS 95 (1975), pp.25-30,with Pl.5; on inscribed bullets,see Foss, pp.27-29 and Korfmann, p.39.

49. see F. Justi, Iranisches Namenbuch (1891), p.164 and Foss, pp.28-29.

50. Foss (p.29) suggests that they may have been Rhodians.

51. Xen.Hell.III.5.1; the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 7.5 makes Pharnabazus the satrap who sent Timocrates to Greece,and is probably a more trustworthy source than Xenophon.

52. see: Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum - von Aulock, Pamphylien, Taf.146-3 and Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the British Museum: Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia, lxxiif., pp.95-101; Barclay V. Head, Historia Nummorum (1911), p.700; C. Kraay. The Celenderis Hoard, Numismatic

Chronicle 1962, p.14; C. Kraay and M. Hirmer, Greek Coins (1966), p.362 and Pl.192; R.A.G. Carson, Coins of Greece and Rome (1971 edition), p.14 and Pl.25; C. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (1976), p.276f, esp. p.277, with n.5 and Pl.58, no. 1006.

For the etymology of the name Aspendus and its possible derivation from 'sphendone' see Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, p.277, n.5 and Foss, p.30, n.29; cf also G.E. Bean, Turkey's Southern Shore (1968), p.24.

53. see Head, op.cit., p.711; Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, pp.277-278 and Pl.58, no.1007. On the dating of the introduction of this series, see Numismatic Chronicle 1971, p.28f.

Other Greek cities which issued coins with depictions of slingers outside the lower time limit of this thesis: Aenis (Head, Historia Nummorum, p.292, with Fig.171); Nysa (Head, op.cit., p.654).

54. see p.9.

55. The main work on true peltasts in the army of the Ten Thousand is Best, Thracian Peltasts, pp.44-78. On Xenophon's terminology for the light-armed troops in the Anabasis, see Best, p.44f.

56. On the 'lochos' and 'lochagoi' in the army of the Ten Thousand see G. Nussbaum, The Captains in the Army of the Ten Thousand, Classica et Mediaevalia vol. 20 (1959), pp.18-29.

57. cf Xen.Anab.IV.2.28.

58. see J. Roy, The Mercenaries of Cyrus, Historia 16 (1967) pp.295 (taxiarchs), 305-307.

59. Xen.Anab.I.2.6. On peltasts from Aenis see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, Pl.J.2 with p.50 (reconstruction based on a javelin-thrower depicted on a 4th century coin from Aenis - Sekunda, p.53, coin D).

60. cf Xen.Anab.I.7.10. On the discrepancy in numbers see Parke, GMS, p.42 and Best, p.46.

61. Olynthus: Thuc II.79.4; Thrace: see Best, chapter 2 (passim).

62. On the Thracian peltasts, see Best, chapter 3 (passim); on Thessalian peltasts see H.D. Westlake, Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. (1935), pp.55f, 72, 106f, 110-112.

63. Best (Thracian Peltasts, pp.56-78) gives a somewhat disjointed case by case survey of the actions in which peltasts took part. I have attempted a brief thematic study of the military roles for which the 'peltastai' in the Greek force were used.

64. As in Thucydides, we find that ravaging parties of troops, when they had become fragmented into small groups, were vulnerable to attack; see Xen.Anab.I.2.25; III.5.2; V.1.6; V.1.17; VI.4.24.

65. Xen.Anab.I.8.5.

66. Xen.Anab.I.8.12-13.

67. Xen.Anab.I.10.7.

68. Xen.Anab.III.4.25-26.

69. Xen.Anab.III.2.36; III.3.6f; III.4.19f; III.4.26; VII.8.16 and cf Cyr.VI.3.3 and Hell. IV.3.4.

70. see J. Roy, op.cit., p.310 and n.91; MTPAX pp.30 and 46.

71. Roy (op.cit., p.310) thinks that they were not regularly armed as fighting troops.

72. Depictions of hoplites with their light-armed attendants:
CVA France 4 (Louvre) IIIHe; Pl.22.1.
Deutschland 48 (München 9); Taf.1.3.
Italy 59 (Chiusi - Mus.Arch.Naz.1); Tav.5.2.
New Zealand 1; Pl.21.12-14.
Netherlands 4 (Leiden 2) IIIJ; Pl.106.8-9.

Yougoslavia 4 (Sarajevo) Pl.22.4-6.
Österreich (Wien, Kunsthist Mus.2) III 1; Taf.94.5 and 95.1.
Belgique 2; III 1d; Pl.10.3c.
Deutschland 6 (München), Taf.87.2 and 88.2.
GB 3 (Oxford 1) III 1; Pl.29.3 and 30.3.
GB 7 (BM) III 1c; Pl.46.1a.
Italy 5 (Bologna, Mus.Civico) III 1c; Tav.19.2; 20.1; 20.2; 21.1; 22.2.
Italy 27 (Bologna, Mus.Civico 4) III 1; Tav.77.1 and 77.2.
Italy 23 (Capua, Mus.Campano 2) III 1; Tav.8.1 and 12.1.
Italy 37 (Ferrara, Mus.Naz.1); Tav.38.1.
Italy 60 (Chiusi, Mus.Arch.Naz.2); Tav.38.1.
Poland 6 (Varsovie, Mus.Nat.3) III 1; Pl.19.2 and 19.3.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. On the Nereid Monument see Smith, op. cit., Vol. 2, nos. 850 - 939. Anderson (MTPAX, p. 138) suggests that the archers depicted on slab number 866 are Cretans.

2. = MTPAX, Pl.13a.

3. = MTPAX, Pl.14b.

4. cf Xen., Agesilaus, 1.25.

5. Best, p.81; but see Xen. Hell. III.4.11.

6. See p. 180f.

7. See pp. 58-9.

8. See p.173.

9. cf Plut., Agesilaus, 34.4; Diodorus, XV.82.6 - 83.2.

10. Plut., Agesilaus, 15.6 and cf Xen. Hell. III.5.1f. For the common archer motif on Persian and Lydian coins, see G. K. Jenkins, Ancient Greek Coins (1972), Pls. 110 - 111, 116 - 122, Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, Pl.4, nos. 80 - 85.

11. See p. 210.

12. See P. Levi, Pausanias: Guide to Greece Vol. 2 (1971; Penguin Books), p. 355, notes 198 and 199. See also Pausanias, IV.22.8f.

13. See p.6.

14. Xen. Anab. IV.6.1.

15. I have come across no depiction of a Greek (or for that matter Egyptian, Hittite or Assyrian) slinger carrying a shield.

16. See p. 117f.

17. See Xen. Hell. IV.6.4; IV.6.6.

18. Xen. Hell. IV.6.8f.

19. Xen. Hell. IV.6.11.

20. On Thessalian light-armed troops see particularly Westlake, Thessaly, pp. 111-112.

21. Xen. Hell. VII.5. 23-25.

22. Korfmann, p.40.

23. of Xen. Hell. IV.2.16.

24. eg: B. Müller, Beiträge zur Geschichte des griechischen Söldnerwesens bis auf die Schlacht von Chäronea (1908), pp. 107-110; O. Lippelt, Die griechischen Leichtbewaffneten bis auf Alexander den Grossen (1910), p. 64f (on equipment); Parke, GMS (1933), chapter 6, passim, esp. pp. 50-57; Snodgrass, AAG, pp. 110-111; Best, Thracian Peltasts, pp. 79-119; Anderson, MTPAX, chapter 7, passim, esp. 117-133; Pritchett, GSW II (1974), pp. 117-125; J. K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece (1978), pp. 200-201; G. T. Griffith in Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of C. F. Edson (1981), pp. 161-167.

25. Confusingly in Diodorus' account of the battle of Mantinea, we have Epaminondas, who must have been armed as a hoplite, throwing a javelin (καὶ πρῶτος ἀκοντίσας, ἔβαλε τὸν ἡγούμενον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων - XV.86.4.) It is obvious that the brave Epaminondas was a target for missile-troops (Diodorus, XV.87.1.), cf Xen. Hell.VII.23-25.

26. WACG, pp. 24-25.

27. See Xen. Hell. III.4.22; IV.1.17 - 19; IV.8.18-19; V.3.3f; V.4.39; V.4.54; cf Hell.VI.2.17 and Plut., Agesilaus, 10.2.

28. See P.119f.

29. Smyrna: p.66f; Paphos: p.85f; Olynthus: p.99.

30. See pp. 247-8.

31. See n. 25 of this chapter.

32. See pp. 226 - 227.

33. See pp. 2 and 6.

34. See Xen. Hell. VI.1.9; VI.1.19 and cf Diodorus, XV. 85.4-5.

35. On the geography of Thessaly, see Westlake, Thessaly, pp. 1-20. Thessaly by the fourth century B.C. also had 3 large 'poleis' - Larisa, Pharsalus and Pherae.

36. On the 'penestae' see Westlake, Thessaly, pp. 22, 27, 32-37, 47-48, 112-113, 144, 179.

37. Shield-bearers: Xen. Hell. IV.5.14; IV.8.39.

38. Xen. Hell. VI.2.23.

39. Xen. Hell.VI.4.9; VI.2.23.

40. Xen. Hell. IV.4.17 and cf also Plut., Agesilaus, XV.6.

41. On daggers and crude weapons See Xen. Hell. III.3.7; V.4.3.

42. See eg. Rüsstow and Köchly, Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens (1852), p.62; H. Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst Vol. 1 (1900), p.144; Lippelt, Leichtbewaffneten, p.62; J. Kromayer and E. Veith, Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer (1928), p.89; Parke, GMS, pp.79-80; Snodgrass, AAG, p.110; Best, Thracian Peltasts, pp.102-110 (also deals with 'reforms' of Chabrias); Anderson, MTPAX, pp. 129-132; Pritchett, GSW 2, p.125; Markle, AJA 82(1978), p.487; G. T. Griffith in Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of C. F. Edson, pp.161-167.

43. Diodorus, XV.44.1-4; cf Nepos, Iphicrates (XI), I.3-4.

44. Thracian peltasts already carried long slashing-swords (machaira) and peltasts are also depicted before this period with long thrusting-spears: Best, Pls. 7 and 8; BSA Vol. 14, Pl.14; CVA Baltimore 2; 3 I, Pl.10.1b; CVA Stuttgart 1, Pl.29.4.

45. See MTPAX, pp. 165-191.

46. See p.195f.

47. of pp. 18-19 (Onasander)

48. See p.205.

CHAPTER NINE

1. On the early tyrants see: T.J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks (1948), pp.48-145; M.I. Finley, Ancient Sicily (1979), pp.27-57.

2. On Polyaenus see the addenda section of the Teubner edition of his works: Polyaenus-Strategematon Libri VIII (1970 edition), pp.XXV-XXXI. On his historicity see Parke, GMS, p.10 and cf E.A. Freeman, History of Sicily, Vol.2 (1891), p.82.

3. On the date see Dunbabin, op.cit., p.66 with n.1.

4. Aristotle, Pol.1310^{b} 29.; Pol.1316^{a} 34.

5. see Freeman, op.cit,. Vol.2, p.57 and Parke, GMS, p.10, n.1.

6. cf Xenophon's usage of the term 'peltastai', see p.9.

7. On the date see Dunbabin, op.cit., p.316, n.8.

8. cf. also Aristotle, Pol., 1310^{b}; Phalaris was in charge of the building of the temple of Zeus Polieus on the citadel of Acragas and began to collect slaves, troops and material there. He claimed that material was being stolen and obtained permission to barricade the citadel; he then armed his slaves and seized the city of Acragas during the festival of the Thesmophoria. See Dunbabin, op.cit., pp.315-316.

9. On the dating of this story see Burn, p.152.

10. On Selinus' defeat of Carthage, cf Orsius IV.6 and Justin XVIII.7 - XIX.2.

11. Date: Aristotle Pol.1315^{b} 36; Diodorus XI.38; Eusebius ed. Fotheringham, p.190. See also Dunbabin, op.cit., p.410, with n.5.

12. see Dunbabin, op.cit., p.421f.

13. HW2, p.197 on VII.158.4. The size of the force itself is not incredible - cf Polybius XII. 26b; Schol. Pindar, Pythian I.146; Ephorus, fr.111; Timaeus, fr.87. The figures given by Diodorus (XI.21) for the Syracusan army at Himera are larger.

14. R.W. Macan, Herodotus Vol.2 (1908), on VII.158•4; HW2, p.197, on VII.158.4; Parke, GMS, p.11; Dunbabin, op.cit., pp.419-420.

15. On Balearic slingers see: A.V.M. Hubrecht, The Use of the Sling in the Balearic Isles, Bulletin van de Vereeniging tot Bevordering der kennis van de Antieke Bescharing, 39 (1964) pp.92-93 and L. Pericot Gracia, The Balearic Islands (translated by Margret Brown, 1972) pp.93-94, 98, 108.

16. Diodorus XI.72.3.

17. see Dunbabin, op.cit., pp.419-420; cf Burn, p.302. See pp.2 and 6.

18. see Monumenti Antichi per cura della R. Accademia dei Lincei, I (1889), p.940, n.1.

19. see Thuc.VI.69.2.

20. For a later Athenian relief depicting an infantryman running with a cavalryman (holding on to horse's tail) see Sekunda, The Ancient Greeks, p.57 (Pl) = Musée Louvre, inv.no.744. See also the 4th century Athenian marble lekythos dedicated to Cephisodotus (Sekunda, p.56 (Pl.) = NMA, inv.no.3620) and the reconstruction K, which is based on the scene depicted on the lekythos. See also HW2, p.197 on VII.158.4; F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (1957), p.57; Sekunda, op.cit., p.53 and cf Thuc.V.57 and Xen.Hell.VII.5.24.

    Commentators who regard these troops as light-cavalry:
    Snodgrass, AAG p.87; Liddell and Scott, English-Greek Lexicon (9th edition - 1968), p.834.

21. Caesar B.C.III.84; B.G.I.48; VII.18,.36,.65,.80; VIII.13. Tacitus, Germania, ch.6.

22. see J. Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: The Western Front 1914-18 (1976), p.83 for an account and an artist's illustration. The Highland infantry ran holding onto the stirrups of the Scots Greys - one infantryman to each horse.

23. see p.177, first ref.

24. Diodorus XI.21.1; cf Herodotus' improbably large force of 300,000 invaders (VII.165).

25. Diodorus XI.22.

26. On Himilcar's death, cf Herodotus VII.166-167.

27. see Diodorus XI.72-73.

28. Diodurus XI.76.1-2.

29. On Sicilian Expedition, see p.150f.

30. see Thuc.VII.78.3; 78.6; 79.2; 79.5-6; 81.4-5; 82.1; 83.3; 84.4.

31. see p.180f.

32. cf Thuc.VII.48.5 and Diodorus XIII.113.2.

33. Diodorus XIII.54.1 and 54.5.

34. Diodorus XIII.54.7.

35. Diodorus XIII.55.4.

36. Thuc.VI.20.4.

37. Diodorus XIII.56-57.

38. Diodorus XIII.80.5.

39. Diodorus XIII.96.5; 108.2.

40. Diodorus XIII.109.1-2.

41. Diodorus XIII.109.3.

42. Snodgrass, AAG, p.111.

43. Diodorus XIII.110.5.

44. Diodorus XIII.111.1-2.

45. Diodorus XIV.14.8.

46. Diodurus XIV.18.4.

47. Missiles: Diodorus XIV.42.2; XIV.43.3. Equipment: Diodorus XIV.43.2-3 and Parke, GMS, pp.68-69.

48. cf Thuc.VI.17.3.

49. Diodorus XIV.50.4.

50. Diodorus' source for the period of Dionysius I is supposed to have been Philistus. On Diodorus, Ephorus,and Philistus,see Gomme, HCT, vol. I, pp.45f, 51-54: On Diodorus see V.J. Gray, The Value of Diodorus Siculus for the Years 411-386 B.C., Hermes 115 (1987), pp. 72-89. On Philistus see R. Zoepffel, Untersuchungen zum Geschichtswerk des Philistos von Syrakus (diss. Freiburg i Br. 1965) and also Parke, GMS, p.69 and Finley, op.cit., p.75.

51. Finley, op.cit., p.58; cf Polybius XII 25f 1-2.

52. Arrowheads: Monumenti Antichi per cura della R. Accademia dei Lincei, 1 (1889) p.940, n.1 and 32 (1927), p.364, Fig.157d. Sling-shots: C. Zangemeister, Glandes plumbeae latine inscriptae, Ephemeris epigraphica, VI (1885); M. Guarducci, Epigrafia Greca, II (1969), p.522f; Korfmann, p.39.

53. R. Macan, Herodotus (1908), on VII.158.4.

54. HW2, p.197, on VII.158.4.

55. see eg Thuc.VII.48.5; Diodorus XI.48.3; XI.67.5 and .67.7; XI.68.3; XI.71-72; XIII.96;XIII. 109.4; XIII.112.3; XIII.113.2; XIV.10.4; XIV.43.4; XIV.78.3; XIV.95.3. see Parke, GMS, pp.20-22, 63-72.

CHAPTER TEN

1. See p.22f.

2. See p.51.

3. See e.g. Tyrtaeus (West) Frag 10.15; 11.11; 11.29f; 12.15-20;Plato, Laches, 190 e5.
Plutarch, Moralia, 210E (Agesilaus 28, 34); 216 C (Agis the Younger 1); 217 C (Androcleidas); 217 E (Antalcidas 8); 232 E (5); 234 C (41); 234 E (45); 235 F (62)(these references relate to the Loeb translation of the Moralia by F. C. Babbit (1931)).

4. See p. 228.

5. He also shows a knowledge of the positioning of light-troops for battle: Rhesus, 485-487.

6. Victory monument: see Pausanias,I.15.4. On the Spartan shield which has been excavated from the Agora, see Snodgrass, AAG, Fig. 19.

7. On Aristophanes' characterization of the Thracian peltasts,see Best, pp. 128-129.

8. See p.157f.

9. Scythian police: See Thesm. 923, 931, 1177, 1193, fr. 411; Acharn. 54, 707; Lysis . 433, 440, 441, 445, 463; Eccl. 143, 258; Equit. 665.

10. See p.166.